Albrecht Gero Muth

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Secret Agent, Diplomat, Militia Leader

Motto: “Tout est bien fini. Je ne regrette rien.”

Epitaph: “Pro DEO et FIDE et utilitate HOMINUM”

Albrecht Gero Muth, aka Muth Pasha, aka Shaikh Ali Al-Muthaba, born 10 May 1964, Cologne, West Germany, Born and raised a Lutheran, he converted to Catholicism with Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, serving as a sponsor. He is married to Viola Herms Drath, a noted American journalist of German birth, author, playwright, academic and Presidential advisor, Mrs. Drath is the recipient of the 2005 William J. Flynn Initiative for Peace Award in recognition of her role in helping lay the groundwork for the “2+4 talks,” which led to the unification of Germany in 1990. The nuptials were officiated by Harry L. Carrico, the Chief Justice of Virginia, at the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Richmond, on 9 April 1990.

Muth graduated from the Nicolaus-Cusanus-Gymnasium, a prestigious secondary school in Bergisch Gladbach in the West German Federal State of North-Rhine-Westphalia, following intermittent school attendance in East Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel and India. Said former Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao: “While your heart will always beat for Germany, the country of your birth, we know that your soul will always sing with the Spirit, which is India.” (*1)

“A native of Germany who attended American University, (Washington, D. C.) Muth has been involved in arms control issues for a dozen years. A protege of his uncle, (Gerald Goetting), the former Vice President of East Germany, (1960-1989) he has advised the President of Mali, (2000-2001) the Estonian Foreign Minister, (1990-1991) the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament (1993-1996) and former United States Senator Chuck Robb (Democrat-Virginia.).” (1989-1990) (*2) He is the recipient of a Presidential citation, a rare recognition for a non-US national, in recognition for his personal efforts, in 1991, “in bringing to justice” the murderers of the late Colonel William F. Buckley, USA, the CIA station chief, Beirut, who died while held captive by Hezbollah. (*3)

For ten months, between spring 1998 and February 1999, Muth served as Gentleman to H.M. Hussein I Bin Talal, King of Jordan, while the latter received medical treatment at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. Commented Dr. Peter Mende, the German Ambassador to Jordan, in response to Mrs. Drath’s inquiry into the whereabouts of her husband, who was running late for a formal dinner being hosted by the Kattans at their residence, adjacent to the Royal Guest Palace, between the third and fourth circle, “Well Viola, “the Pasha is either with the Crown Prince, or the Prime Minister, or he’s in bed with the King.” In recognition of his personal devotion, the King had given Muth issue as Muth Pasha, a non-hereditary title, otherwise no longer in common use in the Royal Hashemite Realm.

Between 1999-2004, Muth served as Executive Director of the Eminent Persons Group, EPG, which “was created to advise U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and support his quest for a small arms nonproliferation regime.” (*4) Consisting of Muslim and Christian world leaders and originally co-chaired by Malian President Alpha Oumar Konare and former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, the EPG was “working with the Secretary-General to shape the global debate on how to slow the rapid spread of small arms and to halt the burgeoning illicit trade,” (*5) in advance of the 2001 U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. State Messrs. Konare and Rocard: “We deeply appreciate Mr. Muth’s arms control expertise in guiding the Group’s substantive work with considerable devotion and against considerable political odds. He rests assured of our continued cooperation.” (*6)

Muth attended the 2001 U.N. Small Arms Conference as a Special Representative of the President of the Republic of Mali and a Member of the Delegation of Mali. Two members of the EPG, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, Japan, and Ambassador Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom, served as Vice Presidents of the Conference. Muth served as “Friend of Chair” of the Committee, charged with drafting the Conference Report, Sir Michael Weston.

The U.N. Conference was mired in stalemate, teetering on the brink of collapse, because of a difference of positions between European countries and the United States on a Franco-Swiss proposal on mandatory marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons which, for the Bush Administration, was tantamount to gun control through the back door of the U.N. An EPG-led diplomatic effort with the major small arms and light weapons producing and exporting States, advanced within the Paris Process, helped pave the way for a Conference compromise in advance of a voluntary mechanism, while keeping the issue of a binding international treaty in abeyance. (*7) The EPG compromise proposal was circulated as a document of the U.N. Conference, setting the stage for Conference follow-on in the areas of tracing through marking and information exchange. (*8) Stated Annan: “I am grateful for everything the EPG has done in the run-up to the Conference, in helping reach a Conference compromise and setting the path for Conference follow-up. An important first step has been taken on the long road to eradicating the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.”

