Alvin Plantinga

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Western Philosophy
20th-century philosophy
Name
Alvin Carl Plantinga
Birth November 15, 1932
Flag of the United States Ann Arbor, Michigan
School/tradition Analytic
Main interests Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion
Notable ideas Reformed epistemology
Free will defense
Modal ontological argument
Proper Function Reliabilism
Evolutionary argument against naturalism
Influenced by Thomas Reid · Abraham Kuyper
Philosophy Portal

Alvin Carl Plantinga (born 15 November 1932 in Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA) is a contemporary American philosopher known for his work in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of religion and modest support of intelligent design. He is currently the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Despite growing up in the Dutch Reformed tradition, Plantinga is a prominent proponent of Molinism in the debate over divine sovereignty and providence. He gave three series of Gifford Lectures.

Contents

[edit] Biography

[edit] Family

Plantinga was born on November 15th, 1932 in Ann Arbor, Michigan to Cornelius A. Plantinga and Lettie Plantinga. Plantinga's father was a first generation immigrant, born in the Netherlands.[1] His family is originally from the Dutch province of Friesland. Plantinga’s father earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Duke University and a Master's Degree in psychology, and taught several academic subjects at different colleges over the years.[2] One of Plantinga's brothers, Cornelius "Neal" Plantinga, Jr., is a theologian and the current president of Calvin Theological Seminary. Another of his brothers, Leon, is an emeritus professor of musicology at Yale University.[2][3] His brother Terrell worked for CBS News.[4]

In 1955, Plantinga married Kathleen De Boer.[5] Plantinga and his wife have four children: Carl, Jane, Harry, and Ann.[6][7] Both of his sons teach at Calvin College, Carl in Film Studies[8][9] and Harry, who is also director of the college's Christian Classics Ethereal Library, in computer science.[10] Plantinga's older daughter, Jane Plantinga Pauw, is a pastor at Rainier Beach Presbyterian Church (PCUSA) in Seattle, Washington,[11] and his younger daughter, Ann Kapteyn, is a missionary in Cameroon working for Wycliffe Bible Translators.

[edit] Education

At the end of 11th grade, Plantinga's father instructed Plantinga to skip his last year of high school and immediately enroll in college. Plantinga followed his father's advice and in 1949, a few months before his 17th birthday, he enrolled in Jamestown College, in Jamestown, North Dakota.[12] During that same year, his father accepted a teaching job at Calvin College, in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In January of 1950, Plantinga moved to Grand Rapids with his family and enrolled in Calvin College. During his first semester at Calvin, Plantinga applied for, and was awarded, a scholarship to attend Harvard University.[13] Beginning in the fall of 1950, Plantinga spent two semesters at Harvard. In 1951, during Harvard's spring recess, Plantinga attended a few philosophy classes at Calvin College. He was so impressed with Calvin philosophy professor William Harry Jellema that he returned 1951 to Calvin College to study philosophy under Jellema.[14] In 1954, Plantinga began his graduate studies at the University of Michigan where he studied under William Alston, William Frankena, and Richard Cartwright, among others.[15] A year later, in 1955, he transferred to Yale University where he received his Ph.D. in 1958.[16]

[edit] Teaching career

Plantinga began his career as an instructor in the philosophy department at Yale in 1957, and then in 1958 he became a professor of philosophy at Wayne State University. In 1963, he accepted a teaching job at Calvin College, where he replaced the retiring Jellema.[17] He then spent the next 19 years at Calvin before moving to the University of Notre Dame.

[edit] Philosophical views

[edit] Free will defense

Plantinga is known for his use of the "free will defense" to the logical problem of evil, particularly as expressed by J. L. Mackie. Plantinga's makes a distinction between a defense and a theodicy. A theodicy tries to justify God's permitting evil by explaining why God allows evil, whereas a defense tries to give a logically possible reason God could have for allowing evil. Plantinga's defense does not claim that God permits evil for the sake of free will but that it is logically possible that he allows evil for the purpose of free will. That is, he does not attempt to show what God's motives for tolerating evil actually are, but rather he merely wants to show that it is possible that God could not have created a world with moral good but no moral evil.

Plantinga's argument has two basic stages. In this first stage he argues that the atheologian has failed to demonstrate that God and evil are logically incompatible. In the second stage he argues positively that the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically consistent. He does so by constructing a model that includes both the existence of God and the existence of evil. Among other things, his model includes the possibility of "transworld depravity," in which all free persons necessarily have an inclination to sometimes do wrong regardless of the world they live in.[18]

[edit] Reformed epistemology

Plantinga espouses a Christian religious epistemology that he dubs "Reformed epistemology." According to Reformed epistemology, belief in God can be rational and justified even without arguments or evidence for the existence of God. More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic. Plantinga eventually develops a religious externalist epistemology that, if true, explains how belief in God could be justified independently of evidence. His externalist epistemology, called "Proper functionalism," is a form of epistemological reliabilism.

