Argentine air forces in the Falklands War

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Historical photo of the FAA A-4C Skyhawk of the IV Air Brigade refueling in flight from a KC-130H Hercules on May 9, 1982. Pilot Lt. Jorge Casco would not return from this mission.
Historical photo of the FAA A-4C Skyhawk of the IV Air Brigade refueling in flight from a KC-130H Hercules on May 9, 1982. Pilot Lt. Jorge Casco would not return from this mission.

This article describes the composition and actions of the Argentine air forces in the Falklands War (Spanish:Guerra de las Malvinas). For an overview of the air forces of the United Kingdom, see British air services in the Falklands War.

Contents

[edit] Background

As Argentina triggered the war it would be reasonably to think they were prepared, and had a plan on how to defend the islands. The military dictatorship that governed the country at the time regarded the seizure of the Falklands as a political act to obtain a diplomatic bargaining position, and not as an act of war. Consequently they were taken by surprise when the United Kingdom responded with a large-scale mobilization, and a task force to retake the islands [1].

The Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Argentina; FAA) had never considered the possibility of waging a long-range naval air campaign against a major NATO power. It was not trained or equipped for such a mission. The FAA had only two tanker aircraft to serve the whole air force and navy, and its fighter-bomber Mirage IIIs and IAI Daggers were not equipped for aerial refueling. The FAA's training, tactics and equipment were focused on a possible war against Chile, resulting from disputes such as the Beagle conflict.[2] [3]

FAA pilots in San Julian - May 1982
FAA pilots in San Julian - May 1982

The Chilean threat was a cause of great concern to the Argentina military during the war. The Chilean armed forces had deployed a significant force to Chile's common border with Argentina, and the FAA was forced to reinstate their retired F-86 Sabres to bolster Argentina's air defences. In Argentina's favour, Peru immediately offered its support to the Argentine cause, with the Peruvian Air Force even offering to fly combat missions. This was politely declined by the Argentine government. As the war progressed, Peru and Venezuela sent critical aircraft spare parts to Argentina, urgently needed by the FAA.

On paper, the 20 subsonic Sea Harriers could easily have been wiped out by the more than hundred Argentine combat planes, including many supersonic jets. The reality was different.
The long distances from their bases prevented them from using their top speed or they risked running out of fuel[4]. Although, the Argentines had more aeroplanes than the British Task force, a good number of them were Pucara turboprops[5]. Also, the A-4 Skyhawk force were dependent on the two available KC-130 tankers, limiting the amount of aeroplanes that could attack simultaneously[6].

Argentina's fleet of A-4 Skyhawk attack jets was in very poor condition. The arms embargo placed by the United States in 1976, due to the "Dirty War", had made most airframes unusable. The involvement of Israel in helping to return the A-4 to full operational status has been alleged, but has never been confirmed. [7]

The small air arm of the Argentine Navy was in the middle of the transition from the A-4Q Skyhawk to the new Super Etendard. Only five of the Etendard's anti-ship Exocet missiles had been delivered at the time of the conflict, at which point an arms embargo prevented the delivery of further shipments. Navy pilots, particulary those of the 3rd Naval Fighters Squadron flying A-4Qs were the only trained in the specific art of bombing warships. Air Force pilots trained during April against the two Argentine Type 42 destroyers, similar to those of the British Fleet, and according the Naval officers all the sorties were shot down causing great concern to the High Command until the successful May 1st strikes which they proved that aircraft could survive [8] [9].

To complete the scene, the Argentine military aviation had never been in a war since their creation, being the last conflict of the country more than a century ago.

In spite of these disadvantages, Argentine air units bore the brunt of the battle during the six-week war, and inflicted serious damage and losses to the naval forces of the United Kingdom. Low-flying jets attacking British ships would provide the world with some of the most sobering and dramatic images of the war. By the end of the conflict, the British forces had come to admire the FAA's spirited conduct in the face of an effective air defence network[10] during the hostilities, but as always, air power alone cannot win a war. Admiral Sandy Woodward, the British Task Force commander said: "[t]he Argentine Air Force fought extremely well and we felt a great admiration for what they did."[11]

[edit] Organisation

The Air units involved in the Falklands War were under the following chain of command:

