African military innovation and change

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African military innovation and change refers to the evolution of the military arts on the African continent, with emphasis on the role of the indigenous landscape, states and peoples within the African continent. Patterns of the military art generally moved from the simple to the more sophiscated as economids and cultures became more elaborate. Areas such as Carthage, Egypt and Nubia are reflected in the antiquarian period. The pre-colonial period also saw a numbero f military changes from cavalry empires on the grasslands to tropical kingdoms. The emergence of the gunpowder era was to spark even more far-reaching consequences cutting across all regions, with ripple effects in culture, politics and econmies.

All of these form the continuum that is African warfare. Due to the massive number of different peoples and regions, a "snapshot" view of military innovation and change is taken below- using the military activities of certain selected peoples or events to illustrate how military innnovation and change has evolved on the continent.

Contents 1 Nature of military innovation and change 1.1 Military innovation: revolution versus incremental change 1.2 Innovation and the exchange and flow of knowledge and technology 2 Military change and the African environment 3 Antiquity 3.1 The naval forces of Carthage 3.2 The land armies of Carthage 3.3 The chariots of Egypt and the bowmen of Nubia 4 The pre-industrial era 4.1 The cavalry empires of the savannah 4.1.1 Arms, equipment and weaponry 4.1.2 Leadership, organization and tactics 5 The gunpowder era 5.1 The mixed challenge of gunpowder 5.2 The forest kingdoms 5.2.1 Arms, equipment and weaponry 5.2.2 Organization and tactics 5.2.3 Fortifications 5.3 The mounted gunmen: Boer and Batsuto 5.3.1 The Boer kommandos 5.3.2 The Basuto riflemen 5.4 Resistance to colonial expansion: Samory and Adbel-kader 5.4.1 Samory in Mali 5.4.2 Adbel-Ek-kader in Algeria 5.5 From innovation to conservatism: the Zulu military system 5.5.1 Military reforms of Shaka 5.5.2 New weapons and new organisation[32] 5.5.3 The Zulu in the gunpowder era 5.5.4 Influence of the Zulu innovations 5.6 Adapting to modern arms: the Ethiopians at Adowa 6 The post-WWII era 6.1 21st century military challenges 6.2 Rise of asymetric warfare and the "technicals" generation 6.3 Major modern forces in Africa 7 Summary 8 See also 9 References 10 Sources

[edit] Nature of military innovation and change

[edit] Military innovation: revolution versus incremental change

Military change and innovation is considered by many theorists to be a "fundamental change to the framework of war" - something unpredictable, and that brings about far-reaching and systematic effects to culture, politics and society. True innovations it is argued are not small changes like adding a new type of rifle bayonet but changes of a sesimic nature.^[1] Writers such as Murray and Knox argue for 5 such revolutionary changes in Western history such as the advanceof the concept of the modern nation-state, the French Revolution which merges mass politics andwarfare, the Industrial Revolution and its material advances, the First World War and its combination of mass armies and mass killing technology with foreshadowings of the Second, and finally the nuclear era. Some nations and leaders seize upon these sesimic shifts or shape them. Others resist such changes and adjustments until forced to by actual or threatened defeat.^[2]

Given the critical role that borrowing from other cultures (horses, domesticated animals, gunpowder, compasses, etc.) plays in military innovation, numerous nations are indebted to others for advances in the military art, both directly and indirectly. Innovation is the process of combining known (whether local or borrowed) elements into new patterns, and military innovation are no different. The discussion below offer a snapshot of developments on the African continent, which stretches from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, the Atlantic, to the Indian Ocean. As African historian Basil Davidson notes, Africa and its peoples are not simply in a region south of the Sahara, as is so often conceived in both the popular and academic imagination. ^[3]

Other writers note that military change and innovation can be incremental, a product of years of growth and development with one advance, building upon another. A culmination of small changes over time cna lead to major departure later on. The Marian reforms to the Roman Army for example, built upon the existing phalanx, mobilization and equipment base, but involved a more unified sense of common citizenship among Rome's soldiers, since the reogranisation de-emphasised some class distinctions. ^[4]. In Africa, a summary of such changes would be:

• The coming of the horse
• Use of better metal weapons
• Consolidation of pre-colonial nation-states and empires
• Introduction of gunpowder weapons
• Era of colonial conquest

[edit] Innovation and the exchange and flow of knowledge and technology

Military innovation also is associated with the flow of technology, materials, ideas and people. The gunpowder revolution for example finds its origin in a Chinese invention. The famous Roman gladius was copied from the Spanish tribes conquered by Rome.^[5] The stirrup, so critical to Western cavalry warfare, originated in Asia, as did the compass, so critical to the navigation of naval shipping. The flow of materials, technology, ideas and people across continents and regions undercuts simplistic notions of ethnic superiority in explaining the military pattens of various peoples.^[6] Indigenous development took place in all regions, but so did the transformational flow of ideas and technology from elsewhere. The ancient Germans for example, were poorly organised and armed and were often soundly defeated by the Romans, a Mediterranean people. In later centuries however, the tables were turned, and the Germans emerged as very proficient and technically advanced fighters. The massive sweeps of Mongol cavalry forces (an Asiatic people) not only routed European armies, but at their height, controlled a significant part of the Eurasian landmass, an empire that was to be bigger than Rome's, covering an estimated 12 to 22% of the earth's land surface. As scholar Thomas Sowell notes, the broad sweep of history has reshuffled the rankings of peoples time and time again, and will do so again in the future.^[7]

