Xinghua Campaign

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Date	August 29, 1945 - September 1, 1945
Location	Xinghua, Jiangsu, China
Result	Communist victory

Combatants

National Revolutionary Army

Chinese Red Army

Commanders

Liu Xiangtu 刘湘图

Strength

7,000

10,000

Casualties

7,000

374

Xinghua Campaign (兴化战役) consisted of two battles fought between the communist New Fourth Army and the former Japanese puppet regime forces, the nationalists. The campaign took place during the Chinese Civil War in the immediately post World War II era, and resulted in a communist victory.

1 Prelude
2 The Nationalists' Strategy
3 The Communists' Strategy
4 Campaign
5 Outcome
6 See also
7 Copyedit

[edit] Prelude

Like the other similar clashes between the Communists and the nationalists in China following WWII, the Xinghua Campaign stemmed from Chiang Kai-shek's realization that his nationalist regime had neither sufficient troops nor transportation to move his army into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Chiang feared that the Communists, who already dominated much of rural China, would further expand their territories by being the first Chinese faction to accept the official Japanese surrender, thus giving control of the regions occupied by Japan to the Communists as well. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their war-time puppet regime not to surrender to the Communists, and furthermore to quell unrest and fight off the Communists until the eventual arrival of the nationalist troops.

One result of Xinghua Campaign was that most of the members of the Japanese-installed puppet regime rejoined the nationalists, who they had deserted following early Japanese victory over the Nationalist army. These former Nationalists consisted mostly of Chinese warlords and their private armies, only nominally under Chiang Kai-shek’s control before and after WWII. The warlords felt no loyalty to a cause greater than their own, and had defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep some of their former power in exchange for their collaboration.

Although the warlords' lack of loyalty and independence from the Nationalist power structure posed a great threat to Chiang, he recognised that they needed to be handled with delicacy. Moving against the warlords would alienate other factions within the nationalist ranks and deprive Chiang of soldiers that could garrison Nationalist territory, freeing up Chiang's own troops to fight the Communists.

[edit] The Nationalists' Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the nationalists would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

Since the former nationalists turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these warlords and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These warlords and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those nationalists who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these warlord would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these warlords and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

[edit] The Communists' Strategy

The communists' strategy was much simpler than that of the nationalists' because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the nationalists. The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the nationalists withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists well deserved to represent China and accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

[edit] Campaign

As Chiang Kai-shek allowed the former nationalists to turn Japanese puppet regime force to rejoin the nationalists, they were given the instruction not to surrender to the communists, but instead, to fight the communists off until the arrival of Chiang’s troops. The city of Xinghua, located in central Jiangsu, was guarded by the nationalists. Japanese puppet regime force rejoined to the nationalists totaling more than 7,000, including the 22nd Division and local security regiments. The communist New Fourth Army was determined to take the city, and massed units from the communists' Central Jiangsu Military District to do the job.

The communist units begun to enter the positions for attack on the city on August 26, 1945, and by August 28, [1945]], they were ready. On August 29, 1945, the first battle of the campaign had begun when the communists started to take nationalist positions in the outskirt of the city, and the defenders were soon forced to abandon their strongholds outside the city wall and driven into the city. At 8:00 PM on August 31, 1945, the assault on the city itself begun, and under the cover of shelling from mountain guns, the enemy soon breached the defense and penetrated into the city. After fierce street fighting, the city fell into the enemy on the next day and the campaign concluded with the end of this second battle.

The entire nationalist garrison of Xinghua was decimated, and out of the 7,000 defenders, around 2,000 were killed. The remaining 5,000, including the commander-in-chief of the city defense, who was also the commander of the nationalist 22nd Division, and Liu Xiangtu (刘湘图) were captured alive by the enemy. They also managed to capture 64 artillery pieces, 122 machine guns, and 3,324 repeating rifles in addition to other weaponry and provisions. The communists' loss was extremely light in comparison: only 49 killed, and 325 wounded (including 40 officers wounded).

[edit] Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the Warlord era|warlords in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the warlord problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

[edit] See also

[edit] Copyedit

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