User talk:AzureCitizen

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[edit] Battle Assembly edits

Azure, nice work on the revisions to my Battle Assembly article. Thanks for that. --Eplack 11:02, 23 December 2006 (UTC)

Glad they were appreciated. It's a good term article that you wrote; for most non-USAR folks, the term is probably unknown. -- AzureCitizen 03:16, 24 December 2006 (UTC)

You're certainly correct about that. Just about everyone that talked to me about my work in the Reserve calls everything we do Drill. From Basic Training to Annual Training. Even PT... Everything is just "Drill" to them. Well I hope they can look up battle assembly on wikipedia next time I mention it. --Eplack 09:47, 11 January 2007 (UTC)

		The Original Barnstar
		Looking back, I think you deserve this for your contributions to the article. -- Eplack136.160.144.217 (talk) 13:52, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Ferrets article

Please feel free to take whatever the problem that you have with my reversion of your recent edit to this article is as far as you like. A second opinion could only be helpful. --Malleus Fatuarum 23:17, 8 October 2007 (UTC)

I see that you have reverted without any further discussion. Fair enough, the article was very poor anyway, so I suppose that percentage-wise you haven't made it all that worse. --Malleus Fatuarum 01:32, 9 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Custer

Good edit. Changing it to cavalry commander bypasses any future drama on the topic that might occur.⇒ SWATJester ^{Denny Crane.} 22:18, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

Roger that, thanks. Real quick, what do you think of editing the John Allen Muhammad entry from "Beltway Sniper", Gulf war veteran, former NOI member to just Convicted "Beltway Sniper", or something similar? It seems the "veteran" or "Nation of Islam member" parts are just incidentals and not really things that made him a famous former soldier, i.e., everyone in that section is a veteran, ourselves included. Just a thought. -- AzureCitizen 22:31, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Battle assembly article getting promoted!

Azure, after we've both added a lot to the battle assembly article, I submitted it for peer review from the Military History WikiProject. So far, it's been rated "start" head over and check out the discussion page and maybe we can bump it up a notch or two. --Eplack 08:35, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Moved article

I have moved the discussion in reference to United States Cavalry to the discussion page of the article discussion page in order to keep the messages in one consolidated location, which can be found http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:United_States_Army_Cavalry -TabooTikiGod 19:13, 3 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Scope of Counterintelligence

Yes, the US intelligence community page uses the limited definition of counterintelligence. You'll note, however, that this definition disagrees with JCS Pub 1-02 and other doctrinal guides, both US and non-US. I think that USIB definition is dangerous, and wanted to present it a broader context, specifically that it is redefining and restricting responsibility. I would very much like to see agreement on that redefinition from the Congressional intelligence committees, but, AFAIK, it hasn't been brought to them.

CIA keeps reorganizing on the subject, so you had Angleton doing counterespionage under the name "CI Staff", with Osborne doing everything else in the Office of Security. Without making too much of a POV issue of it, I wanted to show the contrast side-by-side. In my reasonably professional opinion, the current Administration is trying to make everything OPSEC, and makes more and more use of assorted sensitive-but-unclassified labels outside the declassification system. While there is flux with the retirement of the director of the Information Security Oversight Office, there have been both unprecedented activities both in reclassifying declassified information, and also in putting things into categories covered neither by FOIA nor the declassification system.

I'm not trying to come at this from a partisan standpoint, but I am extremely concerned with the push to make more and more material restricted, including to the confusion of state and local law enforcement and emergency service organizations. Actually, I strenuously disagree OPSEC is "everyone's job", because the safe bureaucratic thing is to restrict everything. "Everyone" is not qualified to do objective risk assessment. As an example, going back quite a number of years, the Federal Telecommunications Standards Committee, in the late seventies, issued two standards covering the then-new Data Encryption Standard. FED-STD-1026 dealt with the algorithm, some aspects of key management, and communications protocols, had NIST as proponent, and was coordinated through the entire group. FED-STD-1027, which dealt with physical security of the cryptoequipment, was left exclusively to NSA.

Communications security is decidedly a specialist job, although the expertise is no longer limited to NSA alone. You may or may not have looked at the SIGINT#Defensive SIGINT material I wrote, but I discussed a range of issues with regard to COMSEC, not just cryptography, but compromising emanations, inadvertently induced radiations, side channels and covert channels. Of course, none of these is terribly useful if the crypto keys are left unprotected by physical means, or if cleartext is protected.

At the intersection of COMSEC and physical security is the proper threat assessment of SCIFs. As you presumably know, TEMPEST requirements have largely been eliminated for US facilities, as long as there is a reasonable physical exclusion zone. There's a bit of that in Radiofrequency MASINT.

Are we in agreement that counterespionage is a proper subset of counterintelligence, being principally a CIA responsibility when foreign and FBI domestically?

Apropos of personnel security, especially in the UK when MI5 was not compromised by Philby alone, but by Wright's and others suspicion that Soviet penetration into the executive suite meant that the positive vetting system could have been nullified. It was thankfully a bit more restrictive that the Golitsyn-Nosenko-Angleton affair was more restricted to CIA proper rather than a general clearance system, but, while the molehunt was underway, almost paralyzing Soviet Russia Division in the DO.

Not considering counterintelligence as a overall discipline, indeed including personnel, physical, communications, and other disciplines, all requiring specialized knowledge, means no one has responsibility for overall information and operational security. The new USIB definition, technical as it may be, could well be catastrophic for US security. Remember that Pearl Harbor was not a failure of collection or analysis, but of dissemination. If "OPSEC" restricts everything, what happens to the next warning? Howard C. Berkowitz 01:41, 28 October 2007 (UTC)

As a slight add-on, you might want to look at something that is still in working draft, User_talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox1-OverarchingIntelligence, along with User_talk:Hcberkowitz/Analysis. There has been some discussion, triggered by the SIGINT and MASINT work, that there needs to be something tying together the intelligence cycle, and those activities, such as CI, budget, and policymaker acceptance, that aren't strictly in the cycle. Just as I finally split articles from SIGINT and MASINT, the same is needed in the overall article, which really isn't covered elsewhere. Some UK editors have commented there needs to be reconciliation between newer US military doctrine and NATO CCIRM, and that may be the place. Howard C. Berkowitz 01:46, 28 October 2007 (UTC)

Sorry for the delay in getting back to you. I didn't return to Wikipedia until just after lunch today, and have carefully read what you posted in response. You began your posting with something which I think I should probably quote directly - for ease of reading I'm going to put it in italics: "Yes, the US intelligence community page uses the limited definition of counterintelligence. You'll note, however, that this definition disagrees with JCS Pub 1-02 and other doctrinal guides, both US and non-US." I'm having some trouble seeing that; could you please refer me to some specific examples where JCS 1-02 or other doctrinal guides (either US or non-US) include OPSEC and other security practices under counterintelligence?

