Abdul Rahman al-Amri

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Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir Al Amri (Arabic: عبدالرحمن العمري‎) (April 17, 1973 — May 30, 2007) was a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] Al Amri's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 199. The Department of Defense reports that Al Amri was born on April 17, 1973, in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.

Press reports identified Al Amri as a Saudi that the DoD reported had committed suicide on May 30, 2007.[2][3][4]

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 199 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

AL AMRI, ABDUL RAHMAN MA ATH THAFIR Abdul Rahman Ma ath Thafir Al Amri

  • Captive 199 was identified as Abd al-Rahman Ma'adha Dhafir al-Hilala Al Umari on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 September 2004.[5]
  • Captive 199 was identified as Abdul Rahman Ma ath Thafir Al Amri on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board, on 6 October 2005, and on the first two official lists of captives, released on April 20, 2006 and May 15, 2006.[1][6][7]
  • Captive 199 was identified as Abd Al Rahman Maadha Dhafir Al Hilala Al Umari on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board.[8]
  • Captive 199 was identified as Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir (al Umari) Al Amri on four official lists of captives' names released in September 2007.[9][10][11][12]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[13][14] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[15]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abd al-Rahman Ma'adha Dhafir al-Hilala Al Umari's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 September 2004.[5] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of al Qaida:
  1. The detainee stated it was his duty to fight for Jihad.
  2. The detainee has personal knowledge of al Qaida operatives in Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee began his travel to Afghanistan in September 2001.
  4. The detainee's travels took him from Jordan to Damascus, Syria; then to Tehran, Iran before reaching Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan.
  5. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Kabul where he relinquished his passport and belongings before leaving for the front lines to fight.
  6. The detainee was identified as having the alias Abu Anas.
  7. The detainee was identified as the person responsible for providing a movie that provided all the details on how the USS Cole was attacked and the explosives that were used.
  8. The detainee was identified as Abu Anas, a person responsible for providing a movie regarding the 11 September 2001 attacks.
b. The detainee participated in hostile operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee was trained in the Saudi Arabian Army on anti-tank-weapons, artillery, and light weapons.
  2. The detainee fought in Tora Bora.
  3. The detainee admits carrying an AK-47 while retreating from Baghram, Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee surrendered to the Pakistani Police.

[edit] Transcript

Al Amri chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[16]

[edit] Captive 199's statement

The Department of Defense did not release a transcript from the unclassified session of his Tribunal. The Department of Defense did release a two page document entitled: "Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement.

The final paragraph of the document is an authentication, signed by the Tribunal's President:

I certify the material contained in this transcript is a true and accurate summary of the testimony given during the proceedings.

The first paragraph of the document stated:

The Personal Representative provided the following statement on behalf of the detainee:

The rest of the document consisted of brief paraphrases as captive 199's responses to the allegations.

  • Captive 199 acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan.
  • Captive 199 acknowledged seeing Osama bin Laden, from a distance.
  • Captive 199 acknowledged going by the name "Abu Anas" while in Afghanistan. But he said he never finished school, there were other foreigners who used the same pseudonym, and he stated it must have been one of them who was responsible for the video about the the USS Cole bombing.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Rahman Ma ath Thafir Al Amri's first annual Administrative Review Board, on October 6, 2005.[7] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. A person who met the detainee at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan states that the detainee's job entailed being in charge of the media in Kandahar, Afghanistan. This person believes the detaiene worked for Usama Bin Laden because, if important people were around, the detainee would be with them. The same source recalls seeing the Detainee in Tora Bora during the time period that America was bombing that area.
  2. The detainee stated his loyalties while in Afghanistan belonged to Abd Ess Alam al Tabuqui, because Tabuqui was his leader at the time. The detainee claimed presently that his loyalties belong exclusively to Allah, God Almighty.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was in the Saudi Army for 6 years and received training from U.S. military personnel on the Dragon missile system shortly after Operation Desert Storm.
  2. The detainee's occupation prior to going on Jihad was a soldier with the equivalent U.S. Army rank of Corporal. The detainee was a crewmember of the TOW missile, anti-tank artillery.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee's brother served in the Saudi Army for the last 20 years as an aviation supply officer.
  2. A senior al Qaida commander said he saw the detainee at the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse in 2000. This source saw the detainee again in 2000 in the Kandahar, Afghanistan guesthouse and claimed that the detainee appeared to be a new Mujahideen member who was in Afghanistan for training.
  3. The detainee had knowledge of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution and had limited hearsay information of a future attack on the U.S., which was planned to occur on 12 Feb 2002.
  4. The detainee stated that no one knew the nature of the upcoming 9/11 attacks. The detainee heard thatAbu Hafs al Moritani had a disagreement with Usama Bin Laden regarding upcoming attacks on the U.S., but the detainee did not know the nature of the attacks.
  5. The detainee encountered Usama Bin Laden on two separate occasions while in Tora Bora.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee used to be a heavy hashish and heroin user. The detainee became tired of this life and felt there was some higher purpose, so in the late 1990's [sic] , he quit using drugs and decided on his own to go on the Hajj. During the Hajj, the detainee learned that the life he led was not the correct path and he decided to turn his life around. The detainee's friends were amazed at his life change.
  2. After going to the Hajj in 2000, the detainee decided to leave the Army. The detainee returned to his Muslim faith and frequented a mosque in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia where he met a scholar who advised him to go to Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee initially wanted to participate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but he was not allowed to enter the country (country not specified in document). Instead, he went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. The detainee fought with the Taliban for eleven months.
  4. The detainee was motivated to go on Jihad by the death of a Palestinian your killed by Israeli soldiers. A Saudi Arabian national at a mosque in Tabuk recruited the detainee. The detainee stated that he joined Jihad for religious reasons, motivation by the media, Allah's promise of 72 virgins and paradise in heaven.
e. Detainee Actions and Statements
  1. The detainee traveled from Tabuk, Saudi Arabia to Jordan by taxi and remained there for two days. He continued travel to Damascus, Syria by land, and then traveled by plane to Tehran, Iran. He was instructed to cross into Afghanistan by telling the Afghani border guards that he wanted to assist the Taliban in Jihad. The detainee met with an Afghani Taliban leader who sent the detainee to a Jihad school in Kandahar, where the detainee was interrogated to ensure that he was not a spy. The detainee was then sent to the Kart Barwan guesthouse where he gave his passport and 7000 Saudi Riyals (approximately $1900 USD) to the Amir of the guesthouse.
  2. The detainee admits he carried an AK-47 while he and others were desting for Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he hoped to avoid being captured or killed.
  3. The detainee stated his occupation at time of capture was a Mujahideen soldier in Afghanistan. The detainee had held this occupation for approximately 10 months.
f. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee attended al Mahad al Almi Institute of Science and was expelled during his third year.
  2. Pakistani police captured the detainee.
  3. The detainee was transferred from Kohat, Pakistan to United States custody on 31 Dec 2001.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

