Ali Abdullah Ahmed

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Ali Abdullah Ahmed
Born: January 12, 1970(1970-01-12)
Yemen
Died June 10, 2006
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Detained at: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Alias(s): Salah Addin Ali Ahmed Al-Salami
ID number: 693
Alleged to be a member of: Al Qaida
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status death in custody

Ali Abdullah Ahmed (Arabic: علي عبدالله احمد) (January 12, 1970 – June 10, 2006) (also transliterated as Salah Addin Ali Ahmed Al-Salami) was a citizen of Yemen who was held in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number was 693. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terror analysts estimate he was born in 1977, in Ib, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 693 was named inconsistently on official US Government documents

  • Captive 693 was named Ali Abdullah Ahmed on various lists of Guantanamo captives.[2][1][3][4][5]
  • Captive 693 was named Saleh Ali Abdullah Al Salami on a letter from Terry Henry, a senior officcial from the Department of Justice.[6]

[edit] Death

On June 10, 2006 the DoD reported that three Guantanamo detainees, two Saudis, and one Yemeni committed suicide.[7] DoD spokesmen refrained from releasing the dead men's identities.

Main article: Guantanamo suicide attempts

The next day, June 11, 2006, Saudi authorities released the names of the two Saudi men.[8] Later that day the DoD released the names of all three men.[9] The dead Yemeni man was identified, for the first time, by the DoD, as Ali Abdullah Ahmed. The dead Saudis were identied as Yasser Talal Al Zahrani and Mani Shaman Turki al-Habardi Al-Utaybi.

[edit] Official account

The Washington Post reported that the DoD allege Ahmed: "was a mid- to high-level al-Qaida operative who had key ties to principal facilitators and senior members of the group." -- and that "Throughout his time in Guantanamo, he had been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force,"

The Washington Post reports that Ahmed was a "long-term hunger striker." -- There were several widespread hunger strikes during 2005. A widespread hunger strike that began in late May 2005 or early June 2005 came to a negotiated end on July 28, 2005. Detainees report the camp authorities had agreed to several key concessions, and that they were forced to resume the hunger strike on August 8, 2006.

Initially the DoD reported that none of the three dead men had legal representation.[10] However, on June 14, 2006 the DoD had to acknowledge that Ahmed did have legal representation. But they had yet to give his lawyers the clearance required to visit with him.

Mani Al-Utaybi's legal team reported that they had waited over nine months for the DoD to grant them clearance to see Al-Utaybi.[11] They said that the DoD would not allow them to correspond with Al-Utaybi, because they claimed his legal team did not know the DoD's official spelling of Al-Utaybi's name.

[edit] Hunger strike and forced feeding

At its height more than 100 detainees participated in this hunger strike. The Department of Defense's position was that detainees did not have the right to refuse medical treatment and began force-feeding detainees. Detainees complained that the force-feeding were administered in a particularly brutal manner.

Approximately three dozen detainees remained participating in this hunger strike in January 2006, when the DoD instituted a new measure -- the use of "restraint chairs". Detainees would be strapped immobile in the restraint chairs, during the force-feeding, and for a period of time afterwards. The DoD explained they took this measure so the detainees could not induce vomiting and void the force-fed formula before they began to really digest it. Detainees claimed that the force-feeding caused them extremely painful cramps, and that they would be held in restraint for hours, even if they soiled themselves. The DoD said their policy authorized restraining the detainees immobile for only 45 minutes following the end of the force-feeding.

All but four of the hunger strikers ended their hunger strike just a few days after the initiation of the use of the restraint chair in January 2006. The Washington Post reports that Ahmed continued his hunger strike from late 2005 to May 2006.

Ali Abdullah Ahmed and Yasser Talal Al Zahrani had previously been listed on the DoD's two official lists. The other Saudi, previously named as either "Maniy bin Shaman al-Otaibi" or "Mani bin Shaman bin Turki al Habradi", had not been previously listed on either official list.[8][12][13][1]

[edit] Murder suggestions

On June 14, 2006, Ali Abdullah Ahmed's father claimed that his son couldn't have committed suicide, and alleges that he was instead "assassinated by American soldiers".[14]

[edit] Post-mortems

All three of the families of the dead men have challenged the American post-mortems.[15] The families all took steps to have second post-mortems after the bodies were returned to them.

Patrice Mangin, who headed the team that volunteered to examine Al Salami's body, said that it was routine to remove some organs that decay rapidly.[15] Some family members had expressed concerns when the bodies were missing the brain, liver, kidney heart and other organs.

Mangin however said that the US authorities had kept Al-Salami's throat, and that his team couldn't state an opinion as to whether he hung himself until it was returned.[15]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ali Abdullah Ahmed's Combatant Status Review Tribunal on 1 November 2004.[16] The allegations it listed were:

The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
  1. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Faisalabad, Pakistan via Karachi Pakistan.
  2. "'The detainee worked directly for Usama Bin Ladin's family.
  3. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida courier directly associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad [sic] .
  4. The detainee resided at the Issa safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  5. Abu Zubayda was the director at the safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan as well as one located in Peshawar, Pakistan.
  6. Residents of a safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, routinely received endorsement letters from a known al-Qaida operative to attend terrorist training camp.
  7. The purpose of the Khaldan camp [sic] was to train fighters for jihad.
  8. A Khaldan [sic] camp weapons trainer was captured at an Abu Zubaydaa [sic] safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  9. The al Qaida weapons trainer from Tora Bora identified the detainee from his time in Kabul, Afghanistan as well as his time in al Qaida's camp Khalden [sic] .
  10. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant as being associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad [sic] .
  11. Senior Al Qaida facilitator Abu Yasir Al Jaza'iri identified the detainee.