JCS 1-02 defines counterintelligence as "counterintelligence — Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or internationalterrorist activities. Also called CI. See also counterespionage; countersabotage; countersubversion; security; security intelligence. (JP 2-0)

I was about to ask if you would feel more comfortable if "CI" were changed to "security", but that term, again, has become so broad as to mean nothing. It's not uncommon, when walking down a public sidewalk, to have some large individual bar one's way, muttering "security". Such an individual is often merely a bodyguard or generic entourage member for an entertainment or sports figure. If they show me valid law enforcement credentials, I will listen to what they claim, but, if they can't demonstrate lawful authority, I may mutter back "prosperity" and continue on my way. If they touch me without lawful authority, I suppose we may have to find out who had the better sensei.

I also noted that you later referred to the USIB definition as "new," but I'm having trouble with that as well, as it follows what I've been doctrinally taught by DoD CI schooling in resident course instruction in 1987, 1990, 1996, and 2004; that OPSEC, COMSEC, INFOSEC, personnel security, physical security, etc., do not fall under CI, and are not within the direct scope of CI activities, units, or organizations.

I can only say that I've encountered attempts to manage terms since I had my first clearance in 1967 or so, so 1980s definitions indeed do feel a bit new.

Note that the DoD a broad definition, including countersabotage, which is hard to imagine without physical security being a major component. Part of my being conflicted is that the USIB OPSEC definition is so broad, so vague, that it essentially says nothing to me. At the same time, I'm seeing growth of a "conceal everything in the name of OPSEC" culture, which flies in the face of decades of work on more open national security processes. I wrote my first policy paper on information protection in the early seventies, under the auspices of the Ripon Society, which got me fairly good access to policymakers. Sensible openness means that there is intelligent review, but the things that truly need protection are held tightly. I'm afraid that the homeland security color codes and other activities substitute theater for rational policy.

What I'm hearing you describe is counterespionage, not counterintelligence, whatever the courseware may have called it. My greatest concern here is OPSEC, which once meant something specific but, to me, has been generalized to the point of meaninglessness. EO 12333 never defines it, so I don't know how to rationalize OPSEC as part, or not part, of CI.

Further, this article is not about "US OPSEC" or "US CI". Conversations with British and other colleagues are difficult in that they restrict more of their definitions, but there is a strong sense of disagreement with the US definition.

It is not that they aren't very important in their own right; it's just that they are not considered CI. Further, the USIB definition is clearly drawn from Executive Order 12333, which established back in 1981 that counterintelligence did not include personnel security, physical security, document (information) security, or COMSEC in paragraph 3.4(a). Can you please explain why you perceive this to be a "new" concept, or one that has not followed by all US Intelligence activities as directed by EO 12333 a quarter century ago?

I am willing to agree that EO 12333 does not start by defining these, but, under paragraph 3.4(g)(3), it leaves a wide scope for essentially anything being defined as a counterintelligence activity. In other words, 3.4(g)(3) trumps 3.4(a).

Perhaps your primary concern or argument as to why OPSEC and other security practices should fall under counterintelligence is more of a philosophical one, that when considering CI, in the broadest possible definition, it should be concerned with countering all aspects of intelligence collection by foreign nations, and thus, since something like OPSEC or physical security or the other fields help prevent that collection, it must be a part of CI. Although I can appreciate that in the broadest sense, I see plenty of practical problems in application. I mentioned earlier that OPSEC was "everybody's job," and you disagreed.

If you can give me an unambiguous definition of OPSEC, that doesn't easily fall into either the trap of either keeping information away from those with a national security need to know, or being able to conceal embarrassing but not privileged information, I will examine that. Failure to defend Pearl Harbor in 1941 came, in part, from so much security that the operators didn't have information they needed. OPERATION EAGLE CLAW, the attempt to rescue the Teheran embassy hostages, did follow "OPSEC"...to the point that the critical helicopter crews did not train in joint operations, and weather and area specialists with full clearances were not consulted. I've personally been deceived by Paul H. Lemmen, who was able to conceal a con game with references to "OPSEC".

I can respect that, but from a CI perspective, we can't possibly put that task or burden on our CI personnel and agencies, who already have their hands full with the high-level CI fight. OPSEC and the other SEC disciplines must be incorporated down to the lowest level, in everything that we do, for everyone, in order to be effective. From a common office office worker at their desk in a non-intelligence activity practicing proper INFOSEC by keeping SF704 coversheets in place or initialing the SF 702 everytime they open their GSA container, to a communications worker using proper procedures in handling COMSEC materials, to even a physical security officer making sure that room keys are issued and properly accounted for, every person plays a part in helping to defend against the intelligence collection methods employed by the other side.

It's not happening. We are so busy with the visible that we ignore the real threats. Let me go back to the early seventies work, and draw contrasts. I had extensive interviews with the then director of security at CIA, who told me his nightmare was the cleared staffer smuggling out documents every day. In contrast, at that time, the Marines were still guarding the corridors at Fort Meade, with a reputation of firing three times before crying "halt", and apparently there to protect not against the trusted individual violating trust, but to buy time, when the Soviet Guards Airborne Division landed on the roof, to buy time to trigger the destruction charges. At that time, which agency was having more information leaking? CIA or NSA? CIA's position, as expressed by Howard Osborne, was to be sure that people understood the reason for security roles and cooperated intelligently. NSA was the large club of "never say anything".

Please take a quick look the wiki article on INFOSEC and note the poster someone put up at top right: "Security is everyone’s responsibility," ergo, OPSEC is "everybody's job." I think you mentioned that "everyone is not qualified to do objective risk assessment," and I would agree with you there, but objective risk assessments can be left to CI experts

Again, my major objection is to the current usage of OPSEC, and I'm willing to negotiate almost everything else. Unfortunately, I know of no word or phrase, beside CI, that hasn't been corrupted. The CI people rarely are qualified to do COMSEC or INFOSEC.

while the functional realm of OPSEC and the other security disciplines remain a task for everybody. I think you also stated that you believe not considering counterintelligence as a overall discipline, to include the SEC disciplines, means no one has responsibility for overall information and operational security.

Correct.

All I can say in response is that lumping the SEC disciplines in with CI still won't make one entity responsible for overall information and operational security - our CI agencies and personnel can't possibly do that job, it is up to every rank and file individual to employ the SEC disciplines and make them part and parcel of their jobs.

If no one is responsible at a high level, and again not necessarily a US level, I don't believe it will happen.

Returning directly to the issue on the Wikipedia entry on Counter-intelligence, I think the accepted consensus and doctrine in the US Intelligence Community

Again, this is meant not to be US-specific.

is that counterintelligence is specifically contemplated to refer to CI activities which detect and neutralize the intelligence operations of foreign intelligence services (when I started in the 80s, we called them HOIS, not FIS), both in "information gathered" and "activities conducted" to prevent espionage and sabotage, but is not interpreted to include OPSEC, COMSEC, INFOSEC, etc., which are separate and defensive security practices in their own right.

A key to what you just said is "foreign intelligence services". Today's threat is more subtle; the techniques that targeted the KGB aren't necessarily appropriate to much smaller, non-national actors.