In April 2004, Michael-Francis Dei-Anang, a nephew of the Secretary-General’s, replaced Muth as EPG Executive Director, with Muth assuming the position of EPG Deputy Executive Director and Special Advisor to Annan. (*9)

The appointment had been held up for nearly a year, because a newspaper profile had exposed Muth as a secret agent of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, (*10) tasked with running the former agents of the defunct East German intelligence service, still in the employ of the U.N., at the behest of the American Central Intelligence Agency. Muth was able to operate out of the New York office of U.N. Under-Secretary-General Joseph Verner Reed, a family friend of President Bush, (41) who, years earlier, due to his personal life style, had come into the radar of East German intelligence and who had retained a former translator for Muth’s uncle as his executive assistant. The article further revealed that Muth had been on the BND payroll, while serving as Special Advisor, 1993-1996, to Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, a former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and a close friend of Muth’s uncle, the former Vice President. Petrovsky was then serving as the Director-General of United Nations Offices at Geneva, the U.N.'s operations centre and a major intelligence listening post. Muth's appointment had been secured by the direct intervention of Dr. Hans-Heinrich Rosenlehner, the former Chief of BND Clandestine Services, at the time serving as the BND Resident in Washington, with Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann, the German Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

What made the expose especially dicey for Muth were the revelations of his prior service in the East German Intelligence Service and subsequent service for the BND, which found him not only spying on then-U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whose independent streak was increasingly drawing Washington’s ire and would eventually lead to his replacement by Annan, but also spying on then-U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright and then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, a neighbor of Muth’s and his wife’s in the fashionable Georgetown neighborhood in Washington, DC.

Not only did Muth succeed in planting a listening device in the boudoir of Ambassador Albright’s master bedroom in her Georgetown residence which, however, due to technical difficulties, only picked up the sound of running water, rather than the happenings in the adjacent room. But, more importantly, Muth proved himself successful in electronically surveilling the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence at the Waldorf Towers in New York. On 5 February 2003, the surveillance recorded a ten-minute exchange between then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and then-U.K Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, in which, following the critical U.N. Security Council meeting on Iraq earlier that day, both, privately, as reported by Dan Plesch and Richard Norton-Taylor in the Guardian on 5 June 2003, (Plesch serves as a member of the EPG Advisory Group) “expressed serious doubts about the quality of intelligence on Iraq's banned weapons programme at the very time they were publicly trumpeting it to get United Nations support for a war on Iraq.” At the time, Secretary Powell’s serious doubts were not publicly known and the “Waldorf transcripts” were considered an intelligence scoop. What did the General know, when did he know it and what did he tell the American people will continue to haunt and potentially tarnish a soldier’s unblemished record of devoted service to the Nation.

The Federal German Government of then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, alongside then-French President Jacques Chirac, a vocal opponent of U.S. President George Bush’s objective to go to war against Iraq, had actively contributed to the article in retribution for Muth’s efforts to help steer a controversial war-authorizing resolution through the U.N. Security Council, under the African Presidency in March 2003, in very much the same fashion, in which he had pushed the EPG compromise document through at the U.N. Small Arms Conference two years prior.

Not unlike the Valery Plame case, which had led to the outing of an under-cover CIA operative by the Bush White House for reasons attributed to her husband’s opposition to the Iraq War, the affair led to formal inquiries by American counter-intelligence, the German Federal Parliament and the German Press Complaints Board. A counter-statement was, subsequently, printed by Sueddeutsche Zeitung and, at the political level, resultant contention was resolved, amicably, eventually.

