Talk:Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind

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[edit] Language of Azad Hind and correct script

Please see this link that shows some propaganda posters released by Azad hind govt. These are in Hindi and Bengali (based on devnagari) scripts. Where Hindi letters are used, the language is still hindustani, which means you're just as right putting the Urdu script there, as anybody else is in putting the Devnagari. The point is both can be justifiably claimed to be appropriate, but also that a person who can't read urdu script can still pick it up from the Hindi script, and appreciate the link. Hope you see my point. Please discuss before reverting.130.209.6.40 23:02, 14 May 2007 (UTC)

I never ended up replying to this, though now I am. The link doesn't show anything. There are some posters in Hindi and Bengali... so what? It doesn't prove the need for a Devanagari rendering of Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind. Writing Devanagari here is contrived, based not on something to do with the topic itself but on extraneous after-the-fact developments such as the ascent of Hindi. Tuncrypt (talk) 14:26, 19 November 2007 (UTC)
See Peter Fay's The Forgotten Army pg 245,246,317,320. It says in clear words that the language of Azad Hind was to be Hindustani written in Romanic script, not Dev Nagari, not Urdu, not Persian. Hope this clarifies the matter. Also, if you have any constructive edits to contribute, please do so, and desist from seemingly PoV (linguist in this case) edits. One thing you need to remember is a number of readers wont know urdu or persian script, so the hindi text helps as well.Rueben lys (talk) 14:59, 19 November 2007 (UTC)
If your point about Azad Hind's official language is the case, then we might feel free to remove both Urdu and Hindi. Regardless, Urdu makes sense being there, because AHAH is an Urdu series of words. Secondly, point out the POVness in my edits before just hurling out that abbreviation at me. Lastly, "One thing you need to remember is a number of readers wont know urdu or persian script, so the hindi text helps as well" is shockingly inept. Cyrillic text would help as well. As would Korean. And Hebrew. So really, what's your point? What matters is the factual applicability of Hindi to the item, not its "helpfulness". Seemingly there is none, and it is the omission of irrelevant information and inclusion of relevant information that is the "help" which we are assigned to give. If it is simply a rendering of the word in such and such a language that a user desires then he/she is completely free get that information by going to the left-hand side of the page and checking its different language versions. Tuncrypt (talk) 17:27, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

It is NOT Urdu, it is HINDUSTANI, which is arose out of mixture of Hindi and Urdu. Hence it is as factually applicable as Urdu. You PoVness is your deleting the Hindi text selectively to undo "overemphasisation on Hindi" as you said earlier. And stop making weasel arguments, Korean, Fijian,or Apache Indian was not relevant to the languages of India, or that used by Azad Hind. Moreover, not many people from the amazonian rainforest are likely to come and look at this article, or try to interpret it. I dont see how it is ommission or irrelevant information when you spell out the name in a language extremely relevant to the name. If you have any concrete contributions to make, do so. If not stop trying to prove a point or call an RfC.Rueben lys (talk) 17:52, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Uh no, it's Urdu. The izafat construction makes it so. But either way, didn't you initially say that Roman script was what mattered?
Also, my last point was not quite a weasel argument. True, unlike all those languages Hindi/Devanagari does have a degree of association to the topic by virtue of its general Indian-ness. But that amounts to nothing at all substantial, and very much like all those other languages it lacks a concrete degree of applicability to the title. The vague, highly invoked principle of "what has to do with India has to do with Hindi" is wrong. So, is AHAH a Hindi word? Was AHAH ubiquitously, notably... written in Devanagari (e.g. by reason of the script being given official status)? The answers remain no, so no Hindi/Devanagari script. It's that simple. Tuncrypt (talk) 18:13, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

From User talk:Tuncrypt#Official language of Azad Hind —

Hello Turncrypt. It looks like we're getting into an impasse with the official name and language of Azad Hind. I can assure you the official language was Hindustani in Romanic script, and the name itself was adopted by Bose to precisely avoid the problems of Hinduness (Hindi or other Sanskrit derived languages) and Muslimness (Urdu). I dont know enough about language to tell you what's izfarat, but I have defeintely read enough about Azad Hind to know unequivocally that the language is Hindustani, not Urdu, not Hindi. If feel so strongly about this, I would recommend calling an RfC, since I felt your edits were not helping. Hope this helps.RegardsRueben lys (talk) 20:51, 19 November 2007 (UTC)
We are not at an impasse; you're just not making sense. You say that Azad Hind's language was Hindustani in Roman script, and yet you argue for the inclusion of Hindi script. That is a contradiction. If Azad Hind's language was Hindustani in Roman script as you have repeated endlessly and which I never denied anyway, then you can remove both Urdu and Hindi scripts.
Having done that, my second point is that again, while Azad Hind no doubt declared its working language as Hindustani, outside of that and for all purposes the actual phrase Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind itself is objectively Urdu in character (i.e. by vocabulary and grammar: izafat) and therefore having an Urdu transcription would be appropriate.
So that is it. I think that I have laid out my case in this post clearly and logically, and it is now simply left to be understood. I'm not here to fight you or to manifest any anti-Hindi bias or whatever (which I don't have). I'm simply calling for the removal of at least Hindi script because of its inappropriateness to the topic, and your point on Hindustani confirms that anyway. Tuncrypt (talk) 14:29, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

