Ais Gill rail crash (1913)

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The Ais Gill rail crash occurred on the Settle-Carlisle Railway in the north of England on September 1, 1913. The immediate cause of the crash was a signal passed at danger, but there were a very large number of contributing factors.

Contents

[edit] Overview

The two trains involved were both passenger trains which left Carlisle railway station in the early hours of September 1, destined for St Pancras station. The Midland Railway, which owned and operated the Settle-Carlisle line, had a policy of using small engines, and the two locomotives had barely sufficient power to surmount the steep gradients on the line with the heavy trains they were assigned. In theory, the load pulled by the first engine was over its maximum limit, and the driver asked for assistance from a pilot engine but was told none was available.

To make matters worse, the coal with which both engines were supplied had not been properly screened and was full of slack and "small coal", which would not fire well and would tend to clog the grates.

The first train left Carlisle at 1:38 am. As it struggled up the gradient to Ais Gill summit, the highest point of the Settle-Carlisle line, the steam pressure steadily dropped, and the train eventually stalled half a mile short of the summit. As they cleaned out the grate and tried to build up steam pressure, the driver and fireman made the mistake of telling the guard that they would only be standing for a few minutes. The guard therefore did not protect the train in the rear (by laying detonators or walking a considerable distance along the line with a lantern).

Meanwhile, the second train was also struggling, although it had a lighter load. Just short of Mallerstang, a few miles north of Ais Gill, the driver left the cab, to walk round the outside framing and oil some of the working parts while the train was in motion. Even though this procedure (which would horrify modern safety experts) was no longer necessary since wick lubricators were in use, drivers apparently continued to do it out of habit and pride.

While the driver was out of the cab, the fireman was having difficulty getting an injector to work and the boiler water level was dropping. When the driver returned, both men worked on it, and eventually restarted it. While they were busy, their train had passed all the Mallerstang signals, and they also missed a red lantern being waved from the signal box by the Mallerstang signalman and another being waved by the guard of the first train. Shortly after, they looked up from their distractions to see the first train stalled in front of them only a few yards away, and far too late to stop.

[edit] Damage

The crash caused an unexpectedly high number of casualties. Even though the last vehicle of the first train was a parcels van, the second train demolished it and ploughed into a third-class coach ahead. The roof of the parcels van slid over the roof of the second engine and sliced into a first class sleeping car behind it. As with many railway collisions in Britain about this time, flammable gas escaping from the cylinders for the gas-oil lighting system ignited and rapidly spread a fire. Fourteen people in the first train died, and very few remains were later found. Thirty-eight passengers in the second train were seriously injured. See external link to "The Mallerstang Section of the line" (below) for a list of the names of those who died.

[edit] Aftermath

The subsequent enquiry blamed the crews of both engines; the first for neglecting to protect the rear of their train and the second for failing to proceed with caution knowing that they must have passed several signals without observing them. The Mallerstang signalman was also criticised. He had apparently not thrown his home signal to "danger", even though he was aware from the Ais Gill signalman that the first train was still in the section, until he became aware that the second train had overrun his distant signal. If the signal box possessed detonator placers, he was not able to operate them in time (the enquiry made no reference to these).

However, the enquiry recommended the more extensive use of Automatic Train Control (ATC) , then under extended trial on the Great Western Railway. This would sound a siren in the cab to alert the crew of a train if they passed a signal at danger or caution and then automatically apply the brakes if they failed to acknowledge and cancel the warning.

The site of the crash was quite close to the site of the Hawes Junction rail crash which had taken place less than three years earlier, and to which the Midland Railway's small-locomotive policy had also indirectly contributed (in this instance by leading to a large number of light engine movements).

[edit] See also

[edit] Sources

Red for danger, L.T.C. Rolt, Pan, ISBN 0-330-25555-X

[edit] External links

Coordinates: 54.36174° N 2.34160° W