Talk:Solipsism

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Is this following line actually necessary?

Solipisim is a view that ignorant and conceded fools share while living in denial and in a small self-absorbed world.

It is a value judgment, and I don't think it has any business in an encyclopedic article.

155.212.41.197 20:58, 14 March 2007 (UTC)Matthew Graybosch

A page on Solipsism that doesn't mention Stranger in a Strange Land? I'm shocked, simply shocked. Xoder 06:05 Apr 20, 2003 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] Solipsism not as a stand had within the Material view of the universe, but in opposition to Materialism as a universal view

The Tormont-Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary defines Solipsism only as a philosophy which is;

"1. The theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified. 2. The theory or view that the self is the only reality."

This is to make definition necessary for what 'self' this means in a Solipsist context.[Normxxx Here:  'Self,' as would all terms in a solipsist world, be strictly undefined and undefinable (what could you possible use as a source of definiens?) ] From the article it is taken as the "conception" of self, the mind. Which if viewing other physical selves and refuting those as an external reality it must. Although it definitionally must regard them as an internal reality; true to the one self. Therefore all reality is true not imaginary as it is then the only factor of idea in which there is any knowledge of self. It is reality but only as far as it is part of the self, because it is the only constitution of the self; having no external reality means one's own external body cannot be reality or the construction of the self above & beyond the perception of it for that implies a uniformity of nature in a material world beyond the self; only one's idea of which is what makes the singular reality possible. Therefore it is not correct to see Solipsism as generative of other minds for their own capacity, that doesn't exist to the Solipsist, only that it is generative of how the self knows them. I notice in certain regards this entry seems to assume Solipsism means body and it's senses not the ideas of those senses as it must mean to not be an assumption outside Solipsism, i.e. a physical root for the self instead of only the self being real. As the article is implying that your physical being is the only one that exists with the mention of death as an objection. Being that Solipsism is only infallible in the realm of idea, death as such cannot be even for means of posterity an objection. If only because the state of idea in the realm of death cannot be reasoned one way or another in theory. The same is true of the language argument, the answer isn't "boredom," because boredom itself implies an external source of stimuli, but rather that you yourself create meaning for language, words are true to themselves as far as a self makes them, it is the meaning one alone applies to them which make them exist, which if they did not exist as true to the self, the self would not exist in that it is built out of it's understandings which, in Solipsism, is seen as itself; language is a result of asserting the self, it is not learnt, the meaning of language is synthesized arbitarily from perceptions the self is left to in reflection. The 'brain in a vat' mention is another contradiction; Solipsism is an ideology without presuppositions, not a presupposition that it's conception of self within the universe is the only one of them to exist in the universe, but that it's conceptions in their entirety create the universe indistinguishable from the self. [Normxxx Here:   Much of this is true but besides the point. For convenience, we use language as if there were a real world (whatever that means) inhabited by no fewer than 6.5 billion souls or so. ]Nagelfar 03:22, 10 Aug 2004 (UTC)

"We" ? 1Z 18:55, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

normxxx| talk email 02:54, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] David who?

And what objections does he have exactly? 207.99.6.125 08:44, 16 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Yes, this sentence needs more explanation than just what is there, currently... --NightMonkey 10:30, 22 October 2005 (UTC)
OK, I removed it. Here it is:
 A deeper objection, raised by David Deutsch, among others, cannot.
Without further citations, more mention of his devestating objection, and some justification for its noteability and relevance, it doesn't merit inclusion. --NightMonkey 09:59, 6 December 2005 (UTC)
David Deutsch's argument i s here1Z 00:14, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Buddhism and Taoism are not Solipsism

This article is extremly confused about Eastern philosophy. It is not that the real world is denied by Taoism and Buddhism, but that the self is redefined to include all of the real world. The belief is not that the world is illusion within the mind. I also notice in the objections a lot of arguments relating to Hinduism, which is, again, not really solipsism. In hinduism, one IS essentially considered to be God, which forgets he is god on purpose so as to have fun. But the Hindus believe that many people are God at once, not just one person viewing the rest. Also, this article itself says that solipsism does not make someone God, so the whole thing is contradictory.

[edit] Issue with the Article's Arguments

Wait a second; doesn't the very existence of socio-cultural human value systems that have to be taught to you indicate the existence of someone else out there? I mean, if you really are the only person out there, wouldn't the only value system be a solipsistic one? Also, what's with the lack of Matrix references? -HurriSbezu

To answer questions (1) and (2), no. The very existence of socio-cultural human value systems that have been taught to me would indicate only the existence of information. How that information came to me (whether by a human civilization of which I am physically a part or through electrodes hooked up to my brain by a mad scientist) is unknowable. Unended 23:29, July 20, 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Worldwide delusion

When stating that human beings live in a state of "illusion", a worldwide delusion, you're completely rejecting human feelings and human beliefs. That even if we are living in an illusion, this illusion IS our reality, thus making the illusion the realest it can possibly be. So by one completely ignoring the acceptance of reality, if or if not this reality is an illusion, this illusion throughout humanity has been recognized as a reality, thus putting solipsists back to step 1. --Starsky


The very idea of solipism rejects human beliefs. Also the idea of illusion and reality you are using a different from the definitions used in Solipsism.Bengaska 15:09, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Bertrand Russell

Is there any place for the Bertrand Russell anecdote? http://www.netfunny.com/rhf/jokes/91q3/moresolip.html AnonMoos 06:26, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

I have added it to the metaphysical solipsism page. I think there is a case for re-integrating that page with this one as it is rather short.1Z 18:53, 14 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Wrong defintion?

I was taught that Solipsism meant "The belief that I am the only thing that exists" and that the view "The self is the only thing that can be known to exist" was called Skepticism about the Material World. The important distinction of course is belief versus knowledge. Conflating the two together makes the rest of the article confusing to me.

I think I'm responsible for that and open to it being altered if that is majority opinion (which it probably is). I think solipsism is fundamentally an epistemological position on what it is possible to know, but recognize I may be in the minority. This article in Encyclopedia Britannica takes the epistemological position, as do other sources (you can do a google search for 'solipsism epistemological' to find them). I would ask, however, that if the epistemological position is not in the forefront, that it least be mentioned in the article. Unended 05:10, 13 December 2005 (UTC)
  • i agree, solipsism as i know it is phil of mind, not epist so much. I'm going to remove the meta vs epist distinction from the introduction? hope this does not upset anyone. Spencerk 07:20, 9 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Descartes

Descartes: "I think therefore I am" seems to me to state this philosophy in a nutshell. Since it is such a famous quote, is there a reason it doesn't appear in the article? Is there a distinction between solipsism and Descartes' thoughts? 82.12.124.3 00:42, 8 January 2006 (UTC)

Well, technically, Descartes was a dualist. But since Descartes' God was so easily dispensed with, Descartes (almost inadvertently) also gave rise to modern solipsism. So, I added some words to the Intro. ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 03:51, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

I wouldn't say that "I think therefore I am" is solipsism in a nutshell. For this reason, to say "I think therefore I am," is far different then saying "I think therefore everything else is." Descartes' statement is an affirmation of his own existence, it doesn't concern the rest of the universe. In general a solipsist would agree that "I think therefore I am," however; not everyone who agrees with that statement would be considered a solipsist. Not by a long shot. Nom Déplûmes 16:52, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Nonsense

"All of these objections can be dispensed with an appeal to the solipsist's free will."

I am sorry, but this is without any philosophical ground. Whilst the first two objections might be "dispensed" of, I don't think the solipsist can dismiss the fatal argument of language. Language is a public form of life which is not only encountered privately but also publicly, within a certain social context. When the solipsist says "I exist" (and this is not WP:NOR, you will find that philosophers such as Wittgenstein mentioning it) he assumes the existence of something which he wishes to deny; it implies the public shared world of others. Furthermore, an appeal to logic or empirical laws of nature will contradict his solipsistic position, since that is an appeal to a non-mental, public world shared by others. --Knucmo2 23:51, 27 January 2006 (UTC)

If your brain were in a vat, why could not the programmer who is outfitting you with all the information about the "external world" also not outfit you with language? Objection dispensed. Unended 02:56, 23 February 2006 (UTC)
True enough, but the 'brain in a vat' thought experiment itself is a refutation of solipsism, since all else but the mind in the 'brain in the vat' (including the 'brain in the vat') is part of an external world the mind is busy denying! All that that experiment proves is that you can induce a total illusion in a 'mind'— and my dreams prove that! ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 04:39, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
Yes, but the brain in a vat is just a way to get people to think. It isn't actually what solipsism is about. All solipsism must maintain is that information exists. It needs not brains or vats. The "external world" is all information. All we know is that this information exists. We know not from whence it comes. The "information" is the "external world" as you know it. Solipsists need not deny the existence of any external world. Only that one can have any knowledge of it, since all we really know is that we possess information, source unknown and validity forever unconfirmed. I agree your dreams prove that one can induce a total illusion. And that is sufficient to prove (epistemological) solipsism's validity, but most people (such as apparently yourself) require further argumentation, because they do not understand. Hence, the brain in the vat. Unended 03:59, 2 March 2006 (UTC)


Many, many years ago, when I became a convinced solipsist, I came up with a refutation to DesCarte ("I think; therefore, I am!"), with apologies to Bishop George Berkeley. If you assume a God who created you for an instant, with your memories intact, then for that instant (which would have no duration in time), you would only apprehend you are thinking (the actual act of thinking requires some time duration). Nevertheless, I eventually came to realize the primacy of DesCarte's dictum; but I could go no further— ergo, solipsism!

Furthermore, an appeal to logic or empirical laws of nature will contradict his solipsistic position, since that is an appeal to a non-mental, public world shared by others.

That is so trivially refuted, I can only believe you have not given much thought to the subject. Who says those "others" are not merely phantoms of my own mind? The "non-mental, public world shared by others" visited by the "delusional" or even me (or those "others") in my ("our") dreams is readily conceded not to exist! What's so special about the 'real' world, except your delusional perceptions (or mine)?

Solipsism is irrefutable! normxxx| talk email 21:36, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Why do you talk of MY (another mind) perspective on solipsism then? Or am I just another phantom. [of course you are!] When you say "who says" - well I assume therefore you mean that only you could say that others are phantoms of your mind [But any of the phantoms could claim as much.]- since no one else exists. If you are convinced that I am a phantom - why have you felt the need to respond to such a phenomenon? Could your disagreement with my belief exist if there was not another mind [Sure; I invented you to ease my boredom. Probably for the same reason that YHVH created man, if you believe such. Are you telling me that there can be no Atheists, because to say you don't believe in God, first you have to premise God? That's a puerile argument.]- I think not - no such conflict of beliefs would have arisen in the first place; solipsists would see no use in communicating with another subject as there would be no subject assumedly to communicate with.[There are thousands of virtual worlds out there, all created by versions of my mind for their own amusement. What's one more?] Enough of such business - I am not hostile to solipsism, just that the "free will" dismissal is out of the question. [Well, I have no quarrel with that; as one user said, "free will" is probably undefinable at best and meaningless at worst— certainly to a solipsist.]--Knucmo2 00:04, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
This is easy enough to dispense with. You ask why any solipsist who was "convinced" that you were a "phantom" would respond to you. The answer is simple: because there is nothing else to do. If you are only a figment of the information I possess, not real, but all I possess are figments, why should I not engage you? I have nothing to lose, and you preoccupy my time (as I perceieve it). If I am a brain in a vat, and some mad scientist created you to intellectually spar with me, why should I not spar? What else do I have to do? Within this world, the intellectual debate gives me something to do. It passes the time. Is there no use for a solipsist to communicate with "another subject"? Of course there is. What else is he/she to do? Even if you are a figment of my imagination or somebody else's imagination that I get the pleasure of perceiving, why not talk to you? Unended 07:03, 27 May 2006 (UTC)
Whilst I despise your arrogance in dismissing free will a meaningless and undefinable thing (much as the Logical positivists dismissed ethics as meaningless) I shall state that this debate must continue elsewhere. It is clear that this debate has no longer any bearing on this article - we'll discuss via email. --Knucmo2 13:37, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
Sorry; I really didn't mean to be so brusque, but I was wearing my solipsist hat! I simply do not see how any term may be formally defined in the solipsist universe, nor how such a term could solve any problems or answer any arguments. Again, as a neo(?)logical positivist/scientist, I fail to see how (1) the concept of 'free will' may be operationally defined (or at least unambiguously defined, sans paradoxes and contradictions), or (2) that it has any content worth (scientifically) exploring. As a metaphysician, I really haven't given it much thought! I will await your correspondence; I will admit, I have not explored this subject for many, many years. Have there really been some (new) and valuable insights? (WARNING: I absolutely reject a deterministic universe.) normxxx| talk email 22:42, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
First, stop with the arrows; they're unnecessary and somewhat irritating. More importantly, this discussion is going nowhere. Opinions from real external philosophers can be included, but this original research debate is pointless. Superm401 - Talk 03:45, 17 February 2006 (UTC)
I had already made the point that the debate was going nowhere previously by the way. My original reservations about the article were not original either (Wittgenstein and stuff borrowed from IEP) - of course it went off on a tangent. --Knucmo2 13:24, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] RfC response

not that this is really all that productive an argument...  ;-) ... but free will itself cannot be explained. free will implies that a valid choice exists, and a valid choice implies incompatible outcomes. therefore something exists in the mind (the un-chosen outcome) which can not be created by the mind - so where did it come from?