I am having to reply to this nonsensical rant after many months in hope that it will quench your bloated sense of knowledge. Tour first paragraph I think does not deserve a logical answer so I wont tax my brain. Your second paragraph is concluding that even though the organisation adopted Hindustani as its official language and therefore must have a hindustani name, by your logics it is actually urdu because you want it to be. Your Izafat page is a two line stub wthout any reference and Hindustani page maybe more instructive to you. So that is it. You have not only not laid down anything, you've just wasted my precious time and shown that you dont know anything about AHG, I doubt you know anything about language either. Make some constructive edits and try to improve this page instead of tring to make a point of your scholarship. rueben_lys (talk · contribs) 10:48, 26 March 2008 (UTC)


I'm thinking we can get this article to be a little bit better, to anyone who is interested in contributing a little bit more to the history and functionality of Azad Hind. I've compiled a short list of things we could use:


[edit] Start of Article and suggested course of expansion

1. More primary sources! A lot of the stuff I'm finding is mostly scholarly research but we need more firsthand accounts from the occupied Andaman islands and from the actual ministers of Azad Hind. 2. More of life under the control of Azad Hind. From what I can gather, the government was pretty impotent with most of the governing work done by the Japanese military. 3. More people to come help!

I was responsible for putting in most of the information about the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, derived from the few books which have been written on the subject. The difficulty is that whilst Mohan Singh & Gurbux Singh Dhillon published memoirs of their time in the INA, Loganathan and the other members of the Provisional Govt. do not seem to have done so. The Japanese destroyed all the records on the Andamans when they left, and the accounts I've read rely mainly on interviews with elederly inhabitants who lived through this period, and a couple of unpublished manuscripts (See the main article Invasion and Occupation of the Andaman Islands during World War II. Wikipedia is not a place for original research, so we have to rely on published sources which others can verify. Sikandarji 09:32, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Apparent exaggeration of the role of Azad Hind on India's attainment of freedom

Frankly, I am not too happy with the changes that have been made to this page over the last month or so, which in my view grossly exaggerate the role of the "Provisional Government of Free India" in securing India's independence. When all's said and done, it was nothing more than an Axis puppet state. The British were committed to leaving India from 1942 after the Cripps Mission (which is why Congress agreed to participate in State elections in 1946) and the INA trials and the RIN Mutiny were minor factors - and in any case these have only the most tenuous connection with the actual activities of "Azad Hind" in the only territory it even nominally controlled, namely the Andaman Islands. References to jingoistic newspaper articles and other wikipedia articles are not really satisfactory. Any comments? Sikandarji 22:31, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
I agree with you. Parts of the article aren't factually accurate and represent more of a nationalistic POV than the reality of how little power the INA and Azad Hind really had working with the Japanese. Over the next couple of days I'm going to go through and mark the specific stuff I'd like looked at. --Woogums 22:57, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
There is a separate article for the Indian National Army and a lot of these additions (such as the latest reference and quote) belong there and not on this page. Sikandarji 16:13, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
The INA-related stuff in the 'Relationship with Japan' section is stuff I'd like either moved to another section or removed entirely. What do you think? I'd do it now but I'm at work, heh. --Woogums 22:45, 23 August 2006 (UTC)


It seems it doesn't agree with your point of view rather than exaggerate. The role of the AZH in securing India's independence is not a matter of exaggeration but taking a non-biased viewpoint beyond the military campaign, into the political situation after the war, right from Imphal to the mutinies in the de-mobillising Indian forces. For that to be considered, you need to consider the entire Azad Hind Movement, and not just the INA in Imphal or Kohima. Speculatory and inaccurate facts ought to be removed. But the POVs put down are not just the editor's, they are referenced to Specific govt. intelligence and view points at the time(at least the ones I put down are), and of historians of then and now. I am sure you can find (and you have found) POVs that match yours. Other editors have found stuff to support their's. Fair shout.Rueben lys 11:50, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Debate over the role of the Azad Hind Government

As I said before, newspaper articles and links to other wikipedia articles are not "evidence" - for that you have to turn to the work of reputable scholars, who are mostly agreed that by 1942 the British had already decided to leave India after the war. The protests over the INA trials and the mutiny in the Navy certainly shook them, but they were on their way out by then in any case (and Mountbatten's decision to bring independence forward by a year was largely driven by the growing violence in Bengal). I do not think you can simply conflate the INA and the Azad Hind Government either: what did the puppet state in the Andamans achieve? How many people knew anything about it? You can write about Bose and his personal impact, you can write about the 45,000 men of the INA, but Azad Hind itself was nothing more than an impotent puppet regime.