Military innovation thus encompasses:

• Shifts with widespread effects
• Social changes
• Leadership changes
• Organisational change
• Equipment changes and development of new technology
• Economic changes
• Movement of people, ideas, animals, crops, and technology via trade, migration or conquest

[edit] Military change and the African environment

Large parts of the African continent lack the advantages other continents have in facilitating the spread of ideas, technology and people. As noted above, Europe benefited from many innovations originating elsewhere. Such observations on the African environment appear in several standard histories of African cultures and economies, including the development of states and their militaries. See for example Robert July's Pre-Colonial Africa).^[8] The African environment, especially in the Saharan region and southwards also hinders development of certain economic engines common to other areas, such as mass production of high quality grain crops, or load-bearing animals. Such factors are often critical to large-scale military operations.^[9]

That relatively small, well equippped and organized forces from the outside conquered large parts of Africa is hardly surprising. Relatively small numbers of Roman troops conquered massive areas of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle east. As one historian puts it:

".. the scale of warfare in Africa in modern times has been modest compared to other continents. Even if there had not been a technological gap between African and European armies, or a pressing need for European troops elsewhere, it would rarely have been necessary to send large armies to Africa. The "savage hordes" of popular lore seldom materialized on African battlefields. Because of its 'exceptionally hostile.. environment, its ancient rocks, poor soils, fickle rainfall, abundant insects, and unique prevalence of disease', Africa remained 'an under populated continent until the late twentieth century'. Few African states in the late nineteenth century were capable of fielding armies even remotely as large as those routinely assembled for war in Europe, and the same conditions that kept African populations small also militated against deployment of large European armies in Africa. As one British military historian has put it, there were 'no agricultural revolutions here [in Africa] to allow large-scale requisitioning'.^[10]

As will be seen below, military innovation and change in Africa reflected this environment, but also reflects the impact of new ideas from outside, and the internal dynamism of the continent's peoples, political organization and culture. Like other regions of the world, this pattern sometimes proceeded in both revolutionary and incremental fashion.

[edit] Antiquity

Military developments in antiquity reflected internal demands as well as those of a wider world. Lack of written records from ancient times on Africa hinders understanding of early developments. The empires o f Egypt and Carthage, adn their engagement with the larger Mediterranean zone however, illustrate the effects of innovation and transformation in the antiquarian era, including the process of copying and borrowing between cultures.

[edit] The naval forces of Carthage

The navy of Carthage was the city's military backbone, and the prime force that dominated the Western Mediterranean at the height of Carthage's power. The city boasted fine natural harbors and its fleet included included large numbers of quadriremes and quinquiremes, warships with four and five ranks of rowers. Polybius wrote in the sixth book of his History that the Carthaginians were, "more exercised in maritime affairs than any other people," and Carthagian sea power was the key factor in its rise. Relying heavily on the skills of its sailors and rowers, the maneuverable Carthagian ships struck from Scicly to Spain, and dealt several defeats to its adversaries, including Rome.

The Romans however were masters at copying and adapting the technology of other peoples. According to Polybius, the Romans seized a shipwrecked Carthaginian warship, and used it as a blueprint for a massive naval build-up, adding its own refinements- the corvus- which allowed an enemy vessel to be "gripped" and boarded for hand to hand fighting. This negated initially superior Carthagian seamanship and ships. Polybius describes Roman quinqueremes being built in 60 days from cutting down of the first tree to launch, and Rome's mass production approach, plus its transfer of land tactics to the naval arena was to eventually wear down the opposition, despite large losses from storms in both the First and Second Punic Wars.^[11]

[edit] The land armies of Carthage

Earlier Carthaginian victories. Carthage's land forces were often a mix of contingents from many different parts, (Gaulish and Spanish foot and hiorse soldiers for example) nevertheless core African-based forces helped secure several Carthagian victories over Rome and other enemies. Against Rome, the two most important of these were the heavy infantry from the Libyan/Tunisian area, and the light cavalry of Numidia fromt he Algerian/Tunisian region. The light cavalry forces of Numibia were a key part of Hannibal's victories over Rome. Using javelins as their primary weaponry and riding bareback in swift encirclements, they helped trap the Roman legions at the catastrophic battle of Cannae. The heavy African infantry formed the ominous central double-hinge that swung shut at Cannae, after lighter Gallic/Spanish forces were driven back by the Romans. Cannae was one of Rome's most devastiing defeats, with some 60,000 men lost- more than the British lost at the First Day of the Somme, in the modern industrial warfare of WWI.

