Wikipedia talk:Articles for deletion/Barbara Schwarz (2nd nomination)

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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1) Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful to award the Salt Lake Tribune defendants who are guilty of libel, of malicious defamation, of having published an article and headline that is wrong in sting and gist, of invasion of privacy, of outrageous negligence, of portraying me in false light, of misappropriation, of abuse of image, of abuse of personal identity, of emotional abuse, of copyright violation, of deception, of theft by deception, of fraud, of broken promise, of breech of agreement/contract, of not having published any retraction or letter to the editor with the fair comment reportage privilege neutral reportage privilege? Is the neutral reportage privilege that most states don't accept and the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court does not want to hear about constitutional? 2) Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful to allow the Tribune to take approximately hundred photos of me under deception and publish a goofy or doctored photo of mine in an article I did not agree to? Is that not misappropriation? Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful to allow Tribune to keep these pictures/negatives of me, a private person and no public figure for further abuse? Even in case of a public figure, can the Tribune constitutionally and lawfully keep photos being taken under deception in her own home? Do people not have a right to their own image? Shouldn't the person have a right to copyright of her own image, esp. under these circumstances? 3) Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful to deny jury trail after I clearly had an established prima facie case? Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful by judge Iwasaki to cite no statutes or case law in his order of November 13, 2003 in which he did not make clear if case was dismissed or summary judgment granted? Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful by Iwasaki and judge Barrett to sabotage my disqualification process by deliberately wrongfully claiming that I would have not filed supporting affidavit and certificate of good faith despite courts own docket said I did? Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful by Utah Court of Appeal to wrongfully claim that I did not dispute information in the record and that I did not raise cognizable constitutional claims? Is it constitutional or otherwise lawful by the courts to favor the Tribune and let them come way with just about any violation of the constitution and the laws? Is it constitutional and lawful by the Court of Appeals to apply false legal standards? (See more detailed questions attached as addendum A) DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS United Supreme Court Constitution, Article I; United Supreme Court Constitution, Article III, Section 2; United Supreme Court Constitution, Article IV; First Amendment; Second Amendment; Sixth Amendment; Seventh Amendment; Eighth Amendment Ninth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Copyright Act, 17 U.S. CA paragraph 107; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, paragraph 56; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, paragraph 56 c; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, paragraph 56 (e); Reinstatement (Second) of Torts, paragraph 580; Reinstatement (Second) of Torts, paragraph 625 E; Reinstatement (Second) of Torts, paragraph 652 A; Reinstatement (Second) of Torts, paragraph 652 B; Reinstatement (Second) of Torts, paragraph 652 C; Reinstatement (Second) of Torts, paragraph 652 D; Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 1;Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 2; Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 2 (A); Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 3; Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 3 (B) (2); Utah Code paragraph 21 A-36-113 (1)(2);Utah Code paragraph 45-2-1; Utah Code paragraph 45-3-1; Utah Code paragraph 45-3-2; Utah Code paragraph 45-3-4; Utah Code paragraph 45-3-5; Utah Code paragraph 45-3-5 (1) (a) (b) (2); Utah Code paragraph 61-1-1 (2) (3);Utah Code paragraph 76-6-1102 (2) (Supp. 2000); Utah Code paragraph 76-9-03 (1)(2)(3); Utah Code paragraph 76-9-401 (1); Utah Code paragraph 76-9-402; Utah Code paragraph 76-9-403; Utah Code paragraph 76-9-405; Utah Code paragraph 76-9-406; Utah Code paragraph 76-9-407; Utah Code paragraph 76-9-502 (2001); Utah Code paragraph 76-9-505; Utah Code paragraph 78-8-103; Utah Code paragraph 78-8-104; Utah Code paragraph 78-21-1; Utah Code paragraph 78-27-37 (2); Utah Code paragraph 79-2-2 (1) (2) (3) (2002); Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 65 (B) (d) (2) (A); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Ann. Chapter 12;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action stems from my complaint for injunctive relief against the Salt Lake Tribune for publishing a maliciously defamatory, libelous, incoherent and confused newspaper article about me that is not just false in details but also in sting and gist and in the headline. It is about malicious defamation, libel, excessive publication of a very twisted version of my private life on Sunday, May 5, 2003, Mothers day, their front page, abuse of my identity, emotional abuse, calling me for example a "FOIA terrorist" or asking a history professor who never met me to act as shrink to make statements about my mental state and citing his unqualified remarks in the Tribune article. That article was delivered to 150.000 Utah household and was made available on-line to millions. Felons and other lawless people are fans of this article, cheer for it and distribute it actively. The case is about violation of privacy and about how Tribune deceived me, their broken promises, agreement and contract with me. Tribune reporter Christopher Smith lured me in an interview by promising to write a very different article, one about how my FOIA cases are being used against members of the public and members of the free press. Case is also about that Tribune photographer Rick Egan took approximately hundred photos of me under deception in my own home, that I did not agree that any photo of mine can be used in the article that the Tribune published, that the Tribune has no right to my image, that I am not a public figure per legal definition and even if I would be, Tribune has not right to keep photos of a public figure that were taken in that person's home under deception. My constitutional right for a jury trial was denied by the Utah courts. Biased Third District Court judge Glenn Iwasaki threw my case out without investigating any facts. Iwasaki acted as if he would work for the Tribune or their law firm but not like an impartial judge.