The former is tasked specifically to CI agencies, and the latter is a broad responsibility of all government and contractor personnel everywhere. In that regard, the Wikipedia entry on counterintelligence should really reflect the accepted consensus of the intelligence community, as opposed to what you or I might think it ought to be. After considering the issue, and only in the limited sense of what should appear under that wiki entry, are we in agreement there?

No. I think you are limiting your definition to the US intelligence community, in a period where security is politicized badly.

You asked if I we mutually agree that counterespionage is a proper subset of counterintelligence, being principally a CIA responsibility when foreign and FBI domestically - absolutely. CE is the crown jewel of CI, but CI activities encompass more than just CE cases.

Here we agree.Howard C. Berkowitz 21:21, 28 October 2007 (UTC)

Can I ask where inside that definition you specifically feel OPSEC and the other SEC disciplines were meant by DoD to be "included" when they defined counterintelligence in JCS 1-102? Is it "activities conducted to protect against... ...other intelligence activities?"

Unfortunately, the definitions are rather circular. Yes, that's the closest phrase.

Part of my being conflicted is that the USIB OPSEC definition is so broad, so vague, that it essentially says nothing to me. At the same time, I'm seeing growth of a "conceal everything in the name of OPSEC" culture, which flies in the face of decades of work on more open national security processes.

I can't really speak to that, but I will trust that you've observed plenty of things to lead you to that conclusion. However, if the USIB OPSEC definition is broad and vague, and you feel that OPSEC is becoming overused, wouldn't that be all the more reason why we shouldn't lump OPSEC in with CI? Advocate for more effective OPSEC process rather than try to make it a subset of something which is already distincly defined?

I suppose it depends what you mean by "advocate". Trying very hard to keep this out of the US political realm, while I might argue for a more efficient OPSEC process in Wikipedia, it is my sincere belief that Cheney (especially) and Bush do not want a efficient, clear definition. They want to have a vagueness under which "security" or "OPSEC" can be used, at will, to justify any action, any withholding of data. My hope is that Secretary of Defense Gates may have brought enough intellectual integrity to the job that this trend might reverse.

Perhaps EO 12333 never really defines it because it wasn't considered to be a part of CI? Note that in 1988, the same President who signed EO 12333 issued National Security Decision Directive 298 that established a national OPSEC policy and outlined the five-step OPSEC process.

I can't say. Speculating why the Reagan White House put different things in different documents would be pure guesswork, unless some primary source has explained it.

Agreed, that the article is not about "US OPSEC" or "US CI," but the concept of counterintelligence as currently practiced by nations. However, I haven't seen anything that would lead me to believe that the British or other nations consider CI to include items like information security, personnel security, physical security, etc. Are you aware of nations or services which do?

I took a long, careful look at this but was unable to come to the same conclusion. I think what you're trying to point out is that 3.4(g)(3) gives wide scope for other programs or agencies within the IC being designated by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. But that has never happened - the President has never designated security concepts, practices, and programs like physical security, personnel security, information security, etc., as CI activities. So, since 1981, 3.4(a) stands untrumped in its explicit definition that CI does not include personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs, and that is where we are today.

Again, I'm truly trying to keep this out of the US political arena. Nevertheless, that the President has never done so does not give me any confidence that he will not do so in the future. The...interesting...doctrine of "unitary authority" to do virtually anything under the authority of commander-in-chief, to me, flies in the face of Constitutional tradition and the separation of powers. At this point, I might agree that if the Congress passed a definition, and the President signed it with no "signing statements" saying he might not follow it if he so decided, then that could be a definition of OPSEC. What would be wise to put into such a definition is a separable matter.

I suspect I can't really give you a satisfying definition of OPSEC that you won't find potentially flawed (wink). However, despite how important the lessons of Pearl Harbor, Operation Eagle Claw, and other similar events are, they don't necessarily paint a clear picture as to why the SEC disciplines should be defined as CI activities today.

Again, my major objection is to the current usage of OPSEC, and I'm willing to negotiate almost everything else.

If I may make a heartfelt suggestion... why not work to improve the Wikipedia entry on Operations security instead, rather than trying to make it a part of the CI article?

I've spent enough time around medicine to know that at times, the patient isn't going to get better. This is an equivalent. I do not believe the current Administration will commit to any definition that might constrain it. In other words, I believe OPSEC to be semantically null in the present climate. I use, therefore, other disciplines such as INFOSEC, COMSEC, personnel and physical security, CI, and CE because they retain meaning.

Again, this is meant not to be US-specific.

Agreed, but can you refer us to any non-US intelligence services who consider OPSEC and the SEC disciplines to be an integral part of counterintelligence activities?

The problem is that I see the emphasis on "OPSEC" to be largely US usage. While this would be reaching back historically, classical (as in WWII) Operations Security is actually a subset of Strategic Deception. I believe this is consistent with the London Controlling Section (UK) and Joint Security Control (US).

We should explore then what we consider the definition to be in the non-US community... then see where we can split the difference. Perhaps if the non-US community includes the SEC disciplines in CI, then we can differentiate in the Counter-intelligence article the separate practices so that distinction is apparent (and the US position can be easily sourced, as unsourced material is easily challenged). How does that sound to you?

I cannot, in good conscience, use US definitions of OPSEC until they start to mean something again, rather than, for example, being open-ended invitations to make Homeland Security "sensitive but unclassified" warnings outside the scope of any declassification system, outside the scope of the Freedom of Information Act, and outside Congressional review.

I would be willing to speak in terms of strategic deceptions as a means of what I'd call "protecting operations" rather than OPSEC. The chaotic ways in which soldiers are being told, on alternate days, that they can or cannot have blogs, and they can or cannot put things in email, have caused me to lose all confidence in the US approach to OPSEC. OPSEC, in the classical sense, is about protecting specific operations and capabilities. It has morphed to mean "hide all details about US activities". Ironically, the Soviets didn't like OPSEC; it had to be in the USA Institute rather than the GRU or KGB. I really don't think that there is a large OSINT effort in a pentagon-shaped cave in Pakistan.

Each of the books I've written on network design start with "what problem are you trying to solve?" I can't discern a clear definition of the problem OPSEC is intended to solve. It would be Original Research for me to try to define it.

If you can define some generic term, other than OPSEC, that includes CI/CE, and, perhaps at a parallel level, the other security disciplines, I could, in good conscience, write to it. Suggestions? Howard C. Berkowitz 00:15, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

Let me try a variant:

I read your reply last night just before turning in, and tried to think of some generic term that would meet this criteria, but couldn't. Perhaps there is a reason why it is so elusive - the concepts are often complicated, and the US Community has struggled with OSPEC for a long time. I don't envy the troubles you face trying to integrate this concepts and writing on them, and I'm sorry I can't be of much help. I am also no fan of the current administration's policy efforts in these areas, and am troubled by things like the WH-DOJ events transpiring just after 9/11 and other events which are still playing themselves out.

