United States intervention in Chile

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Meeting between General A. Pinochet and US Secretary of State H. Kissinger (1974).

The United States intervened in Chile's politics several times, including before and after Salvador Allende's election. The Marxist presidential candidate Salvador Allende was a top contender in the 1964 election, and the U.S., through the CIA, spent millions campaigning against him, mostly through radio and print advertising. Allende was defeated. Allende ran again in the 1970 presidential election, winning a plurality (near 37%), and was duly invested as President. The U.S. again used covert methods to discourage his election; further U.S. covert operations attempted to promote a military coup and thus to prevent Allende's inauguration. U.S. president Richard Nixon stated his fear that Chile could become "another Cuba", and the U.S. cut off most of its foreign aid to Chile and actively supported Allende's opponents in Chile during his presidency, intending to encourage Allende's resignation, his overthrow, or his defeat in the impending election of 1976.^[1]

While the Nixon administration was clearly gratified by the Chilean coup of 1973, in which Allende died and Augusto Pinochet rose to power, several separate investigations (including the Church Commission Report) have concluded that it is likely that the U.S. had no direct role in bringing it about.^[2]

1 1964 and 1970 elections
2 1970
- 2.1 Track I and II
- 2.2 The killing of the Army Commander-in-chief
3 1973 coup
4 Support for Pinochet
5 Later comments and actions by U.S. officials
- 5.1 2004 investigation
6 Quotes
7 Additional information

[edit] 1964 and 1970 elections

According to the 1975 Church Commission Report, covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence Agency covertly spent three million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome of the 1964 Chilean presidential elections,^[3] and eight million dollars in the three years between 1970 and the military coup in September 1973, with over three million in fiscal year 1972 alone. Covert American activity was present in almost every major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973, but its actual effect on electoral outcomes is not altogether clear. Chile, more than any of its South American neighbors, had an extensive democratic tradition dating back to the early 1930s, and even before. Because of this, it is difficult to gauge how successful CIA tactics were in swaying voters.

[edit] 1970

Efforts by the U.S. government to prevent Allende from taking office after his 1970 election are documented in U.S. materials declassified during the Clinton administration. For example, a formal instruction was issued on 16 October 1970 to the CIA base in Chile, saying in part, "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [United States Government] and American hand be well hidden...",^[4]

Immediately after the Allende government came into office, the U.S. sought to place economic pressure on Chile. U.S. National Security Council documents, later ordered released by U.S. President Bill Clinton [1], include decision memorandum no. 93, dated November 9, 1970, written by Kissinger and addressed to the heads of diplomatic, defense and intelligence departments. This document stated that pressure should be placed on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests, such as Allende's total nationalization of several foreign corporations and the copper industry. Specifically, Nixon directed that no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile [Kissinger, 1970].

Between 1964 and 1970 (under Frei), over USD $1 billion in economic assistance flowed in; during the Allende's tenure (1970-73) disbursements were non-existent or negligible [Petras & Morley, 1974]. The reduction in aid combined with the fall in the value of copper from a 1970 high of $66 to a low of $48 per ton, which undermined Allende's proposed restructuring of the Chilean economy. As the program was dependent on government spending, this caused a decline in the socioeconomic circumstances of Chile's poorest citizens.

However, the U.S. did permit humanitarian aid for Chile in addition to old loans valued at $200 million from 1971-2. The U.S. did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S. aid due to Allende's nationalizations. Allende also received new sources of credit that was valued between $600 and 950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The IMF also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.^[5]

U.S. officials ordered measures up to and including support for a potential coup to prevent Allende from taking office, although there are conflicting views as to whether the U.S. later pulled back from this position. That the U.S. planned a potential coup in Chile is evident in a secret cable from Thomas Karamessines, the CIA Deputy Director of Plans, to the Santiago CIA station, dated October 16, 1970, after the election but before Allende's inauguration. "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup ... it is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [United States Government] and American hand be well hidden" [Karamessines, 1970].

[edit] Track I and II

Once it became clear that Allende had won a plurality of the votes in 1970, the CIA proposed two plans. Track I was designed to persuade the Chilean Congress, through outgoing Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei, to confirm conservative runner-up Jorge Alessandri as president. Alessandri would resign shortly after, rendering Frei eligible to run against Allende in new elections. However, Track I was dropped, because Frei, despite being firmly anti-Allende, was also adamantly opposed to going against Chile's longstanding democratic traditions.

