Self-refuting idea
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Self-refuting ideas are ideas or statements whose falsehood is a logical consequence of the act or situation of holding them to be true.
[edit] Epimenides paradox
The first notable self-refuting idea is the Epimenides paradox, a statement attributed to Epimenides, a Cretan philosopher, that "All Cretans are Liars". Interpreted (for the present purpose) as meaning "no Cretan ever speaks the truth" this cannot be true if uttered by a Cretan.
[edit] Directly self-denying statements
The Epimenides paradox is an instance of a statement of the form "this statement is false". Such statements troubled philosophers, especially when there was a serious attempt to formalise the foundations of logic. Bertrand Russell developed his "Theory of Types" to formalise a set of rules which would prevent such statements being made in symbolic logic[1] but Kurt Godel showed that any logical system which was rich enough to contain elementary arithmetic had to contain propositions whose interpretation was "this proposition is unprovable (in the logical system concerned)" and hence that no such system could be complete and consistent.
[edit] Naive scientism
The statement "no statements are true unless they can be proven scientifically", is self-refuting insofar as it cannot be proven scientifically; the same goes for essentially similar views like "no statements are true unless they can be shown empirically to be true".[2] (This kind of issue was a serious problem for logical positivism).
[edit] Naive Verification- and Falsification-principles
The statements "statements are meaningless unless they can be empirically verified" and "statements are meaningless unless they can be empirically falsified" are both self-refuting because they can neither be empircially verified nor falsified[3]
[edit] Naive materialism
The philosopher Mary Midgley claims the idea that "nothing exists except matter" is also self-refuting because if it were true neither it, nor any other idea, would exist, and similarly that an argument to that effect would be self-refuting because it would deny its own existence.[4]
Several other philosophers argue that Eliminative materialism is self-refuting[5][6][7]
However, other forms of materialism may escape this kind of argument because, rather than eliminating the mental, they seek to identify it with, or reduce it to, the material.[8].[9] For instance, identity theorists such as J. J. C. Smart, Ullin Place and E. G. Boring claim that ideas exist materially as patterns of neural structure and activity.[10][11]
[edit] Naive Foundationalism
The Philosopher Anthony Kenny argues that the idea, "common to theists like Aquinas and Descartes and to an atheist like Russell" that "Rational belief [is] either self-evident or based directly or indirectly on what is evident" (which he termed "foundationalism" following Plantinga) is self-refuting because this idea is itself neither self-evident nor based directly or indirectly on what is evident and that the same applies to other formulations of such foundationalism.[12] However, the self-evident impossibility of infinite regress can be offered as a justification for foundationalism.[13] Following the identification of problems with "naive foundationalism", the term is now often used re-defined to focus on incorrigible beliefs (modern foundationalism), or basic beliefs (reformed foundationalism).
[edit] Naive Utilitarianism
Anthony Kenny also suggests that utilitarianism is self-refuting on the grounds that either determininsm is true or false. If it is true, then we have no choice over our actions. But if it is false then the consequences of our actions are unpredictable, not least because they will depend on the actions of others whom we cannot predict[14]
[edit] Relativism
It is often asserted that relativism about truth must be applied to itself.[15].[16] The cruder form of the argument concludes that since the relativist is asserting relativism as an absolute truth, it leads to a contradiction. Relativists often rejoin that in fact relativism is only relatively true, leading to a subtler problem: the absolutist, the relativist's opponent, is perfectly entitled, by the relativist's own standards, to reject relativism. That is, the relativist's arguments can have no normative force over someone who has different basic beliefs.[17]
[edit] Philosophical skepticism
Skeptics claim "nothing can be known". Can that claim itself be known, or is it self-refuting?[18][19]One very old response to this problem is Academic skepticism:[20] an exception is made for the skeptics own claim. This leads to further debate about consistency and special pleading. Another response is to accept that nothing can be known" cannot itself be known, so that it is not known whether anything is knowable or not. This is Pyrrhonic skepticism.
[edit] Determinism
It can be argued that to assert determinism as a rational claim in a debate is doubly self-defeating.[21][22]
- To count as rational, a belief must be freely chosen, which according to the determinist is impossible
- Any kind of debate seems to be posited on the idea that the parties involved are trying to change each others minds.
Both arguments can be countered, for instance:
- A belief is freely chosen if it is chosen without duress (according to compatibilism).