  • Military Junta - Brigadier General (Lieutenant General) Basilio Lami Dozo
    • Air Defence Command (Spanish: Comando Aereo de Defensa ) - Brigadier Jorge Hughes. Was in charge of the radar network, Mirage IIIEA interceptors and anti-aircraft defences on the mainland.
    • Strategic Air Command (Spanish: Comando Aereo Estrategico ) - Brigadier Helmuth Weber. Coordinated air assets through all the country. The CAE also had the main role of long range maritime surveillance with Boeing 707s and C-130 Hercules.
      • Southern Air Force (Spanish: Fuerza Aerea Sur ) - Brigadier Ernesto Crespo. The FAS was the main organisation involved in combat over the conflict zone.
    • South Atlantic Military Theatre (Spanish: Teatro Operaciones Atlantico Sur ) - Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo. Basically a naval command with the role of coordinating the air, surface and submarine assets in the South Atlantic area. Initially, during the invasion of the Islands on 2 April and before hostilities broke out, the islands were supposedly to be under their command and was considered as the only organisation needed to managed the crisis.
      • Falklands Military Garrison (Spanish: Guarnicion Militar Malvinas ) - Brigade General Mario Menendez (Army)
        • Air Component (Spanish: Componente Aereo ) - Brigadier Luis Castellano.

[edit] Deployment

Argentine airbases: Distances to Port Stanley: Trelew: 580 nautical miles (1,070 km), Comodoro Rivadavia: 480 nautical miles (890 km), San Julián: 425 nautical miles (787 km), Rio Gallegos: 435 nautical miles (806 km) and Rio Grande: 380 nautical miles (700 km).Due to the distance required to fly to the islands, two minutes was the average time Argentine attack aircraft had available in the target area.
Argentine airbases: Distances to Port Stanley[12]: Trelew: 580 nautical miles (1,070 km), Comodoro Rivadavia: 480 nautical miles (890 km), San Julián: 425 nautical miles (787 km), Rio Gallegos: 435 nautical miles (806 km) and Rio Grande: 380 nautical miles (700 km).
Due to the distance required to fly to the islands, two minutes was the average time Argentine attack aircraft had available in the target area.
Mirage IIIEA. Their lack of aerial refuel capability prevented them from being used effectively over the islands in the air-air role. The FAA also flew an Israeli variation of the Mirage, the IAI Nesher, as the Dagger.
Mirage IIIEA. Their lack of aerial refuel capability prevented them from being used effectively over the islands in the air-air role. The FAA also flew an Israeli variation of the Mirage, the IAI Nesher, as the Dagger.
Argentine airfields The only paved runway was at Stanley although was unsuitable for fast jets and its main role was to maintain the airbridge to the mainland. Isla de Borbon - Pebble Island, Pto. Argentino - Port Stanley, Isla Gran Malvina - West Falkland & Isla Soledad - East Falkland.
Argentine airfields The only paved runway was at Stanley although was unsuitable for fast jets and its main role was to maintain the airbridge to the mainland. Isla de Borbon - Pebble Island, Pto. Argentino - Port Stanley, Isla Gran Malvina - West Falkland & Isla Soledad - East Falkland.

Air units moved from home bases to southern facilities. Also feared about British/Chilean air strikes and/or SAS raids, Argentine aircraft were dispersed in the surrounding areas of their southern airfields, e.g., several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose.

[edit] Units

Argentine Air Force Pilots in San Julian Airbase in the formation conmemorating Argentina National Day on 25 May 1982. Notice Dagger (blue/red badges) and A-4C Skyhawk (brown/black) pilots.
Argentine Air Force Pilots in San Julian Airbase in the formation conmemorating Argentina National Day on 25 May 1982. Notice Dagger (blue/red badges) and A-4C Skyhawk (brown/black) pilots.


The numbers in bold are the number of aircraft engaged in combat without counting those in reserve, the numbers in brackets are the number of lost aircraft.

Escuadrón Fénix Coat of Arms
Escuadrón Fénix Coat of Arms
Super Etendard the Exocet platform
Super Etendard the Exocet platform

[edit] Argentine Air Force

Fuerza Aérea Argentina

[edit] Argentine Navy

Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina

[edit] Argentine Army

Comando de Aviación del Ejército Argentino

[edit] Argentine Coast Guard

Prefectura Naval Argentina

[edit] Argentine traffic planes

Gates Learjet, Cessna Citation, Hawker Siddeley HS-125, Commander 690 and Mitsubishi MU-2.
Boeing 737 [13] and Douglas DC-9 (airlift to Patagonia and Port Stanley).

