Stalin Note
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The 1952 Stalin Note, a.k.a. the March Note, was a Soviet diplomatic note dated March 10, 1952 and delivered to representatives of Britain, France, and the United States (the other Great Powers with occupation zones in Germany), which included an offer of Superpower disengagement from Germany if the West would agree that a new, unified Germany would also be neutral and disarmed. This led to "The Battle of the Notes" between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union at a time when the West was developing the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, initiated in 1949) and was negotiating the 1952 Bonn Agreement with the embryonic West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG) as part of Western Cold War strategy. The West's rejection, including the U.S. rejection, of the 1952 Soviet offer to unify Germany created a controversial political and academic debate and established a post-WWII "stab-in-the-back" theory to parallel the post-WWI "stab-in-the-back" theory of German political history and international relations.
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[edit] Timeline
[edit] Pre-1952
May 8, 1945 - Victory in Europe Day
1946 - Mutual deliveries of supplies between Eastern and Western sectors stop
1948-1949 - Berlin Blockade
April 4, 1949 - North Atlantic Treaty
1949 - Western Trizone becomes FRG
June 25, 1950 - North Korea invades South Korea
1950 - Pleven and Spofford plans for European armed forces
[edit] 1952
February 25, 1952 - Lisbon Agreement
March 10, 1952 - Stalin Note begins Battle of the Notes
April 1, 1952 - Stalin orders GDR "to create a people's army--quietly."
June 1, 1952 - Soviets seal FRG-GDR border
September 23, 1952 - Battle of the Notes ends
[edit] Post-1952
May 5, 1955 - FRG "full" sovereignty
May 15, 1955 - Austrian State Treaty
October 27, 1955 - Saarland plebiscite
January 1, 1957 - Saarland incorporated into FRG
December 21, 1972 - FRG and GDR sign Basic Treaty
October 3, 1990 - German reunification
[edit] Political Context
The Stalin Note advanced terms similar to those later adopted for Austria (see Austrian State Treaty). It called for the creation of a neutral Germany with an eastern border on the Oder-Neisse line and all allied troops removed within the year. The West German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer favoured closer integration with Western Europe and asked that the reunification be negotiated with the provision that there be internationally monitored elections throughout Germany. This condition was rejected by the Soviets. Stalin's proposal was subsequently rejected by Adenauer as a propaganda ploy, although some speculate that Adenauer feared what amounted to the Finlandization of Germany under the Soviet reunification plan. The proposal came while the European Defence Community was being discussed, which would have resulted in a rearmed West Germany tightly integrated in the Western bloc.
[edit] Soviet terms for proposed reunification
- Germany was to be reestablished as a united state within the boundaries established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference.
- A single united German government was to play a role in the negotiations of the peace treaty.
- All occupation forces were to be withdrawn within one year following the date on which treaty came into effect.
- Political parties and organizations were to have "free" activity.
- Germany was to become officially neutral and not enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance.
- Germany was to have its own national armed forces and would be allowed to manufacture munitions for these forces.
- Germany would have access to world markets.
- Former members of the German armed forces and of the Nazi Party, except for convicted war criminals, could join in establishing a peaceful and democratic Germany.
[edit] Continuing Political and Academic Controversy
The West's rejection, including the U.S. rejection, of the 1952 Soviet offer to unify Germany created a controversial political and academic debate and established a post-WWII "stab-in-the-back" theory to parallel the post-WWI "stab-in-the-back" theory of German political history and international relations.
Whether Stalin's offer was genuine or simply a tactical manoeuvre to disrupt the ongoing military integration of the West was the subject of a heated debate at the time. No Soviet or East German document released to date offers substantial evidence that Stalin was prepared to abandon the GDR and reunify Germany, although earlier documents indicate Stalin did have an interest in German reunification. Although most historians deny that Stalin was serious about reunification, this question was never definitively answered.
[edit] References
- Steninger, Rolf (1990). The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification. New York: Columbia University. ISBN 0-231-07216-3.
- Walko, John W. (2002). The Balance of Empires: United States’ Rejection of German Reunification and Stalin’s March Note of 1952. Parkland. ISBN 1-58112-592-5.
- Smyser, W.R. (1999). From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-23340-X.