old and appropriate Descartes joke - Descartes had just finished writing his famous line "I think, therefore I am" and was sitting back savoring it, when his butler came in and asked him if he'd like a cup of tea. Descartes thought about it a second and said "no, I think not...", and promptly disappeared from the universe.  ;-) Ted 09:29, 13 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Saffism

Nixdorf: You were right to remove; sounds like just another "philosophical" restatement— which would need a very strong magnifying glass to note the nuance of difference (if any). normxxx| talk  ?email 02:19, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds

The International Encyclopedia of Philosophy

"In introducing 'methodic doubt' into philosophy, Descartes created the backdrop against which solipsism subsequently developed, and was made to seem, if not plausible, at least irrefutable. For the ego which is revealed by the cogito is, Descartes held, a solitary consciousness, a res cogitans which is not spatially extended, which, as such, is not necessarily located in any body, and which accordingly can be assured of its own existence exclusively as a conscious mind. (Discourse on Method and the Meditations). This view of the self is intrinsically solipsistic, and Descartes evades the solipsistic consequences of his method of doubt only by the rather desperate expedient of appealing to the benevolence of God. Since God is no deceiver, he argues, and since He has created man with an innate disposition to assume the existence of an external, public world corresponding to the private world of the 'ideas' which are the only immediate objects of consciousness, it follows that such a public world actually exists. (Sixth Meditation). Thus does God, in Descartes' philosophy, bridge the chasm between the solitary consciousness revealed by methodic doubt and the intersubjective world of public objects and other human beings. It should be clear that this particular evasion of solipsism cannot be availed of by a philosopher who at one and the same time accepts the Cartesian picture of consciousness and rejects the function attributed to God by Descartes - in view of this it is scarcely surprising that we should find the spectre of solipsism looming ever more threateningly in the works of Descartes' successors in the modern world, particularly in those of the British empiricist tradition."

See reference for more...

In A Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed. rev., St. Martin's Press, 1984), CSICOP Fellow Antony Flew calls solipsism "the theory that I am the sole existent. To be a solipsist I must hold that I alone exist independently, and that what I ordinarily call the outside world [including my body] exists only as an object or content of my consciousness. This doctrine, though doubtless psychologically very difficult, if not impossible, to hold, is philosophically interesting in that many thinkers have thought it necessary to attempt refutations, or even to admit that, however bizarre, it is strictly irrefutable. Once we concede...that the immediate objects of sense experience are mind dependent (ideas, impressions, sense data, etc.), it is indeed questionable whether we can argue validly to the existence or nature of a mind-independent external world." ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 02:42, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Nearly all objections can be dispensed with by an appeal to the solipsist's free will.

I haven't a clue as to what is meant by that statement. In trying to find the original source (and maybe a further explanation), I googled the web and discovered that the identical definition of solipsism which appears on the wikipedia article page also appears in over a dozen other web encyclopedias and stores/sources of information. At this point, I would suppose it impossible to establish who was copying whom. But can anyone tell me the meaning of the headline phrase? ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 04:15, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

Lol, that was what my original post was about. I don't think any philosopher or thinker of note has ever said that! --Knucmo2 10:05, 19 February 2006 (UTC)
Yes, I apologize for our off-topic argument; I came into the middle somehow, and thought you were challenging "solipsism" per se. My thing is "philosophy of science" and, I have discovered that (probably because of the roots in empiricism, etc.) many, if not most, scientist/philosophers are closet dualists! I readily admit solipsism is completely impractical and probably an empty philosopy as noted; but it has one virtue, as far as I am concerned, it incontestibly refutes dualism! In fact, if we do away with Descartes' God, even he was a solipsist!
P.S. Based on further research, I believe that Wikipedia has the claim on priority of definition! None of the other definitions reflect the evolution of the definition (even to the stripping down of Deutsch's 'objection,' which I consider to be excellent!) They simply seem to reflect the most recent change (but one!)
P.P.S. What can Free Will possibly mean to a solipsist!?! I mean, mustn't one assume Free Will (or some equivalent) if one is a solipsist? What is it that the solipsist's Free Will is free of!?!⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 20:34, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Solipsism versus Other Philosophies

If you check out my latest addition to the main page, you will see why I am a solipsist (it sounds better than 'naive materialist'). ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 00:20, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] counter the final objection

calling it empty and without content fits nicely into the zen and buddhist view (^_^) And btw, I am a solipsist and would not mind answering any question regarding it. Jiohdi 21:23, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Corrected the responses to the objections, as they were all showing a bias of someone who is not obviously not understanding solipsism from inside that belief. there were "we" and social constructs given as answers, where no solipsist could contemplate such as part of reality. Why would a solipsist bother to correct things for others he does not consider real? Because they are real parts of his own being, and their misunderstandings are part of his overal insanity that he may be seeking to cure... just as one body is made of many parts, one reality is made of many minds...which are ultimately one. just like word and paint can both be running very different code on the same machine at the same time, two minds can be holding different data and still be a part of one whole.

There was also a notable antagnoism towards anyone who takes this view seriously, as I do. Jiohdi 01:52, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

We needn't go too far into motivations; for solipsism, that's a whole other thing. I edited your edits to bring the thing more in line with Western philosophy (and correct some grammar), although I agree that Eastern philosophers have studied solipsism (probably more thoroughly than we in the West), but under different names. My specific objections are invisibly embedded (do a 'page edit' to see them) on the main page. I think a very useful addition would be a new section comparing and contrasting the Western and Eastern philosophies of solipsism, introducing us to the Eastern philosophical terms and their precise definitions (as best we can manage it) in English. Do you feel up to that?
P.S. "sterile philosophy," now in the last objection, simply means it leads to a dead end; there can be no further analysis or questioning. Taking anything on "faith" is not an acceptable philosophical position in Western philosophy (for the reason that there can be no further analysis or questioning, among others), except in Western religious philosophy, which is usually distinguished as distinct. In other words, since there can be no counterargument to a "faith" argument, it is not itself acceptable as a counterargument.⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 20:08, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

I like the recent re-edit after I reverted. Nice clarification, and didn't expand the argument into a message-board post. If we could get some sources and citations, that would be good too. Ultimately, any "objection" that we can reduce to a link (either within WP or to something authoritative externally) is a great improvement. Something like:

no one cares 
see nihilism.

Not that that's a valid argument, but it's a decent example. -Harmil 22:06, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

Normxxx, I'm sorry by your recent edits are not actually encyclopedic. You seem to be carrying on a discussion in this article as if it were a message board. Please, re-write your contributions in the style which is used across Wikipedia. -Harmil 13:25, 23 February 2006 (UTC)

What is your problem? My most recent additions were taken with only minor edits from the International Encyclopedia of Philosophy, whose credentials are at least as good (and probably better than) yours. They are also properly referenced. As far as I am concened they pass muster; if you don't like them, you are free to modify them in accordance with your whims. Arbitrary deletion constitutes vandalism! ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 23:04, 23 February 2006 (UTC)
I'm sorry that you feel that way. Here is a list of concerns with regard to your edits:
  • You introduce a question in an argumentative style. This is a fine style for a lecture, not an encyclopedia
It is not a requirement of encyclopedias that they be terminally boring, and the more modern encyclopedias (such as Wikipedia) are becoming increasingly less 'formal.' The object is to convey information/knowledge as painlessly as possible. What's wrong with a question that captures the essence of the contrast between solipsism and non-solipsism? You think some tedious locution would be preferable?
  • Heavy use of italics for emphasis in ways that communicate little or no extra information to the reader
Reduced the amount of emphasis
  • Use of underline which conveys no information and makes the text harder to read for many users
Eliminated underlines
  • You've extended the introduction substantially, which makes navigation harder, while adding information which isn't actually introductory
Broke out the addition to the Intro (to a separate section)
  • Incorrect use of —
From the Manual of Style: "The em dash is used in much the same way as a colon or set of parentheses: it can show an abrupt change in thought or be used where a period is too strong and a comma too weak. An em dash can have spaces on either side or not, depending on the writer's preference or in-house style rules" I might add that in modern usage, the em dash is used in preference to a semi-colon or colon. However, I removed a few (and substituted a : ; or .)
  • The final paragraph is a tautology, and should not end with an exclamation point in any case.
I am afraid I don't see the tautology (if such exists). Restating the definition in another form (for emphasis) is not a tautology. I eliminated the ending exclamation point, which was intended to indicate that this was a restatement of the premises arrived at by argument and contrasting with the view of the 'last (non-solipsistic) man alive.'
I hope you're not taking this personally. I think the idea is good, but the execution needs to be re-thought. I initially reverted your edit with a comment suggesting how it could be re-worked. That wasn't intended to be a brush-off, but an honest invitation for further contribution. Simply re-working it according to Wikipedia style would resolve all of my concerns.
Well, I tend to take it a little personal when I am brushed off, intentionally or not. When I was a young systems engineer, I occasionally had a manager that would tell me, "I have a rock in mind; please go off and design me a rock." So, I would go off and design a rock and take it to the manager, who would promptly say, "That's not the rock I had in mind; please try again!" It took me a while to realize the futility of that; by the time I became a chief systems engineer, some 20 years or so before I retired, I just laughed at such a request. Your current request is much more reasonable, and I have tried to accede to it (within reason).
Trying to push the edit through without resolving those concerns isn't helping either of us. -Harmil 03:27, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
I agree. ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 20:15, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
My, but inline edits make it hard to tell just what it was that I had said. I wish you would not edit my comments that way. :-/
It's really quite simple. The bulleted text was yours; the indented text was mine. This follows the standard wiki discussion format; or, are you just trying to be argumentative?
I found this statement interesting: "It is not a requirement of encyclopedias that they be terminally boring, and the more modern encyclopedias (such as Wikipedia) are becoming increasingly less formal." This is a statement that I see on Wikipedia fairly often, and usually from someone who is looking for an excuse to have a conversation in the form of an article edit. Q&A of nearly any sort borders very closely on original research if the questions have not been asked and answered before.
And here I thought I was being original! (Can you provide a reference of one other such quote?)
If the questions have been asked and answered before, then an encyclopedia can simply record the results, rather that the conversation.
This shows a basic misunderstanding of philosophical discourse. You think all of Plato can be resolved in one or two sentences per book?
However, you have cleaned up the edit, I suspect about as much as you're going to, so I'll leave it to other editors to take it from here. -Harmil 07:24, 25 February 2006 (UTC)
I have no quarrel with that. ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 00:04, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Bias removed

As a philosophical category of analysis, the viewpoint of the solipsist is entirely empty and without content :That is, other than coloring the world with a shimmer of illusion, with or without the solipsism, the world would remain absolutely the same— so where do we go from there? Viewed in this way, the solipsist seems only to have found a facile way to avoid the more difficult task of a critical analysis of what is 'real' and what isn't, and what 'reality' means. has no place in a factual record, it is nothing but an opinion made by those who do not share the solipsist view and contradicts the importance mentioned above it. Jiohdi 15:28, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

But this was listed as an objection or counterargument to solipsism and it is a good one, so please don't remove it. Simply add your (solipsistic) counter-counterargument!

⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 20:53, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

its really an opinion which makes a valid objection, but it was written too universally, so I have modified it and edited it to make it more accurate. Jiohdi 22:49, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

Nice change. But be careful; for the solipsist, "reality" is meaningless! So, I added single quotes to that last "reality." What do you think of my new section on "Solipsism versus other philosophies?" Still hoping for a compare & contrast between solipsism and the Eastern philosophies. Have fun! ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 23:24, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

Actually, my reality, that of a solipsist, is not meaningless, as I find meaning arises from my concern over my next move... I care about pain and pleasure and understand both of them arise from my own very being. I also experience my true nature as uncreated, unpuprosed and possibily random beyond simply unpredictable...and so every move I feel I am actually able to make is a gamble to some degree and behind all goals I find a single goal... peace of mind. understanding that I am all that is, the whole of reality helps me to see the interconnections between my point of view and that of those who inhabit my mind... my inability to find total peace of mind without attempting to bring peace to those parts of me who currently suffer... like the many cells of the one body.Jiohdi 02:44, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] about the eastern philosophy

I agree that many E philosophies don't see a distinction between the self and the rest of the world. But I think the link between saying that everything is one and saying that only the self exists is tenuous. If everything is one, to call it the self seems egoistic. Do any eastern philosophies actually say that only the self exists, and everything is part of the self? WhiteC 15:55, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

But, if they argue that they are merely a small part of the whole, then they are dualists (see Descartes and Bishop Berkeley). But see my latest addition to the main page (Solipsism and other philosophies) to see how all dualisms (of me and the other) simply reduce to me and my unconscious.
Jiohdi: Can you provide us with an authoritative opinion here?

⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 21:20, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

Buddhism recognizes the notion of self and soul as a chicken and egg problem with out answer... if the self is all there is, how is it possible to perceive or dream something other than what the dreamer is? if the dream is not the dreamer, than what is the dreamer? if the dream is an exact match to reality itself, then the dreamer can never be certain of that as a fact since he only ever knows his dreams or perceptions... so the Buddha placed this in the category of questions that must be refused as they only cause sufferings to those who ponder them too seriously... he said that there is no permanent self and the opposite view was equally flawed. (many western buddhists ignore the last part and cling to the first and in doing so make the absurd statements that self is just an illusion).Jiohdi 18:58, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

Beautiful! Great minds not only wrestle with the same questions, but seem to come up with the same set of solutions (or, non-solutions), independently. Buddha's irresolvable 'chicken and egg,' —questions that must be refused as they only cause sufferings to those who ponder them too seriously— conundrum has been recognized in the west, at least since the time of the Ancient Greeks (is there anything they didn't think of?) This is relective of Xeno's paradoxes and Kant's antinomies: equally plausible and opposite arguments to explain the same thing, but which are irresolvable. ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 20:35, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
"...if the self is all there is, how is it possible to...dream something other than what the dreamer is?" Becuase selves have an inherent ability to imagine things that don't exist?1Z 17:24, 14 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Solipsism versus Other Philosophies

Which I had cut out and put here... This was a new section titled "Solipsism versus Other Philosophies " by Normxxx. The (lengthy) part I cut out is immediately below. Reasons for moving it to the talk page follow...

In all particulars, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between solipsism and the dualist philosophies, e.g., of Descartes or Bishop Berkeley. We have only to substitute the solipsist's "unconscious" for the dualist's God as the author of all (apparently) external events and objects. Indeed, a similar argument may extend to most other systems of philosophy.

"[M]ost philosophers, for the last two millennia at least, have been— and still are— quarreling about whether the world is actually there, the material machine we experience during working hours at least, or if it is a bunch of ideas, something not material anyway, the material world being some kind of perceptive illusion. The two warring factions are called materialism and idealism; none too original. Idealism often— after its most famous proponent— is called Platonism. Religious thinking tends to be some form of idealism.[1] [2] [3] [4]

"Solipsism is idealism taken to extremes, only one dreamy substance existing, that of ones own ego and its entire universe. In so [simplifying things], it becomes fully congruous with a straightforward, non-dualistic materialism, 'naive materialism' as cocky sophisticates call it. That is the beauty of it. It suddenly emerges as a perfect unity, a fusion of two ways of incompatible thinking, as there is no compartmentalization between the ego and the rest of the Universe. The trouble, both with materialism and idealism, you see, is that they invariably end up with an embarassing dualism between the thinking I and the rest of the world.

"Materialism seems straightforward, but then most people find they have the mind-body dualism as a problem. They shouldn't, because that specific problem arises from taking for granted that minds somehow are non-material (that is: idealistic ghosts in the materialistic cupboard, outright magical, non-physical ghosts). If you stay a sane, 'naive' materialist, realizing that the mind is a material machine in action, the brain PC writing to its screen, no dualism is perceived. [To the 'naive' materialist, the 'mind' is no more ephemeral than the execution of a computer program.]

"Now, if you follow me on the solipsist road, looking around, what do you see? The normal world, exactly identical to the drab materialistic one of working hours at least, but you can have no mind-body dualism problem any longer, as all of it is a monolithic you, your thought, your dream if you prefer. Idealism is pooh-pooh as well, as you and the world together are just one 'idea', one thought, one dream. So, you think, how nice: I can live, I even have to live in this one, undivisible world, and obviously I can toss a coin to decide whether I call it "solipsist" or "naively materialist", as they are fully congruent, phenomenologically fully identical, but clinically free from dualism, from any dichotomies."[5]

If we reduce most other systems to a duality between "ideas" and "matter," then to the question which category determines the other, one may answer:

  1. matter (materialist position);
  3. ideas (idealist position);
  4. neither (empiricist position);
  5. we cannot know (agnosticist position);
  6. that debate is empty (pragmatist position);
  7. both (eclecticist position).

But, it is clear from the arguments of all philosophies, that one can only infer the existance of matter and ideas, from their appearance in one's own consciousness. Hence, all other philosophies than solipsism must make certain inferences about the 'Universe' in order to proceed. [6]

... OK that is the end of the bit I cut out.

I didn't delete it wholesale because I thought that would be quite rude, since it is quite lengthy, and it may contain some useful points. But I have several problems with it.

1)The above text includes numerous quotes, but none of these quotes are from famous philosophers--they link to an external site that I can't even read (possibly because I'm color-blind). If the text is supposed to refer to some external authority, then I don't see this article as an authority on the subject of solipsism. If the quotes are supposed to be from someone worthy of mention in an encyclopedia, they need to have references to those people. And if the material is supposed to stand by itself, regardless of who said it, then there shouldn't BE any quotes there at all.

2)Much of the above text is POV--it exhibits a point of view which not everyone may agree with. It keeps saying things like "solipsism is..." rather than "[philosopher X] thinks that solipsism is..." In other words, it seems to be a personal opinion, rather than an NPOV definition.

If the author of the above section would like to respond to these criticisms, then perhaps we could figure out how to incorporate some of the text back into the article. WhiteC 01:47, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

The very first paragraph of the new section, on solipsism versus dualism, relies on the article from IEP which is used to authenticate so much of the rest of this article on solipsism. I agree my other sources were not very famous, but the content is beautifully argued— that should count for something— I believe I can find the more serious philosophical antecedents/references for each of these beautifully argued points— and will.

For some off the cuff preliminary examples, see above references.


⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 03:53, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

OK. I'll have a closer look at it soon. I suspect I may still have some problems with it, but it definitely looks better than it did before your recent changes, and I'll have to spend some time looking at it. Thankyou. WhiteC 05:10, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Solipsism versus Other Philosophies (Continued)...

Well, I am impressed. This work is very well referenced. It makes good sense, and I would suggest subheadings for the other philosophies you are comparing it to--although it is very good, the section is quite long. My remaining problem is with the last paragraph, which reads like a conclusion to a research paper... undoubtedly a very good research paper, but it seems to me to be original research in the way you put things together from different sources to reach a POV conclusion. (If you disagree, or you don't understand why this is a problem for an encyclopedia article, let me know.) WhiteC 02:20, 1 March 2006 (UTC)

No; I do agree with you on the last paragraph. Problem is, all roads in philosophy seem to lead to one end, and one end only— just choose your end! However, I will try to modify the end here so as not to sound like a conclusion. And thanks for the kudos; I was inspired! ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 04:18, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
Well, I tried. But it still comes off as a kind of conclusion. I have decided that (as Hamlet said of Horatio), the problem lies within myself, and so will attempt no further.


A newcomer here. I've rewritten some parts of the rest of the article to try and be more clear, cutting out what I felt to be some needless apostrophes and emphases; feel free to say if they distracted from the actual meaning. I also rewrote some of the objections, which some felt rather straw man-ish. I still don't really understand what is quite going on with the Wittgenstein one, but I didn't feel safe rewriting it, since parts of it seem to be a quote. I also added the morality objection; sure, it doesn't have any legs philosophically, but I've seen it come up in every single casual debate of the topic.

Also, as for the "people die" objection, I easily could have gone back-and-forth a few more rounds, but I felt it was best to cut it short. The non-solipist could volunteer to kill the solipist and find out if the solipsist was right or not, and why the solipsist was so nervous about the prospect. The solipsist could reply that he bets his unconcious brain is a fan of reincarnation, or perhaps even possession with changed memories, so 'killing' this currently awake part of his brain in the context of the unconcious won't do much, maybe. It won't be a guarenteed true death.

I couldn't find a good place to squeeze it in, but this article runs the risk of allowing for equivocation in parts. It'd be good to make it more clear when it's talking about epistemelogical solipsism vs. metaphysical. The epistemelogical variety, making the weaker claims, is much more difficult to assail and has fewer implications as well. For instance, epistemelogical solipsism could be true AND reality could exist (heck, maybe God too). Just because our only true knowledge was of ourselves doesn't mean that there wasn't an underlying reality feeding it; we just couldn't be sure. The metaphysical variety takes the radical step that because we can't prove that this reality exists under the epistemelogical version, therefore it doesn't. Yes, stating it that way makes it pretty clear it's the logical fallacy of shifting the burden of proof, but I'm not sold on the metaphysical variety as you can see, so... but yeah. It's somewhat similar to the transition between agnosticism and atheism ("I can't find God, therefore God must not exist.").

Anyway, as for the real reason I'm here, I also have some serious problems with the Solipsim vs. Other philosophies section. It's certainly researched, which I will assume that WhiteC checked and it's good... but lots of it seems, well, irrelevant. A bit of a background on materialism & idealism is reasonable, but there seem to be long digressions on things that don't really tie into solipsism. But I'm hesitant to just delete it. Other parts are stated assertions that seem POV. Perhaps it could even be pawned off to another page?

A few specific comments...

"But such an argument leads to solipsism, not dualism, since then the Descartes body could only exist as an idea in the mind of the person Descartes."

I don't think this statement is at all self-evident, and I don't think Descartes would either. Is there a source for this? I suppose we could always use the ephemeral "A solipsist might say that such an argument leads to..." There's also the fact that this argument is basically, um, false. You can certainly say that you can stop here and end up with solipsism, but then you have to show why this part of the argument is compelling, but Descartes's later statements on the existence of bodies aren't (even if he can't assume them as axioms like he does with Descartes the mind, he does at least think he's proved them as theorems.)

Idealism, Idealism & Modernism, Historic Roots...

As noted above, I think these sections could use some combining and shortening, unless their relevance can be more directly ascertained.

Solipsism is idealism taken to extremes[29], only one dreamy substance existing, that of one's own ego and its entire universe. In so simplifying things, it becomes fully congruous with a straight-forward, non-dualistic materialism, 'naive materialism,' as cocky sophisticates sometimes like to call it[30]. That is the beauty of it. It suddenly emerges as a perfect unity, a fusion of two ways of incompatible thinking, as there is no compartmentalization between the ego and the rest of the universe

What huh?! Okay, I'm actually curious to here your thoughts on this (and maybe read up a bit more on these links myself) in a forum setting, but this is not remotely self-evident for an encylopedia. Why is pure materialism equivalent to solipsism? Sure, I suppose that if you die, then your personal window to the world closes and any further material interaction is irrelevant, but that only counts if you think that only your experiences are the only thing that matter (meaning you've already accepted solipsism). But just as a quick example: if the dreamy ideal decides to rewind time to 1850 except with more ninja clowns and make everyone not notice anything different, well, so be it. If the 'ego' decides to repeal the laws of causality, again, it can do it. The materialist universe is dramatically different; there are certain laws that must be obeyed becuase there isn't any other way for them to be. The "rest of the universe" is NOT your ego.

Which is to say, that the choice of 'worldview' is probably arbitrary: everyone will still behave the same in the end. All 'worldviews' may be shown to be roughly congruent, at least as they affect the everyday behavior of their adherents! And all seem to nicely account for all of the everyday phenomena recognized, resulting in paradoxes only if their results are reexamined using another 'worldview.' Even the prudent solipsist looks both ways before crossing the street.

Same problem as above. This is proof by assertion, and at best should be a viewpoint attributed to somebody, not a statement of fact. Suppose that the universe is actually solipistic for me, and I "wake up" to some degree and am able to control my unconcious mind (Neo in the Matrix style?). Guess what? I don't have to look both ways before crossing the street! I can just always walk on a raised platform that automatically appears whenever I want to cross, or make myself invisible and incorporeal to passing cars, or rewind time every time my old body gets hit. Even if I haven't "woken up," if I believe the world to be solipsistic, the morality arguments in the Objections I added would result in a very different worldview (or, at the very least, COULD result in a very different worldview). The theological idealist will do whatever she believes God to command; the materialist might follow either egoism or secular humanism; but the solipsist, knowing that in some sense they created the world, can treat it entirely as their plaything. It'd be no different than something made in SimCity; you only choose to respect the rights of others because you feel like it (or, alternatively, gave some to them voluntarily), not because they actually have them. I don't believe that these three viewpoints lead to congruent actions at all. For another example, look at suicide bombers- if your soul is the only thing that truly exists, you should be happy to give up your body to please God. Materialists might do it only if their happiness or respect for others demanded that they commit suicide. Solipsists, though, well, who knows how they might react to the proposition- whether they believe that they cannot die in their own delusion and so fire away, or else that when they die, the world dies, so they'd never choose to do that option.

(It should be noted that Hinduism & Buddishm are a little different on this; my impression is that rather than emphasizing that the world is you, they emphasize that you are the world, and so safeguarding the world becomes a little more important, while de-emphasizing yourself and your delusions of independence. There aren't as many magic reset buttons. It's a matter of focus; rather than "I am the entire world, Rargh!" it's "I am nothing but part of the world").