One of Muth’s briefs for Annan, whom he served in personal capacity, was Iraq, the aftermath of the U.S. invasion and, in particular, the advance, as part of the Secretary-General’s “good offices mission,” of Annan’s proposed dual-track framework, which “envisioned a “national reconciliation conference” to be convened under competent Iraqi authority, with the objective to integrate those nationalist elements of the insurgency, amenable to political compromise, into the political process.” (*11)

Externally, “Annan’s dual-track framework envisioned a reconfigured Middle East Quartet or a “contact group,” possibly comprising the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, a desirable configuration of the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United Nations, alongside with the active involvement of regional powers, at the level of the Arab League or individual States.” (*12)

By the time Muth arrived in Iraq in fall 2006, he had cultivated Iraq's core constituencies, including Shia militia and Sunni insurgency leaders. In particular, “he had worked assiduously with the Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar,” (*13) who was then perceived as a firebrand anti-American cleric. In December, he helped organize a meeting of Iraq’s Shia leadership at Najaf. The meeting further built on a meeting, which was held, under his stewardship, near Mosul on 25 October 2006, between leaders of the Shia militias and the Sunni insurgency, in advance of common cause for a forthcoming national reconciliation forum, set forth in the Ninneveh Memorandum. (*14)

As Muth told Roland Flamini, the immediate-past Chief International Correspondent of United Press International, at the conclusion of the Najaf meeting, which was charged with making a renewed Shia effort to find a way beyond the ever growing Shia-Sunni sectarian violence: “The Iraqis have to be given credit for trying to launch "a political process with the near-term goal to get all parties to agree to an interim cessation of violence and, in the long-term, to reach national accord on the principles -- political and religious -- which will govern the 'new' Iraq." (*15)

The end of Annan’s term on 31 December 2006 did not permit Muth time to implement the Secretary-General’s dual-track framework, which was formally embraced by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a televised address to the Iraqi people on 5 December 2006, in part in an effort to side-step U.S. President Bush’s effort to further militarize the Iraq Question by what would come to be termed a “troop surge,” the additional insertion of, at first, 21,500 troops, then augmented to 28,500, then, again, further augmented by another 30,000 National Guard troops.

At al-Maliki’s suggestion Muth stayed in Iraq, accepting on 28 January 2007, at the strong urging of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the revered leader of Iraq’s Shia, interim appointment as Senior Commander of the Political-Military Affairs and Special Operations Command of Jaish-al-Mahdi, aka "the Mehdi Army," i.e. the Shia militia loyal to al-Sadr. States Muth, who took the nom de guerre of “Shaikh Ali Al-Muthaba,” upon assuming command: “It shall be the overall objective of my mission, while in Iraq, serving the noble cause of an Iraq, whole and free, to build an entente cordiale between Jaish-al-Mahdi and the United States Army and to advance political cooperation between the Sadrist Movement and the United States Government, in advance of the Prime Minister's Security Plan for Baghdad, the War in Iraq, and beyond, with the objective of advancing a phased withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraqi territory, in furtherance of early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance. Moreover, my cousins, I want it to be understood, clearly, that I am fully committed to help further the common cause of a timely victory in the Battle for Baghdad: Victory for JAM. Victory for the United States Army, my Brothers. Above all, Victory for Iraq and all Iraqis: Shia, Suni, Kurd and Christian. God be with Us.” (*16)

Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani was first in recognizing the potential benefit to be had from Muth’s moderating influence on al-Sadr, who would prove himself amenable to being cultivated into Muth's far-flung international network of notables. In particular, Muth helped establish contact for al-Sadr to Arun Gandhi, the Mahatma's grandson, whose prudent guide and counsel, in exposing al-Sadr to Mahatma Gandhi's Love Ethic of Nonviolence, proved an important milestone in the evolution of al-Sadr's approach to the liberation struggle, which would find al-Sadr opposed to all forms of violence. States Salah al Obaidi, a top Sadr aide, “Sayed Muqtada refuses all kinds of violence and he refuses to answer violence with violence.” (*17) On 10 January 2007, U.S. President Bush had announced the “troop surge.” Many an informed observer was expecting a confrontation with al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army.

Muth was among the first in de-flagging the threat perception. Writes Flamini, even ahead of the President’s speech: "A changed situation on the ground will infuse the national reconciliation process with necessary momentum by delivering all the parties of the conflict to the negotiating table," said Albrecht Gero Muth, lately adviser in Iraq to former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, and still involved in the reconciliation in Iraq. He said Moqtada al-Sadr “realizes the implications [for the Mahdi army] in the U.S.-backed Iraqi prime minister's security plan." Now that Gen. Raymond Odierno has said al-Sadr himself would not be targeted by U.S. troops, Muth said, the cleric "will take necessary steps" to avoid Mahdi army clashes with security forces.” (*18)