War in Africa- Carthage's base. Carthage already controlled the North African coast from western Libya to the Strait of Gibraltar, and from there had built an empire in Spain, Italy and Scicily. Rome realized that to eliminate the threat of Carthage, it had to strike at its homeland- its African base. Under Scipio, later Scipio Africanus, it did do convincingly, with significant aid by the horsemen of Numidia under Massina. The final confrontation occurred at the battle of Zama. The mix of both African-based and other forces available to Hannibal was a far cry from what he had enjoyed in Italy. He lacked the devastating Numidian cavalry arm that aided him at Cannae. Most of the best horsemen were in the employ of Rome, under Massinia, and what was left was outnumbered and relatively inexperienced. The foot-forces on hand was also questionable. He was forced to do battle with a mix of Gallic and Spanish mercenary troops, local African levies, and what was left from the battle-hardened veterans of the Italian campaign. While Zama was a defeat, adn lacked the creativity and innovation od his earlier battles, hannibal's deployment at Zama had much to recommend it, particularly in view of his lack of cavalry.^[12] His force was divided into three seperate echelons. After an opening charge by some 80 elephants disrupted the Roman front, the first line of mercenaries would engage the Romans. The second line of African levies would then enter the fight, further grinding away at Roman stamina and cohesion. The trump card lay in the third line- the old guard, the veterans of Italy- a mix of African, Gallic, Italic and Spanish fighting men. They would advance on the tired Romans head to head and vanquish them.

Rome dominant in North Africa. Hannibal's plan was sound and his arrangements did moderately well, but the cavalry attacks that devasted his flanks, the brilliant adjsutments of the Roman commander Scipio, and the final outcome of the battle are well known. Carthage would bow in defeat. Nevertheless its much reduced African base remained and to Rome, still represented a dangerous potential to recover. Cato the Censor's famous declaration, Carthago est delando ("Carthage must be destroyed") during the Third Punic War recognized the potential military dynamism of the city which had regained some measure of commercial success in the years after Zama. Cato thus sought to eliminate this possibility forever. Rome would henceforth be the dominant power in North Africa for centuries to come.

[edit] The chariots of Egypt and the bowmen of Nubia

Chariots were not an Egyptian invention but their extensive use in defeating enemies from the Maghreb and Levant (Assyria, Hyskos etc) serves as an illustration of their effective use by the Egyptians, and how their introduction represented a significant element of change in Northeast Africa. At the Battleof kadesh, and other.. etc etc..

Military change in this region is also reflected not in the more glamorous chariot deployments of high-status nobles or Pharaohs, but in the exertions of the ordinary foot soldier. A key role in such formations was played by the archers of Nubia. Parts of Nubia were renowned for such fighting men, and indeed a part of the Nubian territory was called Ta-Seti or Land of the Bow by the Egyptians. The Egyptians and Nubians were ethnically the closest in the region, exchanging people, material and culture over several centuries, and fighting one another sometimes.^[13] Archers plied their trade in the Egyptian forces, and rendered good service against such foreigh enemies as the Asiatic Hyksos. They also served in an internal security, policing role within Egypt itself. Such activity however was not always one way. While Egypt conquered large parts of Nubia at various times, the Kushite 25th Dynasty, originating in Nubia, was to conquer Egypt itself, drawing upon the archery skills of the region's bowmen.

[edit] The pre-industrial era

The pre-gunpowder era spans the long centuries from the start of medieval times to the beginnings of European colonial expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries. Warfare ranged from minor raiding to major campaigns, and saw the full set of missile, cutting and thrusting weapons used elsewhere in warfare, These depended on advances in metalwork, and ranged from the usual swords and spears, to the full-draw bows of the Yoruba, Mossi and Medjay, to the heavy asegai of the Zulu. Defensive positions ran the gamut- from imposing castles, to field fortifications with trenches and ramparts. Changes in methods and organization accompanied innovations in weaponary. Both infantry and cavalry forces were well represented on the African continent in the pre-colonial era.^[14].

[edit] The cavalry empires of the savannah

Further information: Military history of the Mali Empire and Mali Empire

Contrary to popular impressions, sub-Saharan Africa did produce significant cavalry forces where the environment permitted it. The savanahs of Western Africa and the Sudan in particular saw the development of several powerful cavalry-based states that dominated the region for centuries.^[15] Where the tsetse fly was not strong, the mounted horseman came into his own, and emerged as the true aristocracy of the savannah. As they did further north in Carthage, Egypt and libya, the introduction of the horse had a transformational effect on African warfare. Three powerful states are considered here:

• The Empire of Mali
• The Songhai Empire (successor to Mali)
• The Mossi

[edit] Arms, equipment and weaponry

Cavalry weapons and armor. Among the Fulani-hausa armies of Sokoto, both horse and rider were shielded. The horse was generally covered by quilted cotton, stuffed with kapok fiber, and its rider generally rode into battle with finely wrought chain mail, or heavy quilted armor. The chain mail armor showed similrities to Mameluke design, but the quilting combined local invention with religious inspiration. Local armorers sew tightly rolled wads of paper inscribed with Quaranic verses into the layers of cotton, and kapok. Whatever their spiritual powers, they could often blunt sword cuts, but were less effective agaisnt arrows.^[16] Body armor was supplemented by reinforced leather helmets, and tough shields of elephant or hippo hide. Horse stiruups often made effective weapons in a close fough melee, disemboweling enemy mounts and wounding enemy infantry.