Trying to make headway on the issue of the SEC disciplines (Information Security, Personnel Security, Physical Security, Communications Security, etc.) being added into the Counter-intelligence article in a major re-write, I think we need to figure out exactly where we agree and disagree so that we can try to make some progress there, as I must admit it's actually been confusing to me in our conversations. I'll start with suggesting two statements that you can let me know where you stand with either "agreed" or "disagreed," with "disagreed" responses including (if I might ask for) a direct explanation to help me understand why you disagree. Does that sound reasonable? Feel free to put similar questions to me if you'd like.

Let me observe that when I go to do a security assessment in, for example, a hospital with VIP patients that would have paparazzi/gossip (i.e., spies, but without the honesty and character) eager to find out what is done to whom, I often analyze, write policies, and design every one of the SEC's, including regulatory compliance with contradictory regulations.

The non-US intelligence community (e.g., the rest of the world) may or may not consider the SEC disciplines to be a part of CI.

Agree.

The US intelligence community does not consider the SEC disciplines to be part of CI.

This is touchy. I believe that a good deal of that is security theater, with mandates from a political level, especially now, which really wasn't coordinated through the intelligence community. I'm willing to say that the EO/USIB says that, with a loophole, and the DoD definition can be read either way.

I, too, am still searching for an overall term. Let me throw in something that is real, but hard to define. We have security monitors on radio nets, looking for inappropriate use. Calling BEADWINDOW (see Sigint#Monitoring Friendly Communications, to me, is about a clear an example of a legitimate OPSEC technique, which is assigned (typically) to a COMSEC unit because they have the receivers for it. Howard C. Berkowitz 17:15, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

I'm rapidly wondering if, whether intending it or not, you are thinking of CI as primarily CE. Even so, that would touch on the definition of espionage.

"counterintelligence — Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or internationalterrorist activities". In the narrowest sense, how can one prevent against Boris and Natasha if one does not put the Seeekrit Plan in the safe (i.e., physical security)? Personnel security, we hope, finds the spies before they can do much damage.

It's hard for me to conceptualize "countering [foreign] intelligence" and then restrict myself to not covering the defenses against means of intelligence collection.

From the same source, "espionage — The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation."

"receiving" logically considers the threats against which INFOSEC and COMSEC protect. Howard C. Berkowitz 20:42, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

Aside from any political theatrics, whether one calls the "master discipline" OPSEC or CI, does there not have to be someone with the ultimate security responsibility?

It seems to me that we would both agree that the SEC programs are important, we just disagree on whether or not those defenses against means of intelligence collection are doctrinally considered to be within the scope of counterintelligence as the U.S. government approaches it. Or perhaps you actually agree with that as well, you just disagree as to whether or not those defenses should be doctrinally considered to be within the scope of CI? --

They need to be in the scope of something, or there is a guarantee there will be gaps. I see there being two critical problems:

If there is no overall discipline, there will be gaps to exploit
OPSEC is so vague that it becomes something that has a chilling effect on proper citizen participation and Congressional oversight.

It's one thing to talk about a small direct action or strategic recon patrol, but, against a sophisticated force, you may manage a bit of tactical surprise. In 2003, the Iraqis could have been given a nicely calligraphed map of where and when the heavy forces would arrive, and it wouldn't have made too much difference. There was a surprising amount of deception and surprise with the initial attack in 1991, especially the waves of hard and soft kill SEAD interspersed with direct attacks at centers of gravity.

There isn't that much rational threat assessment, IMHO, to justify the suppression of speech, and much of things such as aviation searches. I can still think of some fairly nasty things TSA would not catch. Howard C. Berkowitz 23:41, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

I think we are converging, and let me propose a "Gordian Knot" sort of solution. What if we create an article, under the intelligence cycle, with one of the following titles:

Security (i.e., nothing about the kind of SEC in the title. All the "SECs" are subheadings or daughter articles)
Protecting the intelligence cycle (tricky. Lets us refer to CI in a narrowly defined separate article. The problem, however, is it doesn't really address protecting broader national interests, the role of the action organizations -- military, law enforcement, emergency response. Should it?)
Protecting the national interest (ugh. Says nothing really, but brings in everybody).

Before proceeding further, some questions. Who/what organization or discipline does threat assessment and prioritzation for all the SECs, in these very different environments?

NSA HQ has people with access to almost everything, so they must have robust personnel security. We'll assume the classic "never say anything" and brief everyone to report potential recruitment, etc. Since they talk to everyone, they need strong COMSEC. They may well overdo physical security; Ft. Meade always looks like it's ready to be hit by a brigade, where Langley looks like a hotel)
The TOC in Fallujah (e.g., they well might get hit by a force, in too close for heavy support. They need COMSEC on tactical things, but NSA isn't exactly going after their comms. Recruitment? Yeah, right.)
An electronics system assembly shop in Silicon Valley. Theft is a real concern. Recruitment of someone to smuggle things out is a serious concern, but this is assembly, not engineering, and their external comms are mostly administrative -- and they don't have people that really know theory of operation or employment of what they build.
Lockheed Skunk Works. You'd better believe there will be both infiltration and recruiting. Comms are sensitive. Perimeter security needs to be good, but intruders get spotted quickly.
US Naval Academy, just before the Army-Navy game.

If we can define a structure that indexes all the SECs, redirects CI to be HUMINT defense (with CE being active measures), and defines who is responsible for protecting the intelligence community (rather than the nation), I think we might be there. Howard C. Berkowitz 17:16, 30 October 2007 (UTC)

If I have time today, I'll create an article, tentatively called "Intelligence security management". Alternate wordings much appreciated. That doesn't flow as nicely as I'd like, but it fits more with the other titles in the hierarchy:

Intelligence cycle (I left tasking in here since it's so much a management function, but perhaps I will split that out.
- Intelligence collection management
  - SIGINT
    - 3 subordinate SIGINT articles, perhaps needing more splitting. Need to resolve COMINT, which points back to SIGINT, and ELINT & FISINT, which are fragmentary
  - MASINT
    - 6 subordinate articles -- maybe some tweaking, some getting a little large
  - HUMINT -- take a look. I cleaned up a bit yesterday, but it's pretty skimpy. All I did was try to talk about sources and add a few, not methods.
  - OSINT: I haven't touched it, ironically given that I do a lot of it
  - TECHINT: not touched
  - IMINT: mot touched
- Intelligence analysis management
  - Intelligence analysis
- Intelligence dissemination management (not up yet)
  - 'Intelligence dissemination and use( not up yet) By "use", I mean the addition of net assessment (or what the Soviets called "correlation of forces, which I think is a better term), and simulation & gaming based on intelligence data
- Intelligence security management
  - Counterespionage, cut back to anti-HUMINT measures. My gut tells me that personnel security, especially clearance procedure, really belongs here rather than a separate article -- when you consider continuing monitoring, it's CI. CE will go in here as well.
  - COMSEC, which exists but I can edit; I'm better on emanations, traffic flow, and key management than crypto proper...when I read the math for the AES, I said "OK, that's a partial elliptical function. Let's both back away, our hands visible, and no one gets hurt." Maybe I will dig into the math someday
  - INFOSEC, again something I can do, although it's a time issue
  - Physical security exists but is more commercial. Should we work in a summary of the published SCIF construction requirements?
  - Personnel security -- there's some material on security clearances, but not quite on topic
  - OPSEC -- I get emotional about that. Maybe I can deal first with horrible examples like Pearl Harbor and EAGLE CLAW, and then work around them. The true value of OPSEC really should be how it frustrates intelligence analysis or subordinate articles.

