Alvor Agreement

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The Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, granted Angola independence from Portugal on November 11, ending the war for independence while marking the transition to civil war. The agreement was signed by the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and the Portuguese government, excluding the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda and Eastern Revolt. The coalition government the Alvor Agreement established soon fell as nationalist factions, doubting one another's commitment to the peace process, tried to take control of the colony by force.[1][2]

Contents

[edit] Negotiations

Leftist military officers overthrew the Caetano government in Portugal in the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974. The MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA each negotiated peace agreements with the transitional Portuguese government and began to fight each other for control of Luanda and the country. Holden Roberto, Agostinho Neto, and Jonas Savimbi met in Bukavu, Zaire in July and agreed to negotiate with the Portuguese as one political entity. They met again in Mombasa, Kenya on January 5, 1975 and agreed to stop fighting each other, further outlining constitutional negotiations with the Portuguese. They met for a third time in Alvor, Portugal from January 10-15 and signed what became known as the Alvor Agreement.[1]

[edit] Treaty terms

The parties agreed to hold the first assembly elections in October 1975. From January 31, 1975 until independence a transitional government consisting of the Portuguese High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho and a Prime Ministerial Council would rule. The PMC consisted of three representatives, one from each Angolan party, and a rotating Premiership among the representatives. Every decision required two-thirds majority support. The twelve ministries were divided equally among the Angolan parties and the Portuguese government, three for each. Author Witney Wright Schneidman criticized this provision in Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire for ensuring a "virtual paralysis in executive authority." The Bureau of Intelligence and Research cautioned that an excessive desire to preserve the balance of power in the agreement hurt the transitional Angolan government's ability to function.[1][2][3]

The Portuguese government's main goal in negotiations was preventing the mass emigration of white Angolans. Paradoxically, the agreement only allowed the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to nominate candidates to the first assembly elections, deliberately disenfranchising Bakongo, Cabindans, and whites. The Portuguese reasoned that white Angolans would have to join the separatist movements and the separatists would have to moderate their platforms to expand their political bases.[3]

The agreement called for the integration of the militant wings of the Angolan parties into a new military, the Angolan Defense Forces. The ADF would have 48,000 active personnel, made up of 24,000 Portuguese and 8,000 MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fighters respectively. Each party maintained separate barracks and outposts. Every military decision required the unanimous consent of each party's headquarters and the joint military command. The Portuguese forces lacked equipment and commitment to the cause while Angolan nationalists were antagonistic of each other and lacked training.[1][3]

The treaty, which FLEC never agreed to, described Cabinda as an "integral and inalienable part of Angola." Separatists see the agreement as a violation of Cabindan right to self-determination.[4] By August 1975 the MPLA had taken control over Cabinda.[5]

[edit] Failure of implementation and outbreak of the civil war

Main article: Angolan Civil War

The transisional government took over on January 31. As stipulated by the agreement it consisted of a representative each from the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. The cabinet included twelve ministers, three from each movement and three from the Portuguese High Commission, who would officially govern the country until independence on November 11. As during the negotiations in Alvor the three movements continued to deeply distrusted each other. [6] [7] In Luanda first clashes between FNLA and MPLA broke out only 2 weeks after the transitional government took office.

The agreement did not establish a mechanism to verify the number of fighters from each force, an error criticized by author Donald Rothschild. Portuguese troops, at that time still in the country, did not interfere. Factional fighting renewed, reaching new heights as foreign supplies of arms increased. In February the Cuban government warned the Eastern Bloc the Alvor Agreement would not succeed. By spring the African National Congress and SWAPO were echoing Cuba's warning.[8] Leaders of the Organization of African Unity organized a peace conference moderated by Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta with the three leaders in Nakuru, Kenya in June. The Angolan leaders issued the Nakuru Declaration on June 21,[9] agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Alvor Agreement while acknowledging a mutual lack of trust led to violence. Many analysts have criticized the transitional government in Portugal for the violence that followed the Alvor Agreement in terms of a lack of concern about internal Angolan security and favoritism towards the MPLA. High Commissioner Coutinho, one of the seven leaders of the National Salvation Junta, openly gave Portuguese military equipment to MPLA forces.[10]