Plantinga develops his view of Reformed epistemology and Proper functionalism in a three volume work on epistemology. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, BonJour, Alston, Goldman, and others. In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function, he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to justification and goes deeper into topics like self-knowledge, memories, perception, and probability. In 2000, the third volume, Warranted Christian belief, was published. Plantinga applies his theory of warrant to the question of whether or not specifically Christian theistic belief can enjoy warrant. He argues that this is plausible. Notably, the book does not address whether or not Christian theism is true.

[edit] Modal ontological argument

Plantinga has expressed a modal logic version of the ontological argument in which he uses modal logic to develop, in a more rigorous and formal way, Norman Malcolm's and Charles Hartshorne's modal ontological arguments.

[edit] Evolutionary argument against naturalism

In Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, he argues that the truth of evolution is an epistemic defeater for naturalism (i.e. if evolution is true, it undermines naturalism). His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value (maximizing one's success at "feeding, fighting, and reproducing"), not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-cum-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, if God created man "in his image" by way of an evolutionary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable.

The argument does not assume any necessary correlation (or uncorrelation) between true beliefs and survival. Making the contrary assumption—that there is in fact a relatively strong correlation between truth and survival—if human belief-forming apparatus evolved giving a survival advantage, then it ought to yield truth since true beliefs confer a survival advantage. Plantinga counters that, while there may be overlap between true beliefs and beliefs that contribute to survival, the two kinds of beliefs are not the same, and he gives the following example with a man named Paul:

“ Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief... Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it... Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behaviour.[19] ”

Thus, since there is no warrant for assuming a strong correlation between truth and survival, evolution conjoined to naturalism undermines the likelihood of both concepts being true.

[edit] Bibliography

[edit] Works by Plantinga

[edit] Representative assessment

  • Ferrer, Francisco S. Conesa, Dios Y el Mal, La Defensa del Teísmo Frente al problema del mal según Alvin Plantinga, Pamplona: University of Navarre Press, forthcoming.
  • Beilby, James (ed) Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York & London, 2002.
  • Kvanvig, Jonathan (ed), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.
  • Claramunt, Enrique R. Moros, Modalidad y esencia: La metaphysica de Alvin Plantinga Pamplona: University of Navarre Press, 1996.
  • McLeod, Mark S., Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
  • Linda Zagzebski (ed.), Rational Faith, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993.
  • Sennett, James, Modality, Probability, and Rationality: A Critical Examination of Alvin Plantinga's Philosophy, New York: P. Lang, 1992.
  • Hoitenga, Dewey, From Plato to Plantinga: an Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.
  • Parsons, Keith M., God and the Burden of Proof: Plantinga, Swinburne, and the Analytic Defense of Theism, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York, 1989.
  • Tomberlin, James E., and Peter van Inwagen (eds) Alvin Plantinga, Profiles Volume 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston & Lancaster, 1985.

[edit] External links

[edit] References

  1. ^ "Self-profile" in Alvin Plantinga, James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen ed., (Dordrecht: D. Riedle Pub. Co.), 1985, p. 3.
  2. ^ a b "Self-profile", p. 6.
  3. ^ Yale Department of Music - Emeritus Faculty
  4. ^ "Self-profile", p. 7.
  5. ^ "Self-profile", p. 14.
  6. ^ "Introduction: Alvin Plantinga, God's Philosopher" in Alvin Plantinga, Deane-Peter Baker ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2007, p. 5.
  7. ^ "Alvin Plantinga," Well-Known Dutch-Americans at The New Netherland Institute website. Retrieved November 6, 2007
  8. ^ “Carl Plantinga Bio”
  9. ^ "Carl Plantinga Bibliography"
  10. ^ CCEL Questions and Answers. Retrieved on 2008-05-23.
  11. ^ "Jane Plantinga Pauw"
  12. ^ "Self-profile", pp. 7-8.
  13. ^ "Self-profile", p. 8.
  14. ^ "Self-profile", pp. 9-16.
  15. ^ "Self-profile", p. 16.
  16. ^ "Self-profile", pp. 21-22.
  17. ^ "Self-profile", p. 30.
  18. ^ "Free Will Defense", in Max Black (ed), Philosophy in America. Ithaca: Cornell UP / London: Allen & Unwin, 1965
  19. ^ Plantinga, Alvin Warrant and Proper Function, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1993. pp. 225-226 (ISBN 978-0-19-507864-0).