Barefoot v. Estelle
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| Barefoot v. Estelle | ||||||||||
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| Argued April 26, 1983 Decided July 26, 1983 |
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| Holding | ||||||||||
| There is no merit to petitioner's argument that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future, and so represent a danger to the community. | ||||||||||
| Court membership | ||||||||||
| Chief Justice: Warren E. Burger Associate Justices: William J. Brennan, Jr., Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor |
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| Case opinions | ||||||||||
| Majority by: White Joined by: Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Conner Joined by: Stevens Concurrence/dissent by: Blackmun Dissent by: Marshall Joined by: Blackmun Parts I, II, III, and IV of which Brennan and Marshall joined, |
Barefoot v. Estelle, is a Texas death penalty case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the admissibility of clinical opinions given by two psychiatrists hired by the prosecution in answer to hypothetical questions regarding the defendant's future dangerousness and the likelihood that he would present a continuing threat to society. The American Psychiatric Association submitted an Amicus Curiae brief in support of the defendant's position that such testimony should be inadmissible and urging curtailment of psychiatric testimony regarding future dangerousness and a prohibition of such testimony based on hypothetical data.[1][2]
In Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 ( 1981), the Supreme Court previously ruled on a Texas death penalty case regarding the use of a psychiatric examination to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial to predict future dangerousness. In that case the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination applied to pretrial psychiatric examinations by a prosecution psychiatrist who later testified regarding the defendant's future dangerousness without warning the defendant that such evidence could be used against him. The Court reasoned that although a defendant has no generalized constitutional right to remain silent at a psychiatric examination limited to the issues of sanity or competency, full Miranda warnings must be given with respect to testimony concerning future dangerousness.[1]
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[edit] Circumstances
Thomas Barefoot was convicted of the murder of a police officer in a Texas state court after a jury trial. The same jury determined, in the sentencing phase of the trial, whether Barefoot should receive the death penalty. Texas statute required that the jury consider whether there was a probability that Barefoot was likely to commit future violent acts and therefore would continue to be a threat to society. Along with other evidence, the prosecution called two psychiatrists who, answering hypothetical questions, testified that Barefoot was likely to remain a danger to society. Neither psychiatrist had examined Barefoot nor asked to do so, but each summarized their professional experience as equipping them to answer the questions accurately. One psychiatrist called Barefoot a "criminal sociopath" and said there was no treatment for this condition and that Barefoot was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. The other psychiatrist testified that Barefoot had "a fairly classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder." He placed Barefoot in the "most severe category" of sociopaths, and on a scale of one to ten, Barefoot was "above ten".[3] The jury considered this as well as other evidence and imposed the death penalty.[4]
The court ignored amicus briefs arguing that psychiatric evidence cannot be offered on such issues with any reasonable degree of certainty.[1]
[edit] Appeals
Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which rejected his argument that this use of psychiatric testimony during the sentencing phase of his trial was unconstitutional and upheld the conviction and sentence. After denials of a writ of certiorari and of habeas corpus, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in Federal District Court raising the same objections to the use of psychiatric testimony. Although the District Court rejected his claims and denied the writ, it did issue a certificate of probable cause. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied a second writ of habeas corpus and denied of execution. The Court of Appeals also denied a stay of execution.[4]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
[edit] Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the denial of a stay of execution by the Court of Appeals, saying that the Court of Appeals followed the procedural guidelines for handling such applications for stays of execution on habeas corpus appeals pursuant to a certificate of probable cause. The court also upheld the appellate court's finding on the merits of the case, reasoning that that clinical prediction testimony was not in every case wrong and could be refuted by opposing experts, trusting the adversarial system to determine the accuracy of such statements.[5]
There is no merit to petitioner's argument that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future, and so represent a danger to the community. ...Nor, despite the view of the American Psychiatric Association supporting petitioner's view, is there any convincing evidence that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable, and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.[4]
[edit] Significance
The court's decision in this death penalty case was very important in influencing the legal opinion regarding psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, a position with which the American Psychiatric Association and other medical ethicists disagree, leading some experts to conclude that a psychiatrist making such statements verges on the brink of being a quack. Nevertheless, courts have been willing to accept such testimony despite the lack of empirical evidence that these predictions of future dangerousness are accurate.[5]
However, forensic experts state that psychiatric testimony on ultimate questions at law is unreliable due to the inherent limitations of current psychiatric clinical and experimental knowledge and practice.[2] Dr. James P. Grigson, one of the psychiatrists that testified in this case, was expelled from the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Association of Psychiatric Physicians (TAPP) for making statements in testimony on defendants he had not examined. The TAPP said his expulsion was due not only for his replies to hypothetical questions but also for predicting dangerousness with 100% certainty.[6]
[edit] See also
[edit] Footnotes
- ^ a b c Brief Amicus Curiae - Thomas A. Barefoot, Petitioner v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent. American Psychiatric Association. Retrieved on 2008-01-24.
- ^ a b Bennett & Sullwold (April 1 1985). Qualifying the Psychiatrist as a Lay Witness: A Reaction to the American Psychiatric Association Petition in Barefoot v. Estelle. Journal of Forensic Sciences. Retrieved on 2008-01-25.
- ^ Barefoot v. Estelle. Retrieved on 2008-01-25.
- ^ a b c Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). supreme.justia.com. Retrieved on 2008-01-24.
- ^ a b Melton, Gary (1997). Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers, 2nd, New York: The Guilford Press, pp 282–283. ISBN 1-57230-236-4.
- ^ Samuel J. Brakel & Alexander D. Brooks. Law and Psychiatry in the Criminal Justice System p. 272. William S. Hein Publishing. Retrieved on 2008-01-25.