The CIA had also drawn up a second plan, Track II, in case Track I failed. The agency would find generals willing to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency and provide them with support for a coup. Presumably, a provisional military junta could then call new elections in which Allende could be defeated.

In September 1970, President Nixon informed the CIA that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million to stop Allende from coming to power or unseat him. As part of the Track II initiative, the CIA tried to convince key Chilean military officers to carry out a coup.^[6]

[edit] The killing of the Army Commander-in-chief

The kidnapping and death of General René Schneider shocked the public and increased support of the Chilean Constitution. Schneider was the army chief commander and a constitutionalist, which meant he would not support a coup. The CIA in Santiago kept contact with two groups inside the military and provided guns and money for kidnapping Schneider, but he was killed inside his car during the operation. This incident caused the citizens and the military to rally behind the just-elected Allende. The NARA (National Archives Records Administration) found documents in Nixon's papers showing that the CIA had instigated the operation ^[7].

Originally the agency came into contact with General Roberto Viaux, who was planning a coup with loyal military officers. An important part of Viaux's plan was to kidnap Chilean Army Chief of Staff General René Schneider, who, as a constitutionalist, was opposed to the idea of a coup from a historically apolitical military. The CIA maintained contact with Viaux, but eventually decided against supporting his plot, instead looking for other generals willing to take part in a coup. About the Viaux situation, Kissinger said to Nixon on October 15, 1970, "This looks hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing would be worse than an abortive coup."

However, on October 22, Viaux went ahead with his plan, which was badly botched. Gen. Schneider drew a handgun to protect himself from his attackers, who in turn drew their guns and shot him in four vital areas; he died in Santiago's military hospital three days later. The event provoked national outrage. As far as American involvement, the Church Committee, which investigated U.S. involvement in Chile during this period, determined that the weapons used in the debacle "were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators."

On September 10, 2001, a suit was filed by the family of Schneider, accusing former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of arranging Schneider's 1970 murder because he would have opposed a military coup [2]. However, CIA documents indicate that while the CIA had sought his kidnapping, his killing, which was committed by a rebel military group led by General Roberto Viaux that had been in contact with the CIA, was never intended. Kissinger declared the coup "hopeless" and said he "turned it off".^[5] By contrast, CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, deputy director of plans, said they operated before and after October 15 with knowledge and approval of the White House.^[8] The CIA maintained contacts with the group in the lead-up to and after Schneider's death, and they continued with preparations for a Track Two coup. On October 22, weapons were given to a group led by General Camilo Valenzuela.^[5]

[edit] 1973 coup

Main article: Chilean coup of 1973

While U.S. government hostility to the Allende government is unquestioned, the U.S. role in the coup itself remains a highly controversial matter. Claims of their direct involvement in the actual coup are neither proven nor contradicted by publicly available documentary evidence; many potentially relevant documents still remain classified. Regarding Pinochet's rise to power, the CIA undertook a comprehensive analysis of its records and individual memoirs as well as conducting interviews with former agents, and concluded in a report issued in 2000 that the CIA "did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency." [3]

The CIA was notified by contacts of the impending Pinochet coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup. On September 16, 1973, after Pinochet had assumed power, the following exchange about the coup took place between U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon:

Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?

Kissinger: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.

Nixon: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.

Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.

Nixon: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.

Kissinger: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [Garbled] created the conditions as great as possible.

Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played.^[9]

There is no evidence that the U.S. instigated or provided material support to Pinochet's successful coup in 1973, but the Nixon administration was undoubtedly pleased with the outcome; Nixon had spoken with disappointment about the failed coup earlier that year.. The U.S. did provide material support to the military regime after the coup, although it criticized them in public. A document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000 titled "CIA Activities in Chile" revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses.^[10] The CIA's publicly announced policies on paid informants have since been modified to exclude those involved in such abuses, but at the time they were evaluated on a case-by-case basis and measured with the value of the information they provided.

The coup, regardless of the degree of U.S. involvement, achieved the U.S. government objective of eradicating the perceived threat of socialism in Chile and brought about a regime sympathetic to their own interests. In her evaluation of United States foreign policy around the time of the coup in Chile, Jeane Kirkpatrick, later U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, highlighted her country's lack of overt aggressiveness in the developing world while events were transpiring in Chile. "In the last decade especially we have practiced remarkable forbearance everywhere." [Kirkpatrick, 1979] While this is the case for overt U.S. policy, severely constrained by the movement that had grown up in opposition to the Vietnam War, nonetheless, as discussed above, at the very least United States policy regarding aid helped lead to Allende's downfall and the U.S. at some times actively supported coup planning, although possibly not that of the coup that actually occurred.