I provided lengthy affidavit on August 8, 2003 with supporting

exhibits that clearly proved the deception and fraud by the Tribune and that the reporter knew that the article that was published was not the truth about me or my activities. The Tribune filed no affidavit in return to rebut my affidavit because they know that they are at fault. The only affidavit that Tribune filed was one of Christopher Smith that said nothing to the merits of the case. It was unlawful and inappropriate by judge Iwasaki to grant summary judgment in a confused unprofessional order that cites no statute, law or case opinion and did not even make sure if case was dismissed or summary judgment granted. I filed motion to disqualify Iwasaki, but he deliberately forwarded on October 15, 2003 only my motion and not the supporting affidavit and certificate of good faith to presiding judge Peuler to sabotage my motion to disqualify him. Judge Peuler, avoided to rule on it and handed the matter to judge William Barrett, who ruled on October 21, 2003 that my motion to disqualify Iwasaki is denied because I failed to file a supporting affidavit and a certificate of good faith, despite that the official Third District Court docket showed that I filed affidavit and Certificate of Good Faith on October 14, 2003. I appealed the case, and the Utah Court of Appeals ignored all facts of the case and all violations of the law by Tribune and the Third District Court judges. Despite this appeal of judge Iwasaki's disqualification and bias was pending, judge Billings and Jackson remanded my case to Iwasaki without first ruling on the disqualification appeal. On May 5, 2005, CA judges Billings, Davis and Jackson affirmed summary judgment (despite order of Iwasaki was not clear as to if summary judgment is granted or case dismiss) to illegally protect Tribune defendants/appellees. The Court of Appeals decision is unconstitutional, corrupt and biased because the Tribune article is not protected by neutral reportage privilege or fair comment privilege since it does not contain accurate or disinterested reporting. The article was written two years after I filed no FOIA requests anymore. It was not newsworthy. Article is wrong in sting and gist and approximately 150 000 households in Utah and millions on-line were misinformed about me and my activities. I did not file thousands of FOIA requests to the government and reporters filed a lot more. I did not strain the public records system, and Tribune reporter Smith wrote himself that federal workers are lazy and use all kinds of justifications not to come to work. Article is also not protected under fair comment privilege as article was solely published to cause me harm. My private life is none of the publics concern; moreover, what Tribune scribbled is not my life but their corrupt and confused version of it. The article also does not reflect my true speech. Be informed that Tribune reporters sold for $ 20.000 lies about the Smart family to the National Enquirer that they published a forged letter that badly influenced a mayoral campaign and that a Huntsman speaker complained about the dishonest and shabby reporting of that paper.