When asked about the event on 11 September 2001 and the devastation that the World Trade Center attacks caused, the detainee was very upset that so many civilians were killed. The detainee believes that as a fighter it is unfair to kill civilians. If someone came at the detainee with a weapon then he would fight but he would not kill any civilians or unarmed individuals. The detainee went to fight for Jihad because it is every good Muslim's duty.
b.

The detainee provided the interrogator with whatever information he or she asked for. The detainee has been interviewed many times and fears that everyone will think he is helping the Americans. Other detainees constantly ask detainee what is going on.
c.

The detainne never gave bayat to Usama Bin Laden explaining that he only wanted to be a fighter. By giving bayat to Usama Bin Laden, the detainee might be pulled off the front line for other duties.
d.

The detainee is very cooperative and tries to give an explanation with every answer.
e.

In response to allegations that the detainee is responsible for providing a movie detailing the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks, the detainee believes it is another individual with the same name as the detainee's who made the movies.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board.[8] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
1.

The detainee quit using drugs and went on the Hajj on his own during the late 1990s, when he learned the life he lead was not the correct path and decided to turn his life around.
2.

The detainee was motivated to go on jihad by the death of a Palestinian youth killed by Israeli soldiers. A Saudi Arabian national at a mosque in Takuk recruited the detainee. The detainee stated he joined jihad for religious reasons, motivation by the media, Allah's promise of 72 virgins and paradise in heaven.
3.

The detainee initially wanted to participate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but he was not allowed to enter the country. Instead, the detainee went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. The detainee fought with the Taliban for eleven months.
4.

The detainee admits he carried a Kalashnikov rifle while he and many others were heading for Jalalabad, Afghanist, where he hoped to avoid being captured or killed.
5.

The detainee stated his loyalties while in Afghanistan belonged to his Mujahedin leader at the time. The detainee claimed that presently his loyalties belong exclusively to Allah, God Almighty.
b. Training
1.

The detainee attended al Mahad al Almi Institute of Science in Saudi Arabia and was expelled during his third year.
2.

The detainee was in the Saudi army for nine years and received training from United States military personnel on the Dragon missile system shortly after Operation Desert Storm.
3.

The detainee's occupation prior to going on jihad was a soldier with the equivalent United States Army rank of Corporal. The detainee was a crewmember of the Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile anti-tank artillery.
c. Connections/Associations
1.

A senior al Qaida operative said he saw the detainee at the Kabul, Afghanistan guest house in 2000. This senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee again in 2000 in the Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house and claimed that the detainee appeared to be a new Mujahed who was in Afghanistan for training.
2.

The detainee had knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States prior to their execution and had limited hearsay information of a future attack on the United States, which was planned to occur on 12 February 2002.
3.

The detainee encountered Usama bin Laden on two separate occasions while in the Tora Bora region, approximately during the beginning of December 2001.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

When asked about the events on 11 September 2001 and the devastation that the World Trade Center attacks caused, the detainee was very upset that so many civilians were killed. The detainee believes, as a fighter, it is unfair to kill civilians. If someone came at him with a weapon then the detainee would fight, but he would not kill any civilians or unarmed individuals. The detainee went to fight for jihad because it is every good Muslim's duty.
b.