The hand weapons of the Sudnic cavalry were the sword, battle-axe and broad-bladed spear. Among the Mossi, horseman wore as many clothes as possible to protect against enemy arrows.. Four or five tunics, reinforced by leather and various magical or religious charms made up his armor. Horses were protected with large pieces of leather, with a large front piece of copper for the horse's head. Traditional village groups- commoners were perennial prey for the Mossi, and they often defended themselves by strengthening village fortifications. Blacksmiths made arrows, spears and other weapons from iron mined and smelted in Mossi country. The Mossi sometimes tipped their cavalry lances with the same poison used by archers.

Infantry weapons. Foot-soldiers were less important in the savannah empires but units like archers rendered good service. Bow strength was comparatively weak accoring to some writers, averaging only 40 pounds at full draw. The use of poisoned arrows from the West African plant, Strophantus hispidus and other sources however, helped rectify this shortcoming, and bowmen were skilled at delivering a large vlume of shafts.^[17] Among tribes such as the Marka poisoned arrows were about 1 ft long, tipped with iron and poison, and unfeathered. Archers generally carried quivers filled with 40-50 arrows each. Volume could he heavy, with some men firing two arrows at a time. Volume made up for the lack of accuracy with the unfeathered arrows. Resupply arrangements were not well articulated, an archer exhausting hi quiver generally called it a day.^[18]

[edit] Leadership, organization and tactics

Military operations of the savannah empires are illustrated by the Mossi.^[19] Men of noble birth dominated the Mossi cavalry. Commoners were forbidden from serving in the cavalry, the main strength of the Mossi forces, and were relegated to auxiliary units. A typical cavalry unit was made up of 10 to 15 horsemen. The Mossi emperor delegated supreme command on expeditions to a field commander, or tansoba.

Raiding was the most common form of Mossi combat. Informants or scouts would locate a settlement or caravan. The raiding force took advantage of terrain, screening their approach, and utilizing knowledge of supply points like watering holes. March order was typically single file, until the target was spotted. The Mossi horsemen then charged, usually encircling the target, seizing slaves and cattle, and making a quick retreat. In bigger expeditions, a more formal battle order was taken. Infantry skirmishers, who were usually considered more expendable, formed a vanguard to engage the enemy. The cavalry next charged, organized into three units, right, center and left. If the initial infantry attack was unsuccessful, the cavalry might retreat, leaving the infantry to its own fate, or helping them if so ordered by the force commander.^[20]

Other savannah forces were more organized. The Zaberma Army of the Upper Volta was also a primarily cavalry force. The Zaberma forced prisoners - blackmsiths, leatherworkers and miners to make weapons. About 20% of the army was needed to supervise this forced labor. Quartermasters and paymasters accompanied each expedition and tried to keep an accounting of the booty captured- gold, cattle, slaves and other treasure. After the king had received the bulk of the booty, the quartermasters redistributed the rest to the fighting units. Some forces retained religious specialists, the ulamas to exhort the troops, arbitrate disputes, and regulate punishments.^[21]

[edit] The gunpowder era

[edit] The mixed challenge of gunpowder

A proverb attributed to the King of Dahomey in the 19th century states: "He who grinds the powder, must win the battle." Such an observation was both perceptive as gunpowder weapons took on an increasingly large role in African warfare. Introduction of such firearms however did not quickly displace native arms and organization. Responses were mixed- from outright rejection (the Zulu king Shaka for example), to a mix of spear and rifle side by side on the battlefield. The guns introduced into Africa were often lower quality, inaccurate, slow-firing varieties. They sometimes compared unfavorably with traditional weapons such as poisoned arrows, or the quick charges of motivated cavalry and spearmen. The Portugese for example were repeatedly unable to conquer large parts of the Zambesi region because fast-charging African spearmen from wel organized states liquidated the European musketeers when they emerged from their fortifications. The observations of Zulu King Chaka on the efficacy of firearms versus African alternatives were thus not totally unreasonable. Improvements in technology were to alter this pattern, but nevertheless, the gun advanced in fits and starts into African warfare.^[22]

Generally speaking African war-making did not seek to conquer and occupy large swathes of territory permanently, while annihilating tens of thousands. Manpower resources for one were too slim for such sweeping results. The desire to acquire slaves was another factor in many areas. Mass liquidation of entire populations simply made no sense if the focus was on acquiring healthy bodies for sale. Warfare thus often took the form of large-scale raiding expeditions in some areas, even among the destructive Zulu, who were content to devastate huge buffer zones surrounding their kingdom without making serious attempts to occupy them permanently. The Savanah states likewise often using a raiding/punitive expedition format rather than seek the mass extinction of enemies. By the mid 1700s some 400,000 guns were being exported anually to Africa, but this inflow often had limited long-term effect on most African miltiary techniques.^[23] The gunpowder challenge in Africa was thus a mixed one. Nevertheless it was to cause significant upheaval among various peoples and regions of the continent, auch as among the Asante.^[24]

[edit] The forest kingdoms

The forest civilizations of tropical Africa suffered comparative isolation in comparison to areas open to the wider tradeof the Sahara and mediterranean. nevertheless several strong kingdoms emerged that were to demonstrate continued evolution in African warfare. some trade in the products of the forest region was conducted with the savannah empires such as kola nuts, skins, gold and slaves. Peopleslike the Yorbua, Nupe, Wolof, hausa and others are examplesof these peoples and states in forested regions.^[25] The comning of the gunpowder era was to bring even more change to this zone, and powers like the Asante, Dahomey, Oyo, the Yorbua states and the Igbo states of Nigeria gained new prominence. Three? of the most powerful forest kingdoms will be considered here.

