Talk:The Geographical Pivot of History
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The last 2 paras I'm referring to are:
- "Although the fascists took much of Ukraine in World War II, nonetheless they were defeated. ...."
- "The Soviet Union accomplished the domination of both Ukraine and Mitteleuropa. It was industrial, technically competent, and militarily able."
Both paras contain a confusing mix of points which seem to contradict the Heartland Theory directly (the failure of the Nazis and the Soviet Union to achive global dominance after conquering the Heartland) and points which appear to make it obsolescent (air power, the rise of Japan). These should be separated.
Para 1 does provides a partial explanation of why conquering the Heartland did not give the Nazis global dominance - "... the Soviets could actually move their factories out of the Heartland". It should also point out that "Mackinder believed that the introduction of the railroad (Philcha: or other fast, high-volume land transport) ... had removed the island's invulnerability to domination by a single power". The USSR's poor infrastructure in early WW2 did not fulfil Mackinder's precondition, and:
- Made it impossible for the Nazis to pull off a quick decapitation (as they did with France). Quick decapitation was probably not a realistic objective anyway because the USSR government could relocate faster and further than its industry could. This meant a war of attrition was inevitable, and the USSR / Russia had far greater manpower.
- Overstretched the invaders' supply lines, especially when General Winter joined the fray.
In para 2, "It (USSR) was industrial, technically competent, and militarily able" reflects the West's fears from the 1950s to mid-1970s. But the Afghan war showed weaknesses in the Soviet army's training, morale and equipment which were symptoms of economic and social decay - see The Collapse of the Soviet Military by W.E. Odom (Yale University Press). Earlier signs of Soviet weakness were the USSR's inability to feed itself, which became apparent in the 1960s, and the realisation in the very early 1960s that the missile gap was in the USA's favour both numerically and qualitatively (see for example We All Lost the Cold War by R.N. Lebow & J.G. Stein, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics - but it's a bad book in most other ways.) In short, the USSR lacked the economic capability to turn possession of the Heartland into global dominance.
The rise of Japan was geopolitically more relevant at the time of the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War - modern Japan lacks the military component of geopolitical influence. But Japan does highlight the economic weakness of the USSR (and Russian Empire).
I suggest restructuring paras 1 and 2 into 2 separate sections:
- "Apparent failures of the Heartland theory" would discuss the failure of the Nazis and of the USSR to translate control of the Heartland into global dominance. I've already said why I think these examples do not refute the theory.
- "Factors which may make the Heartland theory obsolete" would discuss the impact of advances in military technology including air power, missiles (including those launched from ships and subs), nuclear weapons and satellites. This issue is one for the real geo-strategic buffs - let's hear from you!
Philcha 14:04, 17 October 2006 (UTC)