So, yeah, enough ranting. The general point is that it'd be a good idea to make the parts of this section to keep a little more distant. I wasn't the one who stuck the "verify" tag on, but while there are lots of links, perhaps we could rephrase the assertion parts to make it more obvious who would claim this or that. SnowFire 19:52, 14 March 2006 (UTC)

Normxxx: I chopped up your piece. It's a bit of a work in progress, so feel free to restore parts; I took out some of the statements I mentioned above as being fairly strong without much qualification or backing. I'm not averse to putting them back in, but I would suggest that they need to be rewritten to be less argumentative and more encylopedic. Currently, I got the feeling it was basically saying "and this proves exactly why every other philosophy is really solipsism in disguise!," except it didn't really seem to offer a convincing proof (and I say this outside of the fact that I happen to be a non-solipsist; there are plenty of reasonaly well-argued points that I don't agree with elsewhere, but I just don't see how, say, humanism is really solipsism by assertion. At most, perhaps Schiller was, sort of.). Plus, it lingered over the idealism/materialism ground without really adding much later on. I tried to add the notable bits to the main Idealism/Materialism section, and cut the rest, keeping the focus on solipsism and how it would relate to other philosophies.

Again, there's no rancor in this, and I think the article on the whole will be stronger for the addition... but concision is also a concern. SnowFire 23:17, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Idealism

Idealism is the view that there is ONLY mind. Platonism - as taught in Philosophy classes - It the belief in Plato's theory of Forms. Platonism is often referred to as Platonic Dualism, as it posits not one, but two fundamental substances, matter and the Forms, with which one is aquainted by a spiritual intellect.

[edit] 206.213.209.31's changes, and the Objections section.

Jiohdi, it was good trying to clean up 206.213.209.31's work, but I think it's just entirely worse from the version before. It sounds very cheerleadery ("I still exist and it'll never be disproved! Hahahah!") and not at all encylopedia-like. The addition to the "Life isn't perfect section" is a gigantic dodge that doesn't even make tons of sense- you are you. Perhaps he or she is referring to the standard idea assumed in solipsism that you don't know your own unconscious desires and that they may be different than your conscious ones, but that's already addressed in the ignorance statement.

Another reasonable concern is the addition that TheOtherStephan made to the Wittgenstein objection. Now, I happen to agree with his point, but it seems to just be repeating what was already said in the previous sentence. I happen to not really get that entire objection at all- like someone copied some random stuff from a philosophy book- which made me nervous about removing it, since maybe it's actually a really good objection in disguise. Perhaps the best thing to do would be just to remove that objection entirely, unless someone can stand up for it. SnowFire 22:16, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

as it was it was all over the place, talking about YOU, the solipsist and the one speaking to the solipsist in no particular order or fashion, so I tried to unify it all into a dialogue format.... and I moved the philospophic analysis to its own section as it is not an objection really.Jiohdi 21:22, 8 April 2006 (UTC)

Hmm. Not sure I agree with the idea of moving it to a dialogue format. The main problem is that it doesn't really allow for quite the back-and-forth the more detached, neutral format allows. For instance, a dialogue works better when there is one consistent dissenter who has a point, but for an encylopedia entry on solipsism, we'd kind of want to mention all the problems raised with solipsism, even mutually contradictory ones. That said, you have a point that the Objections section in general could probably use some revision to make it clearer who is doing what.
As for philosophic analysis, sure it's an objection. It's perfectly valid to say "this may be true, but it is useless." In fact, this may be the most damning of all the objections provided, since it still makes its point even if everything solipsism says is true. If you want philosophy to not be merely true but also useful to some degree (a not uncommon desire), it's a good objection. SnowFire 16:29, 10 April 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Observations by 204.228.117.202

--Word from anonymous author - I myself am somewhat of a Solpsist, but not exactly the true meaning. I believe that everything exists, but only exists around me. For example, a person is to believe that everything they have experienced in their life is led up to be exactly what they are at that moment, and latter experiences will build them up to be somebody important. They also believe that everybody exists, although not in that body at that exact time. What we are seeing as people is simply an illusion from possibly another "universe", "time", or simply not exist at all. Upon one's death, they could believe that other "universes" or "times" realize this, but do not pay much attention. Much like a graph with six billion lines, each showing the events of one persons life, and as one ends another starts, and these lines merge with others although the lines do not know of themselves or lines around them. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 204.228.117.202 (talk • contribs).

(Moved here from article) // Nnp 21:50, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Skepticism vs. Solipsism

Re: "Solipsism is first recorded with the presocratic sophist Gorgias (c. 483-375 BC) who is quoted by Sextus Empiricus as having stated:

Nothing exists

Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it, and

Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others

Solipsism is generally identified with statements 2 and 3 from Gorgias."


I believe these statments are basically Skepticism and not fundamentally Solipsism.

For your consideration:

Skepticism:

Fundamentally Skepticism originated as a response to the eternal debate between Realism and Idealism. The Skeptic intervened with the observation we cannot determine whether Reality is real or an illusion, therefore the debate between Realism and Idealism can never be settled. We will never know the truth. A more radical form of Skepticism is a natural extension of this observation which then assumes since we cannot know this fundamental truth about Reality, and everything is part of Reality, we cannot know the fundamental truth about anything.

Solipsism:

Fundamental Solipsism begins where Skepticism leaves off. The Solipsist states ‘I don’t care’ whether Reality is real or an illusion. If I cannot tell the difference, then to me there is no difference. The only thing that matters to me is how I perceive Reality. If I kick a rock I will perceive pain whether or not the rock is real or only an illusion in my own mind.

Rational Solipsism goes further in its observation that since I know I exist, but I cannot be certain anything else actually does, then the only Reality is the Reality that exists in my own mind. It makes no difference what so ever if there is independent existence beyond my perception. If I do not observe it; it does not exist in my Reality. Fundamentally we are all Rational Solipsist within our own minds as the only Reality we can be aware of is the Reality which we personally perceive. Whether our perceived Reality is a true representation of what actually exists is beyond our ability to ascertain since we can only know what exists within our own perceptions. When we perceive an object we are not actually seeing the object itself; we examine the image of that object that is projected within our own minds. We cannot know for certain how any other mind is perceiving that same object, or its own Reality.

Absolute Solipsism takes the concept to its extreme and states since the only truth that exists is in my own mind, and my mind is the only mind I can be certain exists, then everything I perceive must be an illusion of my own mind. No thing, and no other minds, really exists. I am absolutely alone in my own Universe.

Note that neither fundamental or rational solipsists genuinely entertain the concept their minds are the only minds that exist. Their fundamental abstraction is in the observation of their own Reality and make no real distinction between Realism and Idealism, while the absolute solipsist is squarely in the Idealist camp. Absolute Solipsism garners the most attention and is almost universally defined as the exclusive definition for Solipsism. Since Rene’ Descartes famous exclamation “I Think; therefore I am!” most modern philosophy is an extension of Fundamental or Rational Solipsism prejudiced by the philosopher’s own leanings toward either Realism or Idealism.


The Demise of Realism:

Until the latter part of the 19th century our perceptions of Reality developed from the unchecked debate; despite the protest of Skepticism and Solipsism, between Realist and Idealist. While Realism propagated in the West, Idealism maintained its influence in Eastern philosophy and Religious concepts. Western philosophy has the Realist concept the Mind exists in the Universe. Eastern philosophy maintains the Idealist concept the Universe exists in the Mind.

Western Science is descended from Realism as is most Western Religious concepts. Both maintain a Dualism of a real world fabricated from an unknown fundamental substance in which we are only participants and have little or no control over anything outside our own bodies. Eastern philosophy is more Holistic in its approach maintaining the Buddhist concept there is emptiness at the heart of all matter and we are all connected and responsible for our Consensus Reality.

Late in the 19th century Western thinking began to change, and by the beginning of the 20th century a full fledged revolution took place as the leading minds in physics discovered they had all been transformed into metaphysicist. Bohr, Heisenberg, Einstein, Planck et al, realized the study of the physical was essentially the study of the metaphysical nature of Reality. Einstein’s proclamation “Reality is an illusion; albeit a persistent one.” discarded Realism down the Quantum rabbit hole taking Skepticism along with it. Contrary to the proclamation of the Skeptics that we can never know the true nature of Reality, it was Western Science that unraveled Realism to discover there really isn’t a fundamental particle anywhere to be found. Once we dissect our physical universe down to the Planck length we found all matter really is composed of “emptiness” and Reality is a Grand Illusion. The question now confronting Quantum Theorist and Philosophers is how does that illusion work?


cck

29 April 2006

C.C.Keiser

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by Cckeiser (talk • contribs) .

The Case for Solipsism.

The place to begin is at The Beginning, but in order to do that we must first give an answer to two of the fundamental questions confronting philosophy. The first is The Fundamental Question; "Why is there "Somethingness" and not Nothingness?" The second question is closely related, and that is the question of the First Cause of "Somethingness."

Of course I know "Something" exists. The fact that I am asking the question is proof sufficient. Even if I entertain the Idealist concept that all I perceive is an illusion, and then embrace the Solipsist proposition the illusion is only in my own mind, I am still left with the fact that my mind exists. My mind is "Something," so therefore "Something" exists.

In order for Something to exist, Something must have always existed. The reason is, we cannot get Something from Nothing. A true Nothingness is devoid of all essence so therefore there is no-thing in Nothingness to induce evolution into Somethingness. The "Null Set" is the most stable of all probabilities and is consequently beyond perturbation. The very unnature of Nothingness precludes any possibility of transformation. If a true Nothingness were ever the case, a true Nothingness would always be the case, and there would be a zero probability of any thing ever existing.

I exist! I am "Something," therefore Something must have always existed, and the answer to the Fundament Question "Why is there Somethingness and not Nothingness" is simply because Nothingness cannot exist. The odds of Nothingness ever existing is nil! The second question of First Cause is therefore rendered moot. There never was a First Cause; "Somethingness" is Infinite.

If we entertain the Realist concept of materialism, were a substance exists, then it must exist in something; a container of some kind. If it exists in a container than we must trace that container bact to the First Container; back to its First Cause. We can say the physical Universe is the container of all substances, but is the physical Universe the First Container, or is it contained in yet another container as the Quantum Theorist propose?

Eventually we must arrive at the First Container which contains everything but is not itself contained. This First Container would then be an Infinite and Unbound Singularity, and we therefore arrive at the very same conclusion as the Idealist. There is just no way to get Something out of Nothing. Somethingness is Infinite and there never was a First Cause.

This brings us to the next fundamental question; "What is "Somethingness"?"

We really don't know. We use circular definitions of one unknown quality to define another unknown quality, and then go back and use the second to define the first. Something that "Exists" is that which we perceive to be "real" What is "Real" is that which we perceive to "Exist"! The only consistency in our definitions is "that which we perceive." All is perception. For anything to exist it must be able to be perceived by our senses. Our senses instruct our minds what is being perceived. Therefore all that exists, exists in our minds. Without perception there is no existence, and without a mind there is no perception. Without mind there is no existence. What is the "Somethingness" that exists? That Somethingness is Mind. The Mind is the only certainty. It is the only existence we can be certain of. All else is uncertain and dubious. If A is equal to B, and B is equal to C, then A is equal to C. My mind; my Consciousness is the infinite Somethingness that exists.

Which brings us to Solipsism: My Mind is the only Mind I know for certain exists! Since all I can know about any thing is what I perceive, and every thing I perceive is perceived by my own mind, I cannot determine the true nature of anything existing external of my own mind. Therefore everything I perceive is my own mind. My mind is the infinite Somethingness that exists. It is the only thing that in fact exists, therefore all else must be part of my own consciousness. Every thing I perceive does not actually have an existence independent of my own consciousness. Every thing my mind perceives is an illusion generated by my own mind, but since I am not consciously aware of manifesting this illusion, everything must be synthesized by my subconscious mind for my conscious mind to perceive. If I have a conscious mind and a subconscious mind, how many other minds do I have that I am not consciously aware of?

The Solipsist Solution to The Problem of Other Minds.

All other minds are Alter-Egos of my own mind. I know about Multiple Personalities where one person can exhibit two or more different personalities which in some cases are vastly different to each other; even different in gender, but they are all manifested by the same consciousness which is often not aware of its own alter-egos. These alter-egos can be of different ages, have different skills and speak a different language unknown to the other ego. We are all each others Multiple Personalities, and all of my other alter-egos compose my subconscious mind. It is from all these other egos I receive the information I use to create my our perceptions of Reality. It is the information I receive from my subconscious mind that enables or limits my own abilities and forms the illusion of a physical Universe.

In an Infinite and Unbound Singularity of Consciousness there is infinite room for infinite egos. No ego is the First Ego. All egos are equally the First Ego and therefore share the same infinite consciousness. The only thing that separates one ego from another is it own perspective. It is this difference in perspective that gives each of us our own individuality and gives meaning to our own minds.