STATEMENT OF FACTS On April 3, 2003, Salt Lake Tribune reporter Christopher Smith left a handwritten letter at my door, telling me he is an investigative reporter and wants to talk to me since my FOIA cases have resulted in an unusual ruling on how and when public information may be released, which may have broad implication for the free press. (See addendum D, the letter.) On April 4, 2003, Smith e-mailed me an message of January 27, 2003, informing me that he noted that I have an alleged bill of Dollars 303 to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and that he encountered new requirements for FOIA requesters, a precedent set with my requests requiring payment of fees not related to search and retrieval of federal records which has unusual ramification for press and public and he indicated that he wants to write about that. (See addendum E) Smith did not write that promised article. The Tribune reporter and editors turned out to be traitors to their own profession and to members of the free press. Instead of helping the public and the members of the free press to more fairness, freedom and access of records within the government and the FOIA offices, the Tribune turned on them by portraying me deliberately wrongfully to the bad and crazy person instead of reporting that the FOIA officers handle FOIA requests unlawfully and arbitrarily and in fact plot against the requesters. Smith deceived me also by writing that he is an investigative reporter. I compare Smith to Jayson Blair, the New York Times reporter who made up his versions of matters. Smith didn't investigate anything, he did not even contact the VA because he knew that the fees were fabricated and a fraud. On May 11, 2003, the Tribune published that maliciously wrongfully and defamatory article with wrong in sting and gist headline: "S.L. Woman strains public records system". (See addendum F, this article.) See also my correspondence with Smith attached to my affidavit of August 8, 2003 and you will come to the conclusion that Smith knew that federal workers are lazy and don't want to work but not that I strained the public records system. Smith described in his correspondence to me that federal employees are work shy and use any justification to not show up for work. I agreed only to a picture taken of me in my apartment for the article that Smith had promised me to write, not for a completely different article that the Tribune published on May 11, 2003. I never agreed to an article in which my private life is being twisted, smeared and defamed. Tribune photographer Rick Egan came to my apartment to take a photo, he shot approximately hundred photos of me, and I agreed only to the use of my photo in an article that would be about the unusual rulings on my FOIA cases on how and when public information may be released, which may have broad implication for the free press. I requested by the Tribune to write a correction or at least a letter to the editor which they ignored. I requested the negatives of the photographs that were made under deception in my apartment but the criminal Tribune kept them. I have a right to my own image. The Tribune has no copyright to private photos made in my home of a private person. I am not a public person per legal definition. On June 2, 2003, I filed a complaint for injunctive relief versus the defendants in the caption of this case. (See addendum G, Third docket sheet, case 930912398 MI, and also my postings about the Tribune reporter, addendum H, I, J, K , and L) On July 21, 2003, Christopher Smith's ridiculous incomplete and truth evading affidavit was filed on July 21, 2003. His affidavit says nothing to the merits of the case and is completely worthless. On August 8, 2003, I filed my affidavit and supported it with numerous exhibits and my correspondence with the reporter attached. (See addendum M, affidavit ) On September 29, 2003, judge Iwasaki granted unlawfully and inappropriately summary judgment or dismissal to defendants. He is not even clear in his order as to what he ruled. He did not investigate any facts, which all were in favor of my case. He favored clearly defendants and acted as if he would be their employee. By October 14, 2003, I had filed a motion to disqualify Iwasaki, a supporting affidavit and a Certificate of Good Faith. On October 15, 2003, biased Iwasaki just forwarded my motion to disqualify him but not the supporting papers to presiding judge Sandra Peuler. She apparently avoided to rule on it and passed it to associate presiging judge William Barrett, who ruled on October 21, 2003 that my motion to disqualify is dismissed because I would have not filed a supporting affidavit and a Certificate of Good faith. That was a lie. Barrett was covering for Iwasaki. All three judges have a responsibility towards their own court docket sheet that clearly reflected that these papers were filed by me on October 14, 2003. (See addendum G, and addendum N, the Barrett order and addendum O (A) my affidavit that I filed these papers.) On November 13, 2003, Iwasaki signed a confusing order, drafted by unqualified Tribune attorney Michael Patrick O'Brien, saying that either my case is dismissed and/or summary judgment is granted. No statute, law or law opinion is cited in the order. (See order attached as addendum P). On November 24, 2003, I filed a Notice if Appeal, on January 13, 2004, appeal was transferred under case no 20030981-SC from Utah Supreme Court to Utah Court of Appeals, and case number 20030981-CA was assigned. Despite appeal as to disqualification of judge Iwasaki was pending before the Utah Court of Appeals, judge Billings and judge Jackson remanded case temporarily back to Iwasaki without ruling first on the disqualification appeal. Judge Iwasaki had no jurisdiction as due to the pending appeal. (See docket sheet of case 20030981-CA, addendum Q and 20041124-CA, addendum R) In case 20041124-CA I, a pauper, are conspiratively financially harassed by Tribune, judge Iwasaki and Utah Court of Appeal judges for having filed a motion to protest a 24 pages long transcript that is unprofessionally and wrongfully transcribed in 49 items. On case 20030981-CA, judges Billings, Davis and Jackson affirmed on May 5, 2005 Summary judgment in a memo decision (not for official publication!) despite that they set a precedent and applied first time the unconstitutional neutral reportage privilege in Utah. (See addendum S, the memo decision.) On May 25, 2005, judge Jackson denied my petition for rehearing. (See addendum T).

Concerned Court of Appeals judges lied that I did not raise

constitutional claims. My 74 pages long brief of April 29, 2004 to Utah CA and my response motion were loaded with constitutional arguments and my reply brief to same court of October 25, 2004 (See addendum U and U(A)). Despite Utah Court of Appeals understood that the Tribune defendants also violated criminal codes, they covered for that yellow journalistic paper. Striking is also that the Utah Court of Appeals first time "recognized" the "Neutral Reportage Privilege", but nevertheless do not want the decision published, as they know their decision is unconstitutional, above the law and corrupt. (See addendum V)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS The Salt Lake Tribune is guilty of libel, malicious defamation in a newspaper article about me that is wrong in sting and gist; I am no public figure. Tribune is guilty of invasion into privacy, of outrageous negligence and portraying me in a false light. Tribune is also guilty of misappropriation, abuse of my image, abuse of personal identity, emotional abuse, copyright violation, deception, theft by deception, fraud, broken promise, breech of agreement/contract and having not published any retraction or my objections to their lies. Under these circumstances it is unconstitutional by the courts to award the Tribune with the neutral reportage privilege or fair comment privilege. The Tribune deceived me that they would use photo of mine in another article. Their photographer came in my home and made approximately hundred photos of me, a private person, in my own four walls. I requested the negatives, but criminal Tribune does not hand them to me. I have the copyright to my own image, not the Tribune. Utah Court of Appeals knows that Tribune violated criminal codes and nevertheless protects that yellow paper. Use of the photo was misappropriation and not returning the photos/negatives of my image is theft. Tribune has no copyright to any photos taken in my home. Jury trail was unconstitutionally denied to me. Dismissal and/or summary judgment was not appropriate. (See confusing Iwasaki order.) I established a prima facie case. Judges abused their discretion. Judges are favoring Tribune and are biased towards me. Judges Iwasaki and Barrett sabotaged Iwasaki's disqualification process. The judges applied no judicial care and no legal standards (Iwasaki and Barrett) and false legal standards (Utah Court of Appeals to my case.) Constitutional rights were denied to me by Tribune and the courts. Court of Appeals claimed wrongfully that I did not identify cognizable constitutional claims or did not demonstrate how defendants violated any of my constitutional rights despite I did so in much detail. The Court of Appeals memo decision of May 5, 2005 is corrupt. ARGUMENT I The Salt Lake Tribune is guilty of libel, malicious defamation in a newspaper article about me that is wrong in sting and gist; I am no public figure. Tribune is guilty of invasion into privacy, of outrageous negligence and portraying me in a false light. Tribune is also guilty of misappropriation, abuse of my image, abuse of personal identity, emotional abuse, copyright violation, deception, theft by deception, fraud, broken promise, breech of agreement/contract and having not published any retraction or my objections to their lies. Under these circumstances it is unconstitutional by the courts to award the Tribune with the neutral reportage privilege or fair comment privilege.

