Battle of Calabria

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Battle of Calabria
Part of the Mediterranean Theater of World War II

Italian battleship Giulio Cesare firing during the battle
Date July 9, 1940
Location Near Calabria, Italy
Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
United Kingdom
Australia		 Italy
Commanders
Andrew Cunningham Inigo Campioni
Strength
1 aircraft carrier
3 battleships
5 light cruisers
16 destroyers		 2 battleships
6 heavy cruisers
8 light cruisers
16 destroyers
Casualties and losses
1 light cruiser damaged
2 destroyers damaged		 1 battleship damaged
1 heavy cruiser damaged
1 destroyer damaged
v • d • e
Battle of the Mediterranean
Espero¹² – Mers-el-Kébir – Calabria¹² – Spada – Cape Passero¹ – Taranto – Spartivento¹ – Excess¹ – Abstention – Matapan – Tarigo² – Crete – Substance¹ – Halberd¹ – Duisburg² – Bon² – 1st Sirte¹² – Alexandria raid – 2nd Sirte¹ – Harpoon¹ – Vigorous¹ – Pedestal¹ – Agreement – Torch – Stone Age¹ – Toulon – Skerki² – Cigno² – Sicily – Sinking of Roma
¹ - Involved an Allied convoy • ² - Involved an Axis convoy
Artigliere and Camicia Nera, Italian destroyers of the Camicia Nera class, during the battle
Artigliere and Camicia Nera, Italian destroyers of the Camicia Nera class, during the battle

The Battle of Calabria, also known as the Battle of Punta Stilo, was a naval battle between ships of Italian Regia Marina and the British Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy. The battle occurred 30 miles to the east of Punta Stilo, the "toe" of Italy (Calabria), on 9 July 1940. It was one of the few pitched battles of the Mediterranean campaign during World War II, involving large numbers of ships on both sides. Both sides claimed victory, but in fact the battle was a draw and everyone returned to their bases as soon as possible. After the battle a massive propaganda effort on the part of the Allies tried to convince the Italian forces that the Allies had won outright; Italian propaganda also depicted this battle as a victory.

Contents

[edit] Origins

When World War II opened, it was much to the surprise of the Italian forces who, like many in Europe, did not expect war until 1941 at the earliest. At the time their forces in Libya were woefully underprepared for war, and the Italian fleet was forced to start large supply operations in order to bring them up to fighting condition.

On 6 July a convoy of four merchant ships left Naples on their way to Bengazi, while attempting to fool the Allies into thinking they were making for Tripoli. The next day their escort force joined them from Taranto after being informed that the Allies had recently left port in Alexandria. The escort consisted of three groups; directly protecting the cargo ships were eight destroyers and four torpedo boats, while a second group sailed 35km to the east and contained six heavy cruisers and another twelve destroyers. Finally the main battle group contained two battleships (Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour), eight light cruisers and another thirteen destroyers.

Meanwhile the Allies were involved in a similar convoy action. The fleet sailed from Alexandria bound in the direction of Malta where the destroyers would deliver supplies and a limited number of specialist reinforcements. Two convoys were arranged to take off fleet stores and civilians from Malta to Alexandria. Two groups of merchantmen were arranged, one at 13 knots and another at 9 knots. Protecting them were three groups of ships, one with five cruisers and a destroyer, Force A, another, Force B, with the battleship Warspite and five destroyers and the main battle group, Force C, with the battleships Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft carrier Eagle and eleven destroyers (One, HMS Imperial had to return to Alexandria with a burst steam pipe on the early hours of 8th July.)

On the night of 8 July, Italian command deciphered Allied radio signals and told their fleet to prepare for action about 65 miles south east of Punta Stilo. Some sources suggest that the Italians had turned to avoid battle as they were moving north when encountered, but in fact they planned to keep the action close to Italy and were deliberately moving north in order to draw the Allies closer to their airbases[citation needed]. During the initial positioning the Italians suffered technical problems on three destroyers and two light cruisers, so these ships were formed up with several additional destroyers and sent to refuel in Sicily. In order to make up for these "losses", another destroyer group was called for from Taranto. At this point, the Italian fleet had 16 destroyers.

Meanwhile the Allies were having problems as well. The day before the battle, Italian bombers from the mainland had attacked their fleet and hit Gloucester's bridge, killing the captain and many bridge crew, 6 officers and 11 ratings, and wounding 3 officers and 6 ratings. For the rest of the battle she would be commanded from the emergency station. While a serious enough blow, it was perhaps more damaging to the Italians, who were convinced the aircraft had inflicted serious damage to a good deal of the fleet and had reduced their fighting power considerably. Rome radio claimed several ships as being struck, some set on fire, and one sunk.

[edit] Cruiser engagement

At noon on 9 July the two fleets were 90 miles apart. Vice Admiral Cunningham could not close the distance with the slower Royal Sovereign and Malaya in tow and took Warspite in on its own. Meanwhile, at 13:15, Eagle launched several sorties by Fairey Swordfish against Italian heavy cruisers, with no success.

The Allied cruiser group was spread out in front of Warspite and at 15:15 they caught sight of the Italian main battle force and the two groups opened fire at 21,500 metres. Italian rangefinding equipment was better than the Allied, and within three minutes they had found the distance even though they were firing at extreme range. Although the Allies' rangefinding was not as good and they had trouble with their rounds falling short, the Allied gunlaying equipment was better and they were able to place their rounds in much tighter groups. Generally the gunnery of the two forces was fairly well matched. After only a few minutes the range was down to 20,000 metres and the Allied guns became useful.

