Battle of Sidi Bou Zid

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Battle of Sidi Bou Zid
Part of Tunisia Campaign
Date 14 February 194317 February 1943
Location 34°52′N 9°29′E / 34.867, 9.483 (Battle of Sidi Bou Zid)Coordinates: 34°52′N 9°29′E / 34.867, 9.483 (Battle of Sidi Bou Zid)
Sidi Bou Zid, Tunisia
Result German Victory
Belligerents
Flag of the United States United States Flag of Nazi Germany Germany
Commanders
Flag of the United States Lloyd Fredendall Flag of Nazi Germany Hans-Jürgen von Arnim
Sketchmap of Tunisia during the 1942 - 1943 campaign
Sketchmap of Tunisia during the 1942 - 1943 campaign

The Battle of Sidi Bou Zid was a World War II battle that took place during the Tunisia Campaign, fought between the 10th and the 21st Panzer Divisions of Hans-Jurgen von Arnim's German Fifth Army and the American 1st Armored Division of General Lloyd Fredendall's II Corps in northeast Tunisia near Tunis.

Contents

[edit] Background

The battle of Sidi Bou Zid was part of the Tunisia Campaign, a series of battles between forces of the German/Italian Axis, and Allied forces consisting primarily of U.S., British and Free French Forces.

The Allied effort to capture Tunis in late 1942 following Operation Torch had failed and since the year end a stalemate had settled on the theatre as both sides paused to re-build their strength. Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, commanding the Axis forces defending Tunisia (by this time strengthened to become German Fifth Army), chose to maintain the initiative gained when the Allies had been driven back the previous year by making spoiling attacks to keep his intentions hidden.

In January 1943, the German-Italian Panzer Army under command of Erwin Rommel (also known as Desert Fox) had retreated to the Mareth Line, originally a French line of defensive fortifications near the coastal town of Medenine in southern Tunisia[1]. They thus linked up with von Arnim. At this point Rommel's army was redesignated Italian First Army with General Giovanni Messe in command while Rommel formed a new army group command, Army Group Africa, responsible for controlling both Messe and von Arnim's armies. In the Sidi Bou Zid area there were elements from both armies, notably 21st Panzer Division transferred from Italian First Army's Afrika Korps and 10th Panzer Division from the Fifth Army.

Most of Tunisia was in German hands but since November 1942, the area surrounding Sidi Bou Zid had been under the control of the Allies.[2] The Allied front around Sidi Bou Zid was held by the inexperienced U.S. II Corps under Lloyd Fredendall and the poorly equipped French XIX Corps under Alphonse Juin. Fredendall neither visited the front nor considered input from commanders farther forward. He was settled in Tebessa 80 miles (130 km) away from the battlefield.[3] In the absence of clear intelligence as to Axis intentions, he had dispersed his forces to cover all eventualities. However, this left his units generally isolated and unable to support each other if threatened with a concentrated attack. At Sidi Bou Zid he had bypassed his divisional commanders and ordered the defensive dispositions himself, without having seen the terrain in person. U.S. infantry were scattered between two distant hills (Djebel Lessouda and Djebel Ksiara) where mutual support was very difficult.[3]

Rommel was very conscious of the threat posed by these forces if they were to make a westward thrust towards the coast some 60 miles (97 km) to the east and isolate the two Axis armies and cut Italian First Army's line of supply from Tunis.

On 30 January von Arnim had sent 21st Panzer to attack the Faid Pass, held by French XIX Corps. Called to assist, Fredendall had reacted slowly and von Arnim's troops had overcome fierce French resistance and achieved their objectives while inflicting heavy casualties.

[edit] Battle

At 04:00 on 14 February four battle groups totalling 140 German tanks drawn from 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions and under the leadership of Lieutenant General Heinz Ziegler[4], the deputy to Arnim, advanced through Faïd and Maizila passes, sites that General Dwight D. Eisenhower had inspected three hours earlier, to attack Sidi Bou Zid, the U.S. communications and supply centre for the Eastern Dorsale of the Atlas Mountains.[5]

The attack started with an advance of tanks belonging to the 10th Panzer Division under the cover of a sandstorm. The 1st Armored Division troops tried to delay the German advance by firing a 105 mm. M101 howitzer semi-fixed installed in an M4 Sherman tank. This tactical move was in vain because they were shelled by German 8.8 cm KwK 43 anti-tank guns.[3][6] In parallel, the 21st Panzer Division started hitting the 168th Infantry’s 3rd Battalion positions on Djebel Ksiara (hill). Under heavy shelling, Colonel Thomas Drake leading 1,900 men of his 3rd Battalion requested permission to retreat. This request was denied by Fredendall who ordered them to hold their positions and wait for reinforcements until the help arrived. This never happened.[3] By the end of 14 February the brilliantly coordinated German attack had overrun two infantry battalions of the U.S. 168th Regimental Combat Team and severely damaged Combat Command A of the U.S. 1st Armored Division.[7]

On 15 February the Germans drove off an armored counterattack from Combat Command C using more than 80 Panzer IV, Panzer III and Tiger I tanks and knocked out 46 of their medium tanks and 130 other vehicles.[8] By the evening von Arnim had ordered three of the battle groups to head towards Sbeitla. They were engaged by the battered CCA and CCC who were forced back. On 16 February, helped by intensive air support, they drove back the fresh Combat Command B and entered Sbeitla.

[edit] Aftermath

The Germans handled the battle with ease and caused heavy U.S. losses before the U.S. withdrew on 17 February. The poor performance of the Allies during the actions of late January and the first half of February as well as at the subsequent Battle of the Kasserine Pass led the Axis commanders to conclude, notwithstanding that Allied units were generally better equipped, they were facing inferior opposition, both in terms of leadership and tactical skills. This became received wisdom among the Axis forces and resulted in a later underestimation of Allied capabilities as units became battle-hardened and poor commanders were replaced.

After being rescued by General George S. Patton's son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John K. Waters, who was held as POW at OFLAG XIII-B camp, many U.S. infantry joined others on 19 February to fight the Battle of the Kasserine Pass. [9]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford University Press 2001) edited by I.C.B. Dear. ISBN 0-19-860446-7
  2. ^ Linwood W. Billings (1990). The Tunisian Task Force (English). Historicaltextarchive.com. Retrieved on 2007-03-28.
  3. ^ a b c d Brian John Murphy (April 2006). Facing the Fox (English). Americainwwii.com. Retrieved on 2007-03-28.
  4. ^ Watson, p.75
  5. ^ Robert A. Newton. Battle for Kasserine Pass: 1st Armored Division Were Ambushed by the Afrika Corps at Sidi Bou Zid (English). Historynet.com. Retrieved on 2007-03-28.
  6. ^ "Worst Defeat" . Time Magazine (1 March, 1943). 
  7. ^ Watson, pp.76 & 77
  8. ^ Watson, p77
  9. ^ A. D. Bedell; A. Arregui; D. J. Boccolucci; M. H. Cassetori; R. V. Chandler (1984). Battle analysis of the battle of Sidi Bou Zid ; 14 February 1943, Tunisia, North Africa : defensive, encircled forces. Fort Leavenworth Kan.: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. OCLC 12570970. 

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