The actual malice rule does not protect a media defendant from reporting false or defamatory statements that are newsworthy if the defendants knows those statements are false. Tribunereporter Smith knew that he portrayed me absolutely wrongfully.

The Utah Court of Appeals did not investigate the facts of the case. Just like judge Iwasaki, they ruled as if they would be paid by the Tribune. The appeal court judges are so biased towards me that they allowed the lawless Tribune to come away with the worst kind of malicious defamation: calling me a terrorist, and that is why they used first time the controversial neutral reportage privilege, one that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied to consider and that the U.S. Supreme Court does not want to hear. Troy Publishing Co. v. Norton, Pennsylvania Supreme Court case 04-979. The California Supreme Court declined also to rule on the Neutral Reportage Privilege in Khawar v. Globe Int., 1998 Cal Lexis 6880 (1998). That court held that Khawar is a private figure and neutral reportage privilege does not exist in cases where republication is the basis for libel involving a private figure plaintiff. I am a private person and no public person. I do not possess any such powers than a public figure. The Utah Court knows that I proceed informa pauperis and can't afford an attorney and can't pay court fees. Neutral reportage privilege was deliberately wrongfully applied. The Utah Court of Appeals seems to know that and that is why - despite they set a precedent - they do not want the decision to be published! The U.S. Supreme Court never held that the First Amendment mandates a neutral reportage privilege. It has been rejected entirely by a number of state and federal appellate courts. See Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1224-26 (3rd Cir. 1987); Mccall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1982); Hogan v. Herald Co., 446 N.Y.S 2d 836, 842 (NY App. Div. 1982). The California Supreme Court ruled that privilege does not exist in cases involving private figures. It noted that among courts that recognized privilege, almost all limit its existence to cases involving public figures. The court was persuaded by the arguments of commentators that republican of accusations made against private figure are never protected by neutral reportage privilege because recognition of an absolutely privilege would be inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's insistence on the need for balancing the First Amendment interest in promoting the broad dissemination of information relating to public controversies against the reputation of private figures. The California Supreme Court found limited value in the republication of accusations against private figures. It stated: "Only rarely will the report of false and defamatory accusations against a person who is neither a public official or a public figure provide information of value in the resolution of a controversy over a matter of public concern. On the other hand, the report of such accusations can have a devastating effect on the reputation of the accused individual, who has not voluntary elected to encounter an increased risk of defamation and who may lack sufficient media access to counter the accusations. Khawar, 1998 Cal. Lexis 6880 at 21.

A person is guilty of libel if he intentionally and with malicious intent injures another or procures to publish any libel. See Utah Code Ann. Paragraph 76-9-502 (2001) and Utah Code 76-9-03, (1) (2) (3), Presumption of Malice. I established that the Tribune is guilty on all counts. (See my affidavit of August 8, 2003 and the exhibits.) West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007-08 (Utah 1994). A statement is defamatory if it impeaches an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. U.C.A. 1953, 45-2-2-(1), Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928. (Utah 1998). Statement is defamatory if it tends to injure plaintiff in his trade, profession, or community standing or lower his estimation of community. Claude v. Thomason, 942, F.Supp. 635. The U.S. Supreme Court defines "actual malice" as making a statement with knowledge that is was false or with reckless disregard whether it was false or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct (1964). In Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P2d 968, (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded a summary judgment decision in favor of KSL. I am no public figure, I did not seek the attention of the media, and reporter Smith contacted me, not I him. He informed me that he found out about me by accident. He reported false and twisted information about me in reckless disregard of the truth. The Utah Supreme Court cited in Seegmiller v. KSL another court opinion, St. Armant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 20 L Ed. 2nd 262, 88 S.Ct 1323 (1968), in which the court precisely defined the term "reckless disregard for the truth", as incorporated in the "actual malice" statement. [390 U.S. at 731.] In Seegmiller v. KSL, the Utah Supreme Court concurred with Comment g to paragraph 580 B of Restatement (Second) of Torts which sets forth the evidentiary standards to be employed in determining how negligence is to be proven in a defamation action brought by private figures. In my case, Tribune reporter Smith did not do his homework, did not check the FOIA logs of the agencies, did not contact the reporter(s) that indeed filed thousands more requests than I did, did not investigate if the fees that the U.S. Department of Veterans fabricated were a fraud, did not check if adequate laws were applied to any lawsuit of mine, did not made truthful research about my private life and never should have put anything private about me that in the article in the first place. He acted with outrageous negligence, and knew that he published falsehoods when he wrote that defamatory maliciously article and libeled me. The Tribune wrongfully accused me of having overloaded the federal government, which can be compared to criminal activity. They also named me a "FOIA terrorist", but oddly did not call the prominent reporters that filed so many more requests than I did, "terrorists". In Seegmiller v. KSL, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that indeed allegations of criminal conduct, being particular damaging to a reputation, have historically been treated as slanderous per se under common law. "A false light claim is 'closely allied' with an action for defamation, and the same consideration apply to each. Stien, 944 P.2d at 380 (Utah). Truth is not a defense that Tribune can claim, because the article is wrongful in sting and gist and even in the headline. Claiming that I am the most prolific requester of FOIA requests and not others, claiming that I overloaded the system, while I didn't, are not insignificant inaccuracies. My defamation and invasion of privacy (false light) claims don't fail because there is a genuine dispute about the substantial truth of the statements in the article. In analyzing false light privacy claims, Utah follows in cases they are not biased as in mine the Restatement of Torts Section 625E, which states as follows: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.

