United States v. Miller

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United States v. Miller
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 30, 1939
Decided May 15, 1939
Full case name: United States v. Jack Miller, et al.
Citations: 307 U.S. 174; 59 S. Ct. 816; 83 L. Ed. 1206; 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9513; 22 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 331; 1939-1 C.B. 373; 1939 P.H. P5421
Prior history: Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas
Holding
The National Firearms Act - as applied to transporting in interstate commerce a 12-gauge shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long, without having registered it and without having in his possession a stamp-affixed written order for it - was not unconstitutional as an invasion of the reserved powers of the States and did not violate the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Charles Evans Hughes
Associate Justices: James Clark McReynolds, Louis Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Harlan Fiske Stone, Owen Josephus Roberts, Hugo Black, Stanley Forman Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas
Case opinions
Majority by: McReynolds
Joined by: Butler, Stone, Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter
Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. II

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)[1], is the only Supreme Court of the United States decision to directly address the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miller is a controversial decision in the ongoing gun politics debate, as both sides claim that it supports their position.

Contents

[edit] Background

United States v. Miller involved a criminal prosecution under the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). Passed in response to public outcry over the St. Valentine's Day Massacre, the NFA requires certain types of firearms (including but not limited to fully automatic firearms and short-barreled rifles and shotguns) to be registered with the Miscellaneous Tax Unit (later to be folded into what eventually became the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or ATF) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (ancestor of today's Internal Revenue Service)[2], with a $200 tax paid at the time of registration and again if the firearm is ever sold. This was widely interpreted as a prohibitive measure, as the $200 tax was levied upon items which at the time were relatively common and typically cost less than ten dollars. The United States Department of the Treasury nonetheless claimed that it was a revenue-collecting measure.

[edit] The trial court

Jack Miller and Frank Layton were suspected bank robbers and moonshiners being watched by agents of the Department of the Treasury. On April 18, 1938 Miller and Layton were arrested for transporting an unlicensed sawed-off shotgun (defined as "having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length") across state lines while engaged in interstate commerce, in violation of the NFA.

This was a federal case and was therefore heard by the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. On January 3, 1939, U.S. District Court Judge Heartsill Ragon agreed with the defense's claim that the NFA was intended to restrict the individual ownership and possession of arms, in conflict with the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The defendant's argument at the trial court was reported (in the text of the Supreme Court opinion) to be as follows:

The National Firearms Act is not a revenue measure but an attempt to usurp police power reserved to the States, and is therefore unconstitutional. Also, it offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment to the Constitution, U.S.C.A.-'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.'

The trial court agreed, ruling that section 11 of the National Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment. The trial court threw out the indictment. The United States Attorney, Clinton R. Barry, appealed to the Supreme Court.

[edit] At the U.S. Supreme Court

On March 30, 1939 the Supreme Court heard the case. Attorneys for the United States argued four points:

  1. The NFA is intended as a revenue-collecting measure and therefore within the authority of the Department of the Treasury.
  2. The defendants transported the shotgun from Oklahoma to Arkansas, and therefore used it in interstate commerce.
  3. The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.
  4. The "double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length, bearing identification number 76230" was never used in any militia organization.

Neither the defendants nor their legal counsel appeared at the U.S. Supreme Court.

On May 15, 1939 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice McReynolds, reversed and remanded the District Court decision. The Supreme Court declared that no conflict between the NFA and the Second Amendment had been established, writing:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.

The Court indicated that only military type arms are constitutionally protected.

Describing the constitutional authority under which Congress could call forth state militia, the Court stated:

With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.

The Court also looked to historical sources to explain the meaning of "militia" as set down by the authors of the Constitution:

The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. 'A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.' And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

[edit] Interpretations

Gun control advocates claim this case as a victory because it states that ownership of firearms may be restricted. Some further interpret the decision to mean one must be a member of a government-controlled militia in order to be protected, although the court did not explicitly state this.

Gun rights advocates claim this case as a victory because they interpret it to state that ownership of military weapons is specifically protected. Furthermore they frequently point out that short-barreled shotguns have been used in every US military action in history since their invention, and the statement that the judges were not made aware of this should be taken to mean exactly that. Because the defense did not appear, there was arguably no way for the judges to know otherwise. Two of the justices involved in the decision had prior military experience, Justice Black as a Captain in the field artillery during WWI and Justice Frankfurter as a Major in the Army legal service, however there is no way to know if they were personally aware of the use of shotguns by American troops. During WWI, between 30,000 and 40,000 short-barreled pump action shotguns were purchased by the US Ordnance Department and saw service in the trenches and for guarding German prisoners.

Some argue [3] that fundamental issues related to the case were never truly decided because the Supreme Court remanded the case to the federal district court "for further proceedings", which never took place -- by the time of the Supreme Court decision, Miller had been killed, and Layton made a plea bargain after the decision was handed down, so there were no claimants left to continue legal proceedings.

Subsequent rulings have been allowed to stand, indicating that short-barreled shotguns are generally recognized as ordinary military equipment if briefs are filed (e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942), describing use of short-barreled shotguns in specialized military units).

[edit] See also

[edit] External links