Just as a personal note, no, I'm not retired, but consulting is a little slow at the moment. It turns out that the MASINT is quite relevant to the commercial remote sensing I'm doing for commercial fishing. My fisherman business partner bops me when I start talking about detecting an Oscar II two convergence zones out and prosecuting the contact, and reminding me that I need to be thinking about different fish, like tuna and scallops (MASINT like techniques involved with both) Howard C. Berkowitz 16:11, 31 October 2007 (UTC)

You might find it interesting to look at the Army Counterintelligence FM 34-60 of 1995, at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-60/f34-60_3.htm I can't remember if that's what I had in mind at the time I wrote about all the "SEC's" being under CI, but this version is rather explicit about defensive CI in both multithreat briefings, and in countermeasures against each of the major intelligence collection disciplines. You can look at my working draft of what is to be the CI article under User talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox0-SIGINT Platforms (didn't make it a wikilink, and ignore the title). It's probably fair to say that current CI doctrine has evolved to being principally counter-HUMINT, but FM 34-60, for example, clearly puts OPSEC, COMSEC monitoring, personnekl security, etc., under CI. Howard C. Berkowitz 00:28, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

I've tracked down the NSDD on OPSEC, and browsed until I found a DOE site that mentioned that OPSEC had been formalized as a result of a CINCPAC or JCS study in 1965, called PURPLE DRAGON, which was to figure out how the other side would know when ARC LIGHT and ROLLING THUNDER missions were coming in. Now I have Wikitrouble. From Vietnam days, I remember reading the Lessons Learned papers, which automatically declassified in 3 years, that explained, at least, how the VC knew about incoming B-52s, and I sort of remember ROLLING THUNDER opsec problems. As far as citing these, however, the online document about PURPLE DRAGON is not attributed, and says that NSA inherited OPSEC mostly because the people that did PURPLE DRAGON wound up at NSA.

From a Wikipedia standpoint, I don't know if there is any practical way to cite the references. I know they were in MACV "Lessons Learned" publications, around 1967, declassify after 3 years. Somewhere in the bowels of the Army, there are probably microfilms of those documents, but I only remember the approximate title -- yet I remember the exact OPSEC violations and they might not be bad examples.

After going through a few more documents, including the NSDD and the NDU paper you mentioned, there is some language that suggests:

OPSEC complements the other SEC's, but doesn't include them
CI is now defined mostly as counter-HUMINT
OPSEC, as written, makes reasonable sense for combat operations, but I'm walking a very thin line about the Wiki Sin of OR to try to interpret what the assorted authors actually meant. After 40 years of living in the DC area, why should I be surprised to find a number of policies being contradictory?
I thought OPSEC might cover all threats to intelligence, but it definitely doesn't, even to the point that the DCIA has some authority that neither DIRSA nor NCIX can override, apparently, on some sources and methods -- which read like "intelligence community" rather than CIA, and I don't know if this is an allusion to clandestine services, or someone cutting and pasting from when the DNI didn't exist and it's old language about the DCI, not DCIA.
At this point, I don't think there is an umbrella term for either the overarching security issues just for intelligence, or the possibly broader scope for the US generally. If the underlying "counterterrorism is part of everything" meme holds, I might get it under intelligence cycle security.
Even for an old OSINT person, I'm amazed how much I've found. Howard C. Berkowitz 05:23, 6 November 2007 (UTC)

Never, in the course of human events, has a US Army doctrine been "blurry" :-)

You might find it interesting to look at the Army Counterintelligence FM 34-60 of 1995. I can't remember if that's what I had in mind at the time I wrote about all the "SEC's" being under CI, but this version is rather explicit about defensive CI in both multithreat briefings, and in countermeasures against each of the major intelligence collection disciplines.

Good reference on your part to find and point out, I'd meant to dig my paper copy out and give it a look but it isn't physically located where I'm at here and I didn't think to look for it online. By defining CI Operations as "special" and "general," and then explictly including support to force protection and security programs in the latter, it makes a good argument that SEC programs really are part of CI or are closely connected with it, insofar as the field manual puts these into practice for the Army. One thing you probably noticed is that it says that CI General Operations support the SEC programs, without actually saying that CI General Operations include the SEC programs or control them, but further down in the manual the line becomes a little more blurry. Two references I found last week that I wanted to share with you for good current sourcing material for US CI are here and here, please take a look when you get the chance. The second reference is the better of the two and includes an annotated defintion of CI on page 5.

Thanks for the second. I had referenced the first. You are quite correct that the 1995 manual starts out with some useful distinction between general and special operations, which fit my original thesis somewhat better. While I didn't go to this manual at first when drafting the article, I may well have read it before.

I think it's fair to say that over 12 years or so, there have been changes in the US definition of CI. It's been much harder to find references for NATO, other alliances, and other countries. There may be a discussion of the changed philosophy in an open journal like the Army War College's Parameters, but it also might be in something like CIA's Studies in Intelligence, with both unclassified and classified versions.

Right or wrong, there's been a trend to more classification in CI, and especially the HUMINT-related parts of CI. I note that the new CI HUMINT manual is classified, and other documents say that the definition of "counterintelligence force protection [human] source intelligence" is classified. In a demonstration of OSINT, it is in the 1995 CI FM, and also in two research papers, one from the Air Command and Staff College and one from the Naval Postgraduate School. It's arguable if that the US has more or less benefit from such classification, as the Air Force paper specifically addresses reorganization and funding of force protection. The author has some specific observations as how procedures at the time failed to protect Khobar Towers, although, of course, his changes might not have saved it either. That one hits close to home; a friend of mine, who is not a professor at one of the service institutes, someone who wears the Master Nerd Badge, also now wears the Airman's Medal for repeated trips into the wreckage to pull out injured personnel, while he himself was injured.

I make the observation about the policies being argued, because I think they could do more good for the US if presented to Congress for funding and authorization, than some al-Qaeda analyst reading how we define a classified phrase.

You can look at my working draft of what is to be the CI article under User talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox0-SIGINT Platforms (didn't make it a wikilink, and ignore the title). It's probably fair to say that current CI doctrine has evolved to being principally counter-HUMINT, but FM 34-60, for example, clearly puts OPSEC, COMSEC monitoring, personnel security, etc., under CI. Howard C. Berkowitz 00:28, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

Wow, you have been busy! Impressive. I only gave it a quick read just now but I will return to look at it more in depth, and once again you've obviously put a lot of time and quality effort into this. It's going to greatly advance the quality of the main space article when you replace the current entries. If I have any suggestions, do you want me to make any proposed edits, right there on the sandbox page? I figure you can easily revert or undo something I edit if you feel it it doesn't help or if the original text was better, and I won't take issue with it. I didn't see anything right off the bat that I even thought should be changed, I just wanted to ask first. --AzureCitizen 15:59, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

Since I keep tweaking it, and am, I suspect, where it's near the point of diminishing returns before just publishing it, either make changes in it but put them in italics, or, preferably, put it on the discussion page so I don't miss it. That can be either my general page here or the page in my sandbox (probably better here). Incidentally, originally to speed edit time, I took out the whole section on CI failures and agencies, which is sitting in User talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-CIfail. Since I've gotten better at wikilinking between articles, and the main CI article is getting huge, it may be better to put that case study material in a separate, but thoroughly cross-linked article. Indeed, one thing I was about to do was to take the list of 20 do's and don'ts for running a CI operation, taken from a CIA article, and crunch them down but also give them Wiki headings so I can give cross-links internally in the article and between articles.