C.C.Keiser May 17, 2006

cckeiser 01:03, 19 May 2006 (UTC)

Link removed by request. My apologies. (I'm still learning the Wiki-ways)

If you also have an objection to the rest of this submission; which is basically "original research", even thought it is based on the traditional philosophical debate on Solipsism, please feel free to remove it entirely.

I will not be offended in the slightest.

It is obviously not a NPOV, and was submitted here for the sole purpose of providing the Solipsist point of view which is not, in my opinion, very well represented in the article.

cckeiser 03:59, 20 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Realism simplier?

"Occam's Razor would then suggest that the existence of reality might be a simpler solution than a massive unconscious mind."

I can't say the above is true, one cannot say which is less of a jump for Occam's Razor to apply to either postulate over the other; starting from your own perception the problem of the unification of all separate phenomon in the universe has the observer in common, and are so solved in a root cause (solely a psychology of sorts). Whereas in the realists view every instance needs to be taken down to a physical cause, which has your own perception dealing in it's presentation to ones own person to be perceived anyway, which may as well equally violate Occam's Razor by the minds eye projecting the external as self-existing and duplicating the steps of systematizing an answer to questions of phenomena. Nagelfar 05:51, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

I'll be honest and say I don't quite understand what you're saying here, but even if you disagree, this is an argument used by realists (so if you have solipsist sympathies, you don't have to believe it). Occam's Razor is just a rule of thumb anyway, so even if you do believe realism to be "simpler," it doesn't prove it. Anyway, I'll just say that if you were to ask a random "man on the street" what the simpler explanation for their favorite team losing the big game was, their star player being injured, or it all being part of a vast cosmic illusion by their own unconscious mind for unknown purposes, I suspect that 99% of them will say the injury explanation is simpler. Not a proof, naturally, but this is not an inherently ridiculous statement that no one believes. SnowFire 15:32, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
There is a difference between common sense and occam's razor. Simplifying a postulate (as much as possible from the standpoint of logical deduction) and the simplicity of understanding things grounded in common sense (from being conditioned by teachings and the interactions of sensory feelings) do not always equal the same. Taking apparent effects to other apparent causes may suppose an external matrix of events to orient oneself by, but the separate question of reducing the origin of it all from an absolute beginning has only ones perception as the sole variable; the eternal observer. You can reduce the matrix of cause and effect to a beginning by the physical quantum sciences by each cause in itself as a logical external-projection of the senses down to a big bang. Though it is still projected as an external from the stand point of ones own perception creating or positing relations as a vehicle for self-orientation and multiplication of experiences unique to the self. Nagelfar 23:46, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] General comments.

I think the early part of the Objections section got somewhat confused between Jiohodi's attempt to move it to the first person and Knucmo's attempt to move it back. I brought back some of the old statements, and generally tried to third-person it up. This had the unfortunate impact of making it much more gendered- using "he" and "him" and the like rather than "I" and "my" and so on, which I think is appropriate here. That said, I've seen admins run around demanding first-person purges even on places like the Free Will page where it would make perfect sense to write in the first person, but oh well. Third person it is.

It should also be noted that I removed the {[fact}} tag that Knucmo stuck in on the morality objection. You don't need to check your facts to know that A->B and "I don't like B" is not a valid argument, regardless of whether A or B are true. I point out that the argument can be salvaged if you can prove not B- that is, that morality exists for sure. But while it would be nice to have more references for philosophical debates on the topic, we don't need to have somebody hold our hand for simple logic.

I also removed the Wittgenstein objection that had been complained about before as making no sense. Again, if anybody wants to redo it so that it's easier to understand for laypeople, definitely go at it and put it back.

Should we remove the current Hinduism section? It doesn't have any content except a possibly out-of-context quote at the moment. Religious writings often need to be looked at holistically; this could well be a prep statement saying that one who has mastered themselves is ready for anything, and doesn't necessarily have a darn thing to do with solipsism. I mean, we SHOULD have a Hinduism section, but a good one, and a bad one may well be worse than nothing. SnowFire 17:22, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

The Wittgenstein argument needs to be reformulated, as it is from a major philosopher, plus, I don't see why it shouldn't feature. There's nothing wrong with "gendered" language; the whole thesis of language being a subconscious expression of patriarchy against women is vapid and has no place on a serious encyclopaedia. As regards the first-person, yes, it needed to be changed, and also some of the remarks were of a very colloquial tone; not ideal for an encyclopaedia. --Knucmo2 18:21, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
Well, the reference to Wittgenstein's book is still in the references section. It's that the part of the argument I could understand seemed mostly to be the language argument already in the list; I'd move the reference to his name there, but not being personally familiar with Wittgenstein's work, I would not want to do violence to what he thought by merely guessing at it based on a second-hand explanation of his thoughts. To put it bluntly, I consider myself reasonably smart, and the argument just doesn't make much sense for me. I don't know if that's Wittgenstein's fault, mine, or the person who originally wrote the entry. If there's some merit to the argument, hopefully someone who IS familiar can write up something better than the jargon-heavy old objection.
As for gendered language, not to go too off-track, but there doesn't need there to be a conspiracy for sheer accidents to have subtle effects anyway. That said, the neuter in English is by default male, and I'd rather not mangle the language ("Friends, Romans, countrypeople?"), so gendered terms it is. Still, in situations where they can be avoided gracefully, I don't see why they shouldn't be. SnowFire 19:59, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
As for gendered language, there is no such thing as a sexist language. The APA may think otherwise, I do not for various reasons, one being that it substitutes aesthetic judgment for political one; "The purpose is solely ideological" and fails to understand the nature of language. Another is that it makes the false assumption that words cannot have more than one meaning. But I'm not going to get into an argument as this politically correct thesis rarely comes under challenge and causes flames of indignance from its Orwellian defenders (I have been shot down in flames in real-life debate for this; this is not to say that ad hominem attacks weakened my argument at all). As for Wittgenstein's objection, it does need to be reworded without a precise of jargon where absolutely necessary, otherwise the jargon just becomes empty with an attempt to impress --Knucmo2 23:18, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Is Solipsism Falsifiable?

To Jon Awbrey: If I understand what you say correctly, you're saying that solipsism might be unfalsifiable psychologically, but it's falsifiable logially. This doesn't seem right to me. The original article was clearly not saying that solipsism is unfalsifiable as a matter of "persuading a particular person, with a particular psychological constitution, of the contingency thereof." There are absolutely former solipsists out there who have been convinced that their beliefs were wrong. However, as a matter of logic, no, there isn't a way to falsify solipsism. To do that, we'd need to basically show something along the lines of:

  • A is "solipsism is true" and B is some consequence of Solipsism
  • Therefore, A->B
  • However, B isn't true.
  • Therefore A isn't true.

But solipsism doesn't have any consequences we can check. All it says is that your perceptions are all you have, and you will always have your perceptions- and if you lose your perceptions, you will lose your perceptive capability to notice this. Solipsism posits no neutral, outside observer to check instead. Therefore, there is no way to falsify it. We can laugh at it, but not disprove it. Heck, even if we died, went to heaven, and saw Pearly Gates and flights of Angels and so on, a hard-core solipsist could say that this was the latest vision being granted by his mind to his conscious self.

Now, if there's a legitimate debate here, I'm more than willing to have it and perhaps put it in the article eventually, but it seems fairly cut & dry to me. Feel free to say why I'm wrong. SnowFire 19:45, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Let's be clear about one thing right from the start. An editor who places a statement like the one below in an article bears the fardel of proof for keeping it there:

Solipsism is logically coherent, but not falsifiable, so it is not testable by the scientific method.

JA: Power outages here — discusion to be continued when the storm passes. Jon Awbrey 20:04, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: SnowFire, the sillygism that you gave above tells me that you are working from an incorrect definition of falsifiability. It is a logical property of a proposition or a theory, equivalent to contingency or defeasibility, and not a pragmatic property, which is more correctly called testability. If X => Y and not Y, then we infer not X, This is an inference that X is necessarily false. But falsifiability is about the possibility of being false, not the necessity of being false. Jon Awbrey 20:24, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Lovely. I have to leave for a bit now as well, but a few things. I wasn't the one who put that statement in there; it's been there for some time (I believe it was added in Normxxx's major rewrite?). That said, as a reminder, this is in the first section of the article that serves as an introduction to the topic. Wordy debates on whether solipsism is falsifiable should probably not be here! If it turns out that there is something to say, then we should replace it with some weasaly "Philosophers disagree on the logical nature of solipsism, with some claiming it to be coherent yet unfalsifiable." Then we make a new section called "Solipsism and Logic" where we place the argument.
As for the burden of proof, you have a point, but I believe this to be a very base claim of solipsism. It follows almost directly from how much epistemelogical solipsism denies. Thus, nobody saw fit to add to that explanation. Anyway, I think that I proved that solipsism is unfalsifiable above. Again, if you see a problem with that, please point it out.
As for your explanation. Again, I don't see how psychology is exactly relevant to a logical issue. You mention that
To say that solipsism is unfalsifiabile is to say that it is a necessary truth, a tautology.
That's not true at all. To say something is unfalsifiable merely means that there is no way to prove the truth or falsity of the proposition. For instance, "there is an infinity whose 'size' is between aleph_null and aleph_one." This statement is provably unprovable. It's impossible to find the answer. That said, the statement still has a truth value; it's just that we'll never know if it's true or false short of divine intervention. I'm sure you can think of plenty of other examples of things that are simply impossible to know, yet can only be either true OR false.
As for your recent comment - I wrote the above before I saw it- rest assured I know something about falsifiablity. To quote from the article you linked: "Falsifiable does not mean false." I'm not saying that Solipsism is necessarily true! We agree, sort of! Saying that Solipsism is unfalsifiable very much admits the possibility of it being false. Saying solipsism is unfalsifiable is NOT a compliment.
I don't particularly want to get into a revert war, but I would humbly suggest that you or someone else either revert back to the old statement or else delete the section entirely until we can get hashed out here what the article should say. SnowFire 20:41, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Discussion of placement is another issue. I simply corrected-in-place the statement that was there. A separate heading somewhere below the introduction is probably sensible. I had no assumption about who put the previous statement there, but as the reverter of my recent amendment you became implicated in the defense of the prior statement. You may of course withdraw your support at any time. Jon Awbrey 20:54, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Well, I think the statement is reasonable, but it would hardly be the end of the world if it was removed. I'd much prefer it taken out if you disagree with it than have it replaced by your current statement, though; I don't agree with what you're saying at all. I'm less of a "you must cite every idea! No original thoughts must ever enter your head type!" than some on Wikipedia, but if you do write your own thoughts, you should be darn certain that they are either clearly true, or else reference them in a style like "some solipsists would say" whatever. Currently, you state as fact something I find a stretch even if it was prefaced by "some logicians say."
Anyway. For starters, there's the fact that logically, psychology and what people believe are utterly irrelevant. It doesn't matter if it's hard to convince people that (True And False) is False; it just is by the rules of the game. You keep on bringing up persuading people, their thought processes, and the possibility that they may be wrong. What does this have to do with anything? I don't see the relevance.
Secondly. "To say that solipsism is unfalsifiabile is to say that it is a necessary truth, a tautology." This isn't true at all, as your own linked article on falsifiability points out. Now, you noted that this might be true if you use the word "testable." I think the word falsifiable is more on point; as you yourself say, testable implies a pragmatic property, while falsifiable says "can this EVER be false logically?" Whether there are aliens on Gamma Hydronis 154 might be untestable currently, but it's certainly falsifiable. On the other hand, the existence of certain entities outside the universe that have no impact upon the universe might well be unfalsifiable, because while it might be true, there's no way to check (at least for people stuck in this universe, which would be all living people).
Lastly, the bit about picking the worst possible case seems to be a straw man. Who's used that to say that solipsism is unfalsifiable? I certainly didn't read that into the previous statement. You'll have to be more clear as to what you're getting at.
In short: The old statement said that the truth of solipsism is unknowable. If you disagree with the fact that that's what it said, then we can try and communicate that intent better in a new sentence. If you disagree with that fact, then can you propose a way to determine the truth of solipsism? SnowFire 02:22, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: First off, we agree that psychological arguments are irrelevant. That is just my point. All of the arguments that I've seen for the claim "Solipsism is unfalsifiable" are based on psychological arguments and betray a confusion of — whatever you want to call them — pragmatic, psychological, or rhetorical arguments with logical arguments. But when someone introduces a psychological argument, you have to meet it on those grounds and try to explain how it differs from a logical argument.

JA: Second off, the old statement said "Solipsism is logically coherent, but not falsifiable, so it is not testable by the scientific method". There was nothing about "unknowable", whatever that means, so let's stick to one claim at a time. Terms like "logically coherent" and "falsfiable" do have definitions in logic. Unknowable? — Who knows? Jon Awbrey 02:36, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Third off, unfalsifiable is not the same as unprovable or undecidable. Those terms also have definitions in logic and they are not the same concept as unfalsifiable. The typical indefeasible is really just a tautology whose syntactic form makes it difficult to recognize it as a tautology. Many strings of characters are simply not meaningful enough to qualify as a proposition that can be judged true or false. But the name for that is "meaningless", not "unfalsifiable". Jon Awbrey 02:44, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: By way of reducing excessive subtext in the article, I'm moving the following editorial comment to the talk page for discussion. Jon Awbrey 04:44, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

I happen to believe that logic is nothing more than a formal language, like mathematics, and as such is a pure creation of the human mind according to a few simple axioms. Correspondence to the physical world is the result of human psychology, not an aspect of reality!

