Viet Cong and NVA strategy and tactics
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This article focuses on the strategy and tactics used by the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong (VC), and NVA/PAVN (Peoples Army-Vietnam/North Vietnamese Army) to defeat their American and South Vietnamese (GVN/ARVN) opponents during the Second Indochina War (better known to Americans as the Vietnam War). The terms VC and NVA will be used here due to their widespread popular usage by both South Vietnamese and American military personnel and civilians.
[edit] Overview
It is clear that during the Second Indochina War (Vietnam War) that VC/NLF and Northern NVA/PAVN operatives and fighters received substantial popular support in some areas, compared with the regime of South Vietnam, which too, it must be noted, enjoyed its own measure of popular support. It is also clear that while both the VC and NVA had distinctive aspects as separate organizations, in terms of their ultimate mission, leadership and military operations, they were clearly manipulated and controlled by the Northern Communist party, the Lao Dong. Throughout the conflict, the two forces were closely linked.[1]Towards the end, crushing losses afflicted the VC/NLF, and while it still retained some local influence in some areas, its ranks were dominated by NVA fillers. The stress of this article is on the VC (Main Force)/NVA forces, from a military standpoint, as opposed to general or political histories, or the massive variety of material covering the American war effort.[2][3]
This writing does not attempt in-depth coverage of political history, anti-war protests, American battles, American equipment, ARVN forces, communist theory, political personalities, or general Vietnamese history. It seeks to fill a missing gap - a ground-level, strategic and tactical view of how communist forces won their war. While political and historical factors that obviously impacted the military effort are referenced, the reader is referred to the articles in the "See Also" section for coverage of these other themes. For general history narratives and controversies relating to what the communist forces should be called see National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and Viet Cong.
[edit] Development of the VC/NVA
The Vietminh period. The formation of the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) lies in the communist dominated resistance to the French- the Vietminh. The history of the Vietminh is well known- including their initial organization and guerrilla battles against the Japanese occupation during WWII, their dedication to Marxism-Leninism (disguised in various ways for public consumption), continual internal war with other rivals (particularly nationalist groups), their growth following the triumph of Mao in China, their expanded mobile and guerrilla operations (particularly in the North), and their final victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu. Yet that victory left a bitter taste for the communist leadership, as Vietnam was partitioned in 1955, and the Southern part of the country saw the accession of staunch anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem.
Formation of the VC and NVA. The expulsion of the French had still left a clandestine organization behind in the South, reinforced by thousands of Southerners that had gone North after the communist victory. This clandestine organization worked for Diem's overthrow and in turn came under heavy pressure by his government. As the Marxist regime under the Lao Dong Party consolidated its often brutal rule over the North, it also sought to also bring the South under its dominion. As early as 1959, the Central Committee of the Party had issued a resolution to pursue armed struggle. It set up a special unit, the 559th Transport Group, to establish way-stations, trails, and supply caches for the movement of men and material into the zone of conflict. In 1960 the Central Committee formed the National Liberation Front (NLF), popularly known as the Viet Cong (VC). The NLF/VC took in not just armed guerillas but served as a broad front for a variety of groups opposed to Diem. In the North, the regime created a regular army from the remnants of the Viet Minh, well equipped with Soviet and Chinese weaponry, the People's Army-Vietnam or PAVN. PAVN forces were more commonly termed the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) by their American and South Vietnamese opponents, and their best units and leaders had already seen almost a decade of continuous combat in the field.[4]
Initial success of the VC/NLF. The heavy pressure brought upon local southern cadres and organization by the Diem regime provoked increasing assistance from the North. Early operations saw heavy southern involvement, as both local recruits and southerners who had moved north after the French War (the "regroupees") returned to fight. Struggling for survival, Diem's regime had caused some damage to the communist cause, but some of his authoritarian methods and cronyism had also alienated a variety of groups in South Vietnamese society. The VC/NLF capitalized on this to expand their base among disaffected elements. By 1965, they were increasingly effective, conducting attacks in regimental size, regularly drubbing Diem's troops, and threatening his government with extinction. Total VC/NVA strength is controversially estimated by the American Military Assistance Commmand- Vietnam (MACV) at around 180,000 men in 1964. Opposing them during the war's early phases were (on paper by various estimates) over 300,000 ARVN troops and a US troop level that stood at around 16,000 in 1964, This was to increase rapidly in later years.[3]
[edit] Recruitment And Training
[edit] NVA recruitment and training
Based on a wide variety of accounts, the performance of some NVA units was excellent, and at times they garnered a grudging respect among those they fought for their discipline, morale and skill. NVA training however was surprisingly conventional, with little emphasis on jungle warfare. Recruitment was primarily based on the military draft of North Vietnam, and most NVA soldiers served for the duration of the conflict. There were no "rotations" back to the homeland. A typical training cycle took about 90 days for the recruit, with instruction on conventional military skills and procedure. Special emphasis was placed on physical conditioning. Political indoctrination was part of the package, most acutely during a special two-week "study" phase.