As a pure matter of keeping articles of manageable size, what do you think of the "overarching SEC" article referencing the 1995 definitions, and then putting the CI draft into the position of "counter-HUMINT", just as COMSEC (and other things) are counter-SIGINT and SATRAN is counter-IMINT? What that might eventually look like, hierarchically, could be:

Intelligence cycle management

Intelligence cycle security (includes the 1995 CI manual definition of SECs, updated for new technology)

Counterintelligence (fills the counter-COMINT role)

Case study article, maybe combining list of services or eventually breaking out the list of services

---maybe Counter-SIGINT, which might be a lot of crossreferences. Here I start getting into trouble, because the 1995 CI manual definition of "SECs" doesn't track countermeasures to the other intelligence collection disciplines. I hate articles that are really a collection of stubs on some of the SECs (or that I could fill out later, like using the unclassified SCIF construction guide as an example of physical SEC). On the other paw, I had to stop and think what C-HUMINT and C-IMINT and C-SIGINT meant when I saw them in the 1995 manual, and their content may be better under the collection discipline. The CI draft certainly covers C-HUMINT, originally without the material about personnel security. Starting from the point of the Slammer Project (see table in the CI draft) on why people commit espionage, personnel security might fit neatly there. INFOSEC and OPSEC are hard to place.

Howard C. Berkowitz 17:20, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

I published the "Intelligence Cycle Security" and "Counterintelligence" articles, thinking it was time to get wider comment. Last night, I think I figured out some of the conflicts on organization, which may relate to NSDD 298 being drafted before the DNI and NCIX were in position, and there are some jurisdictional conflicts.

The problem remains that there seems to be no term, except the "Intelligence Cycle Security" I invented, that covers all "SECs" relevant to intelligence, and, I think by reasonable extension, counterterrorism. Intelligence, rather than shooting, CT seems to be accepted as a subset of CI.

I am going to let the articles simmer and see if there are more comments, and then possibly contact the IOSS staff to see if they have guidance that clears up the conflicts. Who knows -- maybe this hasn't occurred to them. There are certainly a lot of policy differences between the Army FMs of the nineties and the current documents, especially with some things going into JP's rather than FM's. Classifying the CI JP doesn't exactly help my problem. Howard C. Berkowitz 15:40, 6 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] (Latest)

Howdy! I see we are both on, late in the evening... things relaxed a bit and I've been making sporadic edits over the last hour or so, including restoring the list of CI organizations, and sure enough, you caught that quick and improved it by adding several more.

There was one I have to relate, about US Army Criminal Investigation Command, that often confuses many people in its prior history and current scope. Although the initials are similar, Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) were actually separate organizations and were never connected; take a look at this and this for reference..

Got it. Hadn't really checked the details, as it struck me as just another example of crazed abbreviations. Actually, the US Army wasn't the worst. I can remember feeling like Job in that Jules Pfeiffer cartoon of "why me?" a couple of times. One, when I learned that the NKVD and the NVKD were different incarnations of the same Soviet organization. Two, when I was working at a Navy installation, and realized I was responding to COMNAVSECGRUACTPACDET without any fuss, and knowing what it meant.

I have read the CI article now from top to bottom, and am still amazed at what I high quality re-write you've instituted. One thing I did want to ask you about, I find that when I click on the references that are often at the end of paragraphs, the browser makes a click noise to indicate it received the command, but nothing actually happens. Might be something wrong with my copy of internet explorer, but I wanted to ask you if you'd noticed the same and if there was something going on there that isn't working right. Have you noticed this?

No, but I use Firefox. I find IE sufficiently buggy that I use it only for things where there is no alternative, such as using certain Microsoft system-checking tools.

As far as the rewrite, and I'm still juggling several articles and debating what goes where, it's actually better in this part of Wikipedia than in some of the computer networking areas where there is huge misinformation--of course, I once had to explain to a professor that the reason I believed his interpretation of a paper was wrong, and mine was right, because I wrote the original. Here, there seems to be a certain fascination with Rambo-type operations, but people that find the underlying connections of intelligence interesting seem fairly rare.

there really seem to be gaps in the current US conceptual model, with real areas of responsibility that SHOULD have a name, but don't. Whether these are things that fell through the cracks, such as no one updating NSDD 298 after the DNI was formed, is one possibility. While I thoroughly understand the need for protecting, I also find a tendency, in the current administration, to be constantly looking for ways to hide things that properly should get calm review. Where one document explicitly says OPSEC is about UNCLAS stuff, and another document says the threat assessments need to be classified, the left hand isn't talking to the right hand.

Some of the counter-INT things are now duplicated, which is inelegant. If you had said to me, a while ago, that counter-SIGINT was simple, I might not have agreed, except after I started thinking about counter-MASINT. Oh, I can think of countermeasures to a great many MASINT systems, but each approach is unique to a sub-technology. It's not a simple matter like finding a SIGINT receiver and doing hard or soft kill.

There's still work to be done on SIGINT, but, in looking at all of this work, I'm occasionally asking myself who, if anyone, will make use of it. After having published a few books, I'm not sure I want to take on another project, given Jeffrey Richelson does a fine job, and I'm getting near the edge of what, even though I'm working from open source, that I'm not sure should be discussed in public.

Anyway, thanks for the support. It's good to know someone is looking at it. Howard C. Berkowitz 04:27, 7 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Updates

FYI, I think I've started on a joint cleanup of CI, HUMINT, and the existing espionage article by setting up an article "Clandestine HUMINT", which can pick up the relationships, and then make HUMINT/Espionage the practice of creating sources (with the caveat not all clandestine HUMINT is espionage), where CI is the counter-HUMINT concerned largely with counterespionage. I moved espionage by country into its own section, cutting it back, where possible, to organizations that actually do espionage. Some countries had all HUMINT-related organizations listed.

For some of the non-espionage parts of HUMINT, I've published the start of an article on "Special Reconnaissance Organizations" and am working on a substantive article on SR, which, for now, is in User talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox0-SIGINT Platforms.

It's my hope to start consolidating some really stubby articles on things like "double agent", which lack, in any case, the nuances such as redoubling, defector vs. in-place, etc. This will probably apply to assorted espionage tradecraft, such as couriers and cutouts. There's no article on cell organization, especially some theoretical variants that are coming out of computer science, cryptology, etc.