Moreover, the metaphysical solipsist maintains that it is logically possible that only he exists. This supposition does not imply a contradiction nor an absurdity. I know of no satisfactory argument that shows that solipsism implies a logical contradition or some kind of logical absurdity. Therefore, it is logically coherent. As no (satisfactory) physical test of the proposition can be constructed, it is not falsifiable in the popperian sense.

I am pretty sure it is not a tautology, but many statements that cannot be falsified have the strong flavor of one, even though they clearly may be false, if that has any meaning for such a statement. They can have no empirical meaning! ⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 04:50, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Normxxx, in collating various arguments pro & con the falsifiability of solipsism, I tried to interpret what you intended by the following remark appended to the line about tautology, but I'm not sure I was successful in figuring out what you meant by it. Jon Awbrey 05:08, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

But of course, it seems to be, as one can have no direct consciousness of any other mind but his own.

As you can see from my addition above, you got my message! Thanks! I would just as soon kill the argument as between the logical and psychological aspects of the question, at least in this place— it might fit OK below, with the other arguments pro and con.⇒ normxxx| talk ⇒ email 05:55, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

To Jon Awbey: I still don't see what you're saying. I mean, I don't want to be rude, but you're grasping at tiny irrelevancies while ignoring my main point. You say:
Third off, unfalsifiable is not the same as unprovable or undecidable. Those terms also have definitions in logic and they are not the same concept as unfalsifiable.
...and so on. So, what is unfalsifiable? Humor me, here. It seems obvious to me that we're working off different definitions, but you haven't said what yours is! I've been trying to make it clear what version I'm using, but you instead object when I use not "logically defined" words. As I've said before, I'm using the definition from the first sentence of the falsifiabilty page-
In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are roughly equivalent terms referring to the property of empirical statements that they must admit of logical counterexamples.
By that definition, if you want to say solipsism is not falsfiable, you need to at least propose some kind of empirical counterexample to solipsism- which I asked you for before. But this isn't addressed at all in your addition to the article, currently.
Lastly, you still address "psychological" arguments that I have never seen made in the article ("I'm insane, therefore solipsism is correct?"), and you claim that they "betray a confusion of — whatever you want to call them — pragmatic, psychological, or rhetorical arguments with logical arguments." Well, fine, enlighten me. Why was my previous argument not logical? What are these phantom psychological arguments you are addressing?
Anyway. I tentatively agree with Normxxx that this should probably be under objections, depending on what you're trying to say. SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Questions about solipsism

JA: By way of trying to proceed incrementally but not cyclically, let's see we if we can estblish a series of base camps that proceed toward the con-summit article.

[edit] Definition of solipsism

JA: Question 1. What is the definition of the solipsistic (hypo)thesis, or "solipsism" for short? It is simply not clear at this point that we have (1) a single definition, (2) any coherent definition, (3) any consistent definition, (4) any definition that has its place in the context of an explicit theory of the sort from which any definite conclusions can be drawn. Lacking that fourfold root, I do not see how the article can become anything more than a motley budget of "Urbane Legends About Solipsism" (ULAS). Jon Awbrey 14:48, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Definition of contingent, defeasible, falsifiable

JA: Re:

To Jon Awbrey: I still don't see what you're saying. I mean, I don't want to be rude, but you're grasping at tiny irrelevancies while ignoring my main point. You say:
Third off, unfalsifiable is not the same as unprovable or undecidable. Those terms also have definitions in logic and they are not the same concept as unfalsifiable.
...and so on. So, what is unfalsifiable? Humor me, here. It seems obvious to me that we're working off different definitions, but you haven't said what yours is! I've been trying to make it clear what version I'm using, but you instead object when I use not "logically defined" words. As I've said before, I'm using the definition from the first sentence of the falsifiabilty page-
In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are roughly equivalent terms referring to the property of empirical statements that they must admit of logical counterexamples.
By that definition, if you want to say solipsism is not falsfiable, you need to at least propose some kind of empirical counterexample to solipsism - which I asked you for before. But this isn't addressed at all in your addition to the article, currently. SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: SnowFire, you seem to be reading the Falsifiability intro in a way that seems counter to its intention, which may not be your fault, but simply feedback that it needs to be written more clearly. That article was worked over for quite a long time by a host of editors, of which I was just one, so naturally I blame my co-editors for any defects that remain.

JA: At any rate, the picture I have in my head, which I was too lazy to draw there, is a venn diagram like this:

o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` U ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` ` o-------------o ` o-------------o ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\`/` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/`\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` `P` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` `Q` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` | ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` | ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` \ ` / ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `\`/` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` \ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` o ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` / ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` `\` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/`\` ` ` ` ` ` ` `/` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` ` o-------------o ` o-------------o ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` x ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
| ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o

JA: Let's say that P is the proposition we're targeting. Then all it means for P to be falsifiable is that there exists some counterexample to P, say, the point x in the lower left corner of the universe of discourse U. Jon Awbrey 04:28, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Okay. I think I may see the problem. First off, I misstated myself above. I do not need an actual empirical counterexample (although that would certainly work! It's just stronger than required), I want an empirical test whose result may provide a counterexample.
See, your test above works for something like "all crows are black." You plot every crow in the universe, and if any pop up in ~P, then it's false. Otherwise it's true. However, the general point is that there is some method of determining where that data point falls (look at the crow). That means that by my definition, it is falsifiable. If I go paint a crow white or otherwise find a white crow, I can falsify the statement.
I'm talking about propositions whose truth value cannot be determined. There is no test. Yes, it's on your Venn diagram somewhere. But we simply cannot tell where for sure. My picture would be one from Godel, Escher, Bach showing that in logical systems of sufficient power, there are provable truths, unprovable truths, unprovable falsehoods, and provable falsehoods, all intertwining. I'm thinking of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem by this; there are some things that we might in fact know are true that are nevertheless unprovable from within the system.
Let me try a physics-related example. You wake up one day, but you're in a small unknown room with no windows. You find a note saying that you've been kidnapped by aliens, and are either sitting in a locked room on Earth, or accelerating through space at 9.8 meters per second squared. The walls are perfect and let no radio waves, interstellar radiation, etc. in. If you can succesfully figure out where you are without leaving the room, you can go free! Otherwise, the Earth gets it, or your significant other gets kidnapped, or something bad. Suppose the aliens have kindly also given you whatever scientific measuring devices you like, and maybe kidnapped a few of the world's best scientists to help. How do you figure out the answer?
If you've familiar with your Einstein, you'll know that the answer is "flip a coin."* There is no difference between gravity and acceleration; they are exactly alike in measurement. There simply is no test that can be done. Nevertheless, one of these cases has to be true; there is a truth value.
Now, let me put it to you this way. What is your preferred term for this concept, unprovability? Whatever it is, that's what the sentence meant by "falsifiability." I think falsifiability works as a word too, but if you have a better one, feel free to suggest it.
* (Okay, if you had ridiculously godlike instruments, you might theoretically be able to detect a vague difference across the room via the curvature of the Earth, assuming the Earth is a perfect sphere. But details.) SnowFire 21:26, 15 May 2006 (UTC)
I don't want to be rude, but I think it might be helpful here to state our problem bluntly: Jon Awbrey clearly does not understand what the word "falsifiable" means in philosophy, and is adamant about his misconception. Thank you, Snowfire, for your valiant and patient attempts to get the idea across. Let me see if I can help:
A proposition is falsifiable if one can conceive of an empirical test (experiment) such that at least one possible outcome of that test would prove the proposition wrong. It does not mean, as JA seems to believe, that the proposition is necessarily true, even less that it is a tautology. For example, the statement
The universe is full of pink three-legged elephants, which do not interact with the rest of the universe in any way and never have.
is unfalsifiable: no experiment could disprove it, since the pink elephants by definition do not interact with anything else and therefore could not affect any possible experiment in any way. Being unfalsifiable does not make it true, or even plausible, and certainly not self-evident or tautological. Conversely, statements may be simultaneously falsifiable and true. For example, let's say for the sake of argument that we all agree that the statement
If you drop an apple in mid-air, it will always fall down.
is true (assuming that we are on Earth, standing still, no wind, etc.). The statement is also falsifiable, however: observing a single apple falling upward would provide a counterexample and prove the statement wrong. Even though nobody has observed any upward-falling apple, falling upward is still a possible outcome of the apple-dropping experiment. Popper considered only falsifiable propositions to be scientific. (If you still doubt that this is the meaning of falsifiability in Popper's sense, please read any book or webpage about Popper.)
I will clean up the "Is solipsism falsifiable" section. - Mglg 21:35, 15 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Logical argument versus psychological argument

JA: Re:

Lastly, you still address "psychological" arguments that I have never seen made in the article ("I'm insane, therefore solipsism is correct?"), and you claim that they "betray a confusion of — whatever you want to call them — pragmatic, psychological, or rhetorical arguments with logical arguments." Well, fine, enlighten me. Why was my previous argument not logical? What are these phantom psychological arguments you are addressing? SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Psychological treatments of solipsism

JA: Here are some examples of psychological definitions of solipsism, psychological reasoning about solipsism, and psychological arguments that solipsism is unfalsifiable. Jon Awbrey 01:54, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

  • Solipsism is also commonly understood to encompass the metaphysical belief that only one's self exists, and that "existence" just means being a part of one's own mental states — all objects, people, etc. that one experiences are merely parts of one's own mind.
That's a definition of solipsism, at least a strong form of solipsism distinct from the mere epistemeological version. It has absolutely nothing to do with psychology, or a "psychological definition" (?? What is a psychological definition in philosophy, anyway?). To restate it: "I am all that exists. Everything else is a figment of my imagination." The comment on mental states is merely impressing that all "reality" is nothing more than perceptions coming from inside my head. This is a question of the true nature of reality, not of psychology. -(SnowFire, although not while logged in.) 138.89.233.213 03:21, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: That is one of many statements that are commonly presented as a "definition" of solipsism. Whether it is a real definition is another question, but whatever it is, it is a statement that invokes concepts of "mental states" and "mind", so it's psychological premiss. Any argument that is based on it will be to that degree a psychological argument. That is what the word "psychological" means. In contrast, a statement about what is inside a person's head would be an anatomical statement. Jon Awbrey 03:36, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Yet another example:

  • I am all that exists. Everything else is a figment of my imagination.

JA: Imagination is a psychological concept. So the proposed re-statement is yet another psychological statement about solipsism. Jon Awbrey 03:42, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

The problem is that this is confusing the helpful "try and visualize it this way" explanation of solipsism to be a claim of solipsism. By your current logic, you are out-solipsiszing solipsism, and everything in all human knowledge is psychological, because it involves a human mind somehow. This doesn't seem to be a helpful definition of psychological to me. I see psychological as meaning roughly "as relates to the thoughts and actions of humans."
I will try and put things more formally. When we construct the world logically, psychology is a very high-order concept. We need to start with Descartes first, and if we use psychology to prop up our initial statements, we're doomed. So. What do we have to start with? We have our perceptions and our thoughts. This is not up for debate; if you want to debate whether you're actually thinking now, that's fine, but it's not a question solipsism (or most of philosophy) bothers asking. This is an axiom of the system. We have perceptions and thoughts.
Now, what can we do with them? Realists might deduce scientific laws; theists might find God. The epistemelogical solipsist would say "nothing." The existence of these perceptions are the only things we can know for sure. There is no necessary casual link between our perceptions and anything else- the fact that it appears to correspond to some "reality" is cute, but not provable.
The metaphysical solipsist says that not only is there no provable connection between our perceptions and some outside source, but it unilaterally states that there is no connection. There's no proof for this, but lots of philosophical ideas are just "I think this sounds right." In other words, for the epistemelogical solipsist, there is P (perceptions) and it is inside U (the universe). It suggests that anything in U that "crosses over" into P cannot be trusted, because the Universe might be lying about its true nature. For the metaphysical solipsist, P is really all that exists inside U. Since P can't "look outside" of P to see if there's anything else, why not define U to merely be the current box that's P? If that really was the case, there's no way to tell the difference. How can you show the existence of something outside of P when all you can see is P?
Let's put this mathematically. I control U, which may contain some amount of numbers and I can change at any time. You can see the contents of P, which contains 3 numbers at maximum and picks 3 items from U randomly. Can you determine the contents of U (intersect) ~P, that is everything in U not in P? Even if every time you adjust P, you only see 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and {2, 3, 4} is currently in P; can you say that U (intersect) ~P is {1, 5}? No, you can't, because I might have added 6 since then. Heck, I might have taken both 1 and 5 away. Maybe there were only 3 numbers in U the entire time, and I always removed the numbers not currently under observation. Scientists would say that after enough tests, {1, 5} seem a good inductive guess, because I don't seem to be a whimsical God constantly screwing with U. Epistemelogical solipsists merely say "we can't know." Metaphysical solipsists make the logic jump that because it could have been the "remove everything not in P every time" case, therefore that is the case.
All the comments about "it's all in my imagination" is just trying to make the above easier to comprehend for human brains, as well as proffer a possible explanation for what the existence of only perceptions means. SnowFire 15:32, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Location, location, location

JA: Re:

Anyway. I tentatively agree with Normxxx that this should probably be under objections, depending on what you're trying to say. SnowFire 13:37, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Descartes drops back ... and drops the ball

JA: I have read the following statement from the introduction numerous times now and cannot figure out what it's supposed to be saying. So I'm moving it here for re-examination. Can anybody clarify its intent or rewrite it so that it makes sense? Gratia in futuro, Jon Awbrey 02:05, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

But, in introducing methodological doubt (via Cogito ergo sum) into philosophy, Descartes created the backdrop against which modern interpretations of solipsism subsequently developed and were made to seem, if not plausible, at least irrefutable.

