Talk:Trent Affair
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Removed reference to Conroy's "1862", it's a work of fiction.
- Actually, I never suggested it wasn't fiction, but it is a fictional account of what might have occurred if the aftermath of the Trent affair had turned out differently. It's why I put it in the Further Reading section rather than in References. Would it be possible to include it in "The Trent Affair in Fiction" or something like that so as to emphasize the *fictional* nature without deleted the fact that it might be interesting to readers and appropriate? I'd add it myself, but I don't really want to be an impulse reverter -- I have no personal stake in this, just an interest. Isoxyl 12:37, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
- Then a piece on "fictionalised accounts" after the article? BTW I've just added a piece on the British warplan.
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- Good idea. Should we note under "Further Reading" that this is in fact fiction explicitly? Isoxyl 14:03, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
The section that says others contend that a British intervention would have united the US against a common enemy is a little oversighted (if such is to be used, there should be citation on such to provide such analysis). Considering the circumstances of the situation, I doubt the Confederates would have wanted to side with the Union against the British since it was the Union who seized and captured the diplomats who's main intent was on gaining such support from Europe. Particularily France and Britain. Britain would have been a natural ally had such results occured.
- I agree that this is not an obvious conclusion. I think there are plausible arguments either way. Anyway, Conroy's fictional "1862" above gives one such fictional account, but I'm sure there are many other ways to go. If anything, I think Conroy might be a little generous with what he believes the Union's abilities/resources were, but it wasn't implausible either. Anyway, YMMV. Isoxyl 14:21, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
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- The Union in Conroy's book finds massively more resources than IRL. For example, they build more ironclads at a time when they had less iron (since IRL iron was mostly imported from the UK). Additionally, the British-Canadians are shown to be using massively less resources than they used in some brushfire colonial wars at around the time.
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- I'm sure you're right, I just don't know the historical data on amount of iron, etc., available to various countries in the 1860s. (Few do, I suppose.) Anyway, I think the book is an interesting take on the problem, one which historians will probably never agree on. I think the conjecture about the Trent Affair will never be 'settled', but it IS interesting to think about! I tend to find it hard to believe that having to fight TWO wars/fronts of the war rather than one, the Union could ever be better off than how history really turned out, but perhaps I am being naive or dumb! Isoxyl 19:02, 9 August 2006 (UTC)
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- Actually, several people in the Lincoln administration (notably Seward and Stanton) believed that if Britain declared war on the US that the Union might be restored. In addition, in extant journals of southerners, there is expressed a similar sentiment.
[edit] Puget Sound and the Trent Affair
I read with interest the nicely-in-depth coverage in this article, which also is nicely non-USAcentric as some joint-history articles can be (e.g. Oregon boundary dispute, which like others similar needs considerably more British/British Columbian POV/content). The blow-by-blow of British military plans here was especially good to read/see. I'm a Pacific Northwest history specialist and wondering if the sabre-rattling by BC Governor James Douglas and RN Admiral Baynes during the Trent Affair (and throughout the Civil War) to engage the US over the San Juans dispute and seize back - it was intended - the Puget Sound basin, which was lost to the US with the Oregon Treaty. Their proposal was shot down by London (presumably by coded telegram, as all communications with the colony was still via the US...), but had the Trent Affair broken into open war there would have been war in the PacNW, and pretty much Douglas and Baynes would have been left to their own devices, especially if US forces had, say, pressed northwards, either across the Straits or the 49th Parallel, so this would have been a "theatre of war". It's not that significant, and it wasn't official war plans by Britain, but it is an aspect of the Trent Affair, so wondering if someone here would care to word it suitably short and sweet (I'm not good at that, as you might be able to tell) and in the style of the current article; I can provide page/book cites (several, ultimately). During the 1850s, Douglas had also tried to snooker London in providing materiele and budget for a contingent of 500 men, ostensibly to protect against American incursions because of growing troubles in Washington Territory to do with the Cayuse War and Yakima War, although at least one of the main BC historical volumes (the Akriggs' BC Chronicle) speculates that Douglas' real intent was to invade and annex Russian America, and he was also trying to pitch London on that idea, too (and got shot down); even though there was a more-or-less truce between HBC and RAC managers in the region (business was business); I'll put more on this on the Crimean War page as it's a similar side-line to Douglas' intentions towards Puget Sound re the Trent Affair; posting this here as I gather a British Empire history specialist might be kicking around these parts who could help me out with some of the research/writing towards this content, and also help keep my verbiage in line (in the article that is...I'm hopeless on talkpages in terms of brevity....really, I do try.....).Skookum1 (Talk) 19:08, 11 January 2007 (UTC)