United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 is a resolution by the UN Security Council, passed unanimously on November 8, 2002, offering Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions (Resolution 660, Resolution 661, Resolution 678, Resolution 686, Resolution 687, Resolution 688, Resolution 707, Resolution 715, Resolution 986, and Resolution 1284).

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UN Security Council Resolution 1441

1 Resolution Statement
2 Passage of resolution
3 Implementation of resolution
4 Aftermath
5 See also
6 External links

[edit] Resolution Statement

Resolution 1441 specifically stated:

That Iraq was in material breach of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. Iraq's breaches related not only to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), but also the known construction of prohibited types of missiles, the purchase and import of prohibited armaments, and the continuing refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread looting conducted by its troops in 1991.
That this represented Iraq's final opportunity to comply with disarmament requirements. In accordance with the previous Resolutions, this meant Iraq not only had to verify the existence or destruction of its remaining unaccounted-for WMD stockpiles, but also had to ensure that all equipment, plans, and materials useful for the resumption of WMD programs was likewise turned over or verified as destroyed.
That "...false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations".

[edit] Passage of resolution

George W. Bush addressed the General Assembly on September 12, 2002 to outline the complaints of the United States against the Iraqi government.

On 12 September 2002, President Bush spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations and outlined a catalogued of complaints against the Iraqi government.^[1] These included:

"In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organization that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments....And al-Qaida terrorists escaped from Afghanistan are known to be in Iraq."
U.N. Commission on Human Rights found "extremely grave" human rights violations in 2001.
Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction (biological weapons, chemical weapons, and long-range missiles), all in violation of U.N. resolutions.
Iraq used proceeds from the "oil for food" U.N. program to purchase weapons rather than food for its people.
Iraq flagrantly violated the terms of the weapons inspection program before discontinuing it altogether.

Following the speech, intensive negotiations began with other members of the Security Council. In particular, three permanent members (with veto power) of the Council were known to have objections to an invasion of Iraq: Russia, People's Republic of China, and France.

On 26 September 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld accused Iraq of harboring al Qaeda terrorists and aiding their quest for weapons of mass destruction.^{[citation needed]}

In the meantime, Iraq, while denying all charges, announced that it would permit the re-entry of United Nations arms inspectors into Iraq. The United States characterized this as a ploy by Iraq and continued to call for a Security Council resolution which would authorize the use of military force.^{[citation needed]}

The resolution text was drafted jointly by the United States and the UK, the result of eight weeks of tumultuous negotiations, particularly with Russia and France. France questioned the phrase "serious consequences" and stated repeatedly that any "material breach" found by the inspectors should not automatically lead to war; instead the UN should pass another resolution deciding on the course of action. In favour of this view is the fact that previous resolutions legitimizing war under Chapter VII used much stronger terms, like "…all necessary means…" in Resolution 678 in 1990 and that Resolution 1441 stated that the Security Council shall "remain seized of the matter." Supporters of the US Administration have argued, however, that France's declaration of intent to veto any military action in Iraq effectively prevented the Security Council from remaining seized of the matter since at that point it could take no action to enforce the standing Resolutions.^{[citation needed]}

On 8 November 2002, the UN passed Resolution 1441 urging Iraq to disarm or face "serious consequences". The resolution passed with a 15 to 0 vote, supported by Russia, China and France, and Arab countries like Syria. This gave this resolution wider support than even the 1990 Gulf War resolution. Although the Iraqi parliament voted against honoring the UN resolution, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein agreed to honor it.

In the Security Council meeting following the vote, the Syrian ambassador said on the record

Syria voted in favour of the resolution, having received reassurances from its sponsors, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and from France and Russia through high-level contacts, that it would not be used as a pretext for striking against Iraq and does not constitute a basis for any automatic strikes against Iraq. The resolution should not be interpreted, through certain paragraphs, as authorizing any State to use force. It reaffirms the central role of the Security Council in addressing all phases of the Iraqi issue.^[2]

[edit] Implementation of resolution

Iraq agreed to the Resolution on 13 November.^{[citation needed]} Weapons inspectors returned on November 27, led by Hans Blix of UNMOVIC and Mohamed ElBaradei of the IAEA. The inspectors had been absent from Iraq since December 1998 when they were withdrawn immediately prior to Operation Desert Fox

Inspectors began visiting sites where WMD production was suspected, but found no evidence of such activities, except for 18 undeclared 122mm chemical rockets that were destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. P. 30 As was discovered after the invasion of Iraq, no production of WMDs was taking place, and no stockpiles existed. U.N. inspectors also found that the Al-Samoud-2 and Al-fatah missiles violated U.N. range restrictions, the former also being partially destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Debate about Resolution 1441 therefore turns on whether, despite the absence of WMDs and the acceptance of inspections, Iraq failed to comply with the terms of the Resolution, and whether an invasion was justified in the absence of any further UN Security resolutions on the subject.

