Talk:Thorp nuclear fuel reprocessing plant
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F*kin hell! These brits almost managed to level their island (and kill all fish in the north sea). If those 83 m3 of jice they had in the pool for months did condense due to ventillation, there would be a spontaneuos PU and U chain reaction sooner or later. Then Sellafield goes ka-boom and UK, Norway, Iceland are no more. The comparison with Mayak is no joke and most people still do not understand how bad Mayak was. The guys at Sellafield should face musketry, no less!
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[edit] This some trade jargon?
From the article: "The facility will remain closed until the liquor can be pumped out and extensive repairs will have to be undertaken." Liquor?! 68.39.174.91 06:29, 24 July 2005 (UTC)
- Yes, "an aqueous solution of a non-volatile substance" or "a solution, emulsion or suspension for industrial use". Simesa 21:33, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
- This threw me off too. I'm going to change the ocurrences of 'liquor' to 'solution' for clarity's sake.
[edit] POV?
The lines:
- "This is rather low considering the extreme negligence required to omit months of regular gauge checks and the sheer amount of radioactive material involved in the leak (160 kilograms of plutonium is enough to make 15-25 atomic bombs). As a worst-case possibility, the 2005 Sellafield incident could be compared to the 1957 nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union, where a chemical explosion at the Mayak fuel-processing plant sent similar amounts of radioactive material into the air,"
aren't supported by a cite and seem an unfair comparison. I'll look around for some cites before making a change. Simesa 21:33, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Seismic uncoupling/proper review source
The source for the text I added:
- but these were later removed from the design for seismic uncoupling. However it appears this design change was not evaluated for fatigue, and it is inconceivable a proper review would have permitted this change.
is the board of enquiry report as reported in the "HOW A PIPE FAILED" section of the Nuclear Engineering International external link which says:
- However, when the safety case for the basis of design was produced, the vessels were seismically uncoupled from their steel frame. To accommodate this change, it is clear from visual evidence, said the board of enquiry report, that restraint blocks were not fitted and that some steelwork had been modified to provide additional space between the vessels and the steel frame.
It appears that the design intent was modified at some point after the original design, but before early commissioning. No evidence was found that the design was reviewed to consider fatigue following the modification. The board of enquiry found it ‘inconceivable’ that, had fatigue calculations been performed, it would have been thought acceptable to operate the vessels without lateral restraint.
So it is a POV, but from the most authoritative source! In fact my paraphrase reads less critical than the words used by the board of enquiry. -- Rwendland 00:01, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
- Good source, put it back in. Simesa 04:38, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Rewording required
The line: "Radiation levels in the building preclude entry of humans" is misleading, it implies the entire building is unsafe to enter but its just the cell containing the leak.
See Wikinews article:
"The large stainless steel chamber that now contains the spilled material is too dangerous to enter due to radioactivity, though it poses no danger to those inside or outside the plant."