I am not sure you have seen the references I have cited, for they are not news paper articles. What the British agreed in 1942 was to grant limited power to an elected body and retain policies under the crown (including defence, foreign policy and possibly- although I am not sure on this- finance, which I am not sure equates to independence at all. The word to describe the Cripp's mission's achievemtn was the offer of limited dominion status. The Atlantic charter had declared the support for freedom and liberty etc etc, but Chruchill had specified afdterwards to the parliament that this did not apply to India. So I am not sure where it is that the claim comes from. And regarding the INA and AHG,the newspaper the wikipedia articles have references contained within themselves, and they do show the views of "reputable scholars". If you're trying to prove that INA and the AZH (for the purpose of the AZH was to legitimse the INA) had nothing to do with independence, sorry, I am not an academic so I don't know, but I can find articles and POVs that differ with yours and those of the reputable scholars.

Lastly, the legacy of AGH or INA does not consider the two as fighting forces, it considers the political after-effects of the INA and AGH in the post-war scenario. It does suggest an alternate history, but one has to take a balanced view point and consider both the constitutional negotiations as well as the impetus from the ground by the non-support of the army in 1946 against any possible civillian (and militant) unrest, unlike in 1942 (Quit India) when the police faltered but the army stayed behind the Raj. I have tried to( and am still trying to) portray these both in their fair light. PS: Sorry if I have seemed rude at times. Rueben lys 19:27, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

I take your point - there is still a lot of academic debate about the Cripps mission - what Cripps offered or was authorised to offer, but my source (Judith Brown's Modern India: The Making of an Asian Democracy (Oxford) 1999) suggests that Cripps offered India full Dominion status at the end of the war, with the chance to secede from the Commonwealth and go for total independence - i.e. the same status enjoyed by Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. In the short term he is supposed to have promised to get rid of Linlithgow and grant India Dominion Status with immediate effect, reserving only the Defence and Foreign Ministry for the British for the duration of the War, though this remains murky. Apparently even Churchill realised that the former was a promise which could not be reneged upon, not that he had any say in the matter by 1946-7 anyway. Congress was quite happy to participate in elections in 1946, which it most certainly would not have been had its leaders thought the British had any intention of staying. Gandhi and the Congress had removed the main prop of British rule - namely Indian cooperation - and when you add that to the damage and destruction caused to the Empire by the war, the fact that Attlee was under enormous pressure to bring British troops home, and the hostility of the Americans to any continuation of British Rule, you can see quite clearly that the Raj was finished, with or without the INA and the RIN Mutiny (and you have yet to explain the connection the latter has with the Azad Hind Government). The debates, the worries, the bloodshed in 1945-7 were not over whether the British would go: that battle had been won. It was the question of what would replace the Raj, the division of the spoils if you like, and above all the question of Pakistan.

Finally, I do not think a source (from the RIN Mutiny page) which apparently has this to say about independence in 1947 can be seen as either reputable or unbiased:

Subrata Banerjee, The RIN Strike (New Delhi, People’s Publishing House,1954) "The RIN uprising would have developed in a different direction; had it not been for the policy pursued by them in relation to every struggle that broke out in that period, we would have seen something different from the 1947 transfer of power, according to which the iron grip of British rule was allowed to continue". p.xvii, Introduction by E. M. S. Namboodiripad

So British Rule continued after 1947 did it? That's a new one on me - mind you Namboodiripad was a doctrinaire Marxist and no doubt considered that so long as capitalism continued to exist in India the British (not the banias of course) would still, somehow, be in control. What is this nonsense supposed to mean? Absolute poppycock. Sikandarji 23:13, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

Nice ending to the last edit Mr Sikanderji, though I expected a bit better from you, but I'll let that go.

As for the main issue, there's a debate as to what was offered by Cripp's mission, as you point out now- and there's no confirmation as to what was offered. My source (James Raj: Making and Unmaking of British India) tells me the offer was of dominion status to the tune of those in the commonwealth at an unspecified time after the war. And you keep harping on the elections of 1946, they were held after the RIN mutiny in feb. I don't know if you have noticed, but there's a (referenced) military intelligence report that says the forces could not be trusted. The date of ToP was not set till much later after Feb 1946, so what it certainly did was accelerate the thing (that is believeing that there was concrete desire to leave India in the first place). And the blatant link between RIN mutiny and AHG is that when the movement took a political turn (pretty quickly), it brought forth the nationalist feelings whithin the Indian troops and this became a major inspiration (ie, the political aim of AHG), and the mutineers made the release of INA troops one of their rallying cries. I am really surprised it's taking you so long to spot the link. Lastly, I can't see how deduced the "poppycock" of "So British Rule continued after 1947 did it? That's a new one on me - mind you Namboodiripad was a doctrinaire Marxist and no doubt considered that so long as capitalism continued to exist in India the British (not the banias of course) would still, somehow, be in control. What is this nonsense supposed to mean? Absolute poppycock." from. What Namboodiripad, as a doctrinated communist, would be talking in relation to, was furthering the socialist revolution. The mutinies in the forces gave them the ideal oppurtunity to kick start this. The Raj feared a spread of Soviet influence (these I will include in the INA or AGH article soon, for a fair and balanced view, soon). It was in this situation that the decision to transfer power was made (and whi Wavell, so opposed to Pakistan intially, agreed to partition before he left). The congress intitally drummed up the INA, but after the RIN stuff, did not rick the boat anymore for allowing other powers (namely communists) to gain any support. And yes, Congress was tranferred power in 1947. Lastly, you may have gathered that I am a very polite person, I expect the same from those I correspond or debate with. Please allow this when posting your acknowledgedly informed views.Rueben lys

