Abdul Razak (Guantanamo detainee 1043)

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For other individuals named Abdul Razak, or some variations thereof, see Abdul Razak (disambiguation).

Abdul Razak is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 1043. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate thar he was born in 1958, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[4]

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the US could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Razak's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 26 October 2004.[5][6] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban:
  1. The detainee served as the President of Customs and the Minister of Commerce[7] for the Taliban Government from 1996 until the collapse of the Taliban in 2001.
  2. The detainee was captured on 01 April 2003 by soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) near Zamtu in the Ganda Ab Region. He was turned over to United States Forces later that same day.
  3. When captured by AMF soldiers, the detainee was in possession of a Kalashnikov [sic] rifle.

[edit] Testimony

Razak chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[8] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a seven page summarized transcripts from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[9]

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[10]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.[11] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Razak's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 24 October 2005.[12] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee claimed he fought against the [[Russia]n-backed [sic] Afghanistan Governments of Noor Mohammed Taraki, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal in the Kandahar area beginning in the late 1970's [sic] .
  2. The detainee said that the had stopped fighting and began to work in commerce at the time Najibullah was president of Afghanistan. When the Taliban later gained control, Taliban Commander Hezatullah asked the detainee to join with the Taliban.
  3. As the Taliban Minister of Commerce, the detainee oversaw a fleet of 1700 trucks and shipping vehicles.
  4. The detainee tried to say that he was not the Minister of Commerce but was instead a secretary or assistant to the Minister of Commerce. This is contrary to information the detainee has reported numerous times before.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. Mullah Omar called a meeting in Kandahar. During this meeting the detainee argued for a single tax option that would be fairer for businessmen. The detainee stated that Omar ended up using his suggestions.
  2. In 1999, Omar asked the detainee to be the Taliban Minister of Commerce.
  3. The detianee was able to provide detailed information concerning the relationship between the Taliban Minister of Interior and the Taliban Regional Governors. Taliban Supreme Commander Mullah Omar appointed the Taliban Regional Governors.
  4. In the spring of 2003, Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Usama bin Laden agreed to unite their forces.
  5. The detainee reported that the Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin was the only group he was aware of that may have an active role in attacks on United States interests.
  6. Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990's [sic] , Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in it's Template:Aic attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.
  7. Mullah Omar named Mullah Beradar as a military leader. Beradar was the former Taliban Kabul Corps Commander who served as advisor to the former Taliban Defense Minister.
  8. The detainee, the former Taliban Minister of Commerce, and Mullah Dadullah were appointed as Beradar's deputies.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. At the time of the Coalition attacks on Kabul, the detainee communicated with other members of the Taliban government using a digital satellite phone.
  2. The detainee was identified as one of three Taliban Commanders responsible for the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee on 27 March 2003.
  3. According to eyewitnesses, the men who captured an Ecuadorian Red Cross aid worker, Ricardo Munguia, called Mullah Dadullah on their satellite phone and under Dadullah's orders, shot Munguia dead.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to being the Minister of Commerce in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee said he wanted to go back to what he was doing before he was appointed to that position, which was private finance, such as the trading of oil or fruit.

[edit] Transcript

Razak chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[13] In the Spring of 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a nineteen page summarized transcript from his Administrative Review Board.[9]

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Razak's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 23 July 2006.[14] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee claimed that he fought against the Russian-backed Afghanistan governments in the Kandahar, Afghanistan area beginning in the late 1970's [sic] .
  2. The detainee said that by the time of Afghanistan President Najibullah, he had stopped fighting and began to work in commerce. When the Taliban later gained control, the detainee was asked to join the Taliban.
  3. During ARB 1 proceedings, the detainee said that as the Taliban Minister of Commerce, he oversaw a fleet of only 70 to 80 vehicles, since most were looted.
  4. The detainee was identified as one of the three Taliban commanders responsible for the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker on 27 March 2003.
  5. An Afghan official stated that the detainee had been arrested for orchestrating the murder of the International Committee of the Red Cross worker on 27 March 2003.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. Mullah Omar called a meeting in Kandahar. During this meeting, the detainee argued for a single tax option that would be fairer for businessmen. The detainee stated that Omar ended up using his suggestions.
  2. In 1999, Omar asked the detainee to be the Taliban Minister of Commerce.
  3. The former Taliban Kabul Corps Commander, who had served as advisor to the former Taliban Defense Minister, was named military leader by Mullah Omar.
  4. The detainee, who was the former Taliban Minister of Commerce, was appointed as one of the military leader's deputies.
Other Relevant Data
  1. Afghan Military Forces captured the detainee in April 2003 during an encounter between Afghan Military Forces and anti-Afghan government forces. The detainee was turned over to United States Forces on 24 May 2003.
  2. The detainee stated that when he was detained by Afghan military forces, he provided them with his brother's name instead of his real name. The detainee stated that after his arrest, the soldiers took him to see the local mayor.
  3. The detainee stated that his uncle gave him a Kalashnikov rifle and assisted him to avoid being captured. The detainee stated that four or five military members caught the detainee and insisted that because he had a weapon he had to meet with the commander.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to being the Minister of Commerce in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee said he wanted to go back to what he was doing before he was appointed to that position, which was private finance, such as trading of oil or fruit.
b.

During ARB 1 proceedings, when questioned about the International Committee [sic] Red Cross worker's murder, the detainee stated he was in the custody of the governor of Kandahar, 60 to 70 miles away. The detainee stated the governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan told him Mullah Satar killed the worker and was hiding in the mountains.
c.

During ARB 1 proceedings, when questioned why the detainee was arrested and sent to Cuba and the other officials weren't, the detainee stated that he was not from their tribe. The detainee stated that Defense Minister, Public Works Minister and former governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan were arrested, among others, but were released because of their tribal affiliations.

[edit] Transcript

Abdul Razak participated in his second Review Board hearing.[15] In September 2007 the Department of Defense published an eleven page summarized transcript from his secondAdministrative Review Board.[9]

[edit] Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[16][17] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on 19 December 2006.

[edit] References

  1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  5. ^ OARDEC (26 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- name redacted (published March 2005) pages 45. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  6. ^ OARDEC (26 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Razak, Abdul (published September 2007) pages 37. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  7. ^ The phrase President of Customs and the Minister of Commerce
  8. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 39-45. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  9. ^ a b c "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
  10. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  11. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
  12. ^ OARDEC (24 October 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Razak, Abdul pages 59-61. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  13. ^ OARDEC (December 16, 2005). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 1043 pages 64-82. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  14. ^ OARDEC (23 July 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Razak, Abdul pages 42-43. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  15. ^ OARDEC (31 July 2006). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 1043 pages 38-48. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  16. ^ OARDEC (19 December 2006). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 1043 page 65. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  17. ^ OARDEC (31 July 2006). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 1043 pages 66-73. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.