Angolan-Cuban relations
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Angola | Cuba |
Angola-Cuba relations are, for Angola, second only to relations with the United States. During Angola's civil war ) Cuban forces fought on behalf of the ultimately victorious MPLA against Western-backed UNITA guerrillas.
Pedro Rosso Leal is the ambassador of Cuba to Angola.[1]
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[edit] 1960s
Jonas Savimbi, the future President of UNITA, met with Castro-ally and revolutionary Che Guevara in 1965. Guevara told his superiors he did not trust Savimbi, and Savimbi possibly presented a danger.[2]
[edit] 1975
Castro dismissed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and the Air Force between August 20 and September 5 so they could put all their energy into planning and orchestrating Cuba's invasion of Angola. The Soviets, aware of Castro's plans, opposed Castro's invasion plans but stood by him. Castro asked Brezhnev for staff officers to train FAPLA fighters and transportation for Cuban soldiers, requests the USSR ignored. The Soviets did send military advisers to council MPLA leaders in Brazzaville. The Cuban government gave the MPLA 12,000 M-52 rifles from Czechoslovakia, 133-RPGs from Bulgaria, mortars, light artillery, and machine guns.[3]
Cuba's leaders appointed Raúl Diaz Argüelles as commander of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola. Argüelles, subordinate to General Abelardo Colom Ibarra, the First Deputy Minister of the FAR, traveled with 480 soldiers from Cuba to Lisbon, Portugal and then to Luanda. They escaped detection, arriving on August 21, by posing as tourists. None of them carried weapons. Many carried luggage packed with cash.[3]
The government of the Soviet Union, well aware of South African activity in southern Angola, flew Cuban soldiers into Luanda one week before November 11, the date on which Angolan nationalists had agreed to declare independence. While Cuban officers led the mission and provided the bulk of the troop force, 60 Soviet officers in the Congo joined the Cubans on November 12. The Soviet leadership expressly forbid the Cubans from intervening in Angola's civil war, focusing the mission on containing South Africa.[4]
In 1975 and 1976 most foreign forces, with the exception of Cuba, withdrew. The last elements of the Portuguese military withdrew in 1975[5] and the South African military withdrew in February 1976.[6] On the other hand, Cuba's troop force in Angola increased from 5,500 in December 1975 to 11,000 in February 1976.[7] FNLA forces were crushed by Operation Carlota, a joint Cuban-Angolan attack on Huambo on January 30, 1976.[8] By mid-November, the Huambo government had gained control over southern Angola and began pushing north.[9]
On August 3 a Cuban delegation again traveled to Angola to assess the situation the necessary aid. In a memorandum of 11. August 1975 Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro explains the reasons for the visit and briefs on the contents of the talks. He underlines that the "aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November" is taken into account and the awareness that "the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power". The delegation handed over US$100,000.[citation needed]
Arguelles also mentions that Neto complained "of the little amount of aid from socialist countries and "that the USSR detained aid to the MPLA in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it's very little compared with their vast needs". Arguelles agreed with Neto as he saw the sides in Angola as "clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international Imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represented the progressive and nationalist forces.[citation needed]
[edit] 1977
Angolan government and Cuban troops had control over all southern cities by 1977, but roads in the south faced repeated UNITA attacks. Savimbi expressed his willingness for rapprochement with the MPLA and the formation of a unity, socialist government, but he insisted on Cuban withdrawal first. "The real enemy is Cuban colonialism," Savimbi told reporters, warning, "The Cubans have taken over the country, but sooner or later they will suffer their own Vietnam in Angola." Government and Cuban troops used flame throwers, bulldozers, and planes with napalm to destroy villages in a 1.6 mile wide area along the Angola-Namibia border. Only women and children passed through this area, "Castro Corridor," because government troops had shot all males ten years of age or older to prevent them from joining the UNITA. The napalm killed cattle to feed government troops and to retaliate against UNITA sympathizers. Angolans fled from their homeland; 10,000 going south to Namibia and 16,000 east to Zambia where they lived in refugee camps.[10] Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington of the United Kingdom expressed similar concerns over British involvement in Rhodesia's Bush War during the Lancaster House negotiations in 1980.[11]
[edit] Shaba invasions
1,500 members of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) invaded Shaba, Zaire from eastern Angola on March 7, 1977. The FNLC wanted to overthrow Mobutu and the Angolan government, suffering from Mobutu's support for the FNLA and UNITA, did not try to stop the invasion. The FNLC failed to capture Kolwezi, Zaire's economic heartland, but took Kasaji, and Mutshatsha. Zairian troops were defeated without difficulty and the FNLC continued to advance. Mobutu appealed to William Eteki of Cameroon, Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, for assistance on April 2. Eight days later, the French government responded to Mobutu's plea and airlifted 1,500 Moroccan troops into Kinshasa. This troop force worked in conjunction with the Zairian army and the FNLA[12] of Angola with air cover from Egyptian pilots flying French Mirage fighter aircraft to beat back the FNLC. The counter-invasion force pushed the last of the militants, along with a number of refugees, into Angola and Zambia in April.[13][14][15][16]
Mobutu accused the Angolan government, as well as the Cuban and Soviet governments, of complicity in the war.[17] While Neto did support the FNLC, the Angolan government's support came in response to Mobutu's continued support for Angola's anti-Communists.[18] The Carter Administration, unconvinced of Cuban involvement, responded by offering a meager $15 million-worth of non-military aid. American timidity during the war prompted a shift in Zaire's foreign policy from the U.S. to France, which became Zaire's largest supplier of arms after the intervention.[19] Neto and Mobutu signed a border agreement on July 22, 1977.[20]
[edit] Nitista revolt