I apologise if you took offense at "Poppycock" (I wasn't referring to your writings) - it seems a fairly mild term to me. According to the quotation Namboodiripad says, quite plainly, that "The iron grip of British Rule was allowed to continue" after the 1947 transfer of power, which is quite clearly nonsense. I do not accept that the Nationalist turn taken by the RIN Mutiny can be directly linked to Azad Hind. All India, more or less, was fired by nationalism at this stage; everyone wanted the British to leave, everyone expected them to do so very soon, hence the constant struggles and debates over who whould inherit their power. Congress and the Muslim League also demanded the release of the INA prisoners because it was a convenient bandwagon to jump on once Bose and his army were safely out of the way: that does not mean that they were inspired by the Azad Hind, or viewed it as a model. I am trying to be specific here. The Azad Hind Government nominally ruled over the Andaman and Nicobar islands and a few regions in the far North-East which briefly fell under the control of the Japanese. Its record wasn't exactly stunning in these areas, and in any case it (and the INA) always had to dance to the Japanese tune. I repeat, what did anyone in India know about it? They knew a bit about the INA thanks to the British putting three INA officers on trial (one Hindu, one Muslim and one Sikh - what a propaganda gift that was)! The only people who knew anything about Azad Hind were the unfortunate inhabitants of the Andaman and Nicobar islands. I think you have to take a pretty squint-eyed view of the events of that period to believe that vague rumours about "Azad Hind" were more important than Congress and Muslim League agitation in whipping up nationalism and unrest.

I'm not sure we really disagree over all that much though - I gladly acknowledge that Bose, the INA, Azad Hind, Namboodiripad's communists - all represent a very different model of a post-independence India than that which eventually transpired. I happen to think it would have been a negative and authoritarian one, but that's by the by (the notion that Partition could thereby somehow have been prevented seems to me a fairy-tale. It was far too late by 1945: Jinnah and the Muslim League were ever-more determined, and communal violence steadily growing worse). What I do not accept is that the RIN Mutiny and the INA trials had any profound impact on the British decision to leave, which had been made long before. Sikandarji 10:31, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

I am not speculating as to what India would have been under Bose, or Communists or anybody else for that matter. As you rightly say, all India was gripped by nationalism at the time, but you refuse to believe this had anything to do with Azad Hind. The very thing is (all these I cite not as my own views, but from references which I think will be worthy addition to the article),

a. when the elections were held, there was reports of growing cult of the INA, encouraged by the congress intially. b. The Indian forces were rumoured (and in the process of) to be sent to dutch-east indies and french indo-china to help counter-insurgency (which was one of the causes of ranc during the RIN mutiny) and this bred resentment among them. c. The navy mutiny, after it started, pretty quickly, put the INA's trial as a rallying call, which shows it had a lot of inspiration from the INA (and that is how I'm linking it to AGH for the AGH was not an identity without the INA, and we are not considering the military or political success of the govt itself, but it's legacy in Indian political scenario) d.You say there was a lot of nationalist sentiment among Indians at the time which did not have anything to do with the AGH, where as (and this is from one of the references whithin the article, M Edwards) it seems to me that it rekindled a sleeping spirit. Note the RIN mutiny inspired riots all over India, and most of them demanded the INA's release. Auckinleck pardoned the officer's of the INA after conviction, and this is attributed to his commonsense in order to prevent military as well as civillian uprising of an un-imaginable scale (again I will add this, referenced, to the article once I get some more time). e. After the mutinies, it was deemed by the militray intelligence that the forces could not be trusted to suppress a civillian or insurgent uprising (the congress itself was planning a civillian movement again, prior to the RIN stuff kicking in) and was likely to be source of trouble themselves (see PRO/WO reference in the RIN mutiny article, last section). This was totally opposite to that during 1942, when the army was very active in suppressing Quit India.

I can see your points, but I can see too many grounds on which I (informed, I believe)disagree, and the major point is that there's a big assumption that everything was working smoothly towards indpendence in 1947 anyway, and that if things that did happen had not happened, ToP would have gone ahead regardless. I find that (again, based on more and more of what I am reading and have read in the past) very speculative, assupmptive, and dismissive of a huge chunk of history, whether good or bad. If British decision to leave was already made, when was it made? for it was not in 1942, as Cripp's mission did not know what it had to offer itself. It was not in 1945 for there were still plans to use Indian troops in pro-colonial duties and before the unrests of 1946, to use them as peace-keepers whithin India. Why did the viceroy (Wavell, not Mountbatten) not have a plan of phased withdrawal (he explored al least three different plans, all of which were shot down by the parliament) even in Novemebr 1945? If a proto-govt was already in shape, why was the congress still planning unrest in Nov 1945? Movement for Pakistan was shaping up by 1943 at the latest, why was there no plans to address this issue even in April 1946? And why was the decision for partition made so abruptly, how much did the spectre of Soviet Union shape the decisions that eventually came to be made(apparently) so hastily? I don't hold any water for the communist party, and am sure a communist India would have been authoratarian, and I don't know what kind of govt. Bose would have made, but that is not at all what is being discussed in Legacy of Azad Hind.