However, by 15:22, the Italian fire came dangerously close to the Allied cruisers and Vice Admiral John Tovey decided to disengage. At this point splinters from a 6" shell fired by the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi hit Neptune, damaging her catapult and the reconnaissance aircraft beyond repair. The cruisers began drifting apart, and at 15:30 fire ceased.

[edit] Battleship engagement

One group of Italian light cruisers, mistaken for the very latest heavy cruiser Zara class, was on the Allied side of the battle line and was soon within range of the charging Warspite. Once again the Allied rounds fell short, and neither of her targets, Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano, received any damage in the initial salvos. However by this time Warspite was also out of position, and she circled in place in order to allow Malaya to catch up (Royal Sovereign was still well to the rear).

The Italian commander, Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni, decided to take on Warspite, and started moving his two battleships into position. At 15:52 Giulio Cesare opened fire at a range of 26,400 metres. Conte di Cavour did not fire, a decision many have questioned. Their strategy was to have only one ship targeted at a time, as it was learned during the Battle of Jutland that with more than one ship firing at a single target it became very difficult for the rangefinding parties to tell which rounds were theirs. Conte di Cavour was responsible for Malaya and Royal Sovereign, which were further back and did not enter the engagement.

Warspite, not aware of the Italian firing patterns, split her guns between the two ships. During the exchange one of Giulio Cesare's rounds fell long and caused damage to Warspite's escorting destroyers (Hereward and Decoy) which had formed up on the far side of the action. At 15:54 Malaya started firing, well out of range, hoping to cause some confusion on the Italian ships. Meanwhile the Italian heavy cruisers came into action and started firing on Warspite at 15:55 but had to break off as the Allied cruisers returned.

At 15:59 two shells from Giulio Cesare fell very close to Warspite. Almost immediately after one of Warspite's 381 mm rounds hit the rear deck of Giulio Cesare, setting off the stored ammunition for one of her 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The fumes from the burning ammunition were sucked down into the engine room, which had to evacuate and shut down half of the boilers. Giulio Cesare's speed quickly fell off to 18 knots and Conte di Cavour took over. Giulio Cesare and Warspite were well over 24,000 metres (26,000 yards) apart at the time of the hit, setting the record for naval gunnery against a moving target that stands to this day.

It would appear that Warspite was in an excellent position to deal some serious blows to the slowing Giulio Cesare but she once again executed another tight turn to allow Malaya to catch up. With her guns suddenly silenced during the turn, the rangefinders on Malaya discovered what the Italians had been intending to avoid, that her rounds were falling 2,700 yards short of Giulio Cesare and they had been watching Warspite's rounds.

At 16:01 the Italian destroyers generated smoke and the battleships got under cover. There is some debate about this point today, the Allied position being that the battleships were leaving battle, the Italian that they were attempting to make a torpedo attack with their destroyers from within the smoke.

[edit] Final actions

The Italian heavy cruisers were a serious threat and could have evened the battle between the main battleships, but with Warspite in the battle the Allied cruisers returned and the Italians turned to restart their initial fight with them.

At 15:58 Fiume re-opened fire on her counterpart in the Allied line, Liverpool and soon two groups of Italian cruisers were in combat with the main Allied cruiser battle group. Firing continued as both groups attempted to form up and at 16:07 the Italian cruiser Bolzano was hit three times, temporarily locking her rudder. A near miss on the destroyer Vittorio Alfieri caused minor damage.

Meanwhile the mechanics on Giulio Cesare were able to repair two of the four damaged boilers, allowing the battleship to reach 22 knots. Admiral Campioni, considering the possibilities of his remaining battleship, Conte di Cavour against three enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier, decided to withdraw the battleships towards Messina.

Over the next hour both fleets attempted to make torpedo runs with their destroyer groups without success. At 14:40, the Italian air force made an attack with 126 aircraft, reporting damage on Eagle, Warspite and Malaya; because of some misunderstanding, 50 of the Italian aircraft attacked the Italian ships, without damage. The battle ended at 16:55 with both sides withdrawing.

One final victim was the destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sent to Augusta in Sicily, which was hit by a torpedo launched from a Swordfish at 09:40 the next day.

[edit] Result

After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya, while the Allied ships turned for home along with their escort. However, Allied gunnery proved superior and while the damage to Giulio Cesare was light and repaired within a month, the Allies claimed that they had suffered no damage at all and eventually it seems the Italians came to believe them. While the battle was a draw, it was an Allied win from the propaganda point of view.

One question is why the Italians did not send their two remaining battleships at Taranto, both ready for action and only a few hours from the scene. The answer appears to be that they were afraid to send them out without the destroyer escort, which had been sent out earlier to make up for "losses" in the main fleet. These two ships would have tipped the balance of fire well onto the Italian side.

Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even. The Italian superiority in aircraft due to the nearby land-based aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica should have been overwhelming. In fact they played almost no part at all, with the exception of the damage to Gloucester, yet their battle reports were inflated to the point of claiming damage to half of the Allied fleet.

[edit] Order of battle

[edit] RN Ensign Allies

Force A made up of the 7th Cruiser squadron and HMAS Stuart under Admiral Tovey; Force B commanded by Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham who was the Commander in Chief of the entire Mediterranean Fleet; and Force C commanded by Vice-Admiral H. A. Pridham-Wippel.

The destroyer HMS Escort (sunk), was sunk in the Western Mediterranean where Force H was providing a feint and demonstration against Sardinia to distract the Italian fleet from the sailing of the Allied convoys. HMS Escort was torpedoed on the 11th July during Force H's return passage.

Reference: G. Hermon Gill "Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942" (1957)

[edit] Kingdom of Italy Regia Marina

Italian force commanded by Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni.

[edit] External links

Coordinates: 37°40′N, 17°20′E