Russell v. Thompson Newspaper, Inc. 842 P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1992). Tribune is guilty on all counts. See also Privacy Violation, Utah Code 76-9-402, Libelous matter not privileged, Utah Code 96-9-505, Abuse of Personal Identity Act, Utah Code 45-3-2; Utah Code 76-9-407 (2), 45-3-4, Cause of action for abuse - remedies; 45-3-5(1)(a)(b) (2), Action against publisher - grounds, remedies. Tribune did not correct their lies nor did they compensate me with a cent. Also, free speech must be balanced, however, against the values protected by law of defamation, invasion of privacy, and abuse of personal identity, Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1988). To state a defamation claim based on implied statements plaintiff must show that a reasonable juror could conclude that the alleged defamatory implications constituted probably false assertions of facts. - Doods v. American Broadcasting Co., 145 F.3d 1053 (Cal 1998). The Salt Lake Tribune is guilty of misappropriation, abuse of my image, abuse of my personal identity, emotional abuse, copyright violation, deception, theft by deception, fraud, broken promise, breech of agreement/contract and having not published any retraction or my objections in a letter to the editor. See Utah Code 45-2-1, Retraction by newspapers. The Tribune failed to print any retraction, any correction, and any letter of editor. In deciding whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that a statement expressed or implied a verifiably false fact about a plaintiff alleging defamation, the court must consider the statement in context. Weyrich v. New Republic, Inc. 235 F.3d 617. In deciding whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning the guiding principle is the statement's tendency to injure in the eyes of its audience when viewed in context in which it was made. - Mast vs. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Ut.App.1998). I am no public figure but a private person. The Salt Lake Tribune is guilty of invasion and violation of my privacy. Section 652A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says: one who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interest of the other. The right of privacy is invaded by a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another as stated in paragraph 652B; or b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in paragraph 652C; or c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in paragraphs 652D; or d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as states in paragraph 652E.

An intrusion takes place when a reporter intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon a person's "private space" or affairs. As the reporter and the photographer contacted me under false promises, them entering in my private space, my apartment house, and the photographer in my apartment, is an intrusion, an invasion into my privacy. "Private place" is defined in the Utah Code as a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, 76-9-401 (1). The four areas of privacy law are: Appropriation of name and likeness; Intrusion upon an individual's solitude; Publication of private information about an individual; Publishing material that puts an individual in a false light. See Utah Code 45-3-1 through 45-3-5, Abuse of Personal Identity and Title 76-9-401, 402, 403, 405 and 406, Offenses against Privacy. Public disclosure of private and embarrassing facts: most troublesome of the invasion of privacy claims are the publication about the private life of a person when the publication would be both highly offensive and embarrassing to a reasonable person and not of legitimate public concern. Tribune is also guilty on those counts. Tribune also published a direct link to an Internet newsgroup, which has my home address against my expressed wishes in their headlines and any Salt Lake Tribune reader and any criminal can come right to my apartment! Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L.Rev. 383, 389 (1960). Right of privacy is beautifully defined as "to be let alone." The tort of invasion of privacy includes four separate causes of action: intrusion of the plaintiff's seclusion of private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicly placing plaintiff in a false light; and appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's advantage. Nemani v. St. Louis University, 33 S.W. 3d 184. The Tribune is guilty on all four counts. Utah cases analyzing the invasion of privacy tort have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, also called "Restatement", paragraph 652D says: one who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.