PS: Thankyou for the apology, but it is not neccessary. I am starting to enjoy these discussions.Rueben lys 12:54, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm enjoying the discussion too. I certainly wouldn't claim that things were progressing "smoothly" towards independence in 1947. Nobody was quite sure what form it would take, it was a time of immense turmoil and bloodshed, and the situation changed all the time as the Congress and the Muslim League wrangled amongst themselves, and events such as the RIN Mutiny threw additional spanners in the works. That rather underlines the fact that the British were no longer in control of the process, or indeed making the rules. Part of the reason they couldn't get Congress and the Muslim League to agree was because both sides knew the British were going, and that there was no real reason to listen to them any more. That was the one certainty of this period, even if it is clearer with hindsight: namely that the British were going to hand over sovereignty. To what, to whom - these questions remained unresolved. I would in fact argue that this was more or less inevitable from the time of the Cripps Mission, when the British offered Dominion Status, i.e. de facto independence. It was an offer even Churchill realised could not be withdrawn. The legacy of the INA - particularly the trials - was important in this period in radicalising public opinion and creating unrest. However, this is not the same thing as arguing that the puppet state of Azad Hind was a major inspiration or model for anyone in this period. Unlike the army, its role (or even existence) was more or less nominal. Much of what has been added here belongs on (and in fact duplicates) the Indian National Army page. This article should deal with the territories, leaders and achievements (if any) of the Azad Hind government during the war. Sikandarji 16:13, 30 August 2006 (UTC)


A short reply, will get into details later. One is, The common Indian man is (or was) not a historian, so they draw (drew) the simplest conclusions (again; Edwards ref in article;Indians perceived INA to be on the right side), secondly, unlike Canada, Australia, or even South Africa, Indians are (were, and will remain) racially, culturally, and emotionally different people. So while dominion status does not really make a difference to them (Australia would happiliy keep the queen as the HoS), to Indians, especially in the post-war pressure cooker of India, there wasn't much difference between Dominion and colony (funny because India was a dominion between 1947 and 1950). In fact a significant part of the RIN mutiny had been very anti-white (not neccessarily anti british). No doubt the civil service and the country was passing more and more into Indian hands, but as you said

"Nobody was quite sure what form it would take, it was a time of immense turmoil and bloodshed, and the situation changed all the time as the Congress and the Muslim League wrangled amongst themselves, and events such as the RIN Mutiny threw additional spanners in the works. That rather underlines the fact that the British were no longer in control of the process, or indeed making the rules."

The British were no longer in control because the forces could not be trusted anymore. They were very much in control in 1942, when the army could be trusted. And these mutinies (inspired by INA- which was legitimised in the eyes of the common Indian by the AHG ) provided a ready source of disgruntlement for exploitation by Communist Party, and the Soviet Union had started looking towards India already by then (and raised the communist spectre to Britain. Logical reasoning; transfer power, leave country (at least seem to), stop popular criticism and stop spread of possible revolution). Ie, if army was trustable, then not so much to fear. Which might suggest that so called preformed plans for relinquishing Raj is only a part of the truth.Rueben lys

