Yasim Muhammed Basardah

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Yasim Muhammed Basardah is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] Basardah's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 252.

[edit] Accused of leveling false allegations

Jawad Jabber Sadkhan had a statement from detainee 758 submitted as evidence at his Tribunal.^[2] In his statement detainee 758 identified himself as "Shaker Al Iraqi (Abass Abdou Erromi)". The official record identifies him as Abbas Habid Rumi Al Naely.^[1] He testified that he suspected the accusation against him and detainee 433 were the result of animosity from detainee 111, who he identified as "Ali Abdou Ahtaleb Al Iraqi" and detainee 252, who he identified as "Yassin Basro Al Yamani". The official record shows detainees 111 as Ali Abdul Motalib Awayd Hassan Al Tayeea.^[1] Al Naely says he knew Sadkhan in Afghanistan, and he knew him as a good, peaceloving, family man. Al Naely said that the two men he identified as Sadkhan's accusers did not know him in Afghanistan, and their accusations were complete fabrications.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Basardah chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[3]

[edit] allegations

During his Tribunal Basardah faced the following allegations:^[3]

a. -- The general summary of the allegations that establish an association with terrorism were missing from the transcript. --

1. The detainee admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan in March 2001 for the jihad.
2. The detainee stayed at a Taliban safe house in Quetta, Pakistan during his travel to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stayed at Taliban ^[sic] safe houses in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
4. In April 2001, Usama bin Ladin ^[sic] spoke at one of the Taliban safe houses while the detainee was in residence.
5. The detainee trained at al Farouq training camp.
6. The detainee received training on the [[AK-47|Kalashnikob, Pakistan machine gun ^[sic], explosives, and the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) ^[sic] at the al Farouq camp.
7. Usama Bin Ladin ^[sic] spoke at the al Farouq camp while the detainee was in training.
8. The detainee was at a Taliban house in Kabul, Afghanistan when the U.S. bombing campaign began.

b. -- The general summary of the allegations of hostile activity were missing from the transcript. --

1. The detainee fought on the front lines in Taloqan after his training at al Farouq.
2. The detainee suffered a chest injury while fighting on the front lines.
3. The detainee fled to the Tora Bora region in November 2001.
4. The detainee stayed in a cave with Usama Bin Ladin ^[sic] in Tora Bora.
5. The detainee fled Tora Bora for Pakistan and was captured by the Pakistani military

[edit] opening statement

Basardah's Personal Representative read out the responses Basardah had offered him when they met before his Tribunal:

• Basardah acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan for Jihad.
• Basardah acknowledged staying at the safe houses in Pakistan and Kandahar.
• Basardah acknowledged hearing Osama bin Laden speak at the safehouse in Kandahar and at al Farouq training camp.
• Basardah acknowledged attending al Farouq training camp, and acknowledged being trained to use the AK-47 there. He said, however, that he was not trained to use machine guns, explosives or rocket propelled grenades.
• Basardah acknowledged that he was staying in one of Osama bin Laden's Kabul houses when the US bombing began.
• Basardah acknowledged fighting on the front lines. He acknowledged suffering a chest injury while fighting on the front lines.
• Basardah acknowledged fleeing to the Tora Bora region. Basardah acknowledged seeing Osama bin Laden in a cave in Tora Bora. But he said he was only there for fifteen minutes.
• Basardah acknowledged fleeing to Pakistan where he was captured by the Pakistani military.

[edit] death threats

Basardah's Personal Representative told his Tribunal that Basardah "...has cooperated his entire stay while here. He was actually over in Camp 4 and prior to Ramadan, he was beaten by other detainees who believe he is a spy. He wanted to be moved to this camp. He continues to be cooperative. In the other, he was threatened many times to be killed by other detainees."

Basardah then told his Tribunal that he had just received another death threat the previous Saturday.

[edit] testimony

In answer to questioning by the Tribunal's officers:

• Basardah confirmed that he was heavily influenced by the pay he expected for serving as a fighter.
• Basardah replied that, when he enlisted, he expected to be fighting the Northern Alliance.
• In response to a request Basardah offered this definition of "Jihad":

  "All that I know is that you fight in the name of Allah or for Allah's cause and I all ^[sic] that I know was in becoming a dedicated Muslim is the jihad, to do the jihad. That's all I know. Most of my life, when I was in Saudi Arabia, I spent it in jails because I used to deal in drugs."

• In answer to a question about how he fought on the front line Basardah replied that he was injured his first day. His was a "friendly fire" injury.
• Basardah said that he was injured approximately two weeks before the attacks of September 11, 2001. He hadn't recovered from his wounds enough to return to combat before he was captured.
• In answer to the question, "How do you feel now about jihad?" Basardah replied:

  "When I went to Afghanistan I realized it was not a jihad because the people they were fighting were Muslims too. So it was clear that it wasn't really jihad. When the American forces captured us we knew the truth by then."

• When asked if he would fight jihad again Basardah replied:

  "No, three years is more than enough. That is true, three years, I don't know anything about my family...^[sic]"

The Tribunal President concluded the open session of the Tribunal by assuring Bawazir they "...will pass up through our channels that you are receiving threats here in Camp 5."

Basardah then told the Tribunal that he had requested refugee status because he feared retaliation for offering information on high-level al Qaeda leaders.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Basardah chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[4]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee answered a fatwa issued by Sheikh Hamid al Uqqla ^[sic] and traveled to Afghanistan for the Jihad. ^[sic]
2. The detainee served on the front lines at Taloqan where he was injured.
3. The detainee stayed at the Nebras Arab guesthouse, which was used by fighters headed to training at al Farouq and by Usama bin Laden. ^[sic]
4. The detainee was recruited by Jamaat Tablighi ^[sic], a group that recruits young men for Jihad in Afghanistan. Many of these young men are poor and on drugs. The detainee attended meeting sponsored by Jamaat Tablighi for two months.
5. The detainee attended the Institute of Islamic Studies in Kandahar that supported the fatwa issued by Sheikh Abu Hamoud al Uqqla ^[sic] that called for the brother to fight in Afghanistan against General Massoud and the Northern Alliance.

b. Training: The detainee attended the al Qaida run al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.

c. Connections and Associations

1. The detainee received $100 U.S. dollars from the son of a senior al Qaida operative who came to visit him and other Arabs in a prison near Parachinar, Pakistan.
2. The detainee met Usama bin Laden and listened to him speak words of encouragement and enthusiasm to the fighters who stayed at the Nebras guesthouse.

d. Intent

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to the United Arab Emirates, through Pakistan and then on to Afghanistan.
2. While in prison near Parachinar, ^[sic] Pakistan, the detainee conspired to lie about fighting in Afghanistan and to develop a cover story about teaching the Koran, teaching orphans, finding a wife and helping the poor.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. After two weeks of recovery at a guesthouse, the detainee went to Kabul for further treatment [for] an injury, and then returned to the front lines at Taloqan.
2. The detainee obeyed the order from Usama bin Laden ^[sic] that all Arab fighter should go to Tora Bora.

f. Other Relevant Data The detainee is cooperative and states that he is being honest to his interviewers because he realizes that only by being truthful can he hope to go home.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release of transfer:

• The detainee states that he surrendered to the Pakistani Army after crossing over the border.
• The detainee states that he had no knowledge of plans to kill General Massoud of the Northern Alliance just before the 11 September attacks.
• The detainee states he had no prior knowledge of plans to attack the USS Cole, New York City on 11 September 2001, or of any current or future plans for attack on the United States.
• If released, the detainee states that he would return to his wife in Yemen and would not fight Jihad because he has already fulfilled his one time obligation.

[edit] Basardah's response to the factors favoring detention

• Basardah acknowledged going to Afghanistan, but not to answer Uqqla's fatwa. He didn't hear about Uqqla's fatwa until he arrived in Guantanamo.
• Basardah acknowledged being injured in Taloqan.
• In reply to the accusation that Basardah stayed at the Nebras guesthouse, while waiting for training at the al Farouq training camp he replied:

"Correct, I was sent there by force because that was the only place that would receive Arabs."

• Basardah explained he was with a jihad group, not Jamaat Tablighi. Basardah explained the difference between Jamaat Tablighi and a jihad group. He explained:

"The Tablighi group say that their job is for God only, to notify people about God not to fight. The Jihad groups say it it is about fighting the infidels who enter the Muslim countries."

• Basardah acknowledged attending the Jihad. But he explained that he came just for the monthly 500 Saudi Riyadhs they would send his family.
• Basardah acknowledged that he had once been involved with drugs. He quit using drugs years ago, when he got married.
• Basardah recanted attending the Institute of Islamic Studies in Kandahar. Before he decided to tell the Americans the complete truth he made this up.
• Basardah acknowledged attending the al Farouq training camp, for 21 days. The complete training takes about twice that length of time.
• Basardah corrected the allegation that he received $100 from the son of a senior al Qaida operative who came ot visit him and other Arabs in a prison near Parachinar, Pakistan. He acknowledged receiving $100, but from another detainee, named Hamid Salid Ali, the son of Bashir, who wwas a senior al Qaida commander himself.
• Basardah said he believed Hamid Salid Ali remained in US custody, but he didn't know where.
• Basardah confirmed hearing Osama bin Laden speak at the Nebras guesthouse.
• Basardah corrected the allegation about cover stories. He did develop a cover story, to use in the Pakistani prison, that he was just s cook.
• Basardah's major injuries were burns to his torso and thighs. He did not return to active duty between his injury and the American attacks. He was still recuperating.
• Basardah acknowledged that he did obey an order that all Arab fighters should go to Tora Bora. But that order did not come from Osama bin Laden.
• Basardah confirmed that he had been cooperative his entire stay in Guantanamo, to the point that his life was at risk. He told his board he could not return to Saudi Arabia because a Saudi detainee who had been released back to Saudi Arabia had put out a fatwa against him.

[edit] testimony

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b c} list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ISN 433 -- Testimony from detainee ISN 758, knew each other in Afghanistan, from Jawad Jabber Sadkhan's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - page 156
3. ^ ^{a b} Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Yasim Muhammed Basardah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 9-17
4. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Yasim Muhammed Basardah's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 233