The Concept of Mind

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You have new messages (last change).

In his prominent work, The Concept of Mind (1949), the philosopher Gilbert Ryle described what he saw as the "fundamental mistake" made by Descartes' dualism, and underlying much of western philosophy. Ryle's work famously coined the phrase "the dogma of the ghost in the machine" to refer to Descartes' model.

The fundamental error, according to Ryle, is a category mistake made when philosophers talk about mind and matter as if they were "... terms of the same logical type". Ryle claims that while it does make sense to talk about mental processes and events, that the "... phrase 'there occur mental processes' does not mean the same sort of thing as 'there occur physical processes', and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two". For Ryle, Cartesian dualism makes the mistake of assuming that it is sensible to ask of a given cause, process, or event, whether it is mental or physical (with the implication that it cannot be both).

This concept is futher illustrated by some of Ryle's examples in the text. When a prospective student visits a university, he or she will see the library, the labs, the sports arena, but then may very well ask the tour guide, "but where is the university?", having been under the assumption that it is a different place altogether. According to Ryle, the mistake made by the student is a failure to realize that "university" and "library" are terms that belong to different logical categories.

In the Introduction, Ryle claims that his purpose is to correct the logical geography of the knowledge that we already possess about mental powers and mental operations. Also, he declares that he is determining the logical cross-bearings of concepts. In so doing, he metaphorically compares such knowledge to the reading of a map. This activity displays the logic of the propositions that are used to communicate the concepts. Such logic is, for him, a spatial metaphor that reveals how propositions consistently precede and follow concepts. Descartes' myth, for example, of the separation of mind and body presents the facts that belong to one category in the peculiar language that is appropriate to another category. Ryle wants to relocate the facts, not deny them. For him, every concept legitimately belongs to a certain category. He defines categories as logical types. The way that a concept belongs to a category (logical type), is the same as a set of logically legitimate ways of operating mentally. His book tries to show how mental operations occur that are in violation of logical rules. Thus, Ryle thinks of philosophy as replacing bad category habits with a lawful discipline. The reader must assume that Ryle himself is not misusing concepts when he employs metaphors of space, such as set, geography, relocation, replacing, preceding, following, and taking cross-bearings, in order to communicate his logic regarding concepts and categories. It is then to be taken for granted that the concept logic can lawfully be a member of the category (logical type) space.


[edit] Selected Quote

If my argument is successful, there will follow some interesting consequences. First, the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but dissipated not by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way.... It will also follow that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question. The "reduction" of the material world to mental states and processes, as well as the "reduction" of the mental states and processes to physical states and processes, presuppose the legitimacy of the disjunction "either there exist minds or there exist bodies (but not both)". It would be like saying, "either she bought a left-hand and a right-hand glove or she bought a pair of gloves (but not both)".

– Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind

[edit] Schopenhauer

Ryle's assertion that the workings of the mind are not distict from the actions of the body results from the influence of Schopenhauer. The workings of the will are one and the same as the workings of the body, according to Schopenhauer. Also, Ryle's claim that the nature of a person's motives are defined by that person's actions in a situation is also an example of Schopenhauer's influence. A person's empirical character, Schopenhauer said, is made evident only by that person's actions.

As a student he read Schopenhauer, and a long time later, in his fiftieth year — having, as he thought, forgotten Schopenhauer almost entirely — published the book that made his name, The Concept of Mind, in which not only the central thesis but also what came to be best known of the subsidiary theses come straight out of Schopenhauer, while all the time Ryle himself genuinely believed he was putting forth his own ideas. Only when someone pointed the fact out to him after publication did he realize that what he had done was to recycle Schopenhauer.

– Bryan Magee, Confessions of a Philosopher, Ch. 16

[edit] Bibliography

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org../../../t/h/e/The_Concept_of_Mind_97bf.html"
In other languages