Battle of Kaiapit
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| Battle of Kaiapit | |||||||
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| Part of Finisterre Range campaign, World War II | |||||||
 Australian soldiers from the 2/16th Battalion arriving at Kaiapit on 20 September after the area was captured by the 2/6th Independent Company |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Australia United States |
 Empire of Japan |
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| Commanders | |||||||
| Captain Gordon King | Major Tsuneo Yonekura † | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 226 | 500 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 14 killed, 23 wounded | Over 214 killed | ||||||
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The Battle of Kaiapit was an action fought in 1943 between Australian and Japanese forces in New Guinea during the Finisterre Range campaign of World War II. The elite Australian 2/6th Independent Company attacked the village of Kaiapit on 19 September to secure the area so that it could be developed into an airfield and then held it against a strong counter attack. During the two days of fighting the Australians defeated a larger Japanese force while suffering relatively few losses. This victory enabled the Australian 7th Division to be flown into the Finisterre Range.
Contents |
[edit] Background
[edit] Situation
Following the capture of Lae, General Sir Thomas Blamey, the Allied Land Forces commander, intended to exploit his success with an advance into the upper Markham Valley. This would protect Nadzab, where a major airbase was being developed, from Japanese ground attack. It could also serve as a jumping off point for an overland advance into the Ramu Valley.
On 16 September 1943 - the day that Lae fell - Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring, the commander of I Corps, Major General George Alan Vasey, commander of the 7th Division, and Brigadier General Ennis Clement Whitehead commander of the Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, and therefore the Allied air commander in New Guinea, met at Whitehead's headquarters. General Whitehead wanted fighter strips established in the Kaiapit area by 1 November 1943 in order to bring short range fighters within range of the Japanese base at Wewak.[1]
Until a road could be opened from Lae, the Kaiapit area could only be supplied by air and there was a limited number of transport aircraft. Even flying in an airborne engineer aviation battalion to improve the airstrip would involve taking aircraft from those supporting the 7th Division at Nadzab. Moreover, Whitehead warned that he could not guarantee adequate air support for both Kaiapit and the upcoming Finschhafen operation at the same time. However, Herring calculated that the 7th Division had sufficient reserves at Nadzab to allow maintenance flights to be suspended for a week or so after the capture of Kaiapit. He planned to seize Kaiapit with an overland advance from Nadzab by independent companies, the Papuan Infantry Battalion, and the 7th Division's 21st Infantry Brigade. [2]
General George Kenney later recalled that "Colonel David W. "Photo" Hutchison, who had been the air task force commander at Mairilan and had moved over to Nadzab to take charge of air activities there, was told to work out the problem with Vasey. I didn't care how it was done but I wanted a good forward airdrome about a hundred miles further up the Markham Valley. Photo Hutchison and Vasey were a natural team. They both knew what I wanted and Vasey not only believed that the air force could perform miracles but that the 7th Division and the Fifth Air Force working together could do anything."[3]
[edit] Geography
The Markham Valley is part of a flat, elongated depression varying from 8 to 32 km wide that cuts through the otherwise mountainous terrain of the interior of New Guinea, running from the mouth of the Markham near Lae to that of the Ramu some 600 km away. The two rivers flow in opposite directions, separated by an invisible divide about 130 km from Lae. The area is flat and suitable for airstrips, although it is intercut by a number of rivers, tributaries of the two rivers. Between the Ramu Valley and Madang lay the aptly named Finisterre Ranges. The 7th Division’s mission was to prevent the Japanese at Madang from using the Markham and Ramu Valleys to threaten Lae or Nadzab.
[edit] Reconnaissance
The airstrip at Kaiapit was reconnoitred on 11 September 1943 by No. 4 Squadron RAAF, which reported that it was apparently in good condition, with the Kunai grass recently cut.[4] Captain Everette E. Frazier, USAAF, selected a level, burned-off area near the Leron River, not far from Kaiapit, and landed in an L-4 Piper Cub. He determined that it would be possible to land C-47 Dakota aircraft there. On 16 September, Colonel Hutchison approved the site for Dakotas.[5]
[edit] Prelude to the battle
[edit] 2/6th Independent Company
The 2/6th Independent Company had arrived in Port Moresby from Australia on 2 August 1943. The unit had fought in Papua in 1942 in the Battle of Buna-Gona and had since conducted intensive training in Queensland. The company was under the command of Captain G. G. King, who had been its second in command at Buna. King received a warning order for the capture of Kaiapit on 12 September and had access to detailed and aerial photographs of the area.[6]
An independent company at this time had a nominal strength of 20 officers and 275 other ranks. Somewhat larger than a conventional infantry company, it was organised into three platoons, each of three sections, each of which contained two subsections. It had considerable firepower. Each subsection had a Bren light machine gun. The gunner's two assistants carried rifles and extra 30-round Bren magazines. A sniper also carried a rifle, as did one man equipped with rifle grenades. The remaining four or five men carried Owen submachine guns. Each platoon also had a section of 2-inch mortars. To make the company self-supporting, it had its own engineer, signals, transport, and quartermaster sections.[7]