Neto's Interior Minister, Nito Alves, had successfully put down Daniel Chipenda's Eastern Revolt and the Active Revolt during Angola's War of Independence. Factionalism within the MPLA became a major challenge to Neto's power by late 1975 and he gave Alves the task of once again clamping down on dissension. Alves shut down the Cabral and Henda Committees while expanding his influence within the MPLA through his control of the nation's newspapers and state-run television. Alves visited the Soviet Union in October 1976. When he returned, Neto began taking steps to neutralize the threat he saw in the Nitistas, followers of Alves.[21] Ten armored cars with the FAPLA's 8th Brigade broke into São Paulo prison at 4 a.m. on May 27, killing the prison warden and freeing more than 150 supporters, including 11 who had been arrested only a few days before. The brigade took control of the radio station in Luanda at 7 a.m. and announced their coup, calling themselves the MPLA Action Committee. The brigade asked citizens to show their support for the coup by demonstrating in front of the presidential palace. The Nitistas captured Bula and Dangereaux, generals loyal to Neto, but Neto had moved his base of operations from the palace to the Ministry of Defence in fear of such an uprising. Cuban troops retook the palace at Neto's request and marched to the radio station. After an hour of fighting, the Cubans succeeded and proceeded to the barracks of the 8th brigade, recaptured by 1:30 p.m. While the Cuban force captured the palace and radio station, the Nitistas kidnapped seven leaders within the government and the military, shooting and killing six.[22]
While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster. Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened.[22]
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda, a Cabindan separatist rebel group, attacked a Cuban base near Tshiowa on August 11.[23]
[edit] 1978
UNITA released a communiqué from Paris on November 13, 1978, detailing an anti-UNITA attack by 20,000 troops from Portugal, Cuba, Katanga, East Germany, and the MPLA.[24]
[edit] 1980s
In 1981, newly elected United States President Ronald Reagan's U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, developed a linkage policy, tying Namibian independence to Cuban withdrawal and peace in Angola. Cuba increased its 35,000-strong troop force in Angola from 35,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in 1985. South African forces tried to capture Lubango, capital of Huíla province, in Operation Askari in December 1983.[25][26]
[edit] Peace negotiations
The Cuban government joined negotiations on January 28, 1988, and all three parties held a round of negotiations on March 9. The South African government joined negotiations on May 3 and the parties met in June and August in New York and Geneva. All parties agreed to a ceasefire on August 8. Representatives from the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed the New York Accords, granting independence to Namibia and ending the direct involvement of foreign troops in the civil war, in New York City, United States on December 22, 1988.[27][25] The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 626 later that day, creating the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, a UN peacekeeping force. UNAVEM troops began arriving in Angola in January 1989.[26]
[edit] Withdrawal
The National Assembly passed law 12/91 in May 1991, coinciding with the withdrawal of the last Cuban troops, defining Angola as a "democratic state based on the rule of law" with a multi-party system.[27] Observers met such changes with skepticism. American journalist Karl Maier wrote, "In the New Angola ideology is being replaced by the bottom line, as security and selling expertise in weaponry have become a very profitable business. With its wealth in oil and diamonds, Angola is like a big swollen carcass and the vultures are swirling overhead. Savimbi's former allies are switching sides, lured by the aroma of hard currency."[28]
[edit] Related Books
- Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 ISBN 978-0807854648
[edit] References
- ^ Angola: Cuban Ambassador Considers Announcement of Polls Date Important (HTML). Angola Press Agency via allAfrica (2007).
- ^ Kukkuk, Leon (2005). Letters to Gabriella, 156.
- ^ a b George, Edward (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito, 65-70.
- ^ Westad, Odd Arne (2005). The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, 230–235.
- ^ Martin, Peggy J.; Kaplan; Kaplan Staff (2005). SAT Subject Tests: World History 2005–2006, 316.
- ^ Stearns, Peter N.; Langer, William Leonard (2001). The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, Chronologically Arranged, 1065.
- ^ Mazrui, Ali Al 'Amin (1977). The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa, 227.
- ^ Angola Reds on Outskirts of Pro-Western capital city, January 30, 1976. The Argus, page 10, via NewspaperArchive.com.
- ^ Porter, Bruce D (1986). The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 149.
- ^ Unknown (1977). 'Absolute Hell Over There' (HTML). TIME Magazine.
- ^ Unknown (1980). Carrington on Rhodesia (HTML). TIME Magazine.
- ^ Garthoff, Raymond Leonard (1985). Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 624.
- ^ Schraeder, Peter J. (1999). United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, 87–88.
- ^ Danopoulos, Constantine Panos; Watson, Cynthia Ann (1996). The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook, 451.
- ^ Ihonvbere, Julius Omozuanvbo; Mbaku, John Mukum (2003). Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences, 228.
- ^ Tanca, Antonio (1993). Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, 169.
- ^ Dunn, Kevin C (2003). Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity, 129.
- ^ Mukenge, Tshilemalema (2002). Culture and Customs of the Congo, 31.
- ^ Vine, Victor T. Le (2004). Politics in Francophone Africa, 381.
- ^ Osmâanczyk, Edmund Jan; Mango, Anthony (2003). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements, 95.
- ^ George, Edward (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, 127–128.
- ^ a b George (2005). Pages 129–131.
- ^ Kalley (1999). Page 12.
- ^ Kalley, Jacqueline A.; Elna Schoeman (1999). Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997, 9.
- ^ a b Tvedten, Inge (1997). Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction, 38-40.
- ^ a b John Hashimoto (1999). Cold War Chat: Chester Crocker, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (HTML). CNN.
- ^ a b Alao, Abiodun (1994). Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa, XIX–XXI.
- ^ Huband, Mark (2001). The Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa After the Cold War, 46.
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