Men selected for infiltration to the South received more intense training- with more political indoctrination, weapons handling, and special emphasis on physical conditioning, particularly marching with heavy packs. Specialized training (heavy weapons, signals, medical, explosives) was given to selected individuals in courses that might last up to a year. Pay and rations for designated infiltrators was more than that given to other troops. Compared to their VC counterparts most NVA had a higher standard of literacy. While his preparation was not especially impressive by Western standards, the typical NVA soldier proved more than adequate for the task at hand, with most of his learning occurring on the job. Throughout the conflict, NVA defections and surrenders were extremely low, especially compared to that of the VC, a testimony to their motivation and organization.[5]
[edit] VC recruitment and training
Importance of the party cadres. Recruitment of VC fighters followed patterns similar to those in Mao's Revolutionary China.[6] Party operatives dominated or influenced most significant activities, and so the initial agents of recruitment were the party cadres, tightly organized into small cells. The cadre, or team of cadres, typically were southern regroupees returning to help the insurgency. Since such persons would have some knowledge of the local area, theirs would not be a "cold call". They would enter a village, and make a careful study of its social, political and economic structure. Cadres usually downplayed communism, stressing local grievances and resentments, and national independence. All was not serious discussion. Musical groups, theater troupes and other forms of entertainment were frequently employed. Party operatives infiltrated local community organizations, spreading the word subtly to all who would listen. The personal behavior of cadres was also vital. They were expected to lead austere, dedicated lives, beyond reproach. This would enable villagers to contrast their relatively restrained, non-pecuniary way of life, with the corruption of government representatives or targeted enemies. Female cadres sometimes made effective recruiters, being able to shame and goad young males into committing for the Revolution.[7]
Use of local grievances and individuals as a basis for recruitment. Local grievances and resentments were carefully cataloged by cadres. The political power structure of each community was carefully studied, and an analysis was made of individual villagers as to their class status, and potential helpfulness or enmity to the revolution. Detailed personal data (some potentially embarrassing) were harvested on each potential supporter or recruit for later use. The cadres would then hit their targets with a variety of methods- friendship, casual political discussions, membership in some community organization, sponsorship of some village festival or event, or activism related to some local grievance or issue. As targets were softened up, the pressure increased. A small nucleus of followers was usually gathered, and these were used to further expand recruitment. The cadres exploited the incompetence, corruption or heavy-handedness of local government officals to stoke the fires. They also seized on perceived injustices by private parties- such as landlords. RAND studies indicate that about 80% of those who joined did so out of: (a) felt economic and social frustration and the promise of advancement by the VC, (b) personal incidents and oppression by government officials, and (c) the naivete of youth promised excitement and adventure. Seekers after social justice or communist theory were a small minority.[8]
The "parallel government" - strengthening the VC grip on the masses. As their web expanded, VC methods became more bold. Hit squads attacked and eliminated selected enemies. Ironically, officials who were TOO efficient or honest might also be liquidated since their conduct might mitigate the grievances and resentments the cadres sought to stoke. Farmers who owned "too much" land might also be fingered. Government facilities, or the private property of those on the target list might also be damaged and sabotaged. Such terror attacks not only eliminated rivals, they served as salutory examples to the villagers as to what could potentially befall them if they opposed the Revolution. If fully successful, the once sleepy village might be turned into a functioning VC support base. The VC intent was to set up a "parallel" adminsitration, operating clandestinely. Such "revolutionary government" would set and collect taxes, draft soldiers to fight, administer justice, redistribute land, and coordinate local community events and civic improvements. All this activity had one aim- to further the VC/NLF cause, and tighten the Party's grip over the masses.[9]
