Battle of Morotai
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Western New Guinea | |||||||
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Part of World War II, Pacific War | |||||||
LSTs landing supplies at Blue Beach, Morotai |
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States Australia Netherlands |
Empire of Japan | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Charles P. Hall (land) Daniel E. Barbey (naval) |
Takenobu Kawashima |
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Strength | |||||||
57,020 | ~500 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
45 KIA, 103 wounded[1] | Over 305 KIA (US estimate), 15 captured, hundreds more died of disease and while crossing to the island.[2] |
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The Battle of Morotai was a battle of World War II which took place on the island of Morotai, in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) between 15 September and 4 October 1944. United States and Australian forces attacked the island as it was needed as a base to support the liberation of the Philippines later that year. The Allied force greatly outnumbered the island's Japanese defenders and Morotai was secured after two weeks of fighting.
Contents |
[edit] Background
Morotai is a small island located in the Halmahera group of eastern Indonesia's Maluku Islands. Most of island's interior is rugged and covered in thick jungle. The largest of the few lowland areas is in the south west corner of the island and is called the Doroeba Plain. Prior to the outbreak of war Morotai had a population of 9,000 and had not been commercially developed. It formed part of the Netherlands East Indies and was ruled by the Dutch through the Sultanate of Ternate. The Japanese occupied Morotai in early 1942 during the Netherlands East Indies campaign but did not garrison or develop the island.[3]
Morotai first became important to the Japanese in early 1944 when they began to develop the neighbouring larger island of Halmahera as a focal point for the defence of the southern approaches to the Philippines.[4] In May 1944 the 32nd Division arrived at Halmahera to defend the island and its nine airstrips.[5] Two battalions from the 32nd Division's 211th Infantry Regiment were deployed to Morotai and work began on an airstrip on the Doroeba Plain. The airstrip was abandoned due to drainage problems, however, and both battalions were withdrawn in July 1944 to reinforce Halmahera.[6]
In July 1944 General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the South West Pacific Area, selected Morotai as the location for air bases and naval facilities which were needed to support the liberation of Mindanao, which was planned for 15 November. While Morotai was undeveloped, it was selected over Halmahera as the larger and much better defended island was judged too difficult to capture and secure.[7] The capture of Morotai was designated Operation Tradewind. The landing was scheduled to take place on 15 September 1944, the same day as the 1st Marine Division's landing at Peleliu. This would allow the United States Pacific Fleet to protect both operations from a Japanese counter-attack.[8]
[edit] Prelude
At the time of the Allied landings Morotai was defended by approximately 500 Japanese soldiers. The main Japanese unit was the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit which had gradually arrived on Morotai between 12 and 19 July 1944 to replace the two battalions of the 32nd Division. The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit comprised four companies and was manned by Japanese officers and Formosan soldiers. Small elements of several infantry, military police and support units were also present on the island. Major Takenobu Kawashima, the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit's commander, had deployed the majority of his combat force in the south-west sector of the island while the remaining elements were deployed in lookout posts and detachments around Morotai's coastline.[9] The largest of these outposts was on the island's north-east end at Cape Sopi and consisted of about 100 men.[10]
The Allied force assigned responsibility for Morotai outnumbered the Japanese by more than 100 to 1. The Tradewind Task Force was established on 20 August under the command of Major General Charles P. Hall and numbered 40,105 soldiers and 16,915 USAAF and RAAF personnel. The force came under the overall command of the United States Sixth Army and its main combat elements were the XI Corps headquarters, the 31st Infantry Division and the 126th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from the 32nd Infantry Division. These units were supported by a large anti-aircraft group and engineers. The Tradewind Task Force also included large numbers of construction and other line of communications units whose role was to swiftly develop the island into a major base. The 6th Infantry Division was designated the force reserve but remained on the mainland of New Guinea.[11] General MacArthur accompanied the force onboard USS Nashville but was not in direct command of the operation.[12]
The landing force was supported by powerful air and naval forces. The United States Fifth Air Force directly supported the operation while the Thirteenth Air Force and Australian First Tactical Air Force conducted strategic missions in the NEI and Philippines.[13] The naval force was designated Task Force 77 and was organised into two attack groups, four reinforcement groups, a support group and an escort carrier group. The attack and reinforcement groups were responsible for transporting the assault force and subsequent support units and comprised 24 destroyers, four frigates, two Australian Landing ship infantry (LSI), five APDs, one LSD, 24 LCIs, 45 LSTs, 20 LCTs and eleven LCIs fitted with rockets. The support group consisted of two Australian heavy cruisers, three US light cruisers and eight US and two Australian destroyers. The escort carrier group comprised six escort carriers and 10 destroyer escorts and provided antisubmarine and combat air patrol. A fast carrier group with two fleet carriers, two light aircraft carriers and escorting ships was also available to support Task Force 77 if needed.[14]