On December 7, 2002, Iraq filed its 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN in order to meet requirements for this resolution. The five permanent members of the Security Council received unedited versions of the report, while an edited version was made available for other UN Member States. On December 19, Hans Blix reported before the United Nations and stated in regards to Iraq's December 7 report (unedited version): "During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated." By March, Blix declared that the December 7 report had not brought any new documentary evidence to light.

Iraq continued to fail to account for substantial chemical and biological stockpiles which UNMOVIC inspectors had confirmed as existing as late as 1998. Iraq claimed that it had disposed of its anthrax stockpiles at a specific site, but UNMOVIC found this impossible to confirm since Iraq had not allowed the destruction to be witnessed by inspectors as required by the pertinent Resolutions. Chemical testing done at the site was unable to show that any anthrax had been destroyed there.

Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei presented several reports to the UN detailing Iraq's level of compliance with Resolution 1441.[1] [2]. On January 30, 2003 Blix said that Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm, and by mid-February the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles remained unresolved. Blix's March 7 report stated "Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections."

At this point, the US Administration asserted that Iraq remained in material breach of the UN Resolutions, and that, under 1441, this meant the Security Council had to convene immediately "in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security".

Before the meeting took place, French president Jacques Chirac declared on March 10 that France would veto any resolution which would automatically lead to war. This caused open displays of dismay by the US and British governments. The drive by Britain for unanimity and a "second resolution" was effectively abandoned at that point.

In the leadup to the meeting, it became apparent that a majority of UNSC members would oppose any resolution leading to war. As a result, no such resolution was put to the Council.

At the Azores conference of March 16, Tony Blair, George W. Bush, and Spanish prime minister José María Aznar announced the imminent deadline of March 17 for complete Iraqi compliance, with statements such as "Tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world". On the 17th, speeches by Bush and UK foreign secretary Jack Straw explicitly declared the period of diplomacy to be over, as declared by Resolution 1441's prohibition on giving Iraq new opportunities for compliance, and that no further authorization from the UN would be sought before an invasion of Iraq (see 2003 invasion of Iraq). The USA and Britain, while admitting that such a resolution was diplomatically desirable, insisted that Iraq had now been given enough time (noting also the time since the first disarmament resolutions of 1991) to disarm or provide evidence thereof, and that war was legitimized by 1441 and previous UN resolutions. Non-permanent Security Council member Spain declared itself with the USA and Britain. Nevertheless, this position taken by the Bush administration and its supporters, has been and still is being disputed by numerous legal experts. According to most members of the Security Council, it is up to the council itself, and not individual members, to determine how the body's resolutions are to be enforced.[3][4][5]

More information is found in United Nations actions regarding Iraq.

[edit] Aftermath

The factual accuracy of this article is disputed.
Please see the relevant discussion on the talk page.

In June 2006, the national Ground Intelligence Center, a Department of Defense Entity, released a report detailing the weapons of mass destruction that had been found in Iraq, including pre-1991 sarin gas and mustard agent. The report stated that, "While agents degrade over time, chemical warfare agents remain hazardous and potentially lethal."[6]

The Bush administration commissioned the Iraq Survey Group to determine whether in fact any WMD existed in Iraq. After a year and half of meticulously combing through the country, the administration’s own inspectors reported[7]:

“

"While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible Indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered."

”

The review was conducted by Charles Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group. In October 2004, Bush said of Duelfer’s analysis[8]: "The chief weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, has now issued a comprehensive report that confirms the earlier conclusion of David Kay that Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there."

Factual questions about the Iraqi declaration still remain. To date the contents have still not been made public for independent scrutiny.[9] When the UK government was asked to state where in the Iraqi government's declaration there were false or inaccurate statements, the reply was that it was a confidential matter and that "huge quantities of documents remain to be translated."[10]

There has not yet been any proof on record that there were inaccuracies in the declaration. The Iraq Survey Group showed that how little there was to declare anyway, and the small fragments that remain cannot be checked against the document to see if they were listed.^{[citation needed]}