For three days in a row, the company had prepared to fly out from Port Moresby, only to be told that its flight was cancelled due to bad weather. On 17 September 1943, it finally took off for Leron in a special flight of 13 Dakotas of the US 374th Troop Carrier Group.[8] Flying the lead plane was Captain Frank C. Church, operations officer of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing,[9] who was considered one of the wing's "hottest" pilots.[10] Captain King flew in Church's lead plane. As the plane came in to land, King spotted Papuan patrols in the area.[11]
One of the Dakotas blew a tyre on landing on the rough airstrip; another tried to land on one wheel. Its undercarriage collapsed and it made a belly landing. The former was subsequently salvaged, but the latter was a total loss.[12] King sent out patrols that soon located Captain J. A. Chalk's B Company, Papuan Infantry Battalion, which was operating in the area. That evening Chalk and King received airdropped messages from Vasey instructing them to occupy Kaiapit as soon as possible, and prepare a landing strip for troop carrier aircraft. Vasey informed them that only small Japanese parties that had escaped from Lae were in the area, and their morale was very low.[13]
Vasey flew in to Leron on 18 September where he met with King. Vasey's orders were simple: "Go to Kaiapit quickly, clean up the Japs and inform division".[14]
[edit] Japanese
In fact, the Japanese commander, Major General Nakai Masutaro of the 20th Division, had ordered a force to move to Kaiapit under the command of Major Yonekura Tsuneo. Yonekura's force included the 9th and 10th Companies of the 78th Infantry Regiment, the 5th Company of the 80th Infantry Regiment, a heavy machine gun section, a signals section and an engineer company, a total of about 500 troops.[15] From Kaiapit it was to threaten the Allied position at Nadzab, creating a diversion to allow the Japanese garrison at Lae time to escape. The main body left Yokopi in the Finisterre Range on 6 September but was delayed by heavy rains that forced the troops to move, soaking wet, through muddy water for much of the way. Only the advance party of this force had reached Kaiapit by 18 September, by which time Lae had fallen.[16] Yonekura, moving by night to avoid being sighted by Allied aircraft, was by this time no further from Kaiapit than King, but had two rivers to cross.[17]
[edit] Battle
Captain King assembled his troops at Sangan, about 16 km south of Kaiapit, except for one section under LIeutenant E. F. Maxwell that had been sent ahead to scout Kaiapit. On the morning of 19 September, King set out for Kaiapit, leaving behind his quartermaster, transport and engineering sections, which would move the stores left behind at the Leron River first to Sangan and then to Kaiapit on the 20th. He took one section of Papuans with him, leaving Chalk and the rest of his men to escort the native carriers bringing up the stores.[18]
King's men walked for 50 minutes at a time and then rested for ten. The going was relatively easy insofar as the ground was fairly flat, but the two metre high Kunai grass trapped the heat and humidity and the men were heavily loaded with ammunition.[19] The company reached Ragitumkiap, a village with striking distance of Kaiapit at 1445. While his men had a brief rest, King attempted to use the new 208 radios he had brought with him to contact the larger Army No. 11 Wireless Set he had left behind at Sangan - and from there Vasey back at Nadzab - but found that their range was insufficient. He also heard shots being fired in the distance and guessed that Maxwell's Section had been discovered.[20]
The 2/6th Independent Company formed up at 1515 in Kunai grass about 1200 metres from Kaiapit. As the company advanced it came under light machine gun fire from foxholes on the edge of the village.[21] A 2-inch mortar knocked out the light machine gun.[22] The foxholes were outflanked and taken out with hand grenades and bayonets. The Japanese withdrew, leaving 30 dead behind. The Australians suffered 2 killed and 7 wounded, including the lightly wounded King.[23]
The company established a defensive position for the night. While they were doing so, Lieutenant D. B. Stuart, the commander of one of the Papuan platoons, arrived. They had become concerned when radio contact had been lost and he had been sent to find out what was going on. King ordered him to bring the Papuans up from Sangan with extra ammunition and the No. 11 set. At around 1730, a native appeared with a message for the Japanese commander. The paper was taken from him and he was shot when he tried to escape.[24] Later, a Japanese patrol returned to Kaiapit, unaware that it was now in Australian hands. They were killed when they stumbled across a Bren gun position. Four more Japanese soldiers returned after midnight. One of them escaped.[25]
Meanwhile, Yonekura had reached Kaiapit after an exhausting night march. He was aware that the Australians had reached Kaiapit but his main concern was not to be caught in the open by Allied aircraft. Spotting Australian positions in pre-dawn light, the Japanese column opened fire. A torrent of fire descended on the Australians, who replied sporadically, attempting to conserve their ammunition.[26] Despite this, King launched an immediate counter-attack on the Japanese, which took them by surprise. Closely bunched together, the Yonekura's troops formed perfect targets for the Australians' Owen guns. By 1000, the action was over.[27]
King's men counted 214 Japanese bodies, and estimated that another 50 or more lay dead in the tall grass. Abandoned equipment included 19 machine guns, 150 rifles, 6 grenade throwers and 12 Japanese swords.[28]
[edit] Aftermath
[edit] Consolidation
The 2/6th Independent Company had won a spectacular victory but now had 23 wounded and was very low on ammunition. Lieutenant Frazier landed on the newly captured airstrip in his Piper Cub at 1230.[29] He rejected the existing strip and oversaw the preparation of a new one on better ground new Mission Hill.[30] Colonel Hutchison flew in for a test landing the very next day, 21 September, at 1530. He collected the wounded and returned to Nadzab with them. He came back an hour later with a load of rations and ammunition. He also brought Brigadier I. N. Dougherty, commander of the 21st Infantry Brigade, and his headquarters, who took charge of the area. Around 1800, six more transports arrived.[31] Taking advantage of good flying weather on 22 September, 99 round trips were made between Nadzab and Kaiapit,[32] and by 29 September, the entire 21st Infantry Brigade had moved to Kaiapit.[33]
