Victoria v Commonwealth (1957)
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| Victoria v Commonwealth | |
High Court of Australia |
|
| Full case name | The State of Victoria v The Commonwealth |
| Date decided | 23 August 1957 |
| Citations | (1957) 99 CLR 575 |
| Judges sitting | Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ |
| Case history | |
|---|---|
| Prior actions: | none |
| Subsequent actions: | none |
| Case opinions | |
| (7:0) The State Grants Act 1942 was valid under the taxation power (per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ)
(4:3) Section 221 of the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act is not a valid exercise of the taxation power (per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Kitto and Taylor JJ) |
|
Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575 ("the Second Uniform Tax case") is a High Court of Australia case that affirmed the Commonwealth government's ability to impose a scheme of uniform income tax, ultimately arising in a vertical fiscal imbalance in the spending requirements and taxing abilities of the various levels of government.
Contents |
[edit] Facts
- See also: South Australia v Commonwealth
The Uniform Tax system implemented in 1942 relied upon 4 pieces of legislation, all held as constitutionally valid in the First Uniform Tax case. Some of the laws were justified under the defence power, however the scheme was not dismantled despite the end of wartime conflict.
The Income Tax Act 1942 could not be challenged because it was within the taxation power. The Income Tax (Wartime Arrangements) Act 1942 was not an issue because it had already been repealed.
[edit] Decision
The High Court affirmed the position of the First Uniform Tax case, with some exceptions.
The States Grants Act 1942 was held to be valid, despite a section 96 issue. The Commonwealth can use the section 96 grants power to induce a state to exercise its own powers as well as abstain from using its powers. Hence the Commonwealth can do such things to encourage or discourage a state from exercising its powers. However, while it can induce such things, it cannot coerce a state into accepting a grant. Nonetheless, indirect compulsion is constitutional. While the Income Tax Act 1942 raised Commonwealth income tax rates to a level that made it politically impossible for the states to impose their own, this was not at the level of coercion that was prohibited. Latham CJ noted that the states still had the choice not to accept Commonwealth grants. McTiernan J also considered the Act valid under the defence power.
The previous decision on Section 221 of the Income Assessment Act 1942 was overturned, and the law was held invalid. The majority (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Kitto and Taylor JJ) thought that it was not pursuant to the taxation power. Dixon CJ held that it could only possibly be a valid exercise of the implied incidental taxation power. However, the scope of section 51(ii) is federal taxation for federal purposes. Hence any taxation law made pursuant to the incidental power must also be federal taxation for federal purposes. Dixon CJ saw the purpose of the legislation as the exclusion of the state's ability to impose income tax, which is not a federal purpose. Although this section was challenged and overturned, it was not important because the states could longer impose income taxes.
The Commonwealth cannot restrain states in terms of their governmental functions. Dixon J inferred from this principles that there should be some restraints on interpretation of section 96 of the constitution. Section 96 grants must be confined to grants of money, and is not a power to make laws with respect general subject matter. It must be concerned with state finance and must not be coercive. The power to attach conditions to section 96 grants is broad but they must be within the state's constitutional competence to fulfil.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Winterton, G. et al. Australian federal constitutional law: commentary and materials, 1999. LBC Information Services, Sydney.