• Dahomey
• Asante
• Kongo

[edit] Arms, equipment and weaponry

Traditional weapons. The traditional arms and equipment of the tropical kingdoms of West and Central Africa consisted of the standard cutting, thrusting and smashing weapons. Spears were less strong than those evolved in southern Africa under the Zulu, and doubled as throwing and thrusting implements. The bow and arrow found wide use, with relatively weak bow strength being offset by the use of poisoned arrows in many areas. Use of bowmen to defend fortifications was significant and peoples like the Yorbua sometimes used crossbows for this purpose.

Guns. The advent of gunpowder was to change the landscape cosiderably. Formerly dominant kingdoms like Benin found their hegemony weakened, as new powers arose. The smaller riverine states of the Niger Delta for example began to arm their massive war-canoes with guns and cannon obtained from European sources, and began to carve out new comercial empires that nibbled away the power of the older states.^[26] Guns also played a significant part in the rise of the Ashanti. The bulk of the Ashanti army was made up of infantry, most armed with standard European trade muskets- the 6-foot long, so-called "Long Dane." While of relatively low quality compared to first-rank European firearms, the Ashani forces did comparatively well. As one historian observes:

"From 1807 to 1900, Asante armies fought numerous small and large battles against the British. In several of these they were the clear victors, the only West Afican army to defeat a European army in more than one engagment." ^[27]

[edit] Organization and tactics

Fighting units and mobilization. In the heavily forested regions of West Africa and the Congo, the foot soldier held sway. Most states did not maintain standing armies, but mobolized fightting men as needed. Rulers often built up a palace guard as an elite force. The most striking example of this is in Dahomey, where a special elite corps of female warriors guarded the person of the monarch, and carried out various functions of state such as auditing the accounts of sub-chiefs to determine if they were giving the king his proper cut of taxes collected. The Ashanti followed the same pattern, mobolizing fighters when war was imminent and demobilizing them when the crisis was over.^[28]

Deployment for battle. Most states had a definite battle order for deployment of troops. As historian Robert July notes:^[29], the Fulani grouped their forces so that formations of picked spearmen went into action first. Behind the spearmen came the archers, and further back, a melee of general purpose forces that charged into combat. War leaders had little means of controlling troop movement once the fray was joined. By contrast, the forces of other tropical states were much better organized. In the Congo, troops were divided into companies and regiments, each with their own unique insignia. Designated field commanders controlled troop movement with signals from drums, bells and elephant tusk horns. Skirmishers usually opened a battle with swarms of arrows, followed by the main forces. Deployment was staggered, so that initial fighting waves fell back on command when tired, and fresh contingents moved up from the rear to take their place.

[edit] Fortifications

Defensive works were of great importance in the tropical militaries. Strong citadels were built in Benin and Yourbualand for example surrounded by the full rangte of earthworks and ramparts seen elsewhere, and sited on ground that improved defensive potential- such as hills and ridges. Youbua fortifications were often protected with a double wall of trenches and ramparts, and in the COngo forests concealed ditches and paths, along with the main works, often bristled with rows of sharpened stakes. Inner defensives were laid out to blunt an enemy penetration with a maze of defensive walls allowing for entrapment and crossfire on opposing forces.

[edit] The mounted gunmen: Boer and Batsuto

[edit] The Boer kommandos

The operations of Dutch settlers (Boers) in South Africa was to have significant effects in that part of the region, sparking the development of gun-armed cavalry forces among such peoples as the Basuto and the Griqua. Their mounted horsemen clashed with Briton and Bantu, inflicting a number of defeats on both, and in turn suffering setbacks in their conflicts with these enemies. The genesis of the Boer kommando lies in.. etc etc..

[edit] The Basuto riflemen

Forged under the shadow of the ruthless Shakan system, the Basuto created a mounted light cavalry model that was to have success elsewhere in indigenous Africa - fast-moving groups of horsemen armed with guns. The basuto were surrounded by enemies- from the Zulu, to other African nations, to grasping British and Boer interlopers. They fought them all off.

[edit] Resistance to colonial expansion: Samory and Adbel-kader

The mating of firearms to traditional African forces was to have a wide impact in two ways: (a) internal conquests of indigenous tribes and neignbors and (b) resistance to European colonial invaders bent on their own progam of conquest. Bothof these patterns are seen inthe campaigns of Samory Toure of mali and AdbelKader of Algeria.

