Battle of Albert (1916)
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| Battle of Albert (1916) | |||||||
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| Part of the Battle of the Somme (First World War) | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 British Empire
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 German Empire |
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| Commanders | |||||||
Douglas Haig Henry Rawlinson Ferdinand Foch |
Fritz von Below |
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| Strength | |||||||
| 13 British divisions 11 French divisions |
6 divisions | ||||||
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The Battle of Albert, 1 - 13 July 1916, was the opening phase of the British and French offensive that became the Battle of the Somme.
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[edit] Limitations of sheer artillery volume
The British concentrated and deployed artillery on an unprecedented scale, by which they hoped to destroy German defences prior to the attack :[1]
- 808 18-pounders
- 202 4.5-inch howitzers
- 32 4.7-inch guns
- 128 60-pounders
- 20 60-inch guns
- 1 9.2 inch-gun
- 1 12-inch gun
- 104 6-inch howitzers
- 64 8-inch howitzers
- 60 9.2-inch howitzers
- 11 12-inch howitzers
- 6 15-inch howitzers
The French supplied the following artillery to assis the British bombardment :
- 60 75-mm guns (gas only)
- 24 120-mm guns
- 16 220-mm howitzers
This total of 1,537 guns provided one field gun per 20 yards of front, and one heavy gun per fifty-eight yards. It was employed against a total of 22,000 yards of front, but to this must be added 300,000 yards of support trenches.[2] If one considers that 1 million out of 1.5 million of the shells fired in the preliminary bombardment were shrapnel which could blow aside barbed wire but not harm enemy soldiers under cover, and that many of the remaining high-explosive shells failed to explode due to poor quality of mass-produced fuzes, it is evident in hindsight compared to later battles that the bombardment had little chance of destroying a significant percentage of defenders.
In the event, the 1.7 million shells fired in the 7-day preparatory barrage and first day of the battle, and the 17 mines fired just prior to the assault failed to destroy the German defenders on most parts of the front. Most German defenders survived the barrage in shell-proof observation posts and bunkers and were able to man frontline defences when the assault began. This would later lead to reevaluation of British artillery doctrine, with a change of emphasis from destructive to neutralising fire i.e. a realisation that a determined enemy and his arms could not be simply destroyed by artillery but his ability to fight back at the moment could be severely limited if correctly targeted.
[edit] Counter-battery fire
In this battle there tended to always be enough highly-trained and motivated survivors after barrages to man their defensive weapons such as machine-guns. In addition the Germans had paid extraordinary attention to battlefield communication means and procedures to ensure that frontline troops were usually able to call for and get supporting defensive artillery fire when called upon. Again, the British counter-battery fire in many cases failed to suppress German gun batteries and hence they were available to answer calls for assistance once the main attack had begun. There were communication problems between the British Army and the RFC (Royal Flying Corps) : "... when army pilots had been closely linked to guns, all was well. The removal of these pilots to the more rarified atmosphere of the RFC did not help this co-operation. However, on Zero-Day 1st July, the enemy guns had not been silenced and were able to bring down heavy defensive fire on the attacking infantry [of III Corps]... Though an attempt had been made to co-ordinate the counter-battery fire, its effects had varied from being extremely successful [VIII and XV Corps front] to almost non-effective [III Corps]]... they were let down by shortages of and inadequate equipment and communications".[3]
German guns appear to have survived the initial long bombardment by not firing and hence not revealing their positions : "...there was an unbroken stream of calls for assistance from the front line to engage these terrible means of destruction [mortars] with counter fire. The artillery declared that it was unable to respond to the wishes of the infantry if it was to preserve its guns and so remain ready to fire defensively once the general attack came..." : Landwehr Leutnant M. Gerster Reserve Infantry Regiment 119, speaking of events about 29th June near Beaumont Hamel.[4]
[edit] Faulty implementation of creeping barrages
The divisional artillery of most British attacking infantry Corps failed to correctly follow the new tactics for coordinating infantry assaults and creeping barrages (creeping barrages were intended to lay down fire in front of attacking troops to force the enemy to remain under cover). VIII Corps guns lifted the barrage 100 yards every 2 minutes instead of 50-yard increments per minute as had been intended and hence because nomansland was so narrow the barrage began on rather than in front of the German trenches and then lifted beyond leaving the advancing troops to face unsuppressed defenders; XIII Corps with the exception of 18th Division abandoned the creeping barrage altogether, and 18th Divsion alone attacked with any success; III Corps artillery employed old discredited tactics of "raking" back and forth rather than providing a consistently forward-movement of fire behind which the infantry could advance and the attack failed. X Corps gunfire jumped from trench to trench and some "walked" up communications trenches, again instead of consistently moving forward at a pace the infantry could follow. 9th Brigade adjusted its tactics by advancing close behind the barrage and was able to take the first German trench but was forced to withdraw when the barrage then jumped away to the second line of trenches leaving it uncovered. XV Corps had mixed success : 21st Division artillery "searched" backwards and forwards making it very difficult for infantry to advance behind it and was unsuccessful; artillery of 50th Brigade of 17th Division lifted 500 yards and hence its its infantry advanced with no protection and failed; 7th Division's artillery lifted 50 yards as planned and its infantry were successful.[5]
[edit] 1st July 1916
The result of British planning and tactical failures and German preparedness was that the first day of the attack constituted a major defeat for the British army, in which it suffered its highest-ever casualty rate in a single day, in return for a modest advance on the extreme right where it captured and held Mametz and Montauban.