I would appreciate your taking a look at the discussion page on "Intelligence Analysis", and indeed the intelligence hierarchy as time permits. Someone started a discussion on wanting to cut back intelligence analysis because it's "too wordy". Now, there are some things that might go into their own articles, and it's always possible to tighten text, but I'm a little concerned that we had gone without any serious, integrated discussion of the intelligence cycle, and the first response is of someone that wants to cut on general principles. It may indeed be too wordy, and I'd trust a reality check from you and some other people that contributed during the writing.

[edit] Intelligence analysis?

I saw you restored the edits, but didn't see a note on the talk page. Wrong page, maybe? I misread that he had restored the deletions, and did put my own suggestions on the page. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 02:22, 17 November 2007 (UTC)

I'm not sure the world needs another book on, to coin a phrase, the craft of intelligence, but if this is too wordy, maybe I should think that way, before the Men in Black come for me. You'll appreciate this -- I have a friend who is high in the Canadian parliamentary staff for military and foreign policy. At one point, I made one too many topical Canadian politial joke (I speak American as a native, fluent Canadian, reasonable English with Yorkshire when necessary, and adequate Australian. I very quickly drop to being able to order some dinner in Japanese, German, and Arabic). He threatened to send black helicopters for me, and I inquired if they would be Sea Kings, and, if so, in how many pieces and would FedEx deliver them? Howard C. Berkowitz 23:32, 11 November 2007 (UTC)

As far as non-espionage HUMINT, I'm working on Special Recon, already having started an article that lists SR-capable organizations.

[edit] Structure

See my user page http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Hcberkowitz#Military_Science_and_Intelligence.

I've just started on something that might pull together some tradecraft on the HUMINT side, starting with various ways of passing messages (couriers, dead drops, radio, steganography, even covert channels), protecting messages (encipherment, idea code), assorted people roles (courier, access agent, agent of influence, etc.). I might yet bring in some material from the Studies in Intelligence article by Ivan Serov on tradecraft. So, a Clandestine HUMINT tradecraft is another article.

I do have some material on financial secrecy, but I really don't know enough about clandestine funding to get to a complete article on my own.

Still debating, as apparently do others, if SAR/ISAR should move from Radar MASINT to IMINT, keeping things like counterartillery, missile tracking, etc. radar in MASINT. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 20:34, 17 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] MASINT pointers (I think)

To be honest, I'm not 100% sure what you have in mind, mostly because I don't have a good comparison. HUMINT might be a better comparison than SIGINT, because HUMINT has, at least, subdisciplines (SR and clandestine HUMINT for now--never mind CI and the overlaps of clandestine HUMINT operations), where the subordinate SIGINT entries are not subdisciplines.

Do I make any sense? Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 01:02, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Color me confused

I'm not sure what is going on with the browsers. What I see in the top, indented paragraph are links for the subdisciplines -- nothing seems especially bolded.

There's another effect that I wonder might be related. Look at any of the MASINT disciplines, say "Geophysical MASINT". In each of the discipline articles, I put a list of the six disciplines. Something, whether it's Wikipedia or the browser, is smart enough to avoid a loop: even though I have all six typed in as wikilinks, the one to "Geophysical MASINT" in the Geophysical MASINT article does not show as a wikilink, but as plain text. In the "Radar MASINT", there is a wikilink to Geophysical MASINT, but not to Radar MASINT.

Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 01:20, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] I was looking at diff

What should I look at?

[edit] Aha!

It looks great on your talk page. I have no idea what will happen with things that aren't strictly hierarchical, such as clandestine HUMINT techniques under both CI and HUMINT. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 01:47, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Box, I think

The box looks better, but I am distracted by a large cat who just climbed into a trash can that won't hold his weight. Does that ever happen to James Bond? Octopussy just isn't the same as the very affectionate, very large Mr. Clark. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 01:56, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Other templates

We may be making some WikiHistory here, as I don't know of a set of articles that are tied together the way we are doing it. On the one hand, it will make things more coherent, but that may be seen as bureaucratic. Mind you, we now have little groups of tradecraft scattered in odd places, often mixed with fiction, and not presenting a coherent picture.

I have a sense that this is backing into an Intelligence & Special Operations project, whether that's the intention or not. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 02:27, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Are you thinking of...

At MASINT,SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT, TECHINT having a box that goes up to intelligence collection management ? Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 02:16, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Sleep on it...

The navigation boxes will still be there. I'm encouraged to have seen what I consider the first serious discussion of the model, under intelligence cycle management, over report grading errors without going back and verifying the sequence. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 02:37, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Probably should be a new heading

But it's not. I put up clandestine HUMINT operational techniques, as well as several updates to counterintelligence. Yesterday, I found that the Canadians, maybe not in the most elegant of language, more comprehensively covered defensive CI, intelligence preparation for offensive CI, euphemisms that seemed to refer to offensive CI, and then distinguished it all from criminal intelligence. Tonight, I updated CI with some information I picked up that complements the Project Slammer "motivation for espionage" with motivation for terror.

In the HUMINT techniques, there's quite an extensive discussion, with my drawings, about clandestine cells led by case officers under diplomatic cover, led by NOC but still a national force, and then the somewhat different cell structure that may be al-Qaeda's model. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 02:28, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] About Lists and Similar Things

I have very mixed feelings about the utility of lists of organizations, at least the way they get created in broadly military areas in Wikipedia. With those feelings, however, is a strong suspicion that there is a demand for them, even if some of the lists don't make sense. On the one paw (I'm getting cat assistance with insomnia), there's a fascination with names of organizations, especially see-krit ones that remind someone of James Bond. Personally, I'd rather be reminded of Catwoman, although please do not remind the very affectionate Rhonda next to me. Eight pounds of Cattitude is great -- my sensei would love the way she can intimidate a dog ten times her size -- but I'd sort of like the two-legged variety.

The realities of service/operational politics, national level politics and "security theater", and true changes in doctrine will make any list need lots of maintenance. A list title may simply not match reality in a country with a fairly rational national security establishment, much less one that deliberately plays organizations against one another. Take the Third Reich: what was the counterintelligence organization in 1940? 1944, especially after July 20? SD der SS? Abwehr? Gestapo? Geiheime Feldpolizei? If you went back a few years, you'd find the Inland SD having much more power, until Ohlendorf fell out of favor. The Kripo might have gotten there when Nebe was still in the ascendant--two tragedies as men with some core of decency decided to "redeem" themselves by commanding Einsatzgruppen. Where did Fremden Heeres West and Fremden Herres Ost fit in positive intelligence, versus SD, versus Abwehr? Could one say the same things before and after Heydrich was dead?

Much the same kind of deliberate setting of bureaucracy against bureaucracy went on with the Soviets, and, for that matter, to the Czarist Okhrana, with the "civilian" security side constantly morphing from Cheka to OGPU to NKGB to NVKD to NKVD to MGB to KGB, with trying to fold national-level military organization into the political apparatus, with Party as well as State Security Organs and military, with ad hoc units like the Osoby Otdel and Smersh.