Training of Main Force fighters. Recruits falling into the net were usually taken from the village to another location for political indoctrination and training, sometimes contradicting VC promises that they would be able to serve near their home areas. Those showing promise, (or sometimes sufficient health), were assigned to the Main Force Battalions, which were permanently organized military formations. Other recruits were expected to serve as part-time village helpers or guerrillas. Military training, like that of the NVA was essentially conventional- marching, small unit tactics, basic weapons handling, etc. Illiteracy and lack of education was often a problem in VC ranks, and steps were made ot correct this, with focus on the political task at hand. Specialized and advanced training, as in the NVA was given to smaller groups of men. Political indoctrination continued throughout the VC Main Force fighter's training, with nightly "criticism and self-criticism" sessions to eliminate error, and purge incorrect thought. The quality of VC training and recruitment was more uneven than that of the NVA, and varied based on the war situation. Defections were several times that of their Northern counterparts, but in the context of the insurgency, and the communist willingness to expend lives, the VC fighting man was more than adequate to the task at hand.[10]
[edit] Organization of the VC/NVA
[edit] Dominant role of Northern based Lao Dong (communist) party
Given the Communist Party's dominance over all spheres of Northern Vietnamese society, including the military struggle, it is impossible to understand VC/NVA organization, strategy and tactics without detailing party involvement. The bulk of the VC/NLF were initially southerners, with some distinctive southern issues and sensibilities. Nevertheless, the VC/NLF was clearly a creature of the Northern Lao Dong Party which manipulated and controlled it -furnishing it with supplies, weaponry and trained cadres, including regular PAVN troops posing as "local" fighters.
Hanoi also organized the Southern Communist party, the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP) in 1962, to exercise detailed political control over the insurgency, and COSVN, Central Office for Southern Vietnam, which controlled a substantial range of military activity. While a measure of decentralization was necessary to pursue the conflict locally, the PRP, and COVSN, answered ultimately to their Northern handlers.[11] The NVA likewise was controlled by the Lao Dong, with party committees and representatives supervising and monitoring all echelons. As the war progressed, southern influence weakened, and the northern grip, both military and politically via the Lao Dong Party, was strengthened, a development lamented by some former VC personnel who were forced off the stage by the northeners.[12]
Operating through the PRP, and manipulating a variety of front groups, the communist leadership in the North forged a formidable weapon in both the military and propaganda spheres, garnering both internal support in the South, and international support from sympathetic Westerners. While heavily reliant on Chinese and Soviet sponsors for much of their manufactured weapons, the Northern regime tendered a cool hand between them, playing both communist giants against each other in the service of its own ends. This ruthless, skillful and tenacious leadership was to achieve final triumph after almost two decades of war.[13]
[edit] General structure of Viet Cong and NVA effort
[edit] Role of the Party cadres and officers
The diagram above shows the VC/NVA structure in simplified form. Of note is the control of the Communist party at all levels. Party operatives manipulated civilian front groups and sympathizers, as well as control military units. Cadres were assigned to each level of the structure, a "parallel" administration that constantly supervised and watched those tasked with the activities of the Revolution. Commanders of some military units, or leaders of various propaganda and civic fronts might also be Party members, operating openly or undercover. Cadres were expected to be of exemplary proletarian, moral and political character, faithfully implementing the most recent party line, and monitoring assigned areas for erroneous thought. Class background was important with those from the middle and upper-classes receiving less favorable treatment. The cadre system was a constant in both the VC Main Force and NVA formations down to the company level. Cadres had their own chain of command, parallel with that of the military structure. In any disputes between military officers and the politicl operatives, the political officers generally had the last word.
[edit] VC structure and Organization
The 5-level administrative structure. Publicly, Viet Cong (VC) forces were part of the liberation peoples movement. In reality they were controlled by COSVN. The VC were organized into 3 Interzone headquarters, that were sudvivided into 7 smaller headquarters Zones. The Zones were split into Provinces and further subdivided into Districts. These likewise controlled Village and Hamlet elements. Each level was run by a committee, dominated as always by Communist Party operatives. Each level in theory was subject to the next highest, hence a village commander planning an ambush would have to first apply for clearance from his District bosses, who in turn would refer the matter up the chain of command. This does not imply inflexibility. Local fighters were expected to jump on targets of opportunity, but in general a hierarchy prevailed. The VC were generally grouped into 3 levels.