Read what the Utah Supreme Court wrote in Seegmiller v. KSL, 626 P.2d 968, see addendum W. It confirms that I am not a public figure and don't deserve the Tribune excessive exposure. As Justice Powell stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, supra: He has not accepted public office or assumed an 'influential role in ordering society'. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). He has relinquished no part of this interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. [418 U.S. at 345.] In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, justice Brennan said: "'The right to privacy', in which they eloquently argued that the 'excesses' of the press in 'overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency' made it essential that the law recognize a right to privacy, distinct from traditional remedies for defamation, to protect private individuals against the unjustifiable infliction of mental pain and distress." Justice Brandeis said in his famous dissent in Ohlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), the right of privacy is the 'most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men...' I am private person, no public figure, no limited public figure, no vortex public figure, it doesn't matter how the Tribune like to twist the facts to come away with their outrageous invasion and violation of my privacy. In Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2nd at 808, the U.S. Supreme Court held that private individuals were more vulnerable to injury, and therefore the state interest in protecting them was correspondingly greater. The

Utah Supreme Court wrote: "It is plain that the plaintiff in this case

is not a public official. Nor does he fit the definition of a public figure." And "...general criteria for defining that term were established in Gertz v. Robert Welch," 418 U.S. 323, 41 Led.2d 789 (1997). [Id. at 342, 345]. Tribune did what has come to be labeled as "bootstrapping". It occurs when media defendants attaches (or bootstrap) themselves onto the protection of the actual malice standard by pointing to media, including their own coverage, as evidence that the plaintiff is a public figure. The Supreme Court said: "Clearly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense my making the claimant a public figure." The Utah Supreme Court stated in Seegmiller v. KSL, that Seegmiller did not occupy a position of "persuasive power and influence", nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy. And neither did I. Tribune reporter Smith informed me that he found out about me per accident by researching another case. He informed me also that a governmental employee asked him how he found out about me, and he published that the Church of Scientology speaker told him that they would not know who I am. (See my affidavit of August 8, 2003.) That is not fame, and that is not the life of a public figure. The Tribune is not entitled to privilege, as falsehoods, defamation and actual malice are not covered under the Utah or U.S. Constitution or other laws. See Utah Code 76-9-505, Libelous matter not privileged. Case law generally holds that communications that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if the statement is excessively published, that is, published to more than the scope of the privilege requires to effectuate its purpose. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc, 812 P2.d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (stating that the "plaintiff can show abuse of the privilege by proving that...the publication of the defamatory material extended beyond those who have a legally justified reason for receiving it"). Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Garrison, [T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odd with the premise of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social or political change is to be effected. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are...of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that might derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality, 379 U.S. at 75, 85 S.Ct. 209, (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hamshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 Led. 1031 (1942). For defense of privilege, to apply action for slander and libel, good faith an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion and publication to proper persons must be all established, and absence of any or one of these constitutent elements will, as general rule prevent defendant form relying on privilege. - Dominy v. Shumpert, 510 S.E. 2d 81, 25 GA App. 500 (GA 1998). See also Uema v. Nippon Ex. Hawaii, Inc., 26 F.Supp.2d 1241 (HAWAII 1998); Harding v. Rosewell, 22 F.Supp.2d 806, (ILL 1998); Dawson v. NY Life Ins., 932 F. Supp. 1509 (NY 1996); Ransom v. Baltimore County, 111 F.Supp. 2d 704 (MD 2000); Stokes v. CBS, 25 F.Supp.2d 992 (MINN 1998); Cooke v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 723 A.2d 723. Privilege can't be claimed in case of actual malice, it can't be allowed to be abused, and the Tribune is guilty on all counts. There is no absolute privilege from liability under speech clause of First Amendment for defamatory statements. U.S.C.A. Const. Amendment. 1 - Richmond v. Thompson, 922 P2d 1345, 130, Wash.2d 368 (Wash 1996). As a general rule, alleged defamatory communications that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if the statement is published to more persons than the scope of privilege required to effectuate its purpose. DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979 (UT. 1999). "Privilege" protects those who make otherwise defamatory statements from legal liability Price v. Armour, 945 P.2d 1251 (Utah). Therefore, the Salt Tribune is not entitled to neutral reportage or fair comment privilege or any other privilege. ARGUMENT II The Tribune deceived me that they would use photo of mine in another article. Their photographer came in my home under deception and made approximately hundred photos of me, a private person, in my own four walls. As justification why he took not just one but so many he said that he would not know for sure if his camera works correctly. I requested the negatives/photos, but criminal Tribune does not hand them to me. I have a copyright to my own image, not the Tribune. Utah Court of Appeals knows that Tribune violated criminal codes and nevertheless protects that yellow paper. Use of the photo was misappropriation and not returning the photos/negatives of my image is theft. Tribune has no copyright to any photos taken of me in my home.

Unauthorized reproduction of professional photographs will generally violate the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C.A, paragraph 107. The Tribune had no right to publish my photo. It was violation of the Copyright Act. The photos were obtained under deception. Theft by deception is a violation of Utah Code Ann. Paragraph 76-6-1102 (2) (Supp 2000). See also Utah Code 31A-36-113 (1) (2); 61-1-1 (2) (3). An action for fraud lies where there are false representations by the defendant and reliance thereon by plaintiff to his damage. Semenov v. Hill, 982 F.2d 578 (1999 Utah). Fraud is a false representation of an existing material fact made knowingly or recklessly Debry v. Noble, 899 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). Utah Code 78-27-37 (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees. The use of the photo in the article, to which I never agreed, is misappropriation and a copyright violation. Not returning the negatives/photos of my image is theft of my image. ARGUMENT III Jury trail was unconstitutionally denied to me. Dismissal and/or summary judgment was not appropriate. (See confusing Iwasaki order.) I established a prima facie case. Judges abused their discretion. Judges are favoring Tribune and are biased towards me. Judges Iwasaki and Barrett sabotaged Iwasaki's disqualification process. Judges applied no legal standards (Iwasaki) and false legal standards (Utah Court of Appeals).