In his statement to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 1 February 2007, Muth goes an important step further, when he suggests the possibility of an "entente cordiale" between the Mehdi Army and the United States Army, in advance of the Baghdad Security Plan, which is hoped will enhance security, with the objective of providing the al-Maliki Government the breezing space, in which to advance the process for the national reconciliation of all parties to Iraq’s growing civil strife. (*19)

Drawing inspiration from the “enemy” versus “foe” dialectic, advanced by Professor George Schwab, one of America’s leading state theoreticians, formerly of the City College of New York and now the President of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, an independent think tank, which has distinguished itself in helping advance peace in Ireland and diplomatic compromise on the Korean Peninsula, Muth states: “The enemy” need not be “the foe,” but can be “an ally in advance of common tactical goals,” even where “agreement on larger strategic objectives” remains, at least for now, elusive. (*20) Comments the Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, a Career Ambassador in the United States Foreign Service: “All Muth can do is what he is currently trying to do: to win over the nationalist elements of the insurgency and militias to the American war effort. I suspect this may be in the too hard category, but I don't believe it should be there, as other approaches do not seem to be working.” (*21) To the surprise of Senators and senior Bush Administration officials Muth went even so far as to suggest that "the Hoyatoleslam could be swayed to help position Shia Iraq in a forthcoming showdown with Shia, but non-Arab Iran.” (*22)

Muth is a firm believer in outflanking extremists at the far-end, not the near-end. (*23) Delineating definitions between "extremists" versus "terrorists," as Lieutenant-General Raymond Odierno, United States Army, then serving as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subsequently appointed the Number Two U.S. Combatant Commander in Iraq, and Muth discussed on 18 January 2006, will prove critical in this regard. As General Odierno told Muth: “When we look at it from a United States perspective, it’s about who threatens the United States… I guess you have to get into the technical definitions between the two. The bottom line is who threatens the safety of our citizens in the United States and as well as our allies, and we will deal with them based on that.” (*24)

As Muth had advised, al-Sadr gave orders to the Mehdi Army to stand down and not to confront the United States Army and the Iraqi Army. Contrary to expectation, a new reality was being created to the point, as Flamini reports, “where selected members of the Mahdi Army have been deployed along side U.S. troops and the Iraqi army in a dozen locations. The arrangement is unofficial, little publicized, but nonetheless real.” (*25) States Ambassador Pickering: "To the extent Muth has been successful in aligning al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army with the United States Army, and the Sadrist movement with U.S. interests, and there is some evidence for that, he has made a major contribution to the American war effort." (*26)

Muth ranks among the key architects for the Mehdi Army/ Sadrist Battle Plan (*27) which, as opposed to the American battle plan, drawn up by U.S. Army General David Petraeus, the new Number One American Combatant Commander in Iraq, relies heavily on Sun Tzu's call for restraint over Clausewitz's call for action. Under Muth’s tutelage, the Mehdi Army is re-inventing itself on the battlefield as an “Army for Peace,” a pillar of the National Movement for the Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation, to be led by al-Sadr. In a mere few weeks, between early 2007 and Easter, it has been replaced by Al-Qaeda Mesopotamia as America’s Number One Enemy in Iraq, to the point, where General Odierno is on record as seeking a personal meeting with al-Sadr, (*28) and where U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, for whom Muth and his wife hosted a 65th birthday reception at DACOR Bacon House, the prestigious American Foreign Service Club, within walking distance of the White House, on 30 March 2006, (*29) does not rule out “a political arrangement.” Comments a senior White House official, on customary request for anonymity, because he is not authorized to speak of Muth, publicly: "We follow efforts to re-invent JAM and to align JAM with U.S. interests with keen interest and continuously evaluate word versus deed in this regard. While a ruling on success versus failure of the mission is premature, to date, JAM has shown considerable self-restraint, circumspection and proven itself helpful in advance of the BSP." (*30)

While results of the Baghdad Security Plan remain mixed for the U.S. war effort, (*31) al-Sadr has demonstrably enhanced his political stature. Writes Karamatullah Khan Ghori, Pakistan’s former Ambassador to Iraq, now a commentator for DAWN, Pakistan’s leading English-speaking daily: “Much of the credit for moderating the reflexes and responses of an erstwhile mercurial Moqtada goes to the former special representative in Iraq of Kofi Annan, Albrecht Gero Muth, whose German roots seem to have served him well in a very demanding situation confronting him in Baghdad. Perhaps he has been inspired by the sterling example of the ‘Iron Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, who welded modern Germany out of disparate Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria in the latter-half of the 19th century.” (*32)