I'm not sure it's true to say that the British were "very much in control" even in 1942. They managed to suppress the Quit India movement with relative ease, but only because, in connection with the war, there were more British troops in India then than at any time before. They were extremely reluctant to use Indian troops for the suppression of internal disorder (remember, even at Amritsar in 1919 it was Gurkha troops which were ordered to open fire on the crowd). With the growth of popular protest and dissent this wasn't remotely sustainable - not without a permanent garrison of about 150,000 British soldiers, probably not even then. With the end of the war the British forces had to be demobilised and sent back home. The British were able to run their empire on the cheap with very few European troops (never more than 50,000 in India in peacetime) because they could rely on certain sections of Indian society to cooperate with them, most obviously the army but also the princes, the English-speaking Indian elite, the thousands who served the administration as clerks, telegraph and railway workers. During the 1920s, 30s and 40s the Congress (and later to some degree the Muslim League) dealt a series of hammer-blows to these relationships of patronage, which resulted in the grudging concession of limited democratic government which the British were extremely unwilling to grant. Apart from the princes, whose influence waned sharply in the face of popular politics, the last institution which remained loyal and cooperative was the Indian army, whose recruitment grounds in Punjab received preferential treatment from the regime. During WWII, well before the establishment of Azad Hind, cracks began to appear even in this institution, with the creation of the first INA by Rash Behari Bose. That said, if ordinary Indians perceived the INA to be on the "right" side it is slightly hard to understand why 2.5 million Indians volunteered to fight Fascism and only 45,000 joined the INA. I think there was a widespread recognition that the war had to be won, not least because whilst the British were a weakening force, and would soon have to grant independence, the Japanese might be less obliging if they conquered India. In all this, the activities of Azad Hind were of marginal significance. It was what was happening within India that mattered. Hence the INA trials are important, not least because Congress and the Muslim League joined forces on this issue. The RIN Mutiny is less so, because it was condemned by the major political parties, but in neither case is the Azad Hind Government of any great significance. Hence references on this page to it playing a key role in liberating India from British rule are misplaced. Sikandarji 16:56, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Another quickie. First of all, India had no interest in Britain re: Indian sub-continent. In fact, Auckinleck( as far as I can remember) actually sent a note to the parliament to this vry effect that the Indians (and Burmese and Malays) have no sympathy or interest towards the British whatsowever, and are only in the Empire because they're forced into it, and they will turn and happily kick the British if the chance arose. Second, as I said earlier, the Average (and even the not-so-average)Indian doesn't think as an allied or European Historian, because they had (and still don't have) no interest on the fate of Fascism vs Democracy etc etc, for at the end those democracies and liberalists had no qualms in enslaving(sic) them. Third, 2.5 million certainly fought with the allies, and only 45000 joined the INA. But the perception that INA was on the right (sic) side arose after the war (during the trial in fact) and not during. See the reference of Edwards M whithin the introduction. And lastly, Azad Hind was not an identity (govt.) in isolation to everything else, it was a part of a broader (and possibly a socialist) movement of which the INA, AHG, the Freies Indien, the IIL, the Free India Center and Radio, and possibly even the soviet Union was or was intended to be a part of (and may be even, by a far shot, Iqbal Shedai, and the centro Militaire), although it was quite far removed. (We can call it the Azad Hind Movement). It ended with Netaji's death, but the legacy of Azad Hind (which is what I've called it in the introduction) is not uniquely the legacy of AHG, but a part of that of this broader Azad Hind movement.Rueben lys 08:45, 1 September 2006 (UTC)
When Auchinleck sent his note he was no doubt correct: but for the previous ninety-odd years, going back to the Mutiny, this can't have been true, otherwise the Indians would have kicked out the British long before. With only 50,000 British troops and 1,000 ICS, the opportunity presented itself every day. It didn't happen because certain groups within Indian society found it was in their interests to work with the British, and once those relationships had been destroyed by Gandhi and the Congress the departure of the British was inevitable unless they were prepared to sustain their rule with overwhelming force. This they were able to do temporarily in wartime, but after 1945 it ceased to be sustainable. The troops were going home, the Americans had not been fighting a war for the restoration of the British Empire. In retrospect, Bose's fratricidal campaign was entirely pointless and unnecessary. The only significant legacy of his puppet regime would, as you rightly pointed out, be the furore surrounding the INA trials, creating a widespread (and in my view unfair) public perception that these were the only Indians who had put their lives on the line to secure independence. That is nothing more than a populist myth (why the obsession with violence) but myths can be powerful things: a myth of British military invincibility helped to sustain the Raj and maintain the loyalty of its troops until the fall of Singapore. It was not a myth, however, which destroyed the Raj itself, but a mixture of Japanese aggression and Indian domestic political agitation which slowly but surely suborned all the main props of the regime. Finally, I would draw your attention to the title of this article. It is not called the "Azad Hind Movement", it is not called "The Broad Socialist Movement in India 1945-7" (incidentally, referring to the "Freies India Legion" as Socialist is about as sick a joke as the ostensible title of the Nazi party. I've always felt that Bose's activities in Germany were much less defensible than what he did with the Japanese). There are separate pages for the INA, the RIN Mutiny, for Subhash Chandra Bose. This page is called "Provisional Government of Free India" and should concern itself solely with that. Sikandarji 09:07, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

Wish I didn't have to go to work, but the section where the stuff is being discussed is What Indians feel about..... The Free India legion may not have been given Nazi help to be turned into a socialist force (that depends on your interpretation of what deifnes as socialism), and lastly Bose's actions may be counted as fatricidal, but as I said, to a huge population of Indians, his actions were pragmatic because the Politics of negotiations seemed to be going nowhere. And as I said, European historians see it as black-and-white Fascism vs not-so-much fascism, it made little difference to Indians because India was an occupied country run by an alien people with the help of collaborators who were just as much getting along with their daily lives and being a part of the society. The congress held little real pwoer as shown by Linlithgow's declaration of India as a belligerent state on the side of allies, and Indians saw it as much. Bose seeking Nazi help seen through that POV does not require defence at all (and keeps whthin the NPOV I believe). Also, American help would not have been there to prop up the Raj, true, but that doesn't necessarily equeate America bothering with the Raj at all as long as they got access to the Indian Market (one of Roosevelt's point to Churchill when discussing possible American involvement in the war). And re: Gandhi and the Congress destroying the civil service is debatable, the congress is alleged to have put in yes-men wherever it was elected, and the loyalties of civil servants are said to have been guided by who would be (or was )in power. If the Raj lasted for another hundred years they would have happily stayed in their post. But all this is speculation. The Gurkhas definitely fired at Amritsar, but not during Quit India, when it was the Indian army helping put down the riots. Besides, the whole reason why Quit India was launced was because the Congress saw the Cripp's Mission as another pointless mission designed to delay the movement. Also, Bose did not decide to go to violence overnight. He sought and got support, even from whithin the Congress supporters when he got elected at Tripuri on a radical agenda (and hence Gandhi decided to part ways). Certainly Bose's campaign looks collaborationst from a British POV, whether it was pragmatic or not is still an open question. Whether it did anything to turn the British Indian Army is however, not an open question, and whether it gave any impetus to the Raj to leave is another. As you said yourself, the Raj wouldn't have had the will or power to put down a popular (the congress, as I said earlier was planning a civil disobedience as late as January 1946) or military uprising. It didn't because the people who helped them earlier were not gonna do that anymore (see the estimate from military intelligence report). ButGotta goRueben lys 10:57, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

