Self-Strengthening Movement

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Self-Strengthening Movement (Traditional Chinese: 洋務運動 or 自強運動; c 1861–1894) was a period of institutional reforms initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following a series of military defeats and concessions to foreign powers.

Contents

[edit] Background

The setbacks inflicted upon China as a result of the unequal treaties and the domestic rebellions were important reasons prompting China to initiate a policy of reform in the beginning of the 1860s. There was a convergence of favorable internal and external circumstances which provided the impetus to reform efforts.

The Taipings [1], Niens and Muslