Abdul Aziz Al Matrafi

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Abdallah Aiza Al Matrafi
Born: July 12, 1964(1964-07-12)
Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Detained at: Guantanamo
Alias(s): Abdullah Alalmatrafi,
Abdul Aziz al-Matrafi,
Abu Abdel Aziz
ID number: 5
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Abdallah Aiza Al Matrafi is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 005. He was born on July 12, 1964 in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 5 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdallah Aiza Al Matrafi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on October 28, 2004.[7][2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban and al Qaida:
  1. The detainee established the al Wafa non-governmental organization in Afghanistan.
  2. The al Wafa organization has been identified as a terrorist organization on the U.S. State Department's Terrorist Exclusion List.
  3. The detainee was the director[8] of al Wafa.
  4. The nongovernmental organization 'Wafa' reportedly is believed to possibly be a terrorist organization and may have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahadeen.
  5. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden who provided a letter of introduction to assist the detainee in getting established.
  6. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden in the Summer of 2001, in Usama's house.
  7. The detainee's goal to provide funds to Usama Bin Laden for training, caused disagreement within al Wafa.
  8. The detainee admitted al Wafa smuggled individuals into Afghanistan after 11 September 2001.
  9. The detainee was visited by a member of al Qaida responsible for the protection of Usama Bin Laden at his home in Saudi Arabia.
  10. The detainee had numerous conversations with Mullah Omar[9].
  11. The detainee admitted al Wafa purchased vehicles and equipment for the Taliban.
  12. The detainee negotiated a deal that allowed the Taliban to direct al Wafa's activities.
  13. One of the detainee's known aliases was on an email list of captured suspected al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.
  14. The detainee sent his wife and family out of Afghanistan in August 2001.
  15. The detainee chose an[10] Islamic extremist and al Qaida associate as his successor as director[11] of al Wafa.
b. The detainee supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces:
  1. The detainee purchased weapons, including AK-47's [sic] , RPG's [sic] and anti-aircraft weapons, to support the Taliban.
  2. The detainee attempted to purchase a $500,000 weapon system for the Taliban.
  3. The detainee was the leader of a group of approximately 400 Arab fighters.

[edit] Testimony

There is no record that Al Matrafi participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Founder of Al Wafa

Guantanamo detainee Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil did participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The allegations against Al Zamil state that he, together with Al Matrafi, and another individual named Samar Khand, were the founders of Al Wafa.[12]

While there is no transcript from Al Matrafi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, he gave a statement for Ahmed Abdul Qader, and declined to give one for Mohammed Sulaymon Barre. There is no indication that Samar Khand was present in Guantanamo.

In January 2005 the Department of Defense complied with a Freedom of Information Act request, and published the first of 507 memoranda that each summarized the unclassified allegations against a single detainee. One of the memoranda published in January 2005 contained the allegations against another detainee described as a founder of Al Wafa.[13] If Samar Khand was not present in Guantanamo, and if the author of these allegations agreed with the author of the allegations against Al Zamil, over the identity of the founders of Al Wafa, then these would be the allegations against Al Matrafi.

a. Detainee is associated with al-Qaida.
  1. The detainee admits establishing the al-Wafa organization with detainee ############# ############## ############ ############ ############# ############## ############ ############ ############### ############## ############# ########### ######### ########### ############ ##########
  2. The WAFA organization is listed on Executive Order 13224 as an entity that commits or poses a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism.
  3. Detainee was closely associated with ######################### and admits that ############# was the spokesperson for al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden.
  4. Detainee stayed at a safe house for several weeks in Pakistan while waiting to flee the country. He was arrested at the house with sixteen other persons by Pakistani authorities.
  5. Detainee had prior knowledge of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S.

[edit] President of Al Wafa

Somalian detainee Mohammed Sulaymon Barre requested Al Matrafi as a witness at his CSRT to testify that he had no association with the Al Wafa charity.[14] He said other detainees had told him Al Matrafi was the President of Al Wafa. Al Matrafi declined to be a witness.

[edit] Witness for Ahmed Abdul Qader

Al Matrafi did agree to give a statement that he had never met Ahmed Abdul Qader.[15] Al Matrafi was listed as a "director" of Al Wafa in Qader's CSRT.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[16]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.[17] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdallah Aiza Al Matrafi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 1 November 2005.[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. From 1987 to 1989, the detainee was a rifleman in the Mujahideen Army in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee participated in the first jihad in Afghanistan fighting the Russians on the front line for one and a half years.
  3. After the first jihad in Afghanistan, the detainee was at Sharm Shar in Jalalabad, Afghanistan along with several future al Qaida leaders including Usama Bin Laden.
  4. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee met with Sheikh Abdallah Al-Rayis who proposed that the detainee establish the Al-Wafa office and open religious institutes in Afghanistan.
  5. Shaykh 'Abdalah Al-Rayyis [sic] was Al-Wafa's founder and main financier.
  6. Al-Wafa has been identified as a terrorist organization on the United States Department of State's Terrorist Exclusion List.
  7. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan, by way of Syria and Iran, to establish Al-Wafa in Afghanistan.
  8. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee stayed at a Taliban guesthouse in Herat, Afghanistan.
  9. In 1421 Hijri, the detaiene traveled to Kandahar where he met the Afghan Minister of Education. The detainee returned to Saudi Arabia to discuss the outcome of his trip to Afghanistan with Sheikh Al-Rayis.
  10. In 2001, the detianee established Al-Wafa offices in Kabul and Herat, Afghanistan.
  11. The detainee stated that he headed the Al-Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  12. The detainee admitted that he was director of the Al-Wafa organization in Afghanistan.
  13. The detainee stated, "Nothing happened in Al-Wafa without my knowledge."
  14. In 2001, an Al-Wafa employee met with a microbiologist inside the Kandahar, Afghanistan, Al-Wafa office and authorized four to five thousand United States dollars for the purchase of medical laboratory equipment.
  15. The microbiologist was developing anthrax for al Qaida.
  16. In approximately March 2001, the detainee was approached to discuss potential Al Wafa funding for Taliban Ministry of Communication and Electricity projects in Afghanistan.
  17. In approximately August 2001, Al-Wafa purchased vehicles and heavy equipment for the Taliban.
  18. After September 11 2001, Al-Wafa arranged for several individuals from Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to enter Afghanistan through Iran at the Zahedan border.
  19. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa assisted those who wanted to enter Afghanistan via Iran.
  20. The detainee paid others to transport Arabs and Russians from Iran to Afghanistan.
  21. The detainee provided a cover to smuggle Usama Bin Laden operatives and sympathizers to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. The operative crossed the border into Afghanistan using an Al-Wafa cover.
  22. Al-Wafa provided employment opportunities in its three offices in Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat for individuals who are connected to the Usama bin Laden network.
  23. Basic military training with AK-47's [sic] and rocket-propelled grenades was conducted inside the Al-Wafa offices in Kabul.
  24. Al-Wafa provided financial support to al Qaida after the United States attack in Afghanistan.
  25. In approximately November 2001, the detainee attempted to purchase a missile.
  26. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa was purchasing the rocket to use against the Northern Alliance's attack on the Taliban.
  27. Approximately two days prior to Ramadan, 2001, the detainee traveled with three other Al Wafa members to Khowst and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and then crossed the border into Pakistan.
  28. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police at the Lahore, Pakistan Airport on 11 December 2001.
  29. The detainee was identified by a foreign government agency as a high priority due to the detainee's recruiting activity.
b. Training
  1. The detainee attended basic military training in Turkham, Afghanistan. He received AK-47 adn rocket propelled grenade training.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. During Ramadan 2000 (27 Nov to 27 Dec 2000), the detainee met with Usama Bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan and discussed opening Al-Wafa offices in Afghanistan. The detainee delivered a verbal [sic] letter [sic] from several sheikhs, including Sheikh Al-Rayis, to Usama Bin Laden. Usama Bin Laden gave the detainee a letter to assist him in establishin religious institutes.
  2. In approximately July 2001, the detainee met with Usama Bin Laden at Usama Bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. They discussed the disagreements between Al-Wafa and al Qaida.
  3. The detainee's name was found on a computer in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.
  4. While the detainee was head of Al-Wafa in Afghanistan, he had a number of conversations with Mohammed Omar, a.k.a. Mullah Omar.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee stated that he would lead his tribe in exacting revenge against the Saudi Arabian and United States governments, and he would kidnap four to five Americans at a time and sever their heads.
  2. The detainee states, "Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world."
e. Detainee Actions and Statements
  1. The detainee stated, "I swear to God what you are doing, you will pay. You will experience a greater tragedy than September 11th."
  2. The detainee shouted, "Yes I am a member of al Qaida and I took orders from Usama Bin Laden." The detainee added, "I am a terrorist. Yes I am very proud to be a terrorist."
f. Other Relevant Data
  1. A former Al-Wafa employee identified the detainee as the director of Al-Wafa for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  2. A former Al-Wafa employee identified the detainee as the Kabul-based director of Al-Wafa operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  3. An individual stated it was common knowledge that Al-Wafa delivered weapons and supplies to Afghan fighters in Tora Bora. Al Wafa provided money of al currencies, including United States dollars to those fighters who needed it.
  4. A former Al-Wafa volunteer stated that he gave his passport and money to the detainee for safekeeping at the Al-Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  5. The detainee stated that there is no relation between the al Qaida and al Wafa organizations, explaining that al Qaida disliked Al-Wafa and both organizations were in disagreement.
  6. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa disagreed with the five principals of al Qaida.
  7. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa has no connection with any terrorist organization in any form.
  8. An al Qaida facilitator identified the detainee as having problems with Usama Bin Laden because the detainee had come to do charity work in Afghanistan and was funded by the Saudi royal family, who Usama Bin Laden rejected and denounced. The detainee would take Saudis from al Farouq and try to send them back to Saudi Arabia.
  9. Al Farouq was an al Qaida funded training camp.
  10. The detainee stated that there is no relation between the al Qaida and Al-Wafa organizations, explaining that al Qaida disliked Al-Wafa and both organizations were in disagreement.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he is not an enemy of the United States and it is a shame that he is being detained.
b.

The detainee stated he was against the September 11, 2001 bombings of the World Trade Center because those who died in the bombings were innocent civilians.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah Alalmatrafi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 19 October 2006.[4] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stated that from 1987 to 1989 he was a rifleman in the Mujahedin Army in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee stated he attended a lunch with Usama bin Laden and Abu Hafs at Usama bin Laden's residence in Matar, Afghanistan to discuss the support the detainee was expected to provide for al Qaida.
  3. The detainee stated al Wafa purchased twelve Land Cruiser vehicles for the Taliban.
  4. The detainee stated that AK47 and rocket propelled grenade training was conducted at the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  5. A source stated it was common knowledge that al Wafa delivered weapons and supplies to Afghan fighters in Tora Bora, Afghanistna. Al Wafa also provided money of all currencies, including United States Dollars, to those fighters who needed it.
  6. Al Wafa began providing financial support directly to al Qaida after the United States attack on Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee admitted he took orders from Usama bin Laden.
  8. The detainee admitted he was a member of al Qaida. The detainee also stated he is a terrorist, and very proud to be a terrorist.
b. Training
The detainee received AK47 and rocket propelled grenade training in Turkham, Afghanistan.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. After the Jaji battle, the detianee was at Sharm Shar in Jalalabad, Afghanistan with several senior al Qaida operatives including Usama bin Laden.
  2. The detainee returned to Afghanistan during Ramadan in 2000 to meet with Usama bin Laden to discuss opening al Wafa offices in Afghanistna.
  3. The detainee stated that he initially met Abu Hafs in 1989, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee advised that two months prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, he held another meeting with Usama bin Laden. The meeting was held at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the purpose of the meeting was to discuss unresolved issues from the first meeting with Usama bin Laden, concerning disagreements between al Wafa and al Qaida.
  5. The detainee admitted that he was Director of the al Wafa organization in Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee's name is on a list of incarcerated associates found on a computer hard-drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee attempted to purchase a computerized laser guided missile system and missile from a Pakistani arms dealer in Peshawar, Pakistan with assistance from an individual in the Ukraine for 500,000 United States Dollars.
  2. The detainee stated he wanted 5,000,000 to 20,000,000 United States Dollars payment for his captivity. The detainee then stated that he would lead his tribe in exacting revenge against the Saudi Arabian and United States governments, and he would kidnap four to five Americans at a time and sever their heads.
  3. The detainee stated that I swear to God what you are doing, you will pay. You will experience a greater tragedy than 11 September 2001.
  4. The detainee stated that Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee stated that from 2000 to 2001 he was the National Director for the al Wafa human rights organization in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee explained that the budget for the al Wafa organization was approximately 2,000,000 United States Dollars a year in Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee noted his escape from Afghanistan began in mid-Ramadan from Kabul, Afghanistan and ended in Lahore, Pakistan where he attempted to board a flight to Saudi Arabia and was arrested.
  4. The detainee stated that nothing happened in al Wafa without his knowledge.
  5. The detainee stated he was aware of plans to attack a water dam or a nuclear plant in the United States where hundreds of thousands of Americans will be killed. The detainee advised his associates to change their United States Dollars into British Pounds because the United States Dollar will be worthless.
  6. The detainee explained that he provided money to purchase twenty-five anti-chemical masks from Peshawar, Pakistan.
  7. The detainee advised that al Wafa smuggled individuals into Afghanistan via Iran. Al Wafa worked wiht an Iranian-based facilitator.
  8. Another detainee identified the detainee as the man who paid him to assist in the transporting of both Arabs and Russians from Iran to Afghanistan.
  9. The detainee advised that a Kuwaiti group of five to seven people entered Afghanistan via Iran under the cover of the al Wafa relief organization.
  10. The detainee stated that he was the founder of al Wafa, a humanitarian, non-governmental organization.
  11. The detainee advisded that there is no relation between al Qaida and the al Wafa organization.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that he did not fight with the Mujahedin in Afghanistan and did not receive weapons training in Afghanistan.
b.

The detainee stated that he has never supported Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, not even with one dollar, and as head of al Wafa, he has never handled large sums of money.
c.

The detainee stated that he has never met Usama bin Laden.
d.

The detainee stated al Wafa has no connection with any terrorist organization in any form. The detainee stated that he is not an enemy of the United States, and it is a shame that he is being detained. The detainee stated that he was against the 11 September 2001 bombings of the World Trade Center because those who died in the bombings were innocent civilians.

[edit] Repatriation

Al Matrafi was one of ten Saudi captives in Guantanamo repatriated on December 29, 2007.[18][19]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), United States Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ a b OARDEC (October 28, 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Matrafi, Abdallah Aiza (published September 2007) pages 5-6. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-22.
  3. ^ a b OARDEC (1 November 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Matrafi, Abdallah Aiza pages 3-7. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-22.
  4. ^ a b OARDEC (19 October 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Alalmatrafi, Abdullah pages 7-9. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-19.
  5. ^ a b OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Zamel, Adel Zamel Abd Al Mahsen Al Zamel page 90. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-19.
  6. ^ a b OARDEC (10 May 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Zamel, Adel Zamel Abd Al Mahsen page 42-44. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-19.
  7. ^ OARDEC (October 28, 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- name redacted (published March 2005) page 190-191. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-22.
  8. ^ The phrase "the director" was redacted in the version of this document published in March 2005.
  9. ^ The phrase "Mullah Omar" was redacted in the version of this document published in March 2005.
  10. ^ The phrase "chose an" was redacted in the version of this document published in March 2005.
  11. ^ The phrase "his successor as director" was redacted in the version of this document published in March 2005.
  12. ^ documents (.pdf) from Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  13. ^ CSRT Summary of Evidence memoranda (.pdf) published in January 2005, Combatant Status Review Tribunals - page 34
  14. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 30-37
  15. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Ahmed Abdul Qader's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 5-11
  16. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  17. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
  18. ^ P.K. Abdul Ghafour. "10 More Return From Guantanamo", Arab News, December 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-12-29. 
  19. ^ Andy Worthington. "Who Are The Ten Saudis Just Released From Guantánamo?", Huffington Post, January 8, 2008. Retrieved on 2008-04-19.  mirror