As little opposition was expected at Morotai the landings were planned to take place close to the selected airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain. Two beaches in the south west coast of the island were selected as suitable landing sites and were designated Red Beach and White Beach. The Allied plan called for all three regiments of the 31st Division to be landed across these beaches on 15 September and swiftly drive inland to secure the airfield sites. As the island's interior was of no military value the Allies did not intend to advance beyond the Doroeba Plain.[15]
In order to preserve surprise the Allies did not bombard Morotai prior to the invasion and only a few photographic reconnaissance flights were conducted over the island.[16] The Allied air forces and US Navy attacked Japanese airfields in the eastern NEI during the weeks prior to the invasion, however, in order to supress Japanese resistance.[17] Although the Tradewind Taskforce had little information on the invasion beaches or Japanese positions, the Sixth Army did not land any reconnaissance patrols on Morotai as it was also feared that these could warn the Japanese of the impending invasion. An Allied Intelligence Bureau patrol had been landed in the island in June but the information it collected was not provided to the Sixth Army.[18]
The Tradewind Taskforce was loaded onto the invasion fleet at several bases in north-west New Guinea. Landing rehearsals were conducted at Aitape and Wakde Island in early September and the invasion convoy gathered at Maffin Bay on 11 September and set out for Morotai the next day. The voyage was uneventful and the convoy arrived off Morotai on the morning of 15 September without being detected by the Japanese.[19]
[edit] Battle
The battle of Morotai began at 6:30 on the morning of 15 September. Allied warships conducted a two hour long bombardment of the landing area to suppress any Japanese forces there. This bombardment set some native villages on fire but caused few Japanese casualties as they did not have any troops in the area.[20]
The first wave of US troops landed on Morotai at 8:30 and did not encounter any opposition. The 155th and 167th RCTs landed at Red Beach and the 124th RCT at White Beach. After landing the assault troops reformed into their tactical units and rapidly advanced inland. By the end of the day the 31st Division had secured all of its D-Day objectives and held a perimeter 2,000 yards inland. There was little fighting and casualties were very low on both sides.[21] The Japanese 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit was unable to offer any resistance to the overwhelming Allied force and withdrew inland in good order.[22]
Due to the unexpectedly bad beach conditions the lack of resistance was fortunate for the Americans. While the limited pre-invasion intelligence suggested that Red and White beaches were capable of supporting an amphibious landing, they were in fact highly unsuitable for this purpose. Both beaches were muddy and difficult for landing craft to approach owing to rocky ridges and coral reefs. As a result, soldiers and equipment had to be landed through deep surf, which slowed down the operation and resulted in the loss of much equipment.[23] Like many of his soldiers, General MacArthur was forced to wade through chest high surf when he came ashore.[24] On the morning of D-Day a survey party determined that a beach on the south coast of Morotai was much better suited to LSTs. This beach, which was designated Blue Beach, became the primary landing point from 16 September.[25]
The 31st Division continued its advance inland on 16 September. The division met little opposition and secured the planned perimeter line around the airfield area that afternoon. After 16 September combat operations on Morotai were limited to patrol actions which aimed to hunt down small Japanese parties, though the Japanese did mount an unsuccessful counter attack on 18 September.[26]
From 17 September the 126th Infantry Regiment staged a number of landings along Morotai's coastline and offshore islands to establish radar stations and observation posts. These landings were generally unopposed, though American patrols which were landed in northern Morotai made numerous contacts with small Japanese parties.[27]
On 20 September the 31st Division advanced further inland to secure an expanded perimeter. This expansion was necessary to accommodate bivouacs and supply installations after General MarArthur's headquarters decided to expand airfield construction. The advance met little resistance and was completed in one day.[28] On 22 September a Japanese force attacked the headquarters of the 1st Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment but was easily repulsed. The next day a company from the 126th Infantry Regiment attacked a well dug in Japanese force near Wajaboeta on the island's west coast and was repulsed. The 126th resumed its attack on 24 September and secured the position. US forces continued intensive patrolling until 4 October when the island was declared secure.[29] US casualties during the battle of Morotai were 30 killed, 85 wounded, 1 missing. The Japanese casualties were much higher, with over 300 being killed and 13 captured.[30]
The Japanese history of the battle states that large numbers of reinforcements were landed on Morotai from Halmahera between late September and November. These reinforcements included three raiding detachments, the 3rd Battalion of the 210th Infantry Regiment and the main body of the 211th Infantry Regiment. The history states that while the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit mounted a number of raids on the US perimeter, it was not possible to use the reinforcements to mount larger attacks as the troops were affected by disease and sufficient supplies were not available as US PT boats successfully blockaded the island from 1 January 1945. As a result, the Japanese troops withdrew into central Morotai where many died as a result of disease and starvation.[31] These reinforcements and attacks are not mentioned in US histories of the battle, which state that the Japanese at Halmahera did not attempt to reinforce Morotai and that the Japanese soldiers who survived the invasion attempted to escape by barge, with about 200 being killed by PT boats as they tried to reach Halmahera.[32] Historian Gordon Rottman states that US forces were unaware of these large-scale Japanese landings and believed that the USN was successfully interdicting the island.[33] The US histories record that the Japanese mounted frequent but ineffective air raids on Morotai during the battle, however.[34]
[edit] Aftermath