In a more rational political environment, there was the dissolution of OSS after WWII, the interim organizations before CIA, and then the evolution of the Army role for what originally was a UW mission that initially existed by being called Psyop under McClure. Early Special Forces had a fairly good handle on Eurasian UW, until the early sixties, as the UW mission began to extend to FID. SR, in Vietnam, arguably wandered among the mainstream SF, LRRPs, and SOG. DA was pretty ad hoc -- was Son Tay a DA or CT mission, or was hostage rescue consciously a mission at that point? Flash forward to the Iranian hostage crisis and the lost courage of the CF of EAGLE CLAW, with the subsequent infighting between SFOD and BLUE LIGHT. CIA paramilitary staff got in there somewhere, and is probably still somewhere in SR/DA/UW, depending on deniability, as is SF, but in the JSOC and SOC framework, with whatever isn't called ISA today. GOTHIC SERPENT and the fixes afterward. At the command level, National Counterterrorism Center? Something in DHS? FBI HRT? What about DA for a counterproliferation mission? Even cleared for everything, it is a constantly boiling stew, and I'm open literature only these days. Did sending the Defense HUMINT Service into the NCS mean all clandestine military SR went away? Yeah, right.

So CT versus CI organization lists, to say nothing of people that want to have lists of fictional organizations in there as well? At one point, the Brits seemed to be halfway stable, with SAS and SBS and SIS, but now assorted Northern Ireland units are SRR, with SFSG or whatever the other what-- combat support part of special forces? is called?

You see my confusion about lists. With the last article on clandestine HUMINT techniques, which, while totally written from open sources gets me a little uncomfortable, the offensive CI, counterterror, etc., missions get blurry again. Also, even in the open literature, there's some very creative thinking, as with AQ, about cell systems based on modern networking and fault tolerance theory, and things that make the highest-tech network centric warfare and swarm models not be totally incompatible with what,once mentioned, indicate some very subtle operational thinking is going on in AQ.

Hierarchies in Wiki? I don't know anymore, at least in the human source areas. I can call on my background in theoretical computer science to describe how a similar concept gets used in terror, counterterror, counterintelligence, and SOF, but I'm not sure if discussions of multiple class inheritance and self-repairing networks are exactly illuminating. A few weeks ago, I thought SIGINT and defensive SIGINT were voluminous but not too hard, and then I wandered into MASINT. Even as I struggle with whether SAR/ISAR really is IMINT (both radar and acoustic), I start thinking about counter-MASINT, and smoke comes out of my years.

There's a cartoon I've loved for many years: two multi-starred generals are holding model rockets, and one is asking "Have I got this straight? This is the one that we send up to get the one that they sent up to get the one that we sent up to get...", but a multilayered tactical BMD system that includes a decoy and MARV threat is just that.

Sorry if this is a braindump, or just stream of consciousness, but the sort of thing that happens from snapping bolt upright at 2AM. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 07:42, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

It was LTG Abrahamson, then heading the Missile Defense Agency, who gave one of the all-time responses at a press conference, and it applies, somehow, to the complexity of that with which we are dealing. A challenging reporter demanded to know why an interceptor had missed, why the target vehicle apparently had reentered differently than planned, and the radar was confused.

"Sir", he said, politely and almost in a drawl, "this is rocket science."

I have no simple answer to what is, indeed, a problem that is not simple. A little while ago, I was making some edits to counter-terrorism, and realized one reference related to terrorist tactics (assassination and reprisals). While I tried to put the reference in a better place, with some text around it, I realized that the real problem was that it didn't really deal with counter-terrorism, but with the operational planning of terrorism itself. What kind of counter-terrorism applies when your President has just been blown up, without warning, by a suicide bomber, who succesfully exfiltrated, albeit in small pieces?

At one point, we were only trying to deal with the "INTs" and "SECs". Bringing in the more operations (in the G-3 sense) oriented aspects of terror and counterterror complicates the matter significantly. Of course, what is "terror" to one side is "direct action" to the other.

While I doubt it's feasible on Wikipedia, this is the sort of thing where I'd try to get an off-site meeting of specialists and try to hammer out a model. The lack of a unifying conceptual model for all of these things is one of our problems -- a problem with which the professionals struggle, so how the newcomer sorts out the infinity of mirrors is a true challenge. Even if one tried to write an orientation for the newcomer, I honestly don't know how that fits into wikipedia culture, and whether it might be considered non-encyclopedic and/or condescending. The more I write, the more I realize that I am using an extensive context from military art, intelligence, social sciences, etc.

Unfortunately, my library is in boxes in storage. There is a very good paperback describing the at-first-successful Israeli assassination teams in response to Munich, and one of the best explanations of how an operation needs 8-12 specialized functions to come together, from early target surveillance to post-hit distraction and exfiltration. I'm thinking of looking at the "Terrorism" article to see if things can be tweaked there, but, again, these blur with SOF operational techniques.

I doubt this has been helpful, but maybe this distraction will get my customer to respond to the last two emails. :-( As Bill Marriott used to say, "I've been rich and I've been poor. Being rich is better." Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 17:28, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] US Army Fifth Corps

Is the above redirect correct? The subject is unfamiliar to me. --Brewcrewer (talk) 06:31, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] M4/M16 edit in U.S. Army article

AzureCitizen, thanks for your note. I did follow the footnote at the end of your edit—it pointed to the same fact files site that I used to respond to User:Blain Toddi as evidence that the M16A2/A4 was still in service. After reading the M4 entry a little more closely, I think the confusion lies in the wording of this sentence:

“

It [the M4] ... will replace all .45 caliber M3 submachine guns, selected M9 pistols, and M16 series rifles.

”

The "...and M16 series rifles." part is kinda dangling out there on its own without a specific modifier ("all," "selected") for clarification like the M3 and M9 have. However, my interpretation of this is: "ALL M3 submachine guns, SOME M9 pistols, and SOME (maybe most?) M16 series rifles." I base this conclusion on the following:

The flow of the text in the M4 entry leads me to believe that the word "selected" was intended to apply to both the M9 and M16.
The M16 entry [1] in the US Army Fact Files doesn't mention anything about its imminent (total) replacement by the M4.
A cursory Google search turned up nothing that specifically mentioned the Army's intent to replace ALL M16s with M4s.
You mentioned your personal experience in the USAR—you still have all M16A2s, and a "check's in the mail" promise that you'll get M4s ... someday.
My own personal experience with M16→M4 replacement: yes, most combat units are turning in their M16s and replacing them with M4s. But most support units and institutional units (e.g., Basic Training) still have M16s (A2s, not even A4s yet).
The sheer volume of M16-series weapons in the Army inventory makes in unlikely that they ALL will be replaced with M4s anytime soon—and by that I mean before the M16 AND M4 are both replaced with something different.

So that's my take. Thanks again for the note, hopefully we can get this ironed out without too much of a headache. Mike f (talk) 21:22, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Special thanks

I have to thank you for all your edits and searches regarding the M4/M16 issue where you try to improve the article as much as possible ..thanks again--Blain Toddi (talk) 19:25, 26 November 2007 (UTC)