Judge Iwasaki denied my constitutional right for jury trial and due process. I proved following with my complaint, the affidavit and the exhibits: - The libel, the actual malice, the defamation was published. - The Tribune publication was about me. - The material is false. - The defendants were at fault. Such a case deserves a jury trial, which Iwasaki unconstitutionally and in personal bias denied to me. The Determinative law hereto is Utah Code, Title 78, Judicial Code 78-21-1, Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10, U.S. Constitution, Amendment VII. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (1945) (stating that essentials of due process include fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross examine witnesses.) Right to fair trail incorporates the right to have trial presided over by a judge who was free from "bias" and "prejudice"; bias and prejudice means, amongst other things, undue favoritism towards one of the litigants. See U.S.C.A. Const. Amendment 6. - Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793, 112 Nev. 503. U.S. Trial court Judges Iwasaki and Barrett are guilty of abuse of discretion. Iwasaki dismissed my case without citing any statute, law or court opinion; he got rid of the case without clarifying if the case was dismissed or summary judgment was granted. He signed unprofessional and lawless order. Judge Barrett lied that I did not file a certification of good faith and an affidavit to support my motion to disqualify Iwasaki, despite their own court docket clearly stated that I did, and Barrett denied that motion unconstitutionally and unlawfully and shares Iwasaki's bias. See Utah Code, Chapter I, 78-51-21, Docket to be kept, 78-5-122 Docket entries - prima facie evidence, 78-5-123 Docket Index. Judges and defendants/appellees are guilty of conspiracy. Judges are biased towards me . Right to fair trail incorporates the right to have trial presided over by a judge who was free from "bias" and "prejudice"; bias and prejudice means, amongst other things, undue favoritism towards one of the litigants. See U.S.C.A. Const. Amendment 6. - Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793, 112 Nev. 503. My case was not thrown out based on any law or statute, but just based upon arbitrariness, conspiracy and bias.

Summary judgments (Rule 56 of Fed. R. of Civil Procedure) are granted

if there is no genuine issue of material fact. However, I set forth that in my case there is no shortage of genuine issues and material facts and a genuine issue for trail. See Utah Rules of Civ. Procedure, 56 (e). The confusing order that Iwasaki signed just mentioned that my case was dismissed/or summary judgment granted pursuant to the memorandum of Tribune attorney Patrick Michael O'Brien. O'Brien's motions/memoranda are filled with laws, statutes and case opinions that don't apply even remotely to the situation. His pleadings are filled with falsehoods and defamatory malicious defamation about my character and activities. How can that be the law? I have a right to know under which statutes and laws the judges dismissed my case! This is blatant and flagrant and gross abuse of discretion. Iwasaki applied no legal standards by not considering the merits of the case and by dismissing my case without citing any statute or case law. See Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Annotated, Chapter 12, Rule of Professional Conduct, Cannon 1, 2, and 3 and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 65 (B) (d) (2) (A). Canon 2A states that "a judge shall respect and comply with the law." Cannon 3B (2) requires a judge to a "apply the law". Not applying any laws, as in this case, is clearly gross abuse of judicial power. See Utah Code 78-8-103, Grounds for reprimand, 78-8-104, Criminal. - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, abuse of discretion, Rule 65B (d) (2) (A), allows to direct the particular exercise of a lower court's judgment to correct the lower court's abuse of discretion. Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc., v. Frederick, 890 P2d 1017, 1019-22 (Utah 1995). Indian Village Trading Post v. Inc. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Judges Iwasaki and Barrett are biased against me, they favored the defendants, and they did not fairly and impartially determine the issues and the law. Iwasaki granted summary judgment and/or dismissal (!) to the defendants despite that there is no law that supports his confused decision. He is extreme biased and has a deep seated antagonism against me. Poulssen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 742, (Utah Court Appeals 1997) and (quoting Orderville Irrig Co. v. Glendale Irrig., Co, 17, Utah 2nd 282, 288, 409 Pd 61, 621 (1965). An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the action of the judge...were "inherently unfair". State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120, Ut. Ct. App. 1995. Judges Iwasaki and Barrett were inherently unfair to me by denying my rights bluntly, by conspiring against me by favoring Tribune, by claiming false facts (Barrett) and by citing no law upon which Iwasaki threw my case out. Claim for abuse of process requires two elements, (1) ulterior purpose and (2) act in use of process which is not proper in regular prosecution of lawsuit. Procter & Gamble v. Haugen, 179 FDR, 622. - Under Utah law, whether there was abuse of process is to be determined as issue, independent from rightfulness or wrongfulness of prior steps in proceedings. Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp 1563, affirmed 78 F.3d 59. Fact is that judge Iwasaki did not view the facts of my case in any favorable light. He unlawfully ignored all facts in my favor, and so did Barrett and the Utah Court of Appeal judges. When our review "requires us to examine statutory language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute". Young v. Salt Lake City School District, 2002 Utah 64 P.10, 52 P.3d 1230. Judge Iwasaki did not look at ANY statute when he heard my case but kicked it out. He applied only his own and the Tribune's private laws, which say I am not equal under the law with others. The grant of a motion to dismiss is likewise a matter of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Thimmes v. Utah State University, 2001 Utah App. 93, P4, 22P.3d 257, 258. The appeal court failed to correct the lower court. "We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court." Habermehl v. Potter, 153 F.3d 1137, 1138 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate (only) if the evidence before the court, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. At 1139, see also Rule 56 c, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material facts exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hill v. Allred, 2001 Utah 16, P12, 28 P.3d 1271, Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, P7 48 P.3d 94. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65 (c). The trial courts resolution of the legal issues is accorded no deference since entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law. Hill, 2001 UT. 16 at P12. The Utah Court of Appeals also deliberately confuses the facts of the transcript request. (See case 20041124-CA.) The Utah Court of Appeals covered for judges Iwasaki, Barrett and the Tribune defendants and affirmed and blessed unconstitutional, lawless, conspirative and other corrupt conduct. ARGUMENT VI Constitutional rights were denied to me by Tribune and other courts. Court Appeals claimed wrongfully that I did not identify cognizable constitutional claims or did not demonstrate how defendants violated any of my constitutional rights. The memo decision of May 5, 2005 by Utah Court of Appeals is corrupt.

