Battle of Alam el Halfa

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 This article needs additional citations for verification.
Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2008)
Battle of Alam el Halfa
Part of the North African Campaign(World War II)
Date August 30 – September 5, 1942
Location 30°40′N 29°10′E / 30.667, 29.167 (Battle of Alam el Halfa)Coordinates: 30°40′N 29°10′E / 30.667, 29.167 (Battle of Alam el Halfa)
Near El Alamein, Egypt
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
New Zealand
United Kingdom		 Germany
Italy
Commanders
Bernard Montgomery Erwin Rommel
Strength
XIII Corps (Eighth Army):
4 Divisions		 Panzer Armee Afrika:
6 Divisions
Casualties and losses
1750 killed, wounded or captured[1]
68 tanks[1]
67 aircraft[2]		 2900 killed, wounded or captured[1]
49 tanks[1]
36 aircraft
60 guns[1]
400 transport vehicles[1]
v • d • e
Western Desert Campaign
Invasion of Egypt – Compass – Sonnenblume – Tobruk – Brevity – Skorpion – Battleaxe – Flipper – Crusader – Gazala – Bir Hakeim – Bir-el Harmat – 1st Alamein – Alam Halfa – Agreement – 2nd Alamein

The Battle of Alam el Halfa took place between August 30 and September 6, 1942 during the Western Desert Campaign of World War II. The combatants were Panzer Army Africa, commanded by Erwin Rommel ("the Desert Fox") and the British Eighth Army, commanded by Bernard Montgomery.

Contents

[edit] Rommel's plan

Field Marshal Rommel, after the failure of his attacks during the First Battle of El Alamein had not given up hope of defeating the British Eighth Army. His supply situation was precarious, though, as British aircraft flying from Malta attacked Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, all German provisions had to be driven all the way from Benghazi by lorry. Also German intelligence had warned him of the arrival of a 100,000 ton allied convoy bringing new vehicles for the Allies in Egypt[3]. Realizing that time was against him, and that the arrival of reinforcements for the British would tilt the balance in their favour, he decided to attack.

The Alamein sector did not present such a broad front as had been the case in other desert battles, and any armoured thrust would have to pass between the sea, in the North, and the Qattara Depression, in the South, which was impassable for tanks. The British defences were quite strong but Rommel believed they had a weak point. The Southern sector, between Munassib and Qaret El Himeimat, was lightly held and it was thought the British hadn't had time to build deep minefields as they had done further North.

Rommel's attack was to be led by his German units, the German 15th Panzer Division and German 21st Panzer Division , accompanied by the German 90th Light Infantry Division. To cover their flanks, he had the Italian XX Corpo d'Armata, commanded by General De Stefanis. The plan called for a rapid advance through the British front lines, followed by a sharp left hook movement into their supply lines. After this it was hoped most of the Allied units would be surrounded and destroyed. With characteristic optimism, Rommel's final goal was the occupation of Egypt, and in particular the Suez canal.[4].

[edit] The Allied defences

Allied 25-pounder gun.
Allied 25-pounder gun.

The British Eighth Army, since August 13, had passed under the command of Lieutenant-General (later Field Marshal) Montgomery. An Axis attack was expected but Montgomery after visiting the front lines, simplified the Allied plan for meeting it. The northern sector (roughly from Ruweisat Ridge to the coast) would be strongly held by XXX Corps to deter a major attack in that sector. A strong defensive box (the New Zealand Box) formed the northern end of the XIII Corps sector south of Ruweisat ridge. Accepting that the featureless southern sector would be very difficult to defend against a determined armoured attack, Montgomery chose for the 15 miles of front from the New Zealand box to the Qattara box on the edge of the Qattara Depression to be lightly held encouraging Rommel to attack at this point. The front would be mined and wired while 7th Armoured Division , would provide a mobile defense of this sector. With only artillery and light tanks they were not expected to halt an armoured attack but harass its flank and supplies. The attackers would meet the main defensive positions when they swung north and approached the Alam El Halfa ridge, well in the rear of the Eighth Army's front. Here Montgomery chose to entrench the bulk of his heavy/medium tanks (concentrated in 22nd Armoured Brigade) and anti-tank units and await the Axis attack. Behind the British armour, on the high ground would be two brigades of 44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division and concentrations of divisional and Corps artillery.[5] 10th Armoured Division had been refitting in the Nile delta with General Grant tanks with the effective 75mm main gun and would reinforce the Alam El Halfa position when available. Most of 8th Armoured Brigade , arrived by 30 August and took position on 22nd Armoured Brigade's left while 23rd Armoured Brigade ,filled the gap on their right late on 1 September.[6]