- VC Main-Force Units. The elite of the VC was the Main Force Units, full-time fighters which generally reported to oneof the Interzone headquarters or directly COSVN. Many of these fighters were southern-born and had been trained in the north before re-infiltrating back to serve the Revolution. A majority of main-force fighters were party members, wore the pth helmet common to the NVA and could operate in regimental or battalion size strengths.
- The Regional Forces. Regional or territorial units were also full-time soldiers but they genreally served within or clsoe to their home provinces. They did not have the degree of literacy of the main-force personnel, and did not have the percentageof Party members present in their ranks. They usually operated in units that seldom exceeded company strength.
- Village guerrillas. Village, hamlet or local guerrillas were part-time fighters and helpers, carrying out minor harassment operations like sniping or mine/booby trap laying, building local fortifications or supply caches, and transporting supplies and equipment. Mostly peasant farmers, these militia style units were under the control of low level NLF or Front leadership.
[edit] NVA structure and organization
While NVA formations retained their insignia, signals and logistic lines, supervision followed the same pattern, with Party monitors at every level- from squad to division. Recruitment and training as discussed above was conducted in the North, and replacements were funneled from the North, down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to designated formations. Individual NVA soldiers might be sometimes be assigned as replacement fillers for VC Main Force Battalions, but where distinct units were kept intact, they, like the VC Main Force units, generally answered directly to COVSN for their operations. COVSN in turn was controlled by the Northern Lao Dong Party. The NFL "front" framework, gave political cover to these military efforts. Since Party operatives were in place at all levels throughout the entire structure, coordination and control of the vast politico-military effort was enhanced. NVA forces used a typical triangular divisional structure with well articulated sub-units from divisions, through battalions, down to company level.
[edit] Command and control of VC/NVA units
Both the VC and NVA formations operated under a "system of three" - three cells to a squad, three squads to a platoon, 3 companies to a battalion etc. This could vary depending on operational circumstances. Small-arms dominated the armanent of typical infantry companies. Heavier weapons like 81mm mortars or recoiless rifles and machines guns were at the battalions combat support company. Membersof the combat support unit were also responsible for placing mines and booby traps. Command and control was exercised via standard headquarers companies, always supervised by political cadres. Special platoons such as sappers, recon, and signals were directly responsible to the battalion commander.
[edit] Morale and discipline: the 3-man cell and "self-criticism"
- 3-man cells. All soldiers were grouped into 3-man cells. These had practical advantages in mutual support and assistance among soldiers, but when combined with the constant monitoring of the political cadres, they had the benefit of discouraging individual privacy, and potential thoughts of defection. Monitoring by other cell members was inherent in the system. By most accounts given by VC/NVA prisoners or defectors, the cell system served as a powerful instument of cohesion.
- Criticism and self-criticism. Typical of most Maoist communist organizations, "criticism and self-criticism" sessions were frequently conducted to improve discipline, control and cohesion. Such sessions were conducted on a daily basis and after operations. Of key importance was individual confession of faults or errors, and the detection and purging of incorrect thoughts as a basis for behavioral changes. Leaders first critiqued individual soldiers, who in turn were critiqued by their comrades. Admission of faults and weaknesses was then expected from individuals. Lower ranks were not allowed to comment on the actions of higher ranks. Most communist troops seemed to accept the system, especially whene it was conducted in a way that suggested Confucian ideals- that of an elder father or brother correcting wayward youth or siblings.[14]
[edit] VC/NVA Equipment, arms and logistics
[edit] Weapons
The Vietcong used the AK 47 and the SKS. Americans used the M14 and later the M16. The M16 had serious problems when first introduced. It jammed and failed to extract the spent cartridge. This flaw cost the lives of many Marines during the Hill Fights in 1967. Even after this item was corrected it was suseptable to jamming from dirt or sand in the mechanism. The AK47, on the other hand, was soldier proof. It could be dragged through the mud and still fire. These guns were used when fighting small arms.
The M16 was more accurate, could fire quicker over large distances, it was a modern weapon. It was however flimsy and not very practical for use in the jungle.
