Abdullah Khan

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Abdullah Khan
Born:	1956 (age 51–52) Oruzgan, Afghanistan
Detained at:	Guantanamo
ID number:	950
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status	repatriated
Occupation:	merchant

Abdullah Khan is an Afghani held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] Khan's Guantanamo ISN is 950. The Department of Defense estimates he was born in 1956.

[edit] Background

Khan testified that he was a merchant, from the Northern, Uzbek portion of Afghanistan, who traveled to Southern Kandahar Province in 2003, for the first time since before the Taliban took power. He testified he was threatened, in a Kandahar market place, by locals, who held animosity against him from his earlier visit decades earlier. He felt threatened, so went early to the home of his host Haji Shahzada.

Khan testified that his host invited another man over for dinner and that they spent the evening playing cards. The next day American forces arrested him, his host, and the other guest, based on a denunciation. Khan believed his enemies had falsely denounce him to the Americans, telling them he was the well-known Taliban Governor Khirullah Khairkhwa. Khan believed his enemies collected a large bounty through the American bounty program.

Khan told his Tribunal that his American interrogators in Afghanistan insisted they knew he was lying about his identity. He told his Tribunal they insisted they knew he was really Khirullah Khairkhwa, and that if he didn't confess they would send him to a worse place.

Khan told his Tribunal that he was sent to Guantanamo. He told his Tribunal that the other captives informed him that Guantanamo already held the real Khirullah Khairkhwa, that the real Khirullah Khairkhwa had been captured more than a year before he was captured.

Khan told his Tribunal that when his Guantanamo interrogators also insisted they knew he was Khirullah Khairkhwa he requested that they check the prison roster, and verify they already held the original Khairkhwa. He told his Tribunal that none of his interrogators checked the prison roster, because they kept leveling the accusation against him that he was Khirullah Khairkhwa.

Khan told his Tribunal that the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Tribunal, which had been shown to him just a few days earlier, was the first time the accusation that he was Khirullah Khairkhwa was dropped.

Khan told his Tribunal that the allegations on his Summary of Evidence were brand new to him, that none of the questions his interrogators asked him were related to the allegations.

The main allegations against Khan's host Shahzada, and his fellow guest Nasrullah were that they spent the previous evening with Khirullah Khairkhwa. Shahzada was one of the 38 captives whose Tribunal determined he had not been an enemy combatant after all.Washington Post Khan and Nasrullah's Administrative Review Board hearing recommended their repatriation in 2005.^[2][3]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[4][5] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[6]

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Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah Khan's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on January 5, 2005.^[7] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban:

1. The detainee was a Taliban cook for about two and one half months.
2. The detainee fought for two years in the jihad against the Soviets.
3. The detainee was in charge of ammunition distribution during the Russian jihad.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition:

1. The detainee is alleged to have been a Taliban airfield commander.
2. The detainee may have information regarding attacks against the United States and coalition forces ^[sic] .
3. The detainee is suspected of moving weapons.
4. The detainee discussed plans to conduct attacks against the United States and/or Coalition Forces ^[sic] .
5. United States Forces arrested the detainee with two other detainees in Kandahar Province.

[edit] Transcript

Khan chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[8][9] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published twelve pages of summarized transcripts from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[10] For unexplained reasons the Guantanamo intelligence analysts who managed his case file separated the five pages that recorded the allegations and Khan's response to them from the rest of his testimony.

[edit] Response

In response to the allegatios:^[8]

• Khan denied being a member of the Taliban, or having any sympathy for their ideas.
• Khan acknowledged serving as a cook for the Taliban. He offered the following account of how he came to be a cook:

I came from the province of Oruzgan, Kandahar ^[sic] for labor type work. There were fifty people harvesting the grapes. They came and surrounded us and the handcuffed us, like the draft, and took us with them. I had no choice and I had no power because that was their government. Just like how the Americans brought me, it was exactly the same thing they did to me. When they took us to their center, they asked me to take a weapon and fight for them. I told them I was scared, I cannot fight and I don't have the ability to fight. They said that I had to do something for them. They would not leave me alone like that. I said okay I could be a cook for them. I was very scared and I thought that if I didn't accept the job they would kill me.

• Khan acknowledged fighting the Soviet invaders. He couldn't remember whether he fought the Soviets for two years or two months. Khan acknowledged that he had been responsible for distributing bullets to other anti-Soviet fighters. Khan said the anti-Soviet commander he fought under was Neymatullah.
• Khan offered a long account of his capture and hand-over to American forces. Khan had worked in the area where he was captured prior to the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan. A year after the Karzai administration took over the administration of Afghanistan Khan returned to that area, for the first time since the Taliban took power, to sell produce at a large open-air market. Khan described meeting two men he described as the murderers of two of his family members, who he felt were trying to intimidate him. Khan said he decided to proceed directly to the home of Haji Shahzada, a well off landowner he had worked for in his youth, who had invited him to spend the night at his house. Khan believed that these men played a role in the false denunciations that lead to his capture.
• Khan denied having any information regarding attacks on the United States.
• Khan responded to the allegation that he was suspected of moving weapons:

When and where? Once they told me it was the time of the Russians. I don't know when and where. Where did this come from.

