Battle of Ager Falernus

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Battle of Ager Falernus
Part of the Second Punic War

Date Summer 217 BC
Location Mount Callicula, Campania, present-day Italy
Result Carthaginian victory
Belligerents
Carthage Roman Republic
Commanders
Hannibal Barca Quintus Fabius Maximus
Strength
2,000 infantry,
2,000 Oxen,
2,000 Camp Followers		 4,000 infantry, plus reserves
Casualties and losses
Light 1,000+
v • d • e
Second Punic War
Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Rhone – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene – Ebro River – Ager Falernus – Geronium – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus – 3rd Nola – 1st  Beneventum – 1st Tarentum – 1st Capua – 2nd Beneventum – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Numistro – Asculum – 2nd Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – New Carthage – Ilipa – Crotona – Utica – Great Plains – Cirta – Po Valley – Zama
v • d • e
Punic Wars

The Battle of Ager Falernus (or the Battle of the Falernian Territory) was a skirmish during the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage. After winning the Battle of Lake Trasimene, the army of Hannibal marched south and reached Campania. The Carthaginians moved into the district of Falernum, a very fertile river valley surrounded by mountains. Quintus Fabius Maximus, who had been elected dictator and commander of the Roman field forces after the disastrous defeat, dodged Hannibal and stuck to a strategy to fight only under favorable conditions (Fabian Strategy). He occupied all the river crossings and mountain passes leading out of the valley, thus blocking the Carthaginians inside. After stripping the area of grain, cattle and supplies, Hannibal displayed brilliant tactics to provoke the Roman guard to leave one of the passes. Despite the protests of his staff officers Fabius, who was near the pass with his main forces, refused to attack the Carthaginian army and it managed to escape unscathed.

Contents

[edit] Strategic situation

The defeat of the Roman army in the Battle of Lake Trasimene had removed the Roman consular army blocking Hannibal from marching on Rome. The other consular army, under Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, was on the other side of the Appenine mountains, near Ariminum. This force had lost most of its reconnaissance capabilities as its cavalry of 4,000 had been destroyed in an ambush by the Hannibal's lieutenant Maharbal immediately after the battle of Lake Trasimene.

[edit] Hannibal's movement in central Italy

It is a matter of speculation why Hannibal did not march on Rome or what might have happened had he done so immediately after Trasimene.[1] The Carthaginian army marched into Umbria, through Perugia, although Livy refers to a failed siege of Spoletum, a Latin colony,[2] Polybius does not mention it, and it is likely that only some Carthaginian raiders troubled the Latin colony.[3] Hannibal, while ravaging the countryside, marched through Picenum towards the Adriatic coast, reaching Herita 10 days after leaving Lake Trasimene. Here Hannibal rested the army, who were suffering from scurvy, refitted the Libyan/African troops with captured Roman equipments and retrained them, and using low grade wine as an ointment, brought cavalry horses back to health.[4]

[edit] Prelude

[edit] Roman preparations

The Roman senate and the people, realizing the gravity of the situation, decided to elect a dictator to direct the war effort. As one of the elected consuls was dead and the other one away with his army, the dictator was elected instead of being nominated. Quintus Fabius Maximus, member of the patrician Fabii and consul in 233 and 228 BC, and censor in 230 BC, was elected pro-dictator. Normally a dictator chose his deputy, the Master of Horse, but Fabius received as his Master of Horse Marcus Minucius Rufus, a plebian, in an unusual gesture.[5]

Fabius set about restoring the morale of the Roman people and the defenses of the city. The city walls were repaired, Minucius was directed to raise 2 Roman and 2 allied legions and attached cavalry units. The unwalled towns in Latinum were ordered to be deserted, and the inhabitants moved into walled towns. Certain bridges were torn down to deny the Carthaginians easy passage. Fabius took meticulous care in observing all the religious procedures attached to state affairs and all the civil procedures to boost morale of the city, having blamed the Trasimene disaster on lack of proper religious observations.

Once it was clear Hannibal was not marching towards Rome, Fabius ordered the army of Servilius into Latinum, and he himself left Rome to take command, then joined the army Minucius had raised and marched along via Appia into Apulia.

[edit] Fabian strategy adopted

Hannibal in the meanwhile had marched in a leisurely manner south from Hartia. His army, rested, restored to health, retrained and reequipped, cut a path of destruction through central Italy as they collected grain, cattle, provisions and supplies during the march. Hannibal followed the costal plain, then turned west. Near the town of Arpi, the Roman army under Fabius made contact with the Carthaginian army and camped at Aecae, six miles away from the Carthaginian camp.[6] Hannibal drew up his army and offered battle, but Fabius remained in his camp.