Not just on trial court level but also in my 74 pages long brief of April 29, 2004 to the Utah Court of Appeals, and in my reply motion, I identified numerous cognizable constitutional rights that the Tribune violated or denied. (See addendum U, my brief of April 29, 2004 and my reply brief of October 25, 2005, addendum U (A)). Publishing a maliciously defamatory article about me that is wrong in sting and gist, defendants violated the Ninth Amendment. This Amendment is about the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall be not construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. One of these rights is being left alone, having privacy. The word privacy is not in the Bill of Rights but the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled through a variety of amendments that people have a fundamental right to privacy. The Tribune had no business to spill twisted, out of context or false private information about me to 150.000 households and millions of readers on-line and to provide those people with a direct link to my home address. Furthermore, defendants violated following of my U.S. constitutional rights: the First Amendment protects rights to communicate ideas, concepts, thoughts, beliefs and artistic impressions, but not malicious defamation, libel, invasion into privacy, violation of privacy by a newspaper against a private citizen. - The Tribune cited me deliberately incoherently and out of context. This is also a violation of my right for free speech. Defendants abused the First Amendment by having published a defamatory and malicious article about me. Defendants and their counsel also abused the First Amendment trying to deny to me access to the court, and my right to petition to the court for a redress of grievances by asking the court to deny that access upon my inability to pay the court fees, and by not filing my motions or/and unconstitutionally controlling my motions into not filing them. That is also a violation of my Fourteenth Amendment rights. Those activities are evidence of the outrageous double moral by the Tribune defendants and their counsel. They claim constitutional protection of their free speech, even for their actual malice and defamation, but same time they try to deny all my constitutional rights, even those of access to the courts. The Tribune tries to come away by citing the First Amendment, the "right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." I never would have sued the Tribune if they would have chosen not to write about me at all, but as they have chosen to write about me, and that on their front page, they have to be held accountable that their "right to speak freely" violated rights of mine, including constitutional rights. They did not use their First Amendment rights honestly and ethically, but in a harmful, actual malicious article, that is wrong in sting and gist and violates my rights of privacy, security and defames me outrageously. Tribune counsel misinformed the trial court that I did not claim any constitutional violations of my rights. I did so, in my complaint, page 2. I claimed that the Tribune violated following of my constitutional rights: Utah Constitution, Article 1, Right to protect property (my image on photos); Private property for public use (using maliciously defamatory story about me and my photo to entertain but also mislead people to buy that yellow paper) without compensation for me; Section 25, Rights retained by people; Section 27, fundamental rights (to live in peace, to be not defamed, to protect my privacy). By favoring the Tribune and allowing that paper come away with any violation of the law, by sabotaging the disqualification process of judge Iwasaki, by protecting and awarding the very guilty Tribune with privileges, by corrupting the case and applying no law (Iwasaki and Barrett) and applying wrong laws (Utah Court of Appeals), the Third District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals violated U.S. Constitution: Article III, as they did not hold their offices during good behavior; Article III, Section 2, as they did not apply proper laws and did not threat me equally with others before them; Article IV, as judges ignored Third District Docket sheet that stated that I filed the supporting disqualification papers; Amendment I, as petition to the biased Utah courts does not bring me any relief, Amendment VII, as jury trail was denied to me; Amendment VIII, as be Tribune and the courts see in me apparently a person without any rights.