I was going to say that I didn't think that the meaning of that could be recovered and then I discovered the source! The only thing that seems to have been added is the nonsense about "via cogito ergo sum" — "scripto ergo aporias". iggytalk 03:59, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Do arguments against solipsism also apply to a single god who was all there was at some point?

if one thinks of a being -the sole being- existing all alone, nothing to know, no one to learn from nothing to learn... could he have come up with morality and language and all the other things you deny to a solipsist?Jiohdi 20:35, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

the holy trinity of father = source = true nature = the Generator Of Dreams [G.O.D.] the son or the dreamer who actually expeirences the dream and the dream itself (^_^) Jiohdi 20:39, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Solipsism: "an extreme form of skepticism" or "belief"?

Well, it seams to me that at the very beginning the article falls into the little contradiction. How can solipsism be "an extreme form of skepticism" if, epistemologically, it's a "belief that one's self is the only thing that can be known with certainty" and metaphysically it's a "belief that only one's self exists"?

It's not a contradiction; it's just two different ways the term is used, one epistemologically and one metaphysically. If you use it in the former sense, you go one way, and if you use it in the latter you go another. Unended 06:49, 27 May 2006 (UTC)
You didn't get my point. I was not trying to stress the difference between the epistemology and metaphysics (that's beyond my knowledge anyway :) ) but the contradiction in saying that the "extreme form of skepticism" is a "belief". To my knowledge skepticism should be lack of belief. Let alone an extreme one... :)
Not really. Skepticism is a philosophy, a way of finding knowledge that questions assumptions and takes little for granted; it is not an end. It's entirely possible to be a skeptic and nevertheless believe in reality, science, UFOs, psychic powers, and whatever, just so long as you have proved to your satisfaction that this belief is rational, and maintain a skeptical reserve that you might be wrong. Certainly some skeptics deny everything, but it's hardly required, and it's possible to "lack belief" but do so under grounds a skeptic would deride. SnowFire 16:28, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
Still, I would avoid using the term "belief" with the skepticist point of view. You could say that a skeptic would take something as, say, "probable" if sufficiently proved. The term "belief" is related to the term "faith" that completely opose sceptic thinking. Solipsism can never be proved as the true point of view and therefore can never be taken as "probable" even if "posible" and can never be a true skeptic's weltanschau. :) Moreover, a slightest posibility of solipsism being untrue would make it ethically questionable point of view and therefore should be rejected untill completely proved. Since it can never be proved entirely, nobody can seriously act from the solipsist point ov view, just as nobody realy acts as a true believer in whatever god even if one claims to be, because it's so detached from everyday's reality. So to conclude, it is a bit malicious to conect solipsist fantasy and guessing with a noble skeptic thought, and it should be enough to say that a solipsism is a kind of belief in blah blah...
Skepticism involves a strong belief that reality can be proven, when it fact the only way to prove it is using itself as a proof. This requires a very strong faith in itself, so therefore solipsism would be a natural consequence of extreme skepticism. If you are skeptic enough, nothing can be proven good enough and therefore the conclusion would be that nothing exists. Oh, and to the people above who have claimed to solipsists, you are not, I am. :-)
Well, I am not a philosopher, but if anything, I really love logic and the way it draws conclusions. Your comment has couple of contradictory points. First, "very strong faith in itself" does not exclude the faith in other personalities, or other things as well, so you can not draw the conclusion that solipsism is a consequence of the faith in oneself. Second, if nothing can be proven good enough that doesn't mean that nothing exists – it just means that nothing can be proven good enough. But, I'm wondering what you meant by "very strong faith in itself "? Do you think that Descartes' bases of all the truth (cogito ergo...) is just a strong faith?

There are clearly two quite different meanings of the term solipsism:

  • one philosophical position that nothing outside of ones own experience can be known with certainty even to exist (a position which the brain in a vat though experiement pretty much proves, IMHO), and
  • one belief that nothing except ones own experience does in fact exist.

The former (the "epistemological" usage) is the extreme form of skepticism, while the latter (the "metaphysical" usage) is the belief. The opening sentences could and should be much clearer about this distinction. I'll give it a shot. - Mglg 02:24, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

What you say here is true Mglg, by my understanding, except for the highly questionable assertion about an extreme form of skepticism. Can't cite it right now and don't want to impose too much on the article. The editors will get it right ultimately, and it'll tend to stick once properly explained. Appreciate seeing your points about it. Any citations handy for the defs you just gave? ... Kenosis 02:55, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
No academic citations, sorry, though for what it's worth the American Heritage Dictionary has: 1. The theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified; 2. The theory or view that the self is the only reality. I just tried to clear up the apparent contradiction the anonymous user above pointed out. I don't myself feel strongly about the "skepticism" statement, I just preserved it since it had been there earlier and did seem to make sense now, once it was made clear that it referred only to the epistemological usage. Would you be happier if I change it to say "also called external world skepticism" which is the term used in the article Philosophical skepticism for the same position? My question is about is the "egoism" statement -- is epistemological solipsism really a valid meaning of "egoism"? Mglg 06:44, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
Thanks Mglg. It'll ultimately get sorted out, I expect. ... Kenosis 06:24, 17 June 2006 (UTC)

Guys, if you continue like this you'll make me cry. :) No way can you mix skepticism and belief in one word even if you call it "epistemological and metaphysical". It clearly deteriorates the value of the skeptical thought. Please, make up your mind. Maybe of some help could be that the "Internet encyclopedia of philosophy" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/solipsis.htm) says neither but: "For the solipsist, it is not merely the case that he believes that his thoughts, experiences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, the only thoughts, experiences, and emotions. Rather, the solipsist can attach no meaning to the supposition that there could be thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than his own. In short, the true solipsist understands the word "pain," for example, to mean "my pain." He cannot accordingly conceive how this word is to be applied in any sense other than this exclusively egocentric one." It is therefore merely mater of choice in attitude towards the exterior of oneself that goes as follows: if senses are not mine then they are no senses at all and therefore I don't care. The alternative could be: if senses are not mine than I can not know if there are senses at all, but then again there is a possibility so I better take care. Since not knowing can not be an excuse for not taking care, it's just an attitude of poor philosophical value. Lack of empathy is sometimes considered as a psychological disorder (autism...) and to make it a deliberate choice is inexcusable. Please, don't call it skepticism of any kind.

[edit] Questions about Solipsism section

Some hopefully uncontroversial minor clean-up changes in the last edit, but of note is deleting the "Questions about Solipsim" part near the beginning. It was not well-written and not clear to users without a large philosophical jargon background, which isn't conducive to what Wikipedia is. If Jon Awbey or another person wants to fix that section to be generally accessible, that'd be fine, of course. However, the debate on that seemed to lose steam months ago, and I was waiting to make any changes before consensus could be achieved. Since the debate was stalled, I decided to be WP:BOLD instead.

I did not put back the original statement that caused the brouhaha; for reference,

Solipsism is logically coherent, but not falsifiable, so it is not testable by the scientific method.

I think this still deserves a spot in the article; it was in the old Questions section as "unfalsifiable by the standard of Karl Popper," which I think is silly because that is the standard, basically. A minor note, but perhaps a qualification would work; or perhaps it could be moved to the new Metaphysical solipsism article. SnowFire 17:55, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Edit: Jon Awbey, I see you're back. I wish you wouldn't insist your side was correct, since you edited over my additions extremely aggressively before as well, but fine. I don't want an edit war, but let's resume the debate then as to what exactly you mean. I ran your section past three very smart, college-educated people and we couldn't figure out for sure what exactly you were saying. You'll note that's what I was complaining about above as well. I think that I disagree with your POV, but even if I do, that's not the reason for the deletion; it's because I'm still not even sure what you're saying. There HAS to be a better way to phrase this. SnowFire 17:59, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

JA: What? Just 'cause you think I wasn't paying attention, you think you can sneak your own POV back in? I don't see why posing the questions as questions somehow constitutes a more aggressive insistence on personal correctness than the attempt to hide the fact that there is any question at all. Jon Awbrey 18:52, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

No. Remember our debate up above? I disagreed with your additions then, but being a good Wikipedian, I wanted to hash out our disagreement on the talk page rather than have an edit war. You stopped posting to the debate. I waited two months to see if you would regain interest, and the debate was still stalled, and I still disagreed. So I edited the article. The fact that I waited and at least tried to gain consensus before changing does not imply that I am somehow being evil! You had a very long time to reply, even to say "You're wrong, go away."
Of course deletion isn't the best option, but it's better than having a badly written and confusing piece remain in the article. I would have tried rewriting it myself, but as you can tell from up above, I'm not even sure what the point is. It would be impossible to do justice to whatever was being said if I wasn't sure on the meaning! That's why I was trying to pester you above to figure out what you meant precisely.
Let me rehash again that POV has nothing to do with it. I have no problem whatsoever with opinions different than my own being in the article (so long as they are not presented as fact, natch). However, as a writer of the English language, I can assure you that the current section needs work from, if nothing else, a stylistic perspective. It is not clear to non-philosophers what the heck it's trying to say. SnowFire 19:11, 19 June 2006 (UTC)


Snowfire, before you and JA pull out the fists, please note that the "Is solipsism falsifiable?" section, at the time you deleted it, was heavily rewritten by me, so please don't blame JA for my unclarity. If you read my note at the bottom of "Definition of contingent, defeasible, falsifiable" above on this talk page I think you will see that I am on your side. In the falsifiability paragraph I was, perhaps clumsily, trying to make a point that I consider obvious yet conceptually interesting: Since even a solipsist accepts that perceptions consitute proof of existence (if not existence of oneself, then at least existence of the perceptions), therefore every other person than the solipsist has proof that something outside the solipsist does exist, namely their own perceptions. Indeed, that proof is of a form that the solipsist would find acceptable (since he accepts his own existence on similar grounds), if it could only be communicated to him, which it can't. If you still don't see what I mean, please explain what is confusing and let's converge on a way to reformulate it.

I left the reference to Popper, which you deem silly, in the section for two reasons: (1) As far as I could tell, the disagreement between JA and you seemed to stem from his giving the word "unfalsifiable" a different meaning than you and I do: he seems to mean something like so tautologically true that it cannot be false, while you and I (and Popper, and all philosophers of science that I know of) mean something like cannot be proven false by any possible outcome of any conceivable experiment. The first defines a truism, the second a scientifically meaningless statement. This conflict, being about a word, could thus be eliminated peacefully by referring to a precise meaning of that word in the article. Unfortunately the falsifiability article in its present state offers less than crystalline clarity on the matter, so I thought referring to Popper would be the best thing to do at the moment. (2) Referring to a source seems generally preferable to the OR-smelling habit, which we all suffer from, of stating unsourced "facts". I do see that referring to Popper is uninformative to the great majority of readers who don't know his work, so the (his) meaning of "falsifiable" needs to be explained in the article, with Popper's role being only to differentiate this meaning of the word from possible other meanings (which apparently exist, judging from JA's opinion).