In stark contrast, the French attack was successful and incurred relatively few casualties by the standards of the day. The XX Corps advanced beyond Curlu north of the Somme and was only halted because it depended on the British to protect its left flank, and the British did not advance beyond Montauban. South of the Somme the French I Colonial Corps and XXXV Corps approached the German second position and took 4,000 prisoners.
For this reason the events of the "First Day on the Somme" as they affected the British tend to obsure the overall picture of what was a joint British-French operation.
[edit] 2nd to 13th July
The "fog of war" meant that it took time for much information on the extent of failure, the few successes and lessons to be learned to get back to the British high command and for changes to be implemented. They were hence slow to attempt to exploit the only success of 1st July, the capture of Mametz and Montauban south of the Albert-Bapaume road.
However, General Farndale asserts that "It was clear by last light on 1st July, where it had been used, the creeping barrage was a success"[6] and hence there was enough tactical information available to provide some optimism for future operations.
For the remainder of this period the British carried out numerous small assaults while they digested the results of the first major attack. On 9th July the artillery order for the next phase of the battle was signed, and this still left responsibility for details to individual Corps BGRAs, and perpetuated the loose rather than tight coordination of artillery and infantry which had contributed to the failures of 1st July.
The French attack astride and south of the Somme was far more successful than the that of the British north of the Somme. However, the British failure to advance meant the French XX Corps north of the Somme could not continue its advance as it needed to protect its left flank. Opposite the French sector the geography was less favouable to defenders, German trenches and dugouts were not as strong as those further north, and there had been greater turnover of defending German units.[7]. The French 6th Army advanced as far as 10 km at points along a 20 km front and occupied the entire Flaucourt plateau (which constituted the principal defence of Péronne) while taking 12,000 prisoners, 85 cannons, 26 minenwerfers, 100 machine guns, and other assorted materials, all with relatively minimal losses.
On 11 July the British bombarded and attacked Trones Wood (between Montauban and Guillemont), which was considered necessary to be held before the next stage of the battle, the attack on the German second position towards Guillemont and Longeval, could be launched. The British occupied Trones and part of the wood by the 12th but could not capture the entire wood until the 14th.
On 12 July Falkenhayn called off his attack on the French at Verdun. This may be viewed as a strategic consequence of pressure exerted on German defenders during the Battle of Albert and the need to send reinforcements. However, the Battle of Verdun had already degenerated into a costly stalemate and the Russian Brusilov Offensive on the Eastern front would also have contributed to this decision.
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ Farndale 1986, page 144
- ^ Sheffield 2001, page 171
- ^ Farndale 1986, pages 148-149
- ^ Sheldon 2007, page 133
- ^ Farndale 1986, pages 146-147
- ^ Farndale 1986, 147
- ^ Sheldon 2007, page 128
[edit] References
- Chris Baker, Battle of Albert
- General Sir Martin Farndale, "History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Western Front 1914-18". London: Royal Artillery Institution, 1986. ISBN 1 870114 00 0
- Jack Sheldon, "The German Army on the Somme 1914-1916". Barnesley UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2007. ISBN 978 1 84415 513 2
- Gary Sheffield, "Forgotten Victory. The First World War : Myths and Realities". London: Headline Publishing, 2002. ISBN 0 7472 6460 0