[edit] Armament

Israel supplied 39 IAI Dagger since 1978
Israel supplied 39 IAI Dagger since 1978

[edit] Air Campaign

  • Attack Missions:
System Obs
Ships Sunk HMS Sheffield, HMS Coventry, HMS Ardent, HMS Antelope, RFA Sir Galahad, Atlantic Conveyor plus a Landing Craft Utility ("Foxtrot Four" from Fearless)
Ships Damaged [17] HMS Glasgow, HMS Antrim, HMS Brilliant, HMS Broadsword, HMS Alacrity, HMS Arrow, HMS Argonaut, HMS Plymouth, RFA Sir Bedivere, RFA Sir Lancelot, RFA Sir Tristram, RFA Stromness
A-4 Skyhawk 133 sorties by the A-4B and 86 by the A-4C. They flew with unreliable ejection seats due to the US embargo placed from 1977. Naval A-4Q performed 12 sorties. They were highly dependent on the two available KC-130 tankers, limiting the number of aeroplanes that could attack simultaneously.
Canberra 46 bombing sorties against ground targets, operating from Trelew, to avoid more congestion on the closer southern airfields.
Dagger 153 sorties against naval/ground targets by the two squadrons. Their lack of aerial refueling capacity severely affected their performance without any chance of manouvering over the islands. They were obliged to fly the shortest flightpath and had less than 10 minutes to find their targets. The discovery of their approach corridor by the British led to 7 aircraft being shot down by Sea Harriers CAP, something just realized when one of the downed Dagger pilots was recovered by own troops. By the end of May they began carrying an improvised chaff dispenser consisting of aluminium strips inside their airbrakes.
Total Sorties: The above figures shown a total of 430 attack sorties from the mainland of which 18 aircraft were intercepted by the Sea Harriers and other 14 were shot down by anti aircraft defences.
  • Other Missions:
System Obs
Mirage IIIEA Argentine sources indicate that they were withheld from operations over the islands to protect the mainland against Vulcan strikes[18][19][20], however, they made 58 sorties providing decoys for the strike units with particular success on the 8. June attacks against the British landings ships [21]. Their lesser internal fuel capacity, compared to the Daggers, prevented them from being used in their escort role.
IA 58 Pucará They performed reconnaissance and ground attack missions from the Falklands airfields and surveillance of the Patagonian coast from bases in Southern Argentina. Most of the island-based Pucarás were destroyed on the ground, due to the lack of Hardened Aircraft Shelters. They shot down a Royal Marines Westland Scout.
Fenix Squadron 126 decoying plus 52 reconnaissance sorties. They were also extensively used as communications relay and pathfinder flights to guide the combat jets with the Learjets’ superior navigation systems.
C-130 Hercules 33 night flights to BAM Puerto Argentino in May/June (Blockade runner). Among the cargo transported in those flight were the 602 Army Commandos Coy, 155 mm CITEFA cannons, an improvised land based Exocet launcher, the Roland SAM system and a RASIT radar replacement. They evacuated 263 wounded and a British PoW in their returning flights.
Starting 15 May, they also took over the dangerous task of searching for naval targets for the strike units, after the retirement of the last SP-2H Neptune available. On one of these daylight missions, a Hercules was intercepted and shot down by a Sea Harrier.
29 May, the British tanker British Wye was hit by bombs dropped by a Hercules, north of South Georgia[22] (Not officially recognized by the FAA)
KC-130 Hercules Refueling sorties for A-4s and Super Étendards, also for battle damaged fighters.
Fokker F-28s Navy 15 night flights to BAM Puerto Argentino in May/June (Blockade runner)
Army Aviation 796 helicopter flights on the islands
1st Air Brigade Construction Group Air Force In charge of maintaining Port Stanley airbase operable. Throughout the conflict, the airport installations were attacked with 237 bombs, 1,200 shells from the Royal Navy gunline and 16 missiles, however, it was never out of action entirely. Many sources claim that the runway was covered with piles of dirt during the day causing British intelligence to surmise that repairs were still in progress.[23] Craters were in fact heaps of earth placed there to make it look as though the runway was damaged.[24]. In fact, the British were well aware that the runway was still in use by C-130[25] and attempted to interdict these flights leading to the loss of a C-130 on June 1[26].