• Khan denied discussing plans to attack the United States. He had spent the evening prior to his capture having dinner and playing cards with his host Shahzada and some friends of his.

[edit] Testimony

• Khan explained that he was not Khirullah Khairkhwa, the Governor of Herat. The bounty hunters who sold him to the US said he was Khairkhwa, in order to get a higher price for him.
• Khan explained that he was a shop-keeper. He said he had a limited association with Haji Shahzada , a prominent landowner. Shahzada was also held in Guantanamo, but in another compound. Khan had done a day of grape picking for Shahzada, years prior to 9-11. More recently he had sold Shahzada a dog.
• Khan was arrested while staying at Shahzada'a house in Kandahar, while on a trip ot buy supplies for his shop. He said that this kind of hospitality, among acquaintances, who were from the same area, was not unusual in Afghan culture.
• One of the allegations against Khan was that he was an airfield commander and pilot. Khan replied that he was illiterate, and didn't even know what a pilot was.
• Shahzada submitted a written statement, which Khan's Personal Representative said confirmed Khan's account. When the Department of Defense partially complied with Judge Jed Rakoff's court order they did not include Shahzada's statement. His Personal Representative said he filed a polygraph]] report that he said confirmed Khan's account.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[11]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.^[12] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah Khan's Administrative Review Board.^[13]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought approximately two years in the jihad against the Russians ^[sic] . He was responsible for distributing ammunition.
2. The detainee cooked for the Taliban for approximately two and a half months.
3. New documentation found on the detainee says he is pro-Taliban. He may have shared this information with other detainees.
4. The detainee is suspected of moving weapons.

b. Connections/Associations

1. During the two years the detainee support the jihad against the Russians, his commander was Namatullah Khan.
2. During the two and a half months the detainee cooked for the Taliban, he worked for Mullah Omar's brother who was one of the Taliban ^[sic] Commanders.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. United States Forces arrested the detainee with two other detainees in Kandahar Province.
2. The detainee believes that Mullah Jan (his enemy) betrayed him for money. When the U.S. announced they would pay money in exchange for a Taliban leader, the detainee believes that Jan told the Afghanistan Army and the U.S. that he was a Taliban leader.
3. The detainee states that Mullah Nor Jan is from his village. The detainee's family has been enemies with Jan's family for 30 to 40 years. The feud was from years ago when Jan's family killed two of the detainee's uncles over a land dispute.
4. In the September-October 2001 timefram, a foreign service prepared a list of Arabs and Afghans who were issued visas from the Pakistani Embassy in the United Arab Emirates. The detainee was issued a visa on 15 September 2001.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee denied having any association with the Taliban and denied ever being conscripted by them. After being confronted by the same question about his association with the Taliban, he changed his story and said that he was conscripted by the Taliban and worked as cook [sic] . He said that he did not volunteer and that it was his first and only time he was associated with the Taliban.
b.	The detainee claims that members of the Taliban kidnapped him. He informed the unknown Taliban members that he was not familiar with weapons and could not do anything but cook.
c.	The detainee stated that he did not receive any military training, to [sic] include firing a gun or using explosive devices, and never fired any weapons throughout the Russian [sic] invasion.
d.	The detainee was asked if he had ever worked for the Taliban, killed any coalition soldiers, or participated in the planning of attacks on coalition people. The detainee answered no to all three questions.
e.	The detainee claims that after he returned home to his family from serving with the Taliban he decided to move his entire family to Pakistan to avoid the Taliban.
f.	The detainee stated that he did not know why he was being arrested. He asked why was being taken away and what his crime was. He was not given an answer.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Abdullah Khan chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Recommendations

The recommendations of his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official, were made public on September 4, 2007.^[2][3]

The Administrative Review Board's recommendations quote Abdullah Khan's Assisting Military Officers' report from his Enemy Combatant election form that he declined to attend his Tribunal because he did not want to return to Afghanistan -- that he wanted to live out the rest of his life in Guantanamo.^[2][3]

The recommendations were heavily redacted.^[2][3] It is not clear what the Board recommended. The Board's recommendation was unanimous. But the Department of Defense only made public the recommendations of captives who the Designated Civilian Official had cleared for release or transfer from Guantanamo.

Abdullah Khan's Board's recommendations contained three notable unredacted passages:^[3]

• Recruitment. Members of known terrorist organizations or known or suspected terrorist support organizations recruited the EC.
• (U) Organizational affiliations.. The EC has been a known affiliate of organizations that espouse terrorist and violent acts against the United States and its allies.
• (U) Behavior. The EC's behavior during interrogation and detention do not indicate that he poses a dangerous threat to the U.S. and its allies.

[edit] References

1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b c d} OARDEC (October 21, 2005). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation for ICO ISN 950 page 75. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-07.
3. ^ ^{a b c d e} OARDEC (August 25, 2005). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis for Administrative Review Board decision for ISN 950 page 77-81. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-07.
4. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
5. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
6. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
7. ^ OARDEC (January 5, 2005). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Khan, Abdullah page 80. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-02-26.
8. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement (ISN 950) part 1 pages 59-63. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-26.
9. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement (ISN 950) part 2 pages 14-20. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-26.
10. ^ "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
11. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
12. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
13. ^ OARDEC (July 27, 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Khan, Abdullah pages 78-79. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-07.