Armada of 1779

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Armada of 1779
Part of American Revolutionary War
Date June to September 1779
Location English Channel
Result Costly learning experience; British strategic victory
Belligerents
France, Spain Britain
Commanders
Comte d'Orvilliers

Luis de Córdova y Córdova

Sir Charles Hardy
Strength
66 ships of the line 38 ships of the line
Casualties and losses
Hundreds to disease 1 ship captured

The Armada of 1779 was an exceptionally large joint French and Spanish fleet intended to facilitate an invasion of England, as part of the wider conflict sparked by the American Revolutionary War.

Contents

[edit] Background

In 1778, the British Royal Navy had failed to secure a victory against the French Marine Royale at the Battle of Ushant, leading the latter to believe that they could have won if their force had been larger. On 12 April 1779, France, which had directly allied itself with the Americans in February 1778, signed a secret treaty with Spain to wage war against Great Britain. Fearful of the consequences in their own American empire, the Spanish did not openly support the Americans rebelling against British rule, but were willing to undertake direct operations against British interests, in hope of regaining various territories, most notably the fortress of Gibraltar, which controls the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. On 3 June 1779 the French fleet at Brest unexpectedly left port and sailed southward, then on 16 June Spain declared war on Great Britain.

[edit] Gathering the forces

The plan was for the French fleet, commanded by Admiral d'Orvilliers (who had also led at Ushant), including 30 ships of the line and numerous smaller vessels, to meet a Spanish fleet off the Sisarga Islands, near Corunna in north-west Spain. When the French reached the rendezvous point, the Spanish were not there, because (they later claimed) the winds were unsuitable, so d'Orvilliers had to wait for them. The ships from Brest had deliberately departed before they were fully supplied, to avoid the possibility of being blockaded by the British, so serious problems arose as the wait dragged out to several weeks, no arrangements having been made to take on additional supplies in Spain. Scurvy weakened the crews, and in the hot, crowded shipboard conditions, typhus and smallpox also broke out[1]. The Spanish fleet, commanded by Don Luis de Córdova (who was to be subordinate to d'Orvilliers in the joint enterprise), including 36 ships of the line, finally arrived on 22 July.

Meanwhile, also very slowly, an army of over 40,000 men was being gathered around Le Havre and St. Malo in northern France, with 400 transport boats. The purpose of the combined fleet was to put the Royal Navy out of action, so that the army could get safely across the English Channel (La Manche) and set up a base on the Isle of Wight, or the mainland coast nearby if possible. At the time there were fewer than 40 Royal Navy ships of the line available in the English Channel area, newly under the command of ailing 64-year-old Sir Charles Hardy, who had been desk-bound for 20 years. On 25 July the new Armada set sail northwards to take on the British fleet, but again had problems with the wind, which greatly slowed progress. As time passed, it also became apparent that the sickness which had afflicted French ships (and killed d'Orvilliers' only son, a lieutenant in the fleet) was spreading to the Spanish. Having missed (though they did not know it until later) the opportunity to seize two important British convoys of merchant ships from the West Indies, which reached Plymouth on 31 July, the fleet finally passed Ushant on 11 August and entered the Channel. Three days later, a squadron under American colours (though consisting mostly of French ships with French crews), commanded by John Paul Jones, a captain with an alarming reputation in Britain, set sail from the French port of L'Orient, heading northward towards Ireland as a diversion.

[edit] Action against the Royal Navy

What d'Orvilliers did not know was that the British fleet was not in the Channel. Having learned that the French fleet had gone out into the Atlantic in June, Admiral Hardy was patrolling off the Scilly Isles. On 14 August, the massive combined fleet came within sight of the English coast, and caused a wave of alarm which quickly spread through the country, though not quickly enough to reach the Royal Navy ship HMS Ardent, which left Plymouth on 15 August to join Hardy on patrol. On 16 August the French and Spanish ships sailing slowly eastwards up the Channel received orders from France to turn round, as it had been decided that the best place for the troops to land would be near Falmouth in Cornwall. D'Orvilliers considered this a very bad idea, and sent a reply message to France asking the government to reconsider. The next day HMS Ardent met an outlying French squadron of the great fleet, but was fooled into thinking it was British, and swiftly captured.

The allies hovered off Plymouth, but before any reply to d'Orvilliers' message could arrive, on 18 August a gale from the east drove them far to the west, out into the Atlantic. That had one beneficial result; struggling eastward again, on 25 August they finally learned the location of Hardy's British fleet, so they decided to neutralise it quickly, as they could not cope with the sickness and lack of food much longer. The combined fleet steered for the Scilly Isles, with the intention of forcing a battle, but the British commander decided otherwise. On 31 August, under cover of fog, his fleet slipped past Land's End and began leading his would-be opponents as far as he could towards the key British naval base of Portsmouth. Remarkably, on 3 September, the British fleet, completely undamaged, reached the well-defended safety of the Solent, and set about equipping for battle. This was a problem for the allies, losing men to sickness every day; also French military planners had realised that if the invasion was postponed much longer, troops would be fighting through a British autumn and winter. That day, the great armada abandoned its campaign and set sail for Brest.

[edit] The aftermath

The attempted invasion was worrying to the British, particularly as John Paul Jones's squadron began threatening ports on the east coast shortly afterwards, so hasty improvements were made to coastal defences (examples: [2] [3]). For the Spanish, it was an expensive waste of time; among other things it prevented them from bringing their full force to bear on Gibraltar, which also strengthened its defences after weak early attacks, and was never captured. For the French, it was a disaster. Keeping so many ships at sea, and so many troops waiting at embarkation ports for months on end was hugely expensive- and many good sailors died of disease[4]. D'Orvilliers resigned his post soon after returning to France. The French and Spanish fleets continued joint operations, but more usually as a precaution for troop landings against isolated British garrisons than as a direct challenge to the Royal Navy (notable expections being the unsuccessful commitment to the Great Siege of Gibraltar, and another abortive pursuit of the Channel Fleet in August 1781, not connected with an invasion plan). The French, who had greatly improved their navy after the Seven Years' War, were much more successful on their own.

[edit] Principal sources

[edit] Further reading

  • Patterson, Alfred Temple "The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish attempt to invade Britain in 1779", Manchester, UK, Manchester University Press (1960)
  • H2G2 article on the Armada- bbc.co.uk, accessed 2007-12-06
  • Hippeau, Célestin (ed.) "Le gouvernement de Normandie au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle" (transcripts of French documents, with introduction) Caen, Goussiaume de Laporte (1863)
    • Specifically chapter 4, which spreads from Volume 1 to Volume 2- via Google Books, accessed 2007-12-06
  • del Río, Antonio Ferrer "Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España" (vol. 3 chapter 2) Madrid, Matute (1856), via Google Books- accessed 2007-12-06

[edit] Other references

  1. ^ Hopkins, Donald R. (2002), The Greatest Killer: Smallpox in History, Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press, pp. 73, <http://books.google.com/books?id=z2zMKsc1Sn0C&printsec=frontcover#PPA73,M1> 
  2. ^ Dover's Western Heights fortifications whitecliffscountry.org.uk- accessed 2007-12-06
  3. ^ refortification of Gilkicker Point, near Portsmouth TeamManley website- accessed 2007-12-06
  4. ^ Selig, Robert A. (et al.) "Rochambeau in Connecticut" (chap. 5 sec. 3), Connecticut Historical Commission (1999), via hudsonrivervalley.org- accessed 2007-12-07