Battle of Cornus
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Battle of Cornus | |||||||
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Part of the Second Punic War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Carthage | Roman Republic | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Hasdrubal The Bald, Hampsicora † | Titus Manlius Torquatus | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
15,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry +Sardinians (?) + Elephants (?) |
20,000 infantry (2 Roman and 2 Allied Legions), 1,200 cavalry | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Most killed or captured | unknown, |
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The Battle of Cornus, or Caralis took place when a Carthaginian army sailed to Sardinia in support of a Sardinian revolt against Roman rule. The army, led by Hasdrubal the Bald, fought a similar size Roman army under Preator Titus Manlius Totquatus in the Fall of 215 BC somewhere between Cornus and Caralis. The Romans destroyed the Carthaginian army, and then scattered their fleet in a sea battle south of Sardinia.
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[edit] Strategic Situation
The Romans were hard pressed after the Battle of Cannae, with several South Italian cities deserting to Carthage. Hannibal Barca and his army was active in Campania, a second Carthaginian army under Hanno the Elder had become active in Bruttium. The Romans fielded several armies, avoided attacking Hannibal and striking at his allies whenever possible.
In Iberia, Hasdrubal Barca, brother of Hannibal, had been fighting skirmishes with the Scipio brothers since his defeat in the Battle of Ebro River. The Carthaginian Senate had sent him reinforcements with orders to march to Italy in 216 BC. In Africa, Mago Barca was put in command of an army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 horse and 20 elephants with orders to join Hannibal.
The Romans had fought off and on with the natives since obtaining Sardinia through blackmail in 237 BC. By 216 BC, the situation in the island was ripe for revolt. The single Roman legion posted there was understrength from sickness. The Praetor, q. Mucius Scavola, was also sick. Payment and provisions were irregular from Rome. Hampsicora, a native Sardinian chieftain, had contacted Carthage asking for aid. Carthage had sent an officer named Hanno to finance the revolt, then raised an army similar to that of Mago's for an expedition to Sardinia. Hasdrubal the Bald and another Mago was in charge of the expedition.
Before the Carthaginian expedition sailed for Sardinia, the strategic situation changed. Hanno The Elder was defeated by Titus Sempronius Longus in Lucania, and Hasdrubal Barca lost most of his field army in the Battle of Dertosa in Iberia. The Carthaginian senate ordered Mago to Iberia, but the Sardinian expedition sailed as planned. However, a storm blew the fleet off course to the Balearic islands, where many ships had to be hauled ashore and repaired (Livy xxiii 36, Lazenby J.F p96-98). This delayed the arrival of The Carthaginians to Sardinia.
[edit] Prelude
Hampsicora was busy raising an army and collecting provisions based near the city of Cornus (near Cuglieri on the western coast of Sardinia). The delay of the Carthaginians gave the Romans the opportunity to send fresh forces under the Praetor Titus Manlius Torquatus, who had served in Sardinia in 235 BC as consul. Total Roman forces in Sardinia rose to 20,000 infantry and 1,200 horse with his arrival.
Manlius managed to draw Hiostus, the son of Hampsicora to rashly attack the Romans when Hampsicora was absent on a recruiting mission. In the ensuing battle, 5,700 Sardinians were killed and the rebel army scattered. Hasdrubal the Bald arrived in Sardinia in the fall of 215. He landed near Cornus, and gathered what forces of Sardinians he could, and marched towards Carales. Manlius in response marched out with an army.
[edit] The Battle
The opponents did not immediately engage each other. They encamped close to each other and spent some days skirmishing. When neither side gained any advantage, the respective commanders decided on battle.
The armies formed up traditionally, with Cavalry on the wings and infantry on the center. It is not known if the Carthaginians had elephants with them. The battle was hotly contested for 4 hours, with neither side winning. The decisive moment came when the Roman detachment facing the Sardinians on one of the wings of the Carthaginian line managed to drive them from the field. The victorious Roman wing then wheeled inward and attacked the Carthaginian line, which gave way and was slaughtered. Hasdrubal, Mago and Hanno were captured and Hiostus killed. Hampsicora fled the field, and then committed suicide. The survivors took refuge in Cornus, which was taken by assault a few days later. The Punic fleet managed to extricate some of the survivors.
[edit] Battle of Sardinia Sea
The expedition was escorted by 60 quinqueremes and an unknown number of transports. These took remnants of the expedition and sailed for Africa. On the way they encountered the Sicilian contingent of the Roman fleet returning from a raiding mission from Africa. The roman fleet, 100 quinquereme strong and commanded by Titus Ocatilius Crassus, attacked and captured 7 Carthaginian ships, while the rest scattered and made for Africa. Roman losses are not known (Livy xiii 46).
[edit] Aftermath and Importance
- The Sardinian rebel cities surrendered to the Romans, enabling Manlius to send part of the Roman forces back to Italy.
- The grain supply from Sardinia remained uninterrupted and the Carthaginian navy was denied bases nearer to Italy. With the damage on the Roman agriculture, protection of overseas grain supply was crucial.
- Aside from naval raids on Sardinia in 210 BC, Carthage did not threaten Roman domination in Sardinia again.
- While the Sicilian contingent of the Roman fleet was busy off Sardinia, The Admiral of the main Punic Fleet, Bomilcar, managed to sail to Locri in Bruttium and land a force of 4,000 Numidian horse and 40 elephants for Hannibal. Given the fact that the lack of proper support from Carthage was one of the reasons for Hannibal’s failure, the impact of this reinforcement has not been properly explained (Lazenby, J.F, “Hannibal’s War”, p98).
[edit] References
- Bagnall, Nigel (1990). The Punic Wars. ISBN 0-312-34214-4.
- Cottrell, Leonard (1992). Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80498-0.
- Lazenby, John Francis (1978). Hannibal's War. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 0-85668-080-X.
- Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel Military Paperbacks. ISBN 0-304-36642-0.
- Peddie, John (2005). Hannibal's War. Sutton Publishing Limited. ISBN 0-7509-3797-1.
- Lancel, Serge (1999). Hannibal. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-21848-3.
- Baker, G. P. (1999). Hannibal. Cooper Square Press. ISBN 0-8154-1005-0.
[edit] Further Reading
- Dodge, Theodore A. (1891). Hannibal. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81362-9.
- Warry, John (1993). Warfare in the Classical World. Salamander Books Ltd. ISBN 1-56619-463-6.
- Livius, Titus (1972). The War With Hannibal. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-140-44145-X.
- Delbruck, Hans (1990). Warfare in Antiquity, Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-9199-X.
- Lancel, Serge (1997). Carthage A History. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 1-57718-103-4.
- Casson, Lionel (1981). The Ancient Mariners 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01477-9.