[edit] Transcript

Ahmed chose not to attend his Tribunal.[17]

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[18]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ali Abdullah Ahmed's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 May 2005.[19] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Faisalabad, Pakistan, via Karachi, Pakistan.
  2. The detainee resided at the Issa safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  3. Abu Zubayda was the director at the safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, as well as one located in Peshawar, Pakistan.
  4. Residents of a safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, routinely received endorsement letters from a known al Qaida operative to attend terrorist training camp [sic] .
b. Connections/Associations
  1. A senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the detainee as one of the individuals captured in the Crescent Mill residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan, during a 28 March 2002 raid. The lieutenant further stated that he and a senior al Qaida official met the detainee in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  2. A senior al Qaida operational planner identified the detainee.
  3. A senior al Qaida facilitator Abu Yasir Al Jaza'iri identified the detainee.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. Among the items recovered during the 22 March 2002 raid of the safehouse, which the detainee was captured in, was a notebook containing information regarding nuclear bomb making, passports, and identification cards.
  2. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment and assault during his detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors of plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
b.

A senior al Qaida operational planner stated that the detainee did not go to Pakistan or Afghanistan for jihad. He also stated that the detainee did not go to Pakistan or Afghanistan for jihad. He also stated that the detainee was sent by his family to secure his cousin's release from Pakistani authorities.

[edit] Transcript

Ali Abdullah Ahmed's Presiding Officer concluded that he had chosen not to attend his hearing.[20]

His Assisting Military Officer's notes from the Enemy Combatant election form filled out during the pre-hearing interview, although unclassified, were not recorded in the transcript.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ali Abdullah Ahmed Administrative Review Board, on 8 March 2006.[21] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee acknowledge that he quit his business; left his young wife behind; spent $500 on a passport, visa and ticket; and went to Pakistan with $400 in his pocket. The detainee insists that nobody helped him financially in this endeavor. The detainee insists that once he arrived in Karachi, Pakistan (on an unspecified date), nobody met him at the airport. The detainee then spent seven days at an unidentified hotel that was one hour by car from the airport. After a week in Karachi, the detainee took a bus to Faisalabad, Pakistan where he was admitted to al Salafia University.
b. Training
  1. A witness reviewed all photographs in a photo book and stated that he was familiar with the detainee from the witness's time in Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as the witness's time at Camp Khalden. This witness correctly identified the detainee in the photo book.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. A senior al Qaida facilitator claimed that he first met the detainee at the Abu Suhaib guest house in Kandahar in spring 2000.
  2. A senior al Qaida lieutenant commented on photographs of other detainees who were arrested during 28 March 2002 raids; the photographs were of detainees from the "Crescent Mill" residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan. One of the photographs was of an individual who identified himself as Ali Abdalla Ahmed, a Yemeni national. The senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the person in the photo as someone he had met with Mukhtar [sic] in Kandahar, Afghanistan sometime before or after 11 September 2001. The witness said he could not remember the exact date.
  3. The detainee identified individuals who were with him at al Salafia University, including eleven Yemenis, a Libyan, a Saudi, and a Palestinian. These people later moved with the detainee to the safe house of Issa. The detainee positively identified all of these detainees from pictures. The detainee moved with others to the safe house about three months before a raid by Pakistani police.
  4. The detainee states that an unidentified person at the Jamia al Salafia told the detainee to go to Issa's house.
  5. A witness looked at photos and recognized the detainee, a Yemeni, as one of those staying and captured at Issa's house near al Salafia University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  6. A witness, after reviewing a photograph book, identified the detainee, a Yemeni, from a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  7. A witness identified fifteen individuals as residents of the Yemeni safe house. The detainee was one of those individuals identified as a resident of the Yemeni safe house.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

A witness was shown a photograph of the detainee, and the witness stated that the detainee is not the individual who was an instructor at the training camp in Kohtal.
b.

The detainee denied ever knowing Abu Yasir or Abu Zabayda [sic] . The detainee denied ever being in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to study the Koran and was not involved with the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee said he was innocent. The detainee denied ever having stayed at the Abu Suhaib.
c.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  3. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  4. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  5. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  6. ^ Terry Henry. "GTMO Suicides", Department of Justice, June 2006, p. 23. Retrieved on 2007-10-17. 
  7. ^ Three Guantanamo detainees die suicides, Reuters, June 10, 2006
  8. ^ a b Riydadh names Guantanamo suicide victims, wants bodies, Daily News & Analysis, June 11, 2006
  9. ^ DOD Identifies 3 Guantanamo Suicides, Washington Post, June 11, 2006
  10. ^ About the dead Guantánamo detainees, Miami Herald, June 15, 2006
  11. ^ Lawyers say defense of Guantanamo suicide victim was thwarted, Mainichi Daily News, June 13, 2006
  12. ^ Saudis allege torture in Guantanamo deaths, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 11, 2006
  13. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  14. ^ "Father queries Guantanamo suicide", BBC, 14 June 2006. 
  15. ^ a b c Gitmo detainee buried after body cross-examined, Yemen Times, June 25, 2005
  16. ^ OARDEC (1 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Ahmed, Ali Abdullah 59-60. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-30.
  17. ^ Mark P. Denbeaux et al, June 10th Suicides at Guantánamo, Seton Hall University School of Law, August 21, 2006 - pages 16-17
  18. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), Friday March 10, 2006, pp. 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-12. 
  19. ^ OARDEC (26 May 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ahmed, Ali Abdullah pages 10-11. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.
  20. ^ Summarized Transcript from Ali Abdullah Ahmed's Administrative Review Board - pages 105-106
  21. ^ OARDEC (8 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ahmed, Ali Abdullah pages 52-53. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-30.