Talk:South Africa and weapons of mass destruction

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I do not think South Africa really destroyed their nuclear weapons. If they did, what was the main reason for them to do so? User:152.106.240.139

You have to understand it in context. The process of dismantling Apartheid was begun by the National Party under F.W. de Klerk from 1990 onwards, with an eye to a full democratic election in 1994. Even in 1990, the party's leadership knew that the general elections would almost certainly lead to a group like the ANC taking power, and they regarded the potential ownership of nuclear weapons by the ANC as something that was rather undesirable. The primary reason for this (said to have been reinforced by American and European pressure) was that the ANC had received a lot of support from rogue states such as Iran, as well as having close ties with some extremely dodgy groups, and they would therefore feel an obligation to repay these groups and states once they assumed power. It was felt that if the ANC inherited the nuclear weapons program along with the sophisticated ICBM program, they would not hesitate to export the technology and/or equipment to states like Iran. As for whether they actually did dismantle the weapons, it needs to be pointed out (as the article does) that the SA govt invited the IAEA to inspect all its nuclear activities and sites, and that the IAEA has since praised this as the most open and complete inspection they have ever been able to undertake. For example, during the diplomatic rounds that preceded the Iraq War, South Africa's complete transparency and full assistance during the 1993-1994 inspections were held up as examples of what Iraq was NOT doing. Considering the thoroughness of the IAEA inspection, it's impossible that South Africa was able to retain nuclear weapons. Impi 08:35, 20 August 2005 (UTC)

Thats rather interesting, I never new that the SA gov. was so open about it, but I did know that they disarmed. What if they hid a nuke down a mine shaft for a rainy day? Pure conjecture of course! Banes 04:24, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Well, the way the IAEA gets around that is to account for the nuclear weapons material. For example, if the records show that a certain amount of uranium and nuclear weapons parts were manufactured, and they realise they can't account for some of it, they get suspicious. It's also pretty hard to fudge up all the documentation and keep everybody involved quiet, because somebody will always talk. After all, to store a nuke underground would require the construction of a fairly decent underground chamber in order to keep its condition as stable as possible, and it would need to be guarded 24/7. Considering how many people would theoretically be involved in the construction of the chamber, in moving the weapon, and in guarding it, I think it's pretty certain that somebody would have talked by now. In addition to that, a single nuke isn't all that useful, for a real rainy day deterrent, you need at least two or three. The reason for this is that we only have one delivery method for a nuke, the Cheetah D. If we did have a nuke, and got into trouble, we would need to threaten to use it to get our attackers off our backs. However, a single fighter aircraft is not that hard to shoot down, and is therefore less of a deterrent. Aside from this, you need insurance for the period after you use the bomb, otherwise you'll just be invaded. So with three nukes you can use one, and say: "I have more, don't come any further!".

This is all conjecture of course, ultimately it would make no sense for SA to use a nuke, as it would bring rapid retribution, possibly in nuclear form as well. Besides, the IAEA inspection was thorough, and the NP REALLY didn't want the ANC to gain control of a nuke, so rest assured, we don't have any more of them. Impi 10:02, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

I don't think SA retained a nuclear weapon, but the Vela Incident does call into the question the amount of openness to the IAEA. If it was a nuclear test, it is likely SA didn't disclose something someone knew? If it was an Isreali test (more likley than SA test), it is likely there was some SA logistic support or knowledge, that could have been disclosed to the IAEA. -- Rwendland 12:55, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

There is a chance that South Africa didn't dismantle ALL thier weapons, and it wouldn't be suprising if they didn't. The reason why is that South Africa has a long history of independence from the rest of the world, and thus developed thier own weapons.many of thier scientists to this day STILL manufacture heavy weaponry, such as tanks, cruise missles, etc. and beside, how many times throughout history has a major government organization said that something was undercontrol and taken care of when it wasn't? in fact, we don't know the extent of where the investigators were allowed, whether they were bribed, (a far reach really, though), and number of other factors. in Iraq for example, investigators had restricted movement. the same could theoretically be the same for South Africa. 71.132.148.122 19:35, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

There would be very little reason for South Africa to maintain nuclear weapons these days, and high consequences if they were detected. One can posit endless conspiracy theories but without any good reasons to think otherwise it seems like a waste of time to take any of them seriously. --Fastfission 20:01, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] The strategic threat

In the context of the developing strategic threat - during the latter 70s and into the 80s - the possibility that Soviet-sponsored and directly-supported conventional invasion of e.g Namibia/SudWesAfrika via Oshikango/Ovamboland and/or Walvisbaai, and/or Transvaal/Natal via Maputo was real. Viz the 60,000 Cuban combat troops inserted into Angola during the mid-80s..... The expectation was that these would be supported by Soviet long range bombers striking with stand-off weapons at strategic targets in the RSA, such as LMB/AFB Grootfontein ( Ovamboland ), LMB/AFB Waterkloof ( Pretoria ), SAN Simonstown, vulnerable logistic supply rail/road links, and concentrations of SADF forces. Such long range bombers could operate from only a few large and well-defended base facilities in sub-saharan Africa, such as Luanda in Angola, and few of the SAAFs tactical aircraft could reach that far and survive. A strategic weapon was required to destroy such bases and deny their strategic support and interdiction facilities to Soviet surrogate forces.

The belief that South Africa developed only half-a-dozen quite crude nuclear devices is mistaken. A sophisticated 'deep penetration' delivery system was well-developed, sharing technologies and testing with Israel. Some of this technology has found its way elsewhere via the Pakistani rogue nuclear engineer Dr. Abdul Khan, lining quite a few ANC pockets in the process.

Do bear in mind that 'a viable weapons system needs not only a viable means of production, but also a viable means of delivery.' South Africa had that in its ageing but capable Canberras and Buccaneers, as well as the Cheetah D. -- NeueSoutie 13:07, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

Points well made, followed by good edit to article.Phase4 21:34, 11 September 2006 (UTC)