The following months saw Fabius employ what would be known as "Fabian Strategy", and earn him the title "The Delayer". Despite whatever provocation Hannibal thought up, the Roman army always refused pitched battle, shadowed the Carthaginians from a distance, maneuvered to keep to the high ground to deny the Carthaginian cavalry any advantages, always moved to keep between Rome and their enemy. Roman foragers were covered by flying columns of light infantry and cavalry at all times. Carthaginian foragers and stragglers caught at a disadvantage were cut down whenever possible. With this strategy, Fabius left the initiative to Hannibal and failed to prevent him from looting and destroying Roman property, but his army gained combat experience and remained intact, and the threat of intervention from Fabius kept wavering allies from defecting.

[edit] Carthaginians in Ager Falernus

Hannibal marched west into Samnium, and then moved to Beneventum, ravaging the countryside at will. Fabius cautiously followed keeping to the high ground. From Beneventum, which shut its gates against Hannibal, the Carthaginians moved north to capture a town called either "Venosia"[7] or Telesia.[8] From this place Hannibal struck south west and going through Allifae, Callifae, across the Volturnus River to Cales and then down on the plain near Casilinum.[9] Hannibal let loose his soldiers on the rich land, and all through the summer collected a rich booty of cattle, grain, supplies and prisoners. Hannibal entered the potential trap because either his guides mistook "Canusium" as "Casilinum", or Campanian prisoners had suggested that Capua might defect once Carthaginians reached Campania, which did not materialise.[9]

[edit] Fabius traps Hannibal

Ager Falernus lay on the south of Latinum, and to the north of Capua. Fabius reinforced Casilinum, which guarded one such bridge, and Cales on the south of Ager Falernus. Minucius took up position to the north of the plain to watch both via Latina and via Appia, and Taenum was also garrisoned. The main Roman army camped near Mount Massicus, north of the plain to the west of Minucius, ready to support his position. A detachment of 4,000 was to be sent to watch the passes of Mount Callicula to the east of the plain near Allifae, one of the possible passes through which Hannibal chose to enter the plain. The exact location is still unknown and remains debatable.[6] Thus, the Roman dispositions hemmed the Carthaginians in the plain, trapping them.

Although there were eight possible routes out of Ager Falernus, but being positioned north of the Volturnus River, with all the bridges in Roman hands, there were only three that Hannibal could take to leave the river plain.[10] It seemed that Hannibal would have to attack a Roman position directly to break out; the only question was whether he would choose such a dangerous maneuver before or after his supplies failed.

[edit] The Battle

[edit] Pre battle situation

Fabius in the meantime had visited Rome to perform certain religious duties. The Roman landed rich were also feeling the pinch with Hannibal destroying their property, so defending his strategy was another reason for this visit.

Hannibal, after his plundering mission was completed, decided to leave the plain, choosing not to winter there. The Romans, guided by Fabius, still refused to attack him despite whatever provocation he came up with. Hannibal, on the other hand, did not wish to suffer severe casualties by a head on assault on the Romans settled in fortified camps on the high ground. The Carthaginian army moved east towards the pass beside Mount Callicula through which they had originally entered the plain. Fabius, anticipating the move, blocked the pass with 4,000 troops, and encamped on a nearby hill with the main army.[11] Minucius then joined the army with his contingent.

[edit] Carthaginian preparations

Hannibal made careful preparations to break out of the trap. The day before the battle, he had his men eat a hearty supper and go to bed early leaving the campfires burning. 2,000 oxen from the captured herds were selected, along with 2,000 camp followers to drive the cattle and 2,000 spearmen to guard the whole gang, cattle and all. On the horns of the oxen dry woods and faggots were tied. An officer called Hasdrubal, in charge of army supplies as his role as Quarter master general(the same who would lead the heavy cavalry at Cannae), oversaw the whole operation. Below the Camp of Fabius to the east, and on the north west of the pass, at the feet of mount Callicula, was a saddle. The spearmen were to capture and hold the saddle. There is a story recorded by Appain (Roman History 7.3.14) that Hannibal executed 5,000 prisoners so that they would not cause trouble before the march, an incident not mentioned by either Polybius or Livy.

[edit] The night action

At the appointed time, after the third part of the night had ended, the Carthaginian Army roused itself and made ready to march as silently as possible. The picked force with the oxen marched to the saddle, and when they approached the slopes, the wood and faggot tied to the horns were lit by the camp followers.[12] The oxen began to flee and stampede up the slopes. The lights and sounds of the spectacle attracted the attention of the Romans in the camp of Fabius, and also the detachment guarding the pass. The reaction of the forces were quite different.