I do agree with you that the "Is solipsism one or many?" section was deletable. All it communicated was "Not everybody agrees on the exact definition of solipsism" which is a truism about any concept, and empty unless followed by a list of differing meanings. Furthermore, in its present form the introduction does have exactly that structure: a list of two different meanings of solipsism, so it seems extra pointless to state again that there is more than one meaning, let alone dedicate a section to that message. - Mglg 20:36, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

Actually, let me apologize. I will admit to remembering the Solipsism debate only recently and only semi-skimming the section to see that it was still there; I was mostly looking at the talk section. And as you point out, the initial "is solipsism one or many" section is still quite deletable. Additionally, when I brought in the outside observers was only around the time of JA's initial edits. Now that I read it and look at the edit history, I see that you did indeed improve the section greatly. It makes sense. Your point is, as you say, interesting yet obvious in its own way. My preference would be to perhaps put it lower in the article, and not right in the beginning, but it does seem keepable.
As for Popper, that does seem a fair compromise, although I would have perhaps written it more aggressively.
I happen to agree that the initial section on differing definitions of solipsism is eminently deletable, as noted above.
It seems I jumped the gun. Thanks for the clarification, and anyone else have thoughts on the "Is Solipsism one or Many" section? SnowFire 20:45, 19 June 2006 (UTC)
Sorry, do you mean (with your second-to-last paragraph) that the separation of the two concepts in the introduction is also deletable? That I don't agree with. Currently there are two entirely different ideas being discussed in the article, and the introduction separates them (the rest of the article could do be better job of keeping them separated, but that is a different matter). One meaning is the position that any individual cannot be absolutely certain about anything except his or her current perceptions; the other is a worldview that nothing outside of the self does actually exist. The first meaning borders on the obvious and has IMHO been proven by the Brain in a vat thought experiment. The second meaning is far less plausible and borders on insanity. Various encyclopedias etc. seem to indicate that both these concepts have been referred to as solipsism. It would be highly confusing for Wikipedia to not separate them, if they are indeed both valid meanings of the word. If they are not, we should still separate them, along the lines of "The word solipsism is sometimes also used to refer to the...; this concept is more accurately called ..." though that particular formulation could be a POV can of worms, creating nasty debate about which meanings are "accurate". - Mglg 21:23, 19 June 2006 (UTC)
No, that's not what I meant; the introduction is fine (and, in an unrelated note, agree with your thoughts about the tenability of the two options- the first is timid yet "obvious," the second requires.... a significant leap of faith). I meant specifically the "Is Solipsism One or Many" section which, as you say, is a truism; of course people differ on what solipsism is, and this is already covered in the intro. SnowFire 21:33, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Metaphysical solipsism broken out as article

I note that Jon Awbrey recently created a new article Metaphysical solipsism for one of the two meanings of solipsism discussed in the Solipsism article. The other meaning has no separate article (yet). It seems that there are two logical paths: (A) delete the new Metaphysical solipsism article as a POV fork, or (B) Turn the Solipsism page into a disambiguation page, create a new Epistemological solipsism page, split the contents of the current Solipsism article to the two new pages and merge appropriately with the existing material on Metaphysical solipsism. Comments? - Mglg 20:48, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Reference to Samsara inaccurate

I believe that the reference to samsara is inaccurate here:

Pantheism While solipsism is not generally compatible with traditional views of God, it is somewhat related to Pantheism, the belief that everything is God and part of God. The difference is usually a matter of focus; the pantheist would tend to be identify themselves with being a part of everything in reality, which is actually all God beneath the surface. For instance, many ancient Indian philosophies advocate the notion that all matter (and thus humans) is subtly interconnected not only to our immediate surroundings, but to everything in the universe; that all we can perceive is a kind of vision, Samsara. The solipsist, however, would be more likely to put themselves squarely in the center as the only item of reality, with all other beings in reality illusions. It could be said to be another naming dispute; "The Universe" / "God" for the pantheist is "My Unconscious Mind" / "Me" for the solipsist.

Samsara should be replaced with Maya here, as this is the state of illusion referred to in Hinduism. It is the realization that all perceptions are illusion, or the realization of maya, that is the release from samsara, or cycle of reincarnations. Samsara is used accurately later in the article.

Agreed on maya, though Dharmic thought can also be considered panentheistic. But that; again, is a matter of focus! Khirad 07:55, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Is solipsism one or many?

For your consideration.

Before adding this to the main page and having it immediately yanked, I would prefer to get a consensus opinion and take care of any editing here on the talk page first.

Regarding: "This section is a stub. You can help by adding to it."

"Is solipsism one or many? Philosophical disputes about the character and the consequences of solipsism hinge on the questions of (1) whether there is anything approaching a rigorous definition of solipsism, (2) whether a unique definition can be singled out as the one and only proper definition, or (3) whether there are as many definitions of solipsism as there are solipsists."

(1): Solipsism, at its essence, states the only truth about Reality any Observer can have knowledge of is that truth which is perceived by that Observer.

(2): All truth is entirely perceived truth.

(3): Solipsism makes no distinction between itself and any other perception or philosophy, and acknowledges every Observer (if there are any others) will view Reality from their own point of view and is prejudiced by their education. Therefore no two observers will ever agree on everything; including what they perceive as the true meaning of solipsism.

cckeiser 03:14, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

Hmph. Hello again, cckeiser. To be perfectly honest, I would be in favor of removing that paragraph entirely as a truism, as noted above in older talk comments; of course people differ on what exactly they think solipsism is, just like every other belief in the world. As for your possible expansions... I would propose that to some degree (2), and especially (3), while consistent with what I read of your ideas, are not necessarily consistent with solipsism. Notably, metaphysical solipsism (as opposed to your poly-soilipsism, which seems to be radical relativism) makes the strong claim that there are no other observers, rendering your point moot. SnowFire 20:26, 17 October 2006 (UTC)
Greetings once again “SnowFire,”
…not necessarily consistent with solipsism.'! Of course it is. It’s pure Solipsism.
The essence of any solipsistic philosophy is ‘All truth is entirely perceived truth.’ You can’t have solipsism without it, and it doesn’t matter if the Observer is one or many.
And actually your critique is entirely consistent with (3).
Come on SnowFire, admit it, you’re a closet solipsist!
As for “Metaphysical” solipsism, you got it almost right. The Metaphysical solipsist would say since my mind is ""the only mind I can be certain exists, and if I wish to base my beliefs on only that which I can be certain of, and I cannot prove any other mind actually exists, I must proceed as if my mind is the only mind. In my perceptions of Reality it does not matter if any other mind exists or not, because I can only know the truth that I myself perceive.
It is a perfectly logical and necessary assumption if one is searching for absolute truth.
By the way, Poly-Solipsism is extreme Idealism; which, if you really think about it, just happens to be Solipsism in disguise.
cckeiser 02:26, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

Is solipsism falsifiable?

When propositions 1, 2, and 3 are taken together Solipsism is un-falsifiable!

You cannot argue with a Solipsist.

Solipsism is like The Borg…”Resistance is futile!”

cckeiser 01:43, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Regarding the Realism vs. solipsism objection paragraph

Could it be valid to say that rather than there simply be no meaningful difference between a reality and a large subconscious mind, that it is actually PREFERABLE to give the source of one's experience the title of an external reality due to the fact that there are reasons for the specific nature of the contents of our experiences, corresponding to scientific laws, which depend on the existence of real things (atoms, molecules light, brains etc) wheras with some mysterious "subconscious mind", all relations between experiences would be arbitrary rather than specific? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Uni student2003 (talk • contribs) 07:24, 19 December 2006 (UTC).

[edit] philoconfusion:

Please help to distinguish, as colloquially as feasible, solipsism versus existentialism.

Thank You.

[[ hopiakuta | [[ [[%c2%a1]] [[%c2%bf]] [[ %7e%7e%7e%7e ]] -]] 22:46, 26 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Private language

Surely some discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein's private language argument is needed?1Z 18:17, 14 January 2007 (UTC)

I have put in a bit, what do you think? Ecurbian 13:30, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] On its own terms

I have just made an edit to the summary explanation of solipsism near the top of the page. I am not totally happy with it, but I stand by the basic thrust. The key thing is that I felt from reading through that solipsism was not being explained in its own terms, which seemed like the wrong mood for an objective article. Sections of the article can then discuss how other philosphies react to solipsism. It is possible that some of the new material should be further down (under methodological solipsism for example), but my own position is that what I have written is central to solipsism "on its own terms", and I would like to change the header material that states "Assuming it is untrue, solipsism is a source of mental stress in individuals, inducing dissociative mental states". It is strongly biased: one could equally well say, christianity -- the philosophical idea that there exists an all powerfull being who cares about humanity, and interacts with it through historical actions, assuming it is untrue, it is a source of mental distress and leads to psychotic mind states". The suggestion that the page be merged with that of a mental disorder is effectively the (unjustified) assertion that you have to be mad to be a solipsist.

The reason I did not edit that is because I was not sure how to .. help ?

Sorry, if this edit seems pushy, my heart is pure :) we seemed to be vacilating.

Ecurbian 10:17, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Merge with metaphysical solipsism?

Metaphysical solipsism is only a paragraph long, why is it on its own page? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Peterdjones (talk • contribs) 19:52, 18 February 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Merge with solipsism syndrome

I have removed the discussion tag because no one is discussing it, and the suggestion seem spurious. Ecurbian 13:38, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Attribue argument

So as not to have the page read like a usenet debate, I have removed a counterargument that does not address the original point.

"This objection begs the question. If perception is defined to require an external entity with independent attributes, then it is not clear that what the agent experiences is a perception. Alternatively, if we define what the agent experiences to be perception, then it is not clear that it requires an external entity with independent attributes".

This counterargument misses the point. The solipsist has to admit that there is at least one entity that is not a perception; the entity that is having perceptions. The objection is an argument against the claim that "all is perception", not for the claim that there are external objects.("thus contradicting the solipsist premise that only perception exists.") 1Z 15:39, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

"If the mental states of the solipsist are the only things that exist, making up the fabric of the universe, then that universe operates according to the laws of those mental states. There is no more requirement for machinery to run the thought processes than there is for extra machinery to, for example, run the particles in a classical mechanics universe, or to simulate the bending of space in a relativistic one"

Similar problem. The objection is not that mental machinery is required, the objection is that there is something other than perception going on.1Z 15:58, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

I disagree completely, see also my edit to your second objection below. But, I think there is a strong sense in which there is only one point on which we are disagreeing, something to do with the nature of what is meant by mental states. In the materialist point of view we have thoughts and perceptions that are distinguished for essentially materialist reasons -- perceptions come from outside. In the solipsistic point of view, this distinction is not made, I perceive that 1+1=2, I perceive a red colour. If the problem is with the semantics of the word "perceive" we can use some other word. The point is that the objection asserts the existence of perceptions as defined in a materialist world, and then uses this as evidence against solispism which denies the existence of such things. What we have here is not an argument against solipsnism, but a restatement of the materialist point of view. This is a quibble over the semantics of the word "perception", not a refutation of the basic logic.

Ecurbian 13:32, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Thoughts and perceptions can be phenomenally distinguished. You don't need the materialistic distinction, although it coincides -- for uncoincidental reason -- with the pheomenology.

"I perceive that 1+1=2, I perceive a red colour."

Treating evey mental event as a perception still does not answer the arguemtn as statd. That perception must be an attribute of something.

"If the problem is with the semantics of the word "perceive" we can use some other word."

It is not enough to say you can, you need to do so, to come up with an alternative that does no meet with the same objection. If you think the "logic" can be separated from the language, you need to show how (for isntance, by using P's and Q's formalisation), not just declare that it is possible. 1Z 13:50, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Egoism objection

So as not to have the page read like a usenet debate, I have removed another counterargument that does not address the original point.

"2) The common sense approach: The solipsist position that only one's personal perception exists requires one to hold that all the creations of which one is aware were created within one's own perceptual functioning".
"This objection essentially suggests that to be a solipsist means to have an ego so large as to be socially unacceptable".

What the objection actually says is that solipsism is opposed to common-sense, not that it is socially unacceptable. Solipsists are willing to accept evidence about the indirectness of perception, but they ignore evidence that no single person is smart enough to invent every scientific theory, compose every piece of music, etc, etc.1Z 15:47, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

What the objection to the objection actually says ... is that if the mind of the solipsist is the only thing that exists, there is no requirement that its nature be that of a biological human being, nor that any aspects of itself have to be designed by itself. As such, the inability of a biological human brain to generate all of science in one lifetime is beside the point. A key point is that the solipsistic point of view does not require that the mind of the solipisist was designed by the mind of the solipsist -- in fact that would be a tad circular. The same issues of why something rather than nothing are still left open, as per materialism, but the materialist universe did not have to be manufactured as a product of the materialist universe either.

Of course the mind of a metaphysical solipsist cannot have been designed by something else. So its existence is presumably an incomprehensible miracle. But I have already given a counter-counter-argument to the Superhuman Solipsist objection. The solipsist who goes down that route cannot also use the kind of argument found under the "neuroscience" heading.(Note you have switched from your usual Epistemological Solipsism to Metaphysical Solipsism here. Unsignalled switches of this kind are very confusing to the reader). 1Z 13:40, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Would a restating of the objection and counter argument fix the problem for you?

[edit] This page doesn't really exist

I am bored, so I conjure[1] up this imaginary page - and to make it more interesting, I conjure up an imaginary thingy called the universe to plug this page in :D [1] not "conjured" - there is no tense other than the present, of course - unless i decide there will be.

[edit] Tomas Ryal

I'm pretty sure that the "Ryal, Tomas" author in the references section is a spoof. 'Tomas Ryal' is a character in a bad Paul Auster-rip-off novel called 'The Amnesiac', by Sam Taylor. Taylor has even gone to the trouble of creating a 'Tomas Ryal' page on Wikipedia. The only reference on that page is to a URL registered by the same person who runs Taylor's own website. Google "Tom Ryal" and you'll only find pages that are somehow related to Sam Taylor. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Dr George Matthews (talk • contribs) 13:00, 27 March 2007 (UTC).

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