[edit] Casualties and aircraft losses

  • Aircraft Lost in the Air: no suffix: Air Force


It should be noticed that the Argentine aircraft didn't carry air-to-air missiles, with the exception of 8th Air Brigade Mirage IIIEA fighters and 6th Air Brigade Daggers on May 1st (Lt Ardiles).

11 IAI Dagger A 9 by Sea Harrier[28] , 1 Sea Wolf HMS Broadsword[29], 1SAM Rapier [30]
10 A-4B Skyhawk 3[31] by Sea Harrier, 3[32] Sea Wolf HMS Brilliant, 1[33] Sea Dart, 1[34] AAA HMS Fearless, 1[35] SAM/AAA/small arms fire and 1[36] friendly fire
7 A-4C Skyhawk 2[37] by Sea Harrier, 3[38] Sea Dart, 2[39] combination Sea Cat/Rapier/Blowpipe
3 FMA IA 58 Pucará 1[40] by Sea Harrier, 1 SAM Stinger, 1 small arms fire 2nd PARA
3 A-4Q Skyhawk Navy 3[41] by Sea Harrier. (The 3rd was ordered to eject after attempting to land at Port Stanley)
2 Mirage IIIEA 1[42] by Sea Harrier, 1[43] friendly fire
2 B.Mk62 Canberra 1[44] by Sea Harrier, 1[45] Sea Dart
1 C-130E Hercules 1[46] by Sea Harrier
1 Aermacchi MB.339A Navy 1[47] by Blowpipe
1 Learjet 35A 1[48] by SAM Sea Dart
3 Puma SA330L Army 1 by SAM Sea Dart, 2 gun fire
1 Puma SA330L Army Royal Marines gun fire in Georgias, April 3
  • Total

75 fixed wing aircraft and 25 helicopters.