[edit] Samory in Mali

The long 7 year guerrilla warfare fought by Samory Toure against the French relied heavily on both the horse and the gun. His armies were divided into 3 echelons.. etc etc

[edit] Adbel-Ek-kader in Algeria

The success of AdbelElkader against French invaders of Algeria rested primarily on his mobile striking forces... etc etc

[edit] From innovation to conservatism: the Zulu military system

[edit] Military reforms of Shaka

The Zulu are a significant case in African military innovation and change, due to their military system^[30] which transformed large portions of the continent and the fact that their methods spanned both the pre-gunpowder adn gunpowder eras. Tribal warfare among the Zulu clans was heavily ritualistic and ceremonial until the ascent of the ruthless chieftain Shaka, who adapted and innovated a number of tribal practices that transformed the Zulu from a small, obscure tribe to a major regional power in Southern Africa. Many of the innovations of Shaka were not simply created out of thin air, nor can they be dubiously credited to the influence of European troops drilling several hundred miles to the south, nor can they merely be dismissed as the product of vague environmental forces like drought or overpopulation. Shaka sought to bring combat to a swift and bloody decision, as opposed to duels of individual champions, scattered raids, or light skirmishes where casualties were comparatively light. Such a brutal focus demanded changes in weapons, organisation and tactics.^[31]

[edit] New weapons and new organisation^[32]

New spear and shield. Shaka is credited with introducing a new variant of the traditional weapon, discarding the long, spindly throwing weapon and instituting a heavy, shorter stabbing spear. He is also said to have introduced a larger, heavier cowhide shield, and trained his forces to thus close with the enemy in more effective hand to hand combat. The throwing spear was not discarded, but standardised like the stabbing implement and carried as a missile weapon, typically discharged at the foe, before close contact. None of these weapons changes are largely important in the local context, but mated to an aggressive mobility and tactical organisation, they were to make a devastating impact.

Logistics. The fast moving host, like all military formations, needed supplies. These were provided by young boys, who were attached to a force and carried rations, cooking pots, sleeping mats, extra weapons and other material. Cattle were sometimes driven on the hoof as a moveable larder. Again, such arrangements in the local context were probably nothing unusual. What was different was the systematisation and organisation, a pattern yielding major benefits when the Zulu were dispatched on military missions.

Age-grade regimental system. Age-grade groupings of various sorts were common in the Bantu tribal culture of the day. Shaka manipulated this system, transferring the customary service period from the regional clan leaders to himself, strengthening his personal hegemony. Such groupings on the basis of age, did not constitute a permanent, paid military in the modern Western sense, nevertheless they did provide a stable basis for sustained armed mobilisation, much more so than ad hoc tribal levies or war parties. Shaka organised the various age grades into regiments, and quartered them in special military kraals, with each regiment having its own distinctive names and insignia.

Mobility and training. Shaka discarded sandals to enable his warriors to run faster. Initially the move was unpopular, but those who objected were simply killed, a practice that quickly concentrated the minds of available personnel. Shaka drilled his troops frequently, implementing forced marches covering more than fifty miles a day. He also drilled the troops to carry out encirclement tactics (see below). Such mobility gave the Zulu a significant impact in their local region and beyond.

Encirclement tactics. The Zulu typically took the offensive, deploying in the well known "buffalo horns" formation. It was composed of three elements:

1. the "horns" or flanking right and left wing elements to encircle and pin the enemy. Generally the "horns" were made up of younger, greener troops.
2. the "chest" or central main force which delivered the coup de grace. The prime fighters made up the composition of the main force.
3. the "loins" or reserves used to exploit success or reinforce elsewhere. Often these were older veterans, sometimes positioned with their backs to the battle so as not to get unduly excited.

Organisation and leadership of the Zulu forces. The Zulu forces were generally grouped into 3 levels: regiments, corps of several regiments, and "armies" or bigger formations, although the Zulu did not use these terms in the modern sense. Although size distinctions were taken account of, any grouping of men on a mission could collectively be called an impi, whether a raiding party of 100 or horde of 10,000. Numbers were not uniform, but dependent on a variety of factors including assignments by the king, or the manpower mustered by various clan chiefs or localities. A regiment might be 400 or 4000 men. These were grouped into Corps that took their name from the military kraals where they were mustered, or sometimes the dominant regiment of that locality.

Higher command and unit leadership. An inDuna guided each regiment, and he in turn answered to senior izinduna who controlled the corps grouping. Overall guidance of the host was furnished by elder izinduna usually with many years of experience. One or more of these elder chiefs might accompany a big force on an important mission,. Regimental izinduna, like the NCOs of today's army, and yesterday's Roman centurions, were extremely important to morale and discipline. On the battlefield, coordination was supplied by regimental izinduna (chiefs or leaders) who used hand signals and messengers

[edit] The Zulu in the gunpowder era

The Zulu system spanned both the spear adn gunpowder eras and exemplified the typical outcome in africa when native armies were confrnted by European forces armed with modern weapons. Unlike may other native armies however, the Zulu scored one of the biggest African victories over colonial forces, liquidating a British colun at Isadwhalwana and almost overunning a detachment at Rorke's Drift. Proceeding at a more leisurely pace than their reputed 50 miles per day, a large impi approached the British camp undetected, and bivoucaced in a ravine, wiating until the omens were good for an assault. Discovered by a Britissh cavalry patrol, the entire impi sprang up as one man, and launched their attack from some 4 miles away, in their classic "buffalo horns" formation. Some ten asssult prongs snaked towards the redcoat position, brnching out from the standard 3 part formation- the greener hands in the encircling wings, the prime warriors of the "chest" and a force of older veterans held in reserve.^[33]