- Determinism doesn't assert that people never change their minds, only that such changes are necessitated by causes. If someone changes their mind as the result of hearing an argument, that was a cause.
[edit] Solipsism
On the face of it, a statement of solipsism is self-defeating, because a statement assumes another person to whom the statement is made. (That is to say, an unexpressed private belief in solipsism is not self-refuting). The solipsist can adopt the rather surreal manoeuvre of claiming that her interlocutor is in fact a figment of her imagination, but since her interlocutor knows her is not, he is not going to be convinced![23]
[edit] Controversally Self-Refuting Ideas
[edit] Evolutionary Naturalism
Alvin Plantinga suggests in his Evolutionary argument against naturalism that the combination of Naturalism and Evolution is "in a certain interesting way self-defeating" because if it were true there would be insufficient grounds to believe that human congnitive faculties are reliable.[24] This argument has been supported[25] and criticised[26][27] by a variety of thinkers[28]
[edit] Notes and References
- ^ Russell B, Whitehead A.N., Principia Mathematica
- ^ see eg Keith Ward, Is Religion Dangerous?
- ^ see eg the discussion by William P Alston in The Rationality of Theism (ISBN 0415263328) pp 26-34
- ^ see Mary Midgley The Myths we Live by
- ^ Baker, L. (1987). Saving Belief Princeton, Princeton University Press
- ^ Reppert, V. (1992). Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question. Metaphilosophy 23: 378-92.
- ^ Boghossian, P. (1990). The Status of Content Philosophical Review 99: 157-84. and (1991)The Status of Content Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 264-78.
- ^ Hill, C. Identity Theory
- ^ "Identity Theory of Mind is a theory, in philosophy of mind, which asserts that mental events are type-identical to the physical events in the brain with which they are correlated". -- Wikipedia on Identity theory
- ^ "To the author a perfect correlation is identity. Two events that always occur together at the same time in the same place, without any temporal or spatial differentiation at all, are not two events but the same event. The mind-body correlations as formulated at present, do not admit of spatial correlation, so they reduce to matters of simple correlation in time. The need for identification is no less urgent in this case." Place, U.T., Identity Theories in A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Società italiana per la filosofia analitica. Marco Nanni (ed.). ((online))
- ^ [1] Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind
- ^ Anthony Kenny What is Faith? Oxford: OUP 1992 ISBN 0192830678 pp9-10. This particular chapter is based on a 1982 lecture which may explain the shift in the meaning of the term "foundationalism" since then
- ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on foundationalism
- ^ Anthony Kenny What I Believe
- ^ Cognitive Relativism, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- ^ The problem of self-refutation is quite general. It arises whether truth is relativized to a framework of concepts, of beliefs, of standards, of practices.[http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/relativism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- ^ "If truth is relative, then non-relativist points of view can legitimately claim to be true relative to some standpoints." Westacott, E. On the Motivations for Relativism
- ^ The Gallilean Library
- ^ Suber, P. Classical Skepticism
- ^ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- ^ "Second, the argument for [determinisim is self defeating. A determinist must contend that both he and the nondeterminist are determined to believe what they believe. Yet the determinist attempts to convince the nondeterminist that determinism is true and thus ought to be believed. However, on the basis of pure determinism "ought" has no meaning. For "ought" means "could have and should have done otherwise." But this is impossible according to determinism. A way around this objection is for the determinist to argue that he was determined to say that one ought to accept his view. However, his opponent can respond by saying that he was determined to accept a contrary view. Thus determinism cannot eliminate an opposing position. This allows the possibility for a free will position." Believe
- ^ "Determinism is self-defeating. A determinist insists that both determinists and non-determinists are determined to believe what they believe. However, determinists believe self-determinists are wrong and ought to change their view. But "ought to change" implies they are free to change, which is contrary to determinism." [2]
- ^ ""As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me." (Russsel, B., Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limitsp. 180). "
- ^ Alvin Plantinga in Naturalism Defeated? Ed James Beilby Cornell University Press 2002 p p
- ^ John Polkinghorne is an example of a scientist-theologian who is supportive of Plantinga's position
- ^ [http://philosophy.wisc.edu/sober/fitelsoon%20and%20sober%20on%20plantinga.pdf Fitelson, B. and Sober, E.Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism]
- ^ Robbins, J. Evolutionary Naturalism, Theism, and Skepticism about the External World
- ^ see eg Naturalism Defeated? Ed James Beilby Cornell University Press 2002