Discreet efforts are underway to expand the scope of military cooperation between JAM and the U.S. Army, especially in pursuit of AQ/M, and to augment the military track with a political track, as the U.S. vision and the Sadrist vision for the New Iraq are closer in line than generally assumed. In key sermons, delivered at Kufa on 25 May 2007 and at Najaf on 10 April 2007, al-Sadr showed himself to be a man of Hope, Tolerance, Conciliation, and Unity, as he gradually positions the Sadrist Movement in the center of the body politic of post-liberation and post-Maliki Iraq, drawing both from Mahatma Gandhi’s experience in the Indian Movement for Independence from Colonial rule and Dr. Martin Luther King’s experience in the American Civil Rights Movement. For Muth, the Iraq Question is about the epic struggle between "the Secular" and "the Religious" in advance of "the Democratic."

"With Iraq's secular leadership crumbling under the strains of foreign occupation, al-Sadr realizes that it's time for the Religious to assert its proper role in Iraq's public sphere," Muth says. (*33) Writes Ambassador Ghori: “Moqtada’s reflexes and reactions, in the unfolding backdrop, have, in fact, been tinged by a remarkable overlay of restraint and circumspection. The special advisor of the former U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the patrician German, Albrecht Muth, still in Baghdad, has been a good and serene moderating influence on Moqtada, advising him all the time to hold his horses and tame them in the larger interest of Iraq. The suave German noble does come up as being more successful in his personal diplomacy than the Secretary General’s puffed up Special Representative for Iraq, the former Pakistani diplomat Asharaf Qazi, who prefers to stay at a safe distance from Iraq, in Amman and whose trips to New York are far more frequent than his rare appearances next door in Baghdad.”(*34)