Auchinleck too had based his plans on this approach but had had a number of contingency plans, in case the enemy armour broke through, involving defensive works around Alexandria and Cairo. This resulted in uncertainty amongst his commanders as to his true intentions (as had occurred on the Mersa Matruh defensive position at the end of June) as to whether the main defensive efforts was to be made on the Alamein positions or the fall-back ones. Montgomery's simplification was to jettison the alternative plans and emphasise his intention to fight on his chosen ground and hold it at all costs. This had the effect of clarifying his intention to his field commanders and also released a number of units (notably British 44th Infantry Division) to the front line which had been held back for the contingency plans.

[edit] Ultra

The British knew Rommel's intentions through Ultra intercepts, but the Germans also had a conventional spy network, one of which took place on a houseboat in the Nile. In Bodyguard of Lies (Harper & Row, 1975), Anthony Cave Brown credits British intelligence with luring Rommel to attack in deep sand. [7] A British officer had been sleeping with an Egyptian prostitute in her houseboat on the Nile, and she had allowed two German spies to rifle through his briefcase. This officer was forced to carry a false map of the terrain to a spot near the German lines, where his car blew up and he was killed. The map showed a certain sector in the southern line as hard ground when in fact it was deep sand. British intelligence also convinced Rommel that this area was lightly defended. Rommel attacked here and took heavy losses.


[edit] The attack

Further information: Battle of Alam el Halfa order of battle
British Grant tanks in the Egyptian desert. Before the arrival of the Shermans, these were the best Allied tanks in North Africa.
British Grant tanks in the Egyptian desert. Before the arrival of the Shermans, these were the best Allied tanks in North Africa.

The attack started on the night of August 30 taking advantage of a full moon. From the start things went wrong for Rommel; the RAF spotted the Axis vehicle concentrations and unleashed several air attacks on them. Fairey Albacores of the Royal Navy dropped flares to illuminate targets for Vickers Wellington bombers and for the artillery; also, the minefields that were thought to be thin turned out to be deep. The British units covering the minefields were the two brigades of the 7th Armoured Division (7th Motor and 4th Armoured), whose orders were to inflict maximum casualties before retiring. This they did, and the Axis losses began to rise. They included General Nehring, wounded in an air raid and General Von Bismarck, commander of 21st Panzer division, killed by a mortar bomb.

Despite these difficulties, Rommel's forces broke through the Allied lines by midday the next day and the British units had prudently moved out of their way. The delay to Rommel resulted in the Afrika Korps running short of fuel. This and the continued harassing flank attacks from the 7th Armoured Division forced them to turn north into Montgomery's flank further west than originally planned and directly towards the prepared defenses on Alam el Halfa which the first panzers approached that evening. The Allied units holding the ridge were the British 22nd Armoured Brigade with 92 Grants and 74 light tanks, supported by anti-tank units with 6 pounder guns and the artillery of the 44th and 2nd New Zealand Divisions[8].

As the Panzer Divisions approached the ridge, the Panzer IV F2 tanks opened fire at long range and destroyed several British tanks. The British Grants were handicapped by their hull-mounted guns that prevented them from firing from 'hull-down' positions. When the Germans came into range, they were exposed to the fire of the brigade and their tanks were hard hit. An attempt to outflank the British was thwarted by anti-tank guns and with night beginning to fall the panzers pulled back. During this engagement, the Germans lost 22 tanks and the British 21[9].

The night brought no respite for the Axis forces, as the Albacore and Wellington bombers returned to the attack, concentrating on the Axis supply lines. This added to Rommel's logistic difficulties as he had not received the petrol promised him by the Italians. Accordingly, operations on the following day (September 1) were limited to an attack by 15th Panzer division. Their attack started at dawn but was quickly stopped by a flank attack from 8th Armoured brigade. The Germans suffered little, as the British were under orders to spare their tanks for the coming offensive but they could make no headway either and were heavily shelled.

Air raids continued throughout the day and night and on the morning of 2 September, realising his offensive had failed and that staying in the salient would only add to his losses, Rommel decided to withdraw[10].

[edit] Rommel withdraws

In a message to OKW, Rommel justified his decision to abandon the offensive by the lack of fuel, Allied air superiority and the loss of the element of surprise. On September 2, the situation continued to deteriorate for the Axis. Armoured cars of the 4/8th Hussars (of the 4th Armoured Brigade) broke into the Axis supply echelons near Himeimat and attacked a group of 300 lorries, destroying 57 of them. As a result, Italian armoured units had to be moved to protect the supply lines and prevent further attacks.