[edit] Base Development
Kaiapit did not become an important airbase. By the time engineering surveys of the area had been completed, as a direct consequence of the victory at Kaiapit, Dougherty's men had captured Gusap. There, the engineers found a well-drained area with soil conditions suitable for the construction of all-weather airstrips, an unobstructed air approach and a pleasant climate. It was therefore decided to limit construction at the swampy and malarial Kaiapit and concentrate on Gusap, where the US 871st, 872nd and 875th Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalions constructed ten airstrips and numerous facilities. Although some equipment was able to make the trek overland, most had to be flown in and nearly all of it was worn out by the time the work was completed. The first P-40 Kittyhawk fighter squadron began operating from Gusap in November and an all-weather fighter runway was completed in January 1944. The airstrip at Gusap "paid for itself many times over in the quantity of Japanese aircraft, equipment and personnel destroyed by Allied attack missions projected from it."[34]
[edit] War Crimes
Three dead natives were found at Kaiapit who had been bound hand and foot and then been bayoneted.[35]
[edit] Results of the Battle
The Battle of Kaiapit accomplished Vasey's primary mission, for the Japanese could no longer threaten Nadzab. It opened the gate to the Ramu Valley for the 21st Infantry Brigade. It provided new forward fighter airstrips for the air war against the Japanese. Perhaps most importantly, it provided the Allies with validation of the new training methods and the organisational emphasis on firepower.
Vasey later told King that "We were lucky, we were very lucky". King countered that "if you're inferring that what we did was luck, I don't agree with you sir because I think we weren't lucky, we were just bloody good." Vasey replied that what he meant was that he, George Vasey, was lucky.[36] Vasey confided to Herring that he felt that he had made a mistake: "it is quite wrong to send out a small unit like the 2/6th Independent Company so far that they cannot be supported."[37]
One Japanese historian, Tanaka Kengoro, went so far as to claim that the mission of the Nakai Detachment - to threaten Nadzab so as to draw Allied attention away from the troops escaping from Lae - was achieved.[38]
For his part in the battle, Major King was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.[39]
[edit] Notes
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 414
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 414
- ^ Kenney 1949, p. 300
- ^ RAAF Reconnaissance Report, 11 September 1943, War Diary, 45 Air Liaison Section, AWM52 1/14/40
- ^ Craven and Cate, p. 190
- ^ Bradley 2004, pp. 14-16
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 13
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 415
- ^ Kelly 2006, p. 45
- ^ Kenny 1949, p. 300
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 18
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 19
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 415-416
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 417
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 34
- ^ Kazuhara 2004, p. 123
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 35
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 21
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 21
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 417-418
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 418
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 21
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 418
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 418
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 29
- ^ Bradley 2004, pp. 30-31
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 421
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 422
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 423
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 41
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 423
- ^ Kenney 1949, p. 301
- ^ Kelly 2006, p. 530
- ^ Casey 1951, pp. 171-172
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 427
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 43
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 426
- ^ Horner 1992, p. 272
- ^ Bradley 2004, p. 42
[edit] References
- Bradley, Phillip (2004). On Shaggy Ridge. The Australian 7th Division in the Ramu Valley: From Kaiapit to the Finisterre Ranges. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195553598.
- Casey, Hugh J., ed. (1951), Airfield and Base Development, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office
- Coulthard-Clark, Chris (1998). Where Australians Fought. The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1864486112.
- Craven, Wesley Frank & Cate, James Lea, eds. (1950), Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, University of Chicago Press, <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/index.html>
- Dexter, David (1961). The New Guinea Offensives (PDF). Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved on 2006-12-16.
- Horner, David (1992). General Vasey's War. ISBN 0 422 84462 6.
- Kelly, Robert H. (2006). Volume II: 1943 – Year of Expansion and Consolidation. ISBN 0 646 45837 X.
- Kenney, George C. (1949). General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. New York City: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. ISBN 0-91279-944-7.
- Kuzuhara, Kazumi (2004), Dennis, Peter & Grey, Jeffrey, eds., The Nakai Contingency Unit and the Battles of Kankirei Ridge, Army History Unit, ISBN 0 646 43590 6
- U.S. Army Center of Military History (1966). Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II - Part I. Reports of General MacArthur. Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
