United States v. Matlock

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United States v. Matlock

Argued December 10, 1973
Decided February 20, 1974


Full case name:	United States v. William Earl Matlock

Citations:	415 U.S. 164; 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 8

Prior history:	Motion to suppress evidence granted, W.D. Wis.; affirmed, 476 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1973); cert. granted, 412 U.S. 917 (1973)

Holding

When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Court membership

Chief Justice: Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices: William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., William Rehnquist

Case opinions

Majority by: White
Dissent by: Douglas
Dissent by: Brennan
Joined by: Marshall

Laws applied

U.S. Const. amend. IV

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) was a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court which ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when the police obtained voluntary consent from a third party who possessed common authority over the premises sought to be searched. The ruling of the court established the "co-occupant consent rule," which was later explained by Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) and distinguished by Georgia v. Randolph (2006), in which the court held that a third party could not consent over the objections of a present co-occupant.