An RAF Baltimore. Baltimore and Boston bombers would fly by day and Wellingtons and Albacores by night, thus keeping a constant pressure on the Afrika Korps.
An RAF Baltimore. Baltimore and Boston bombers would fly by day and Wellingtons and Albacores by night, thus keeping a constant pressure on the Afrika Korps.

The 2nd was not an active day on either side, except in the air, where the Desert Air Force flew 167 bomber and 501 fighter sorties[11].

Montgomery realised the Afrika Korps was about to withdraw. He devised offensive plans for 7th Armoured and 2nd New Zealand divisions, though still under the proviso that they would not incur losses that would jeopardize further offensives.

While the 7th Armoured division's operations never got beyond harassment raids, the New Zealander attack was more serious. It involved two Brigades, with armoured support, to attack southwards across the supply lines of the Afrika Korps and isolate them east of the Allied lines. Starting on the evening of the 3rd, the attack started badly and ended in a fiasco. The Valentine tanks of 46 RTR got lost in the darkness and ended up in a minefield where 12 of them were put out of action. The 90th light division dealt fiercely with the attacking infantry who suffered 972 casualties, without being able to prevent Rommel's escape[12].

A different account of the night action of the New Zealand infantry brigades is given by Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein. It should be noted that 10th Indian Division were at the time in Cyprus. The position north of the New Zealand Division, however, was held by Indian 5th Infantry Division (it was relieved by Indian 4th Infantry Division on 9 September):

An attack by our Luftwaffe against the 10th Indian Div [sic], which was in the assembly area for a counterattack against the center of the front, caused the units which were assembled there to scatter to the winds. Also, all other attacks launched by other units against our flanks, especially the New Zealanders, were too weak to be able to effect a penetration—they could be repulsed. A night attack conducted against the X Italian Corps resulted in especially high losses for the British. Countless enemy dead lay on the battlefield and 200 prisoners were taken among whom was Gen Clifton, commanding general of the 6th New Zealand Brigade.

– Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein[13]

After this failure against General Enrico Frattini's 185th Folgore Parachute Division and elements of the "Ariete" Division covering the German withdrawal, Montgomery decided to refrain from further attacks. The Afrika Korps was allowed to retire, though not without being further harried by the Desert Air Force, who carried out 957 sorties in 24 hours[14]. On the 5th, the Axis units were back almost on their starting positions and the battle was over.

[edit] Aftermath and losses

During this battle the Allies suffered 1750 casualties, compared to 2930 for the Axis. The Allies lost more tanks than the Axis but for the first time in this campaign there was no great disproportion in tank losses. Also the constant harassment by the RAF cost the Panzerarmee Afrika many transport vehicles.

It was the last big offensive undertaken by the Axis in North Africa. Ultimately, it was the superior firepower of the Allies and their mastery of the skies that brought them victory.

There has been criticism of Montgomery's leadership during the battle[15], especially his choice to avoid losses, that prevented the British tank formations from finishing off the Afrika Korps, when it was strung out between the minefields and Alam Halfa. Friedrich von Mellenthin in Panzer Battles painted a dramatic picture of Panzer divisions, paralyzed by lack of fuel, under constant bombardment and awaiting a British onslaught.

Montgomery's answer was to point out that the Eighth Army was in a process of reformation with the arrival of new, untrained units and wasn't ready to take the offensive. In addition Montgomery was keen not to let his own armour waste themselves on futile attacks against Rommel's anti-tank screen, something that they had frequently done in the past, in the process handing the initiative to the Axis forces. Indeed, as Rommel complained to Kesselring, "The swine isn't attacking!" [16]

The failure of the New Zealander's attack seems to prove that Montgomery's tactics were right. His refusal to "play to the enemy's tune" allowed him to preserve his forces for the decisive offensive that came to be known as the Second Battle of El Alamein.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ a b c d e f Watson (2007), p. 14
  2. ^ Buffetaut pp.90-91
  3. ^ Carver p.48
  4. ^ Carver p.49
  5. ^ Walker, Ronald p. 45
  6. ^ Roberts and Bayerlein
  7. ^ Bodyguard of Lies, p. 126
  8. ^ Carver p.58
  9. ^ Carver p.62
  10. ^ Carver p.67
  11. ^ Carver p.67
  12. ^ Carver p.70
  13. ^ Roberts and Bayerlein
  14. ^ Buffetaut p. 90
  15. ^ Carver p.181
  16. ^ Walker, Ronald p. 180


[edit] External links