The detainee never gave Bayat to Usama bin Laden explaining that he only wanted to be a fighter. By giving Bayat to Usama bin Laden, the detainee might be pulled off of the front line for other duties.
c.

According to a senior al Qaida detainee the oaths of allegiance, or Bayat, al Qaida member swore to Usama bin Laden are a spiritually binding commitment to obey the leader and his organization and are patterend after the oath of allegiance that early Muslims swore to Muhammad and his successors. The senior al Qaida detainee said al Qaida was the first jihadist group to use this concept as a mechanism for maintaining organizational command and control.
d.

The detainee provided the interrogator with whatever informatin he was asked for. The detainee has been interviewed many times and fears that everyone will think he is helping the Americans. Other detainees constatnly ask him what is going on.
e.

On 6 April 2002, the detainee advised the interviewers to warn the guards that they should take extra precautions during the move because some of the detainees are feeling that they have nothing to lose and are waiting for a time to cry out. The detainee was aware that some other detainees felt that they would rather die than live the way they were living, and some of the detainees would not care about taking someone else with them when they die.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir Al Amri chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Hunger striker

The Associated Press reported that Al Amri had participated in several hunger strikes.[17] According to AP Al Amri weighed 150 pounds when he was transferred to Guantanamo, and his weight dropped to 90 pounds during the 2005 hunger strike. They reported that another Guantanamo captive had reported that al Amri had been participating in a hunger strike as recently as March 2007. He had been force-fed with a nasal tube.[18]

[edit] Reported to have died May 30, 2007

The US Southern Command asserted that a Saudi captive had committed suicide on May 30, 2007.[19][20][21] Initially the DoD withheld his identity.

Early on May 31, 2007 Saudi authorities identified the dead man as Abdul Rahman Maadha al-Amry.[22]

The Associated Press reported, at noon May 31, 2007, that Al-Amry has been identified as one of the "high-value detainees", held in Camp 5.[2][3]

The Miami Herald, citing sources with inside knowledge of the case, reports that the dead man was Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir Al Amri.[4] Their report identified Al Amri as one of the Guantanamo captives who was never allowed to meet with an attorney. The report quotes Al Amri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, where he pointed out that if he had truly been a jihadist dedicated to killing Americans he could have done so when he was receiving military training in Saudi Arabia from American advisors. The article also quoted Al Amri's denial that he had been involved in making a video about the USS Cole bombing.

Other newspaper reports commented on the timing of the death, pointing out that it was almost a year after the three deaths of June 10, 2006, and that both incidents followed a new commandant being assigned to JTF-GTMO, and both incidents occurred shortly before the convening of a military commission.[23][24][25][26]

[edit] Press reports

Department of Defense documents released in September 2007 revealed that al Amri had warned camp authorities in 2002 that conditions at the camp were driving captives to the brink of suicide.[27]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ a b "U.S.: Dead Detainee Was of High Value", Central Florida News, Thursday, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  3. ^ a b "U.S.: Guantanamo Suicide Was "High-Value" Inmate", Stratfor, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  4. ^ a b Carol Rosenberg. "Dead Gitmo captive was Saudi military veteran", Miami Herald, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  5. ^ a b OARDEC (21 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Umari, Abd al-Rahman Ma'adha Dhafir al-Hilala pages 12-13. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  6. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  7. ^ a b OARDEC (October 6, 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Amri, Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir pages 41-44. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-08.
  8. ^ a b OARDEC (June 21, 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Umari, Abd Al Rahman Maadha Dhafir Al Hilala pages 7-9. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-08.
  9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  10. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  11. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  12. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  13. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  14. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  15. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  16. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir Al Amri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 21-22
  17. ^ Ben Fox. "Apparent Gitmo Suicide Was Saudi Veteran", Washington Post, Thursday, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  18. ^ "Guantanamo 'suicide' inmate named", BBC News, Friday, June 1, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-6-1. 
  19. ^ Michael Sung. "Guantanamo detainee dead in suspected suicide", The Jurist, Thursday, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  20. ^ "Gitmo Detainee Apparently Kills Himself", Associated Press, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  21. ^ "Detainee Death at Guantanamo Bay", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), June 1, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-09-27. 
  22. ^ Michael Melia. "Saudi Arabian Guantanamo detainee dies in apparent suicide", San Diego Union Tribune, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  23. ^ Michael Melia. "U.S.: Dead Detainee Was of High Value", Casper Star Tribune, Thursday, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  24. ^ "Saudi Arabian Guantanamo detainee dies in apparent suicide", Boston Herald, Thursday, May 31, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  25. ^ Jane Sutton. "Guantanamo detainee dies of apparent suicide", Toronto Star, May 30, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  26. ^ "Gitmo detainee apparently kills himself", Miami Herald, May 30, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-05-31. 
  27. ^ "AP NewsBreak: Saudi warned before suicide that some at Guantanamo 'would rather die'", International Herald Tribune, September 19, 2007.