Shabir Ahmed

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Shabir Ahmed is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] Ahmed's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 1003. Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1971, in Badakhshan, Afghanistan.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home.  The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair.  The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair.  A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely.  In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press.  Three chairs were reserved for them.  In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held.  And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret.  In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Allegations

A memorandum summarizing the evidence against Ahmed prepared for his Combatan Status Reiew Tribunal, was among those released in March of 2005.[2] The allegations Ahmed faced during his Tribunal were:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban:
  1. The detainee was the Taliban Police Commander of ###############
  2. The detainee admitted supporting the Taliban.
  3. The detainee admitted executing three Afghanis as the ############### for the Taliban in Sheberghan.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition:
  1. The detainee stated he commanded 40 men armed with AK-47 rifles.
  2. The detainee surrendered himself to neutral elders of Andkhoy City, Afghanistan.

[edit] Transcript

Ahmed chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[3]

[edit] Response to Tribunal allegations

  • "In response to the the allegation that the detainee was a Commandant of Sherberghan village in Afghanistan, the detainee stated that this assignment was involuntary. Our city of Badakshatm and tribe was anti-Taliban, but we feard them, so we were compelled to support them. [In Afghanistan] one always has to support whatever government is in power at the time."

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Ahmed chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[4]

[edit] Assisting Military Officer interview

Shabbir Ahmed's Assisting Military Officer told his Board he met with him twice, prior to the Board convening:

  • He described him as "cooperative and attentive". Although he said
  • Unlike most Afghans Ahmed is literate — he was able to read along, in Farsi, as they went through the factors in the Unclassified Summary of Evidence.

He didn't say when the first interview was, but the second interview was conducted on June 17, 2005.

[edit] Factors for and against continued detention:

The caption to this poster, distributed by the CIA in Afghanistan, reads: “You can receive millions of dollars for helping the Anti-Taliban Force catch Al-Qaida and Taliban murderers. This enough money to take care of your family, your village, your tribe for the rest of your life. Pay for livestock and doctors and school books and housing for all your people."
The caption to this poster, distributed by the CIA in Afghanistan, reads: “You can receive millions of dollars for helping the Anti-Taliban Force catch Al-Qaida and Taliban murderers. This enough money to take care of your family, your village, your tribe for the rest of your life. Pay for livestock and doctors and school books and housing for all your people."
This Casio F91W is in daily alarm mode.  This watch is set to beep its buzzer and flash its light at 7:30 am.
This Casio F91W is in daily alarm mode. This watch is set to beep its buzzer and flash its light at 7:30 am.

Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts prepared a Summary of Evidence memo, for the captives, listing the factors for and against their continued detention. The factors were always separated into two sections, entitled: "The following primary factors favor continued detention:" and "The following primary factors favor release or transfer:". The factors favoring continued detention were always further broken down into subcategories, like "Intent", "Commitment", "Association". The list of factors under these subcategories were always numbered. Most transcripts reproduced the category and subcategory headings, and the numbering of the factors. But Shabbir Ahmed's transcript doesn't.

  • The detainee was a Commandant of Sherberghan village in Afghanistan.
  • The detainee supported the Taliban.
  • The detainee executed two men and one woman while acting as the Director of Security for the Taliban in Sherberghan.
  • The detainee is considered a loyal member of the Taliban and had suspected ties to al Qaida and Mullah Omar.
  • A Taliban governor was a childhood friend of the detainee and helped obtain his job.
  • The detainee could not explain why he was offered the position, but thought his friend the governor may have talked with Mullah Omar in order to get him the job.
  • The detainee had assumed the Director of Security position at the behest of another Taliban governor [sic] wasn't [sic] the detainee's childhood friend, but another person for [sic] Kandahar region.
  • The detainee commanded forty men armed with AK-47 rifles.
  • After the war with the Americans began the detainee turned himself [sic] to avoid fighting fellow Afghans.
  • The detainee turned himself in to General Dostum.
  • The detainee took the security chief position because he felt that his hometown region was going to be taken over by the Taliban and he wanted to be in their good graces.
  • The detainee possessed a Casio watch, the model of which has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida with improved [sic] explosive devices.
  • If released the detainee would like to return to Afghanistan and get married and attempt to find work to support his family, possibly as a farmer.
  • The detainee had no issues with the Americans and was happy that the Americans were helping to rebuild Afghanistan and that he had no intentions of impeding the rebuilding process.
  • The detainee had never heard of al Qaida until after the attacks on 11 Sep 01, that [sic] he did not find it acceptable for anyone to kill another person, Muslim, Christian or Jew, and [sic] that {{sic} the detainee did not wish to be involved in fighting.
  • The detainee stated that he heard of al Qaida and Usama bin Laden on television after 11 Sep 01. When the detainee came to Cuba he learned that the al Qaida was composed of mostly [sic] Arabs.
  • The detainee would not agree to join al Qaida or any extremist group on his release.
  • The detainee had nver personally met Mullah Omar.
  • The detainee did not agree with many of the Taliban practices, that he was afraid of the Taliban but that he was happy that they were able to institute the rule of law.
  • The detainee had no information about a training camp of Usama bin Laden, located outside of Sherberghan.

[edit] Response to the factors

[edit] Response to Board questions

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Shabir Ahmed's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 19, 2004 - page 115
  3. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Shabir Ahmed's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 80-90
  4. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Shabir Ahmed's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 203-216