[edit] References

  • FAA Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8
  • (Spanish) Dagger & Finger en Argentina ISBN 987-43-8536-7 book link
  • (French) Frédéric Marsaly: Super Étendard au Combat: la saga d'un guerrier, Aviation Française Magazine, Jan/Feb 2007, ISSN 1951-9583.
  1. ^ Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War
  2. ^ Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War
  3. ^ Offensive Air Operations Of The Falklands War - USMC
  4. ^ "the Mach 2 Mirage and Dagger which in low-level attack are extremely subsonic. ..while low-level attacks by the Argentine aircraft..there would not be a lot of fuel to spare, especially if afterburner was used." page 42 in Aviation Fact File - Harrier, 1984
  5. ^ "The Argentine-built Pucará counter-insurgency aircraft proved its worth in numerous attacks on British land forces, and it was even used to attack shipping. About 75 Pucarás were in service at the start of the conflict." page 33 in Antony Preston:Sea Combat off the Falklands, 1982, Willow Books, ISBN 00-218046-4
  6. ^ "Two A-4B Skyhawks warplanes of the Grupo 5 link up...after topping up their tanks from a KC-130H tanker." page 62 in Air War in the Falklands 1982, 2001
  7. ^ Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8
  8. ^ Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8
  9. ^ HALCONES SOBRE MALVINAS, ISBN 950-9294-07-1
  10. ^ Chapter 12:"The British were awed by the courage of the Argentine pilots, flying suicidally low to attack, then vanishing amid flashes of pursuing Sea Cat, Blowpipe, Rapier, racing across the sky behind them. Alone among the enemy's three services, the air force seemed highly motivated and utterly committed to the battle. 'We should have been able to work out that any nation which produces first-class Formula One racing drivers is also likely to turn out some pretty good pilots.'" - Hastings, Max: The Battle for the Falklands (1983) Michael Joseph Ltd ISBN 0-7181-2228-3
  11. ^ clarin newspaperClarin newspaper Woodward Interview
    La fuerza aérea peleó extremadamente bien y nosotros sentimos una gran admiración por lo que hicieron
  12. ^ Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View
  13. ^ http://www.malvinasmdp.org.ar/Images/Fotos/M085.jpg
  14. ^ Official FAA magazine hacia el 15 Abr se producía la recepción de los misiles Matra 550 Magic adquiridos tiempo antes
  15. ^ Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 — British ships lost & damaged.
  16. ^ Chapter 21 The Bridgehead and Beyond, the battle for Darwin and Goose Green:"In late afternoon Pucaras attacked the British forces, two dropping napalm tanks which only just missed forward troops. Two Pucaras were shot down during the battle, along with an Aeromacchi [sic]. - Lawrence Freedman, Signals of War, The Falklands Conflict of 1982, 1990, Faber and Faber-London, ISBN 0-571-14116-1
  17. ^ Sir Lawrence Freedman: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2005, Routledge, ISBN 0-7146-5207-5
  18. ^ [1] "As a result of these heavy losses...it was decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert for a possible Vulcan attack."
  19. ^ [2] "Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense."
  20. ^ [3] La familia Mirage, Aeroespacio, Fuerza Aerea Argentina, ISSN 0001-9127, "Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas." ("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the Falklands.")
  21. ^ Official FAA Magazine (Spanish)
  22. ^ Sir Lawrence Freedman: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2005, Routledge, ISBN 0-7146-5207-5
    "British Wye, carrying fuel for the Task Force, came under attack by a modified C-130 Hercules...eight bombs were released, one of which struck the tanker without exploding.
  23. ^ Offensive Air Operations Of The Falklands War - USMC
  24. ^ http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/vulcan.htm The Avro Vulcan and the Black Buck raids
  25. ^ Morgan, David, Hostile Skies, Orion Books Limited, London, 2006, ISBN 978-0-7538-2199-2
  26. ^ Ward, Sharkey,'Sea Harrier Over The Falklands: A Maverick at War, Phoenix; New Ed edition, London, 2007, ISBN 978-0304355426
  27. ^ Fuerza Aérea Argentina
  28. ^ SN:
    C-403, May21, Sea Harrier ZA190/"009", pilot Capt. Donadille ejected,
    C-404, May21, Sea Harrier ZA190/"009", pilot Maj. Piuma ejected,
    C-407, May21, Sea Harrier ZA175/"004", pilot Lt. Senn ejected,
    C-409, May21, Sea Harrier XZ455/"12", pilot Lt. Luna ejected,
    C-410, May24, Sea Harrier ZA193/"93", pilot Lt. Castillo killed,
    C-419, May24, Sea Harrier XZ457/"14". pilot Maj. Puga ejected,
    C-430, May24, Sea Harrier XZ457/"14". pilot Capt. Diaz ejected,
    C-433, May1, Sea Harrier XZ455/"12". pilot Lt. Ardiles killed,
    C-437, May23, Sea Harrier ZA194. pilot Lt. Volponi killed
  29. ^ SN: C-428, May21, pilot Lt. Bean killed
  30. ^ SN: C-436, May29, pilot Lt. Bernhardt killed
  31. ^ SN: C-204, C-226 and C-228
  32. ^ SN: C-206, C-208 and C-246
  33. ^ SN: C-244
  34. ^ SN: C-215
  35. ^ SN: C-242
  36. ^ SN: C-248
  37. ^ SN: C-309 and C-325
  38. ^ SN: C-301, C-304 and C-310
  39. ^ SN: C-305 and C-319
  40. ^ SN: A-5??
  41. ^ SN: 3-A-307, 3-A-312 and 3-A-314
  42. ^ SN: I-015
  43. ^ SN: I-019
  44. ^ SN: B-110
  45. ^ SN: B-108
  46. ^ SN: TC-63
  47. ^ SN: 4-A-1??
  48. ^ SN: T-2?
  49. ^ SN: 3-H-42
  50. ^ Fuerza Aérea Argentina
  51. ^ Fuerza Aérea Argentina
  52. ^ According to www.naval-history.net/F64argaircraftlost.htm a Pucará was lost over the Atlantic on a reconnaissance mission from Comodoro Rivadavia
  53. ^ SN: C-303 and C-313

[edit] Literature

  • Chant, C.: Air War in the Falklands 1982, 2001, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-84176-293-8
  • Gunston, B.: Aviation Fact File (Modern Fighting Aircraft) - Harrier, 1984, Salamander Books Ltd., ISBN 0-86101-128-7

[edit] External links

[edit] Foreign Studies

[edit] Official Sites