1. I agree that there is a serious problem with differing POVs here, seen once again here: "the Politics of negotiations seemed to be going nowhere". That's absolutely correct: to Indian politicians, and to the population at large, all British concessions towards self-government were seen as too little, too late. They might indeed have felt that the British were going to stick around for ever. They would, however, have been wrong. From a British perspective, all these reforms from Montagu-Chelmsford onwards were things they didn't want to concede. Had they really been firmly in power, able to rely on overwhelming force, why would they have bothered to negotiate at all? The answer is that they needed the support of the Indian political class, and this pushed them reluctantly towards democratic, or semi-democratic reform. Thus while the Congress leadership saw the Government of India Act as a huge disappointment because it did not allow any representation at the centre, the British also saw it as a defeat, because they had had to hand over power in the provinces to elected Indian politicians (and they did have real power and access to patronage - hence the numbers who flocked to participate in the 1937 elections) who would now have authority over British members of the ICS. Negotiations actually achieved a lot, including the offer of post-war independence in 1942, but I agree that the level of trust between the two sides was so low by this stage that it would have seemed to many that they were going nowhere.

2. "And re: Gandhi and the Congress destroying the civil service is debatable, the congress is alleged to have put in yes-men wherever it was elected, and the loyalties of civil servants are said to have been guided by who would be (or was )in power. If the Raj lasted for another hundred years they would have happily stayed in their post". And how did Congress get the power to install these "yes-men", if not through Gandhian agitation? The reference to elections says it all really. I should have made it clearer that I am not talking about the ICS, which was being Indianised in this period (40% of ICS officers were Indian by the end of the war) but in a process over which Congress had no control, as it was by examination. What I was referring to was the manner in which Gandhi and the Congress undermined confidence in the Raj amongst those working lower down the scale, and encouraged them to withdraw their cooperation, until the Government of India needed Congress assistance to help run the country (hence the Government of India Act, still the basic foundation of the Modern Indian Constitution). The whole point is that this meant the Raj couldn't last for another hundred years.

3. "Bose seeking Nazi help seen through that POV does not require defence at all". I'm really not sure I can agree with you there. Most other Congress leaders seemed to have realised just how unpleasant the Nazis were, and that the British were the lesser of two evils. Indeed, if Linlithgow hadn't been such an idiot in failing to consult the Congress leadership before declaring war it is very likely that they would have supported the war effort. Only Bose seems to have put on his moral blinkers at this stage, choosing to leave India and espouse violent struggle on the other side just when the British started to negotiate again. I suspect this was also influenced by the fact that he wanted to re-join his wife in Berlin.

4. "it made little difference to Indians because India was an occupied country". I think they would have discovered the difference pretty quickly if the Germans or the Japanese had succeeded in invading and occupying India, with or without Bose's assistance. This is something else that has been lost sight of in this debate. Even if Bose's violent struggle had succeeded, it would not have resulted in an independent India, but in the country acquiring new and much nastier masters, all at the expense of a massive and possibly terminal allied defeat.Sikandarji 08:53, 3 September 2006 (UTC)


I have just come accross a really good book (and got pressing commitment issues as well)Rueben lys 18:06, 3 September 2006 (UTC)
This gonna be as quick as possible.

1.The first point you make, Democratic or Semi Democratic Reform. These concilliatory sugar plums (not my words) were intended to "Create a stable political situation to prolong the British rule in India and keep her a willing partner of the British Common Wealth" (Montagu's intial words. Words may have changed a bit due to memory quoting but generally a right and accurate portrayal). The first of the points is British rule was not only political, but also (as Gandhi realised in 1919) economic, and hence the efforts to keep her whthin common-wealth at the least. In fact, the biggest thorn on the congress's side was not independence in the 20s, it was allowing British industries Free Trade. And in 1937, the elections were held not to form a national govt, but to form local bodies and a legislative council to which the Viceroy had Over all power of Veto ie, absolute power is not to India, but decided by Whitehall. So much for real apetite for democratic self-govt. As for the polotical middleclass you talk about, they were there to serve the British Govt's interests by making the country governable (or at least trying to). And besides, their alleigance was not to the Congress, it was to the Crown. And the Congress participated in the elections, according to Nehru, with utlost reservations not to accept the changes, but to seek to undo the changes. Also, this may have been a loss for the Zealots among Conservatives, but it was a logical path " to extend the life of the British Rule in India" for the more pragmatic politician, who could keep asking the Congress to come to the negotiating table and, as I quoted earlier (can't remember the name at the moment)- offer concilliatory sugar plums while the capacity of whitehall to set the political future of the country changed little, as did the economic viabillity of the Indian market.

