Ali Ahmad Jalali

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Ali Ahmad Jalali

Ali Ahmad Jalali (b. 1940) is an Afghan American and a Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, which is located in Washington, D.C. He is also the former Interior Minister of Afghanistan, who served from January 2003 to September 2005.

1 Early history
- 1.1 Military career and politics
2 References
3 External links

[edit] Early history

Jalali, an ethnic Pashtun, was born in Afghanistan in 1940. He has been involved in politics and media for most of his life. He previously served with the Voice of America for over 20 years covering Afghanistan, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East, including assignments as Director of the Afghan Radio Network Project and chief of the Pashto, Dari, and Persian services.

[edit] Military career and politics

He is a former colonel in the Afghan National Army and was a top military planner with the Afghan resistance following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He attended higher command and staff colleges in Afghanistan, the United States, Britain, and Russia, and has lectured widely.

A U.S. citizen since 1987, Jalali left his job as a broadcaster for VOA to become the Interior Minister of Afghanistan. Jalali replaced Taj Mohammad Wardak in January 2003.^[1] Prior to joining the Afghan government, Jalali lived with his family in suburban Maryland. His family remains there. He has a son, 36, and a daughter, 31.

He has written extensively about the military of Afghanistan for scholarly journals and the mass media, in addition to reporting on Afghanistan and Central Asia for VOA for almost two decades.

Jalali is the author of several books, including a three-volume military history of Afghanistan. His most recent book, The Other Side of the Mountain (2002), co-authored with Lester Grau, is an analytical review of the Mujahedin war with the Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Jalali wrote an influential critique in the spring of 2002 of the U.S. military role in Afghanistan, arguing that the way the United States used local chieftains in the War on Terrorism "enhanced the power of the warlords and encouraged them to defy the central authorities." He later softened his criticism but pointed out that local militias still play a significant role in working with the U.S. military.