[edit] Support for Pinochet

See also: Operation Condor

The U.S. provided material support to the military regime after the coup, although criticizing it in public. A document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000, titled "CIA Activities in Chile", revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses.^[10]

CIA documents show that the CIA had close contact with members of the Chilean secret police, DINA, and its chief Manuel Contreras (paid asset from 1975 to 1977 according to the CIA in 2000). Some have alleged that the CIA's one-time payment to Contreras is proof that the U.S. approved of Operation Condor and military repression within Chile. The CIA's official documents state that at one time, some members of the intelligence community recommended making Contreras into a paid contact because of his closeness to Pinochet; the plan was rejected based on Contreras' poor human rights track record, but the single payment was made due to miscommunication.[4]

On March 6, 2001, the New York Times reported the existence of a recently declassified State Department document revealing that the United States facilitated communications for Operation Condor. The document, a 1978 cable from Robert E. White, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay, was discovered by Professor J. Patrice McSherry of Long Island University, who had published several articles on Operation Condor. She called the cable "another piece of increasingly weighty evidence suggesting that U.S. military and intelligence officials supported and collaborated with Condor as a secret partner or sponsor."^[11]

In the cable, Ambassador White relates a conversation with General Alejandro Fretes Davalos, chief of staff of Paraguay's armed forces, who told him that the South American intelligence chiefs involved in Condor "keep in touch with one another through a U.S. communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which covers all of Latin America". This installation is "employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries". White, whose message was sent to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was concerned that the US connection to Condor might be revealed during the then ongoing investigation into the deaths of Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt. "It would seem advisable," he suggests, "to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in US interest."

The document was found among 16,000 State, CIA, White House, Defense and Justice Department records released in November 2000 on the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and Washington's role in the violent coup that brought his military regime to power. The release was the fourth and final batch of records released under the Clinton Administration's special Chile Declassification Project.

[edit] Later comments and actions by U.S. officials

In her evaluation of United States foreign policy around the time of the coup in Chile, Jeane Kirkpatrick, later U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, highlighted her country's lack of overt aggressiveness in the developing world while events were transpiring in Chile. "In the last decade especially we have practiced remarkable forbearance everywhere." [Kirkpatrick, 1979] While this is the case for overt U.S. policy, severely constrained by the movement that had grown up in opposition to the Vietnam War, nonetheless, as discussed above, United States policy regarding aid (at the very least) helped lead to Allende's downfall, and the U.S. actively supported coup planning on some occasions, although possibly not that of the coup that actually took place. US President Gerald Ford publicly admitted in 1974 that the CIA had covertly operated in Chile ^[7]

U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered the release of numerous documents relating to U.S. policy and actions toward Chile. [5] The documents produced by various U.S. agencies were opened to the public by the US State Department in October 1999. The collection of 1,100 documents dealt with the years leading up to the military coup. One of these documents establishes that U.S. military aid to the Chilean armed forces was raised dramatically between the coming to power of Allende in 1970, when it amounted to US$800,000 annually, to US$10.9 million in 1972.

In a 2003 interview on the U.S. Black Entertainment Television network, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was asked about why the United States saw itself as the "moral superior" in the Iraq conflict, citing the Chilean coup as an example of U.S. intervention that went against the wishes of the local population. Powell responded: "With respect to your earlier comments about Chile in the 1970s and what happened with Mr. Allende, it is not a part of American history that we're proud of." Chilean newspapers hailed the news as the first time the U.S. government had conceded a role in the affair.

[edit] 2004 investigation

The lower house of the Chilean Congress announced on October 6, 2004 that an investigation would begin of alleged CIA activities in Chile over a period of several decades. Of particular interest are the CIA's efforts to prevent Allende's election in 1970.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Quotes

"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves." — Henry Kissinger ^[12]

"Not a nut or bolt shall reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and all Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty." — Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, upon hearing of Allende's election.^{[cite this quote]}

"Make the economy scream [in Chile to] prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him" — Richard Nixon, orders to CIA director Richard Helms on September 15, 1970.^[13]

"It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden..." — A communique to the CIA base in Chile, issued on October 16, 1970.^[14]

"I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and, certainly, in our best interest." - Gerald Ford at a presidential news conference in reference to U.S. operations in Chile.^[15]