They were met by withering British riffle, rocket and artillery fire that made the advance falter. The firery exhortationsof the regimental indunas or commanders however encouraged the host, and when British fire slackened, the Zulu prongs surged forward, smashing into the camp and annihilating its defenders. In his earlier encounters with European visitors to his kingdom, the Zulu King Chaka had dismissed firearms as ineffective against the massed charge of the regiments. At Isandwhalwana, th monarch's boast held true. But as the Zulu war went on, massed rifle and artillery fire repeatedly broke the back of Zulu attacks, as they persisted in assaulting heavily fortified positions and failed to use captured firearms effectively.^[34] Despite earlier deomnsrations of firepower, te Zulu had failed to adapt effectively.

[edit] Influence of the Zulu innovations

The Zulu military system was to transform large swathes of the continent, from south east Africa, into parts of East and Central Africa through the disruptive warfare that broke out during the reign of Zulu king Shaka. Numerous nations were to arise copying Zulu methods and weapons. The Shangaan for example, founded by war-leader Shoshangana, were to migrate into what is now Mozambique and force the Portuguese into paying them tribute.^[35] The disruption, known as the Mfecane was also to create several powerful nations it its wake, such as the Swazi, the Nebebele, the Shangaan, etc. Innovation in an earlier era however, had become a rigid system. Such military conservatism forms part of the pattern of African warfare.

[edit] Adapting to modern arms: the Ethiopians at Adowa

The Ethiopian victory at Adowa demonstrates the increasing ability of African forces to handle modern arms as gunpowder weapons began to dominate the field. Painful lessons in the killing efficiency of rifled firepower had been dealt the Ethiopian forces in earlier encounters with European armies. At the battle of Aroge for example, British volleys from breechloading rifles crushed the Emperor Tewodros' troops, and the British campaign was to end in his death and the destruction of his capital.

Others learned however. Tewodros's successor, Yohannes IV had been backed by the British and received £500,000 pounds worth of military equipment. This was put to good use against a variety of other enemies, including the mahdi's dervish forces from the Sudan, and in inflicting a crushing defeat on an Italian force at Dogali in 1887. Yohannes' successor Menelik continued the military buildup, and by the 1890s the Ethiopians were a tough fighting force on their own ground, capable of mobolizing massive numbers of infantry.

Historian Bruce Vanderoot in Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, notes that some 100,000 Ethiopian soldiers fought at Adowa, wtih about 70,000 of them carrying modern repeating rifles. This was a far cry from the typical African infantry force facing a European opponent with spear, sword and indifferent trade muskets. The Ethiopans were also the only Africans to employ artillery to any extent during the colonial wars. Their "quick- firing Hotchkiss artillery forced the surrender of an Italian fort in the run-up to the battle of Adowa, and actually outgunned an Italian battery at a crucial point during the battle itself." In essence, the Ethiopian army that faced off against the Italians was not a traditional African force with a few guns tacked on to hordes of spear-wielding infantry. It is true that the army did not have the industrial base, elaborated military establishment, and drill of the typical European force. Proficiency however had been gained through long years of campaigning, as the various emperors consolidated power over internal and external foes.

"Taken all together, the Ethiopian Army was formidable by any standards. Its tough fighting men were masters of both skirmish, or ambush warfare adn shock action. A rare combination by African standards, and one that often caused unpleasant surprises for Ethiopia's enemies."^[36]

Such proficiency however masked many internal weaknesses, including poor logistics, and lack of advanced standardization in organization. Indeed at Adowa the Emperor's forces had run out of suplies and were about to leave the field. Such deficiencies still remained, and wouild count heavily against the indigenous forces when faced with a new Italisn invasion under Mussolini in the 1930s. Nevertheless on the day of Adowa, the Ethiopians were supremely ready for the struggle before them.

At Adowa, the Italians were heavily outnumbered. Prior to the encounter the italian commander Bartieri had gone into garrison, but urgings from Rome prompted him to advance. The Ethiopains concentrated at Adowa, considering retreat as supplies ran low. The Italian advcance on Adowa was a confused affair and the Italian columns became separated. Covered by accurate artillery fire, Ethiopians troops launched a fierce attack that took advantage of this vulnerability, rolling up the Italian line and illing almost 3,000 italians and a smaller numberof African soldiers in italian service. A arge nuber of captives were taken, and the Italian government paid some 10 million lire in reparation money after its defeat. Although the Ethiopains were to be less successful or prepared some 40 years later against Mussolini's troops, the victory at Adowa was to become a landmark in African military history.^[37]

[edit] The post-WWII era

[edit] 21st century military challenges

The military challenge in Africa is huge. It is a continent covering some 22% of the world's land area, has an estimated population of some 800 million, is governed by 53 different states, and is made up of hundreds of different ethnicities and languages. According to a 2007 Whitehall Report, (The African Military in the 21st Century, Tswalu Dialogue), some issues affecting African militaries in the 21st century include:^[38]