[edit] Sources

01: P. V. Narasimha Rao, former Prime Minister of India, Statement before the First Convocation of the Eminent Persons Group, American University, Washington, D C, 2-4 May 2000
02: John Shaw, “Panel of World Leaders Aims to Slow Flood of Small Arms Sales,” The Washington Diplomat, July 2002
03: Albrecht Gero Muth, “Wanderer between the Worlds: Reflections on East-West Espionage,” Remarks, Imperial War Museum, London, 28 April 2001
04: John Shaw, “Panel of World Leaders Aims to Slow Flood of Small Arms Sales,” The Washington Diplomat, July 2002
05: Ibid.
06: Alpha Oumar Konare, President of the Republic of Mali, and Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister of France, “The Role of a Small Arms Control Regime in Stemming Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation,” Consultative Document, Presented to the 55th UN General Assembly (The “Millennium Assembly”) under Agenda Item 74 (w): SMALL ARMS (54/54/R) By the Delegation of the Republic of Mali on behalf of the Eminent Persons Group
07: Albrecht Gero Muth, “The WASHINGTON COMMUNIQUE on the Proliferation of SALW: Elements of an International Action Agenda,” Speech before the First Continental Meeting of African Experts on SALW, Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, May 17-19, 2000
08: Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Albrecht Gero Muth, "Drain Small Arms Pipelines: Long Term Implications of Inserting Small Arms into Regions in Conflict," Op-Ed, taz, Berlin, Germany, 4 December 2001, also: Albrecht Gero Muth, Small Arms Control: What Next?, SAIS Review - Volume 22, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2002, pp. 213-218, also: Albrecht Gero Muth, UN Headquarters Press Briefing of the EPG Executive Director, United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York, 10 May 2002
09: Kofi Annan, Appointment Letter, (Letter of Credence) dated 5 April 2004 and addressed to Albrecht Gero Muth, also: “Annan Kin to Lead Global Small Arms Effort,” Associated Press, 3 April 2004, also: Roland Flamini, immediate-past Chief International Correspondent, United Press International, “Iraqi Shiites to Meet in Najaf to Discuss Factional Differences,” World Politics Watch Exclusive, 23 December 2006, also: Karamatullah Khan Ghori, former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iraq, now a commentator for DAWN, Pakistan’s leading English-speaking daily, “Neocons still eager for military victory in Iraq,” DAWN, 30 December 2006
10: Christoph Schwennicke, “Spezial Agent Albrecht Gero Muth tut eine Menge fuer sein Image: Vor allem luegt er,” Sueddeutsche Zitung, 2/3. August 2003
11: Albrecht Gero Muth, “Wooing the Insurgents,” Outside View Commentary, United Press International, 29 November 2005
12: Ibid.
13: Karamatullah Khan Ghori, “Neocons still eager for military victory in Iraq,” DAWN, 30 December 2006
14: Albrecht Gero Muth, “Towards Reconciliation and Sovereignty: Iraqis Claim Their National Destiny,” Article, Furkono, Assyrian Liberation Party, 23 November 2006
15: Roland Flamini, “Iraqi Shiites to Meet in Najaf to Discuss Factional Differences,” World Politics Watch Exclusive, 23 December 2006
16: Albrecht Gero Muth, Order of the Day, Upon Assuming Command of the Political-Military Affairs and Special Operations Command of Jaish-al-Mahdi, Villa Zarathusthra, Al-Mansour, Baghdad, 28 January 2007, also: Albrecht Gero Muth, Letter of 5 February 2007, addressed to the Vice President of the United States, cc. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
17: Salah al Obaidi, Spokesman for Muqtadir al Sadar, McClatchy News Service, 12 June 2007
18: Roland Flamini, “Ahead of Bush Speech, Battle for Baghdad Gets a Dress Rehearsal,” World Politics Watch, 10 January 2007
19: Albrecht Gero Muth, “East by East-West: “Enemy” vs. “Foe” in the Iraq War,” Statement to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1 February 2007
20: Dr. George D. Schwab, “Enemy oder Foe: Der Konflikt der modernen Poltiik,” in Epirrhosis, Berlin, 1968, vol. II, “Enemy or Foe: A Conflict of Modern Politics,” TELOS, No. 72, Summer 1987
21: Thomas R. Pickering, Career Ambassador, United States Foreign Service, Statement, 21 June 2007
22: Albrecht Gero Muth, “East by East-West: “Enemy” vs. “Foe” in the Iraq War,” Statement to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1 February 2007
23: Albrecht Gero Muth, Letter from Baghdad, 8 February 2007, Read by MG Galen Jackman, USA, Chief Congressional Liaison for the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff, at a Mess Dress Diner in honor of Muth’s wife, hosted by the President of the National Bible Association, DACOR Bacon House, Washington, D.C. also: Albrecht Gero Muth, “Wooing the Insurgents,” Outside View Commentary, United Press International, 29 November 2005
24: Lieutenant-General Raymond Odierno, American Enterprise Institute, 18 January 2006
25: Roland Flamini, “The Enemy of My Enemy,” World Politics Watch, Exclusive, 4 March 2007
26: Thomas R. Pickering, Career Ambassador, United States Foreign Service, Statement, 21 June 2007
27: Albrecht Gero Muth, “Mehdi Army/ Sadrist Battle Plan, Grand Strategy,” (Political and Military) Food for Thought Paper, 6 March 2007
28: Lieutenant-General Raymond Odierno, Video-Conference with News Media, 31 May 2007
29: Bulletin, DACOR, Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retried, Washington DC, April 2006
30: Senior White House official, on customary request for anonymity, because he is not authorized to speak of Muth, publicly, Statement, 9 July 2007
31: Albrecht Gero Muth, “Baghdad Security Plan, Progress Report,” 4 June 2007, also: Albrecht Gero Muth, “The Baghdad Security Plan at the 90-Day Marker: A Sadrist/ JAM Perspective,” (UNOFFICIAL) Memorandum, 9 May 2007
32: Karamtullah Khan Ghori, “Iraq under U.S. occupation, four years on,” DAWN, 31 March 2007
33: Albrecht Gero Muth, “The Iraq Question between Secularism and the Religious: Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar Calls on Shia, Kurd and Christian to Unite in Advance of an Iraq, Whole and Free, When, if not Now, is the time to assert the Religious in advance of the Democratic,” Article, Right Truth, 30 May 2007, also, ibid.: “A People Awakens: Towards the National Liberation of Iraq, Part Two, Right Truth, 25 May 2007, also, ibid.: “A People Awakens: Towards the National Liberation of Iraq,” Part One, Article, Right Truth, 10 April 2007
34: Karamtullah Khan Ghori, “Time for a New Beginning in Iraq,” DAWN, 18 February 2007

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