The AK 47 was a simple solid weapon, it was maneuverable, you could have both eyes open, it was easy to use in the jungle and it was practical for guerrilla warfare. The AK could fire over a shorter distance compared to the M16 and was a larger weapon.
The other weapon the Vietcong used was booby traps. These were crucial to the morale building of the Vietcong and brought down American morale. Searches that used to be called search and destroy soon were called search and avoid. The booby traps the Vietcong used were simple, yet lethal. The booby traps weren't however the full attack, when a soldier went down injured a group formed around him and then the Vietcong snipers had a field day and killed the rest of the soldiers. These search and destroy mission took a toll on the Americans and as morale went down so did the will to fight, soon the Americans came to realise they were fighting a war that was already lost. Missions such as search and destroy affected a lot of soldiers psychologically.
[edit] Equipment
[edit] Communications
[edit] Food and medical
[edit] Logistical bases
[edit] Support by "fraternal socialist" allies
[edit] Village corvee labor
[edit] Infiltration into the South
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[edit] Infiltration along the DMZ and sea lanes
[edit] Inflitration via the Ho Chi Minh Trail
[edit] Initial preparation for the infiltrator
[edit] Way station layout, security and branch routes
[edit] Transit time and danger on the trail
[edit] VC/NVA Base Camps
[edit] Camp layout and bunker construction methods
[edit] Camp and personnel administration
[edit] VC/NVA strategy
[edit] Three-phase Mao approach
Stage 1
Infiltrate countryside get to know the people gain their trust spread the idea of revolution sign up new recruits
Stage 2
Lay Siege to the cities ambush enemy and run sabotage terrorism and murder plant mines and boobly traps
Stage 3 Come out into open and attack with guns tanks and regular army units to fight set piece battles --84.70.47.76 22:11, 21 February 2007 (UTC)Joynul Khan
[edit] Ruthless tenacity of communist leadership
[edit] VC/NVA Tactics in battle
[edit] Constant mobility and camouflage
[edit] VC/NVA movement doctrine
[edit] Defensive tactics
[edit] The 3-tier kill zone: construction and layout
[edit] The hugging technique to neutralize American firepower
[edit] VC/NVA "tunnel warfare"
[edit] Withdrawals and redeployments
[edit] Offensive tactics
[edit] Attack planning
[edit] The "four quicks" doctrine
[edit] The "three strongs" doctrine
[edit] Ambush techniques
[edit] Terror attacks
[edit] Metering losses: combat intensity
[edit] Major VC/NVA operations- a summary
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[edit] Early victories
[edit] The big border battles to draw US troops
[edit] The Tet offensive
[edit] The 1972 Easter Offensive
[edit] Final victory
[edit] Demise of the VC
| This article is currently under construction. While political factors weigh heavily in any guerilla war, emphasis is on military strategy and tactics with relevant background on structure and organization. Individual battles work best if summarized, with a link to a more detailed article. Contribution by others users would be very much appreciated |
[edit] References
- ^ Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA, (Ballantine Books, 1993)
- ^ Dave Richard Palmer, Summons Of The Trumpets: U.S. - Vietnam in Perspective (Presidio Press, 1978)
- ^ a b Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA, (Ballantine Books, 1993)
- ^ Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, (The MIT Press: new ed. 1970)pp. 37-146
- ^ PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, Douglas Pike
- ^ On Guerrilla warfare - Mao tse-Tung
- ^ Pike. op. cit
- ^ Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, (The MIT Press, 1970) pp. 44-179
- ^ Pike, op. cit.
- ^ Lanning and Lee, Inside the VC and NVA, op. cit
- ^ Lanning and Lee, Inside the VC and the NVA, pp. 44-73
- ^ Truong Nhu Tang, A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath, (Vintage Publishing: 1986), pp. 47-312
- ^ Lanning and Lee, Inside the VC and the NVA, pp. 44-73
- ^ Lanning and Lee, op. cit
[edit] Bibliography
- A Vietcong Memoir, Truong Nhu Tang
- Big task, Big Victory, Vo Nguyen Giap
- Inside the VC and the NVA, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg
- On Guerrilla warfare - Mao tse-Tung
- On Strategy, Harry Summers
- Peoples War, Peoples Army, Vo Nguyen Giap
- PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, Douglas Pike
- Hell in a Very Small Place, Bernard Fall
- Summons of the Trumpet, Dave Palmer
- Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Douglas Pike