• The continued need to build military proficiency and effectiveness
• The threat of rebellions, coups and the need for stability
• Unrealistic expectations by the West about that Africa should be doing about continental defence and security issues
• The relevance of West Point sytle or Sandhurst training and thinking to the African context
• The weak and fragmented nature of many collective security type arrangements- such as the AU (Africn Union)weak clones of the NATo concept
• The challenge of terrorism asymetric warfare and how African forces shape themselves to meet them
• The danger of giving militaries a bigger role in nation building and development. In Africa such activity touches on political power.
• The appropriateness of international peaceeeping forces and bureaucracies in parts of Africa, with the mixed record of UN peacekeeping in the COngo or Rwanda raising doubts about their efficacy

[edit] Rise of asymetric warfare and the "technicals" generation

With the exception of a handful of nations such as Egypt, South Africa, and Ethiopia, etc most African militaries are typiclly small and lightly armed comparatively speaking, although many have a limited number of heavy weapons such as tanks. The post-colonial era however has also seen the emergence of numerous non-state military forces, such as terrorists, rebel guerrilla orgaizations, ethnic gangs, and local warlords with various politicl platforms. Such non-state actors add to the instability of the African situation, and the growth of asymetric warfare and terrorism makes the military challenges in Africa more acute.

The military landscape that these asymetric forces operate in, has been shaped by political instability and the massive introduction of inexpensive arms, such as the Chinese and Russian variants of the AK-47, RPG (grenade lanunchers) and light mortars and rocket type weapons. The traditional mobility of the horse and camel is diminshed from earlier times, but the rise of the "technical", a pickup truck fitted with machine guns, RPGs and light mortars has brought a comparative degree of mobility and firepower to African fighting organizations, both state and non-state. While unable to match the major armies openly in intensity of firepower and armor, the "technicals" and the weapons descriped above can cause significant harm when local forces fight on interir lines. The best illustration of this is the American intervention in Somalia, where local fighters.. etc etc... Guerilla organizations, para-militaries and other asymetric elements also continue to make important impacts in local areas- theetening to overthrow local regimes as well as generating widespread misery and economic dislocations in various areas. Such patterns are not unique to Africa and are seen also in sucha reas as the Balkans.

[edit] Major modern forces in Africa

Contrasting with the small scale, more fragmented pattern in many parts of the continent are the modern forces of such major powers as Egypt and South Africa. Well equipped for air and ground fighting, such regional powers represent a significant illustration of the capacity of Africa to match First World military effectiveness. The well-organized Canal Crossing of the Egyptians in the 1973 Yom Kippur War for example, is spoken of with respect by some Western military analysts^[39] and demonstrates the degree to which continental forces have mastered modern technology.

However, the best open-source evaluation of Egyptian military effectiveness, Kenneth Pollack's 'Arabs at War,' remains skeptical of any great capability leaps, arguing at length that the same problems that held the Egyptians back in 1956, 1967, and 1973 remain. The initial success at Suez for example, was comprehensively beaten back by the Israelis, first in the Sinai and then in the Battle of the Chinese Farm, leading to the cutting off of the Egyptian Third Army.^[40]Compared to previous Egyptian performances however, the Suez crossing represented a step forward, and illustrated an increasing sophiscation on the battlefield.^[41]

South Africa's forces likewise are the most powerful in sub-Shahran Africa, and represent another demonstration of how modern arms continue to evolve. Intermediate nations like Ethiopia increasingly grow more sophisticated, adding to the dynamic pattern of change and transformation illustrated from the earliest times on the continent, to the present.

[edit] Summary

Military change and innovation can be both revolutionary and transformational, or slow and incremental. Both patterns may combine at various times and places to make significant changes. It also includes profound changes in outlook and organisation. Military change and innovation in Africa is partially a result of ideas introduced from the outside. This is a normal occurrence in many cultures around the world. As noted above, the nations and empires of Europe borrowd freely from elsewhere, both within and outside of Europe. Outside influences however, are not the only reason for significant change and military innovation in Africa. The growth and consolidation of indigenous empires and states also played a critical role. The military innovatios of Shaka are a case in point, having no need for horses, guns or ships, and they had far-reaching effects from the Cape, into Eastern and Central Africa. The growth of the savannah empires and local hegemonies in places from West africa to the Congo, provides further illustration.

Military innovation is also not a static process, but can change the rankings of peoples in profound ways, overturning old verities. Ancient Britons for example, were considered backward in the Roman era, but as the centuries rolled on, the British (themselves beneficiaries of a hundred different strands and influences) rose to create an empire dominating one-third of the globe. In Africa, the southern part of the continent was of little account in terms of the military arts, until the rise of the Zulu system and its many off-shoots, floowed by the rise of the Boers and modern Douth Africa's military muscle. Ethiopia's effective use of rifles and artillery shows the evolution of military practice in Africa, even as the Zulu example shows a different side of the equation in the pre-gunpowder era. The emergence of the "technicals" in the late 20th and early 21st century, and continued improvements in the armies of major regional powers, further illustrates dynamic patterns of military change within the continent.

[edit] See also

• Military history of Africa
• Military history of the Mali Empire
• Kingdom of Kongo

[edit] References

[edit] Sources