2. Re: the manner in which Gandhi and the Congress undermined confidence in the Raj amongst those working lower down the scale, and encouraged them to withdraw their cooperation, until the Government of India needed Congress assistance to help run the country, I am not sure I agree with that. First of all, there's definitively a widely held view that many Congress electees effectively started putting their cronies in the lower positions that you mention regardless of whether they were suitable or not.But this was at the expense of those who were already in the positions and were displaced, and most significantly, a large number of them where muslims. The govt certainly needed congress help to keep the country running smoothly, but it did not need the congress's help to keep the country running. Note that in Punjab in 1919, given the same situation of post-war demobillisation, rising discontentment, preceded by mutinies (even among some of the white troops) and followed by a rising tension among the common people and a possible explosive situation, the Raj responded by the means of Jalianwallah Bagh, and not by means of concilliation. The Raj possibly could not have lasted a hundred years (it was a figure of speech BTW), but it could have prolonged well into 1950s at the least.

3. Re: Most other Congress leaders seemed to have realised just how unpleasant the Nazis were, and that the British were the lesser of two evils. Bose himself was a part of whatever protests against Nazi and Fascist ideas, and more importantly, practices. So Moral Blinkers are possibly the wrong description (Indians say pragmatism). Linlithgow was not an Idiot when he declared war on India's behalf, it was because first of all he was not sure how much that would be supported by the Congress, and more importantly, how would the vengeful people of a subjugated country agree to fight for the Crown. Britain's interests were not first of India, but of self-survival, and vengeful people don't like to help at such times. Oh, and Linlithgow had the power to do so.

Also, Bose's intial reaction to the war was to urge Gandhi to call for a massive civil disobedience movement. Gandhi refused becasue didn't wish to jeopardise Britain's war efforts. Yet, he (and the Congress) did exactly the same thing three years later. Besides - and this follows from the same point- if they really realised how bad the Nazis and Japs were, how come Quit India was launched at a time when Japan was literally bludgeoning the British forces and "threatening" India when they would've prepared to British Subjects rather than Japanese ones??? (this was even before Bose reached south asia and Japan actually launched any offensive even at Arakan). It seems the chance of having one master swapped for another didn't cross the mind of congress's leadership? Or was it Pragmatism?

Lastly, "it made little difference to Indians because India was an occupied country". The view is (or was) not mine. It's that of Auckinleck, (Occupied and Hostile who would like to see the back of us, apparently) and summed up what he thought of the will and capacity of successfully defending India against a Japanese onslought. This was even before the INA becoming what it did. Whether the "difference" bewteen the British and "Japanese" rule would have been clear I don't know. But the Japs did not mount a strike on Imphal in 1942 because first they didn't wish "to antagonise the Indian Public Opinion".Rueben lys 18:12, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Editing the word Puppet State within the introduction

I have removed the term puppet state from the intro into the article and added in a later line whithin the introduction that it is held as a puppet state by some. This is for two reasons. First of all, as the link to the term puppet state itself shows that it is a Pejorative political term and is listed under this category as well, it is therefore a violation of the NPOV policy. Secondly, also from the page on Puppet State, the term is used in the context of denying political legitimacy, and therefore, again, is violating NPOV policy in a controversial article like this, where a number of opposing view points exist (as is clear from the discussions above). And lastly, the page puppet state also lists the Azad Hind government and held some inaccurate information (it has been edited now). I think given the POV nature of the term (and from the edits in the main article, including one reversion of a similar edit, it is a very touchy topic and has many view points), this term should not be used in this article without clarifying that it is alleged by some and refuted by others that it was a puppet state.Dudewheresmywallet 17:07, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Bose: The Forgotten Hero

I've added a line which states that a movie about the INA was made in 2005, directed by Shyam Benegal. Jvalant 07:44, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Accuracy

Going through what I am reading at the moment, I have to say, the Indian perception described here, the middle paragraph on Andaman occupation, is only one and a minority view and does not at all describe what happened and how Indians percieved the Azad Hind government and its army, the Indian National Army. In fact, the organisation was feted as a immensely patriotical organisation without compare, and came to possess a very strong legitimacy in the eyes of common Indians (forget the army), and in fact was a ground for defence of the INA officers. Most of the article concetrates on the army and the japanese occupation of andaman, of which the latter was not, and is still not, the grounds on which Azad Hind is seen.As for the army, it too caught a similar notion, but more on the INA than Azad Hind. This needs to be described properly and in context.Rueben lys 13:42, 13 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] External links

There's seem external links throughout this article that need sorting out. The only form of external link or reference in one paragraph was to http://www.geocities.com/netajimystery/roy which I've removed because (1) it's a geocities page so unlikely to be a reliable source, and (2) it's a dead link anyway. Someone needs to go through and sift the links, but also to add in decent references where required. Purgatorio (talk) 19:08, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

The external link labelled "Subhas Chandra Bose, the Indian National Army and India's War of Liberation" is deaf, I've removed it. --Schwalker (talk) 09:10, 26 January 2008 (UTC)