Already in late January the U.S. had taken up finacial support of the FNLA. By late May the MPLA received arms from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the military balance began to shift in their favour.[11] [12] [13] [14] Again, the U.S. increased their support for the FNLA and for the first time directly aided UNITA. [15] By July the MPLA gained the upper hand in Luanda and expelled the FNLA from the city. UNITA was not engaged in the struggle for Luanda but consolidated its hold among the Ovimbundu. FNLA and UNITA formed an alliance and withdrew from the transitional government, which inevitably fell apart on August 14. Officially Portugal re-assumed executive powers but it was the MPLA that filled the void and extended its control of government. [16]

The war spread out through all of Angola. On July 18 President Ford approved covert aid to FNLA and UNITA, who joined forces, beginning CIA covert operation "IAFEATURE". Great Britain, France, China and South Africa also had clandestine assistance programmes. [17] On July 24 advanced upon Luanda from the north-east, coming as close as Kifangondo. UNITA and MPLA fought in central and southern Angola. [18] By mid-October the MPLA had gained control of 12 of the 16 provinces, including Cabinda. In order to avoid the defeat of FNLA and UNITA South Africa sent special forces as of September 4. The US sent military advisors to southern Angola around the same time.[19] South African support turned into an outright intervention on October 14 with 1,500 to 2,000 troops [20] aiming to eliminate the MPLA from southern Angola and to capture Luanda.[21] [22] [23] FNLA-UNITA-South African forces took five provincial capitals in three weeks and came within 200km south of Luanda. The FNLA and its supporters attacked Kifangondo on the eastern outskirts of Luanda. On November 9 Cuba started operation "Carlota" sending combat troops in support of the MPLA to Luanda (see Cuba in Angola. [24] [25] On November 10, while the last Portuguese were leaving Angola, Cuban-MPLA forces managed to defend Luanda in the battle of Kifangondo, thus maintaining control over the capital. On November 11 Neto declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola. The MPLA-government only had control of about 1/4 of the country and Cabinda. The southern half of Angola and a section in the north was still held by the SADF, FNLA and UNITA. FNLA and UNITA proclaimed their own government based in Huambo.[10]

By then, the Alvor Agreement was all but forgotten. The free elections the agreement had provided for by October 31, 1975 were finally held in 1992. UNITA, in second place, did not accept the outcome and the civil war continued for another 10 years, only to end in 2002, when the UNITA leader Savimbi got killed.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c d Rothchild, Donald S. (1997). Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, 116. 
  2. ^ a b Tvedten, Inge (1997). Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction, 36. 
  3. ^ a b c Schneidman, Witney Wright (2004). {{{title}}}, 200. 
  4. ^ Ryan, J. Atticus (1998). Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization Yearbook, 58. 
  5. ^ Porter, Bruce D (1986). The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980, 149. 
  6. ^ Une Odyssee Africaine
  7. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002
  8. ^ Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, 2005. Page 227.
  9. ^ McDannald, Alexander Hopkins. The Americana Annual: An Encyclopedia of Current Events, 1877-1976, 1976. Page 86.
  10. ^ a b Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. Grasping The Nettle: Analyzing Cases Of Intractable Conflict, 2005. Page 213.
  11. ^ Quotations from "Information des Mitglieds des Politbüros der Volksbefreiungsbewegung von Angola (MPLA), Iko Carreira, zur gegenwärtigen Lage in Angola," p.4-5, enclosed in "Vorlage für das Politbüro," Berlin, Sept.3, 1975, SED, DY30JIV2/2A1911
  12. ^ O Comercio, Feb. 13, 1975,j p. 10
  13. ^ Heimer: Entkolonisierungskonflikt, p. 193-194
  14. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, p. 252-253
  15. ^ http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0044)
  16. ^ http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)
  17. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, p. 293
  18. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, p. 269
  19. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, p. 296
  20. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, p. 300
  21. ^ Deon Geldenhuys, Diplomacy, p. 80 quoted
  22. ^ Spies, Operasie, p. 86
  23. ^ du Preez, Avontuur, p. 32, 63, 86
  24. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, p. 300
  25. ^ Une Odyssee Africaine
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