Fabius refused to budge despite the pleas of his officers and the urgings of Minucius. The Roman army stood at arms but did not move out. Fabius did not want to fight a night battle, fearing a Punic trick to draw the Romans into a battle over broken, uneven ground, where Roman infantry will lose their edge as their lines will be broken, and communication would be hampered. The Roman force stationed at the pass deserted their posts at the head of the pass to attack what they thought was the main Carthaginian army trying to outflank their position and escape across the saddle.

As soon as the Romans left their position, Hannibal's main army left camp, the African infantry leading, cavalry and the cattle herds after them, Celts and Iberians in the rear. The army moved through the pass unmolested, as Fabius did not challenge them. The Roman force attacking the saddle was bewildered when they confronted the lights on the saddle. The cattle ran amok, breaking their lines, the Carthaginian spearmen ambushed them, and worse of all, as dawn broke to make matters clear, a group of Iberian infantry appeared, and being experts in mountain warfare, killed over 1,000 Romans, and managed to rescue the Carthaginian camp followers, the spearmen guard and some of the offending cattle as well.

[edit] Aftermath

The political clout of Fabius began to wane after this incident, as displeasure with his tactics grew in Rome. Hannibal, escaping from the trap he had gotten himself into, marched east towards Apulia, ravaging the Roman estates at will. Fabius cautiously followed him still keeping to the Fabian strategy. He would order towns burned, and crops destroyed in the path of Hannibal. The scorched earth policy was designed to hamper the movement of the Carthaginian army, which, unlike the Roman one, had not secure supply chain and had to live off the land. Hannibal marched east through Samnium into Apulia, and selected the town of Geronium as his winter base. The Carthaginian would again dupe part of the Army of Fabius in Battle of Geronium.

[edit] Importance

The battle itself was smaller than the Battle of Ticinus. Although Fabius was not duped by Hannibal’s moves, his blocking force at the pass was. Leonard Cottrell, in his book “Hannibal: Enemy of Rome”, wrote that the trick was designed to be recognized by Fabius as a trick. Hannibal had studied the mind of his opponent, and devised a plan to make him do exactly what Hannibal needed him to do. Fabius thought Hannibal was trying to get him to fight a night action over broken, uneven ground, where Roman infantry will lose their greatest advantage, discipline and teamwork, as their formations will become disorganized. Since Hannibal was choosing the battle ground and the hour; he might have sprung other surprises to gain further advantages on the Romans. Fabius predictably did what Hannibal had anticipated: nothing.

The Romans guarding the pass, with no Fabius to keep them in check, though they were doing their job when they rushed out: preventing a Carthaginian escape. Again, they acted as Hannibal had anticipated.

It seems both commanders here were following the one of the observations of Sun Tzu, “A battle avoided cannot be lost’’. Fabius, who had avoided fighting a pitched battle with Hannibal because he now held the upper hand, faced Hannibal, who now had to avoid a pitched battle, because he would have to assault fortified Roman positions directly. As B.H. Liddell Hart had observed in his books Strategy and Great Captains Unveiled, successful generals normally understood the concept of economy of force and the value of indirect approach, and also the implications of another Sun Tzu observation, “Know your enemy and know yourself, and victory will be yours”. Hannibal demonstrated all these factors in planning, implementing and orchestrating this small but significant episode. In another year, he would give a very devastating demonstration of his abilities at a place in Apulia called Cannae. Also, a night operation is always hazardous, and requires a certain amount of discipline and administrative control, which was superbly demonstrated by the Carthaginians.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Strategy, B.H. Liddle Hart, p26 id = ISBN 0-452-01017-3
  2. ^ Livy 22.9.1-3
  3. ^ Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, p66 id = ISBN 0-8061-3004-0
  4. ^ Cottrell, Leonard, Hannibal Enemy of Rome, p118 id = ISBN 0-306-80498-0
  5. ^ Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p191 id = ISBN 0-304-36642-0
  6. ^ a b Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War p68 id = ISBN 0-8061-3004-0
  7. ^ Polybius 3.90.8
  8. ^ Livy 22.13.1
  9. ^ a b G.P Baker, Hannibal p.114 id = ISBN 0-8154-1005-0
  10. ^ Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, p186 id = ISBN 0-312-34214-4
  11. ^ Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War p70 id = ISBN 0-8061-3004-0
  12. ^ Peddie, John, Hannibal’s War, p91-93 id = ISBN 0-7509-3797-1

[edit] Bibliography


[edit] Further Reading

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