The development of Morotai into a military base began before the island was secured. Work began on completing the Japanese airstrip as a fighter base on 16 September but it was not completed until 29 September. Meanwhile, work began on a much larger bomber base on the south coast on 18 September and it was completed on 4 October and named Wama Drome. Morotai's permanent fighter garrison arrived as soon as Wama Drome was open and assumed responsibility for the island's air defence from Task Force 77's escort carrier group. Another, and even longer, airstrip was built north of Wama Drome between 23 September and 17 October. Although the air base construction required the destruction of native villages, the US and Australian airfield engineers working on the airstrips were assisted from 1 October by about 350 native labourers who had been recruited through the Netherlands East Indies civil authorities.[35]
Due to a revision to Allied plans Morotai played a much larger role in the liberation of the Philippines than had been originally intended. In September 1944 the planned invasion of Mindanao in November was postponed in favour of a landing at Leyte in the central Philippines in October. The air bases at Morotai were the closest Allied air strips to Leyte and fighters and bombers based on the island attacked targets in the southern Philippines and NEI in support of the landing at Leyte on 25 October.[36] After airfields were completed at Leyte, Morotai was also used as a staging base for land-based fighters and bombers traveling to the Philippines.[37] A PT boat base was also developed at Morotai and four squadrons of the boats were based at the island, from which they conducted attacks on Japanese positions in Halmahera. This force was reduced to a single squadron by February 1945 but remained active until the end of the war.[38] The 31st Division remained at Morotai until April 1945 when it was replaced by the 93rd Infantry Division. Elements of the 93rd Division fought a number of skirmishes in the north-west sector of the island.[39]
Morotai remained an important Allied base after Leyte was secured. Aircraft of the Thirteenth Air Force and Australian First Tactical Air Force were based at Morotai and attacked targets in the NEI and southern Philippines until the end of the war. From April 1945 the island was also used by the Australian I Corps to mount the Borneo Campaign.[40] The island was attacked by Japanese aircraft on 82 occasions between 15 September 1944 and 1 February 1945, though few of these attacks resulted in serious damage.[41] On 9 September 1945 Australian General Thomas Blamey accepted the surrender of the Japanese Second Army at a ceremony held on the I Corps' sports ground at Morotai.[42]
[edit] Notes
- ^ Rottman (2002), pg 255.
- ^ Rottman (2002), pg 255.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 456-457.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 460.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 460.
- ^ Willoughby (1966), pg 348-349.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 450-451.
- ^ Taafe (199), pg 218.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 460 and Willoughby (1966), pg 349-350.
- ^ Rottman (2002), pg 253.
- ^ Krueger (1979), pg 126 and Smith (1953), pg 463.
- ^ Manchester (1978), pg 337.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 464.
- ^ Morison (2002), pg 21-22 and Krueger (1979), pg 127.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 475-477.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 482-483.
- ^ Taaffe (1998), pg 219.
- ^ Krueger (1979), pg 125.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 481-482.
- ^ Taafe (1998), pg 219.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 483 and 487.
- ^ Willoughby (1966), pg 350.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 483-485.
- ^ Manchester (1978), pg 388.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 487.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 488 and Willoughby (1966), pg 350.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 488.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 488.
- ^ Krueger (1979), pg 130.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 489.
- ^ Willoughby (1966), pg 350-352.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 488-489 and Morison (2002), pg 24.
- ^ Rottman (2002), pg 255.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 489 and Krueger (1979), pg 132.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 490-491.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 491-493.
- ^ Morison (2002), pg 25.
- ^ Morison (2002), pg 28-29.
- ^ Combat Chronicle- 93d Infantry Division. Combat Chronicles of U.S. Army Divisions in World War II. United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved on 2008-02-06.
- ^ Morison (2002), pg 25.
- ^ Smith (1953), pg 493.
- ^ Long (1963), pg 553.
[edit] References
- Gill, G. Hermon (1968). Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945, Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 2 – Navy. Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
- Krueger, Walter [1953] (1979). From Down Under to Nippon. The Story of Sixth Army in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press. ISBN 0892010460.
- Long, Gavin (1963). The Final Campaigns, Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army. Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot [1958] (2002). Leyte, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Vol. 12. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0252070631.
- MacArthur, Douglas (1966). The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Reports of General MacArthur. Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History.
- Manchester, William (1978). American Caesar. Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964. London: Hutchinson. ISBN 009920780X.
- Rottman, Gordon L. (2002). World War II Pacific Island Guide. A Geo-Military Study. Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0313313954.
- Smith, Robert Ross (1953). The Approach to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History.
- Taafe, Stephen R. (1998). MacArthur's Jungle War. The 1944 New Guinea Campaign. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700608702.
- Willoughby, Charles A. (editor in chief) (1966). Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area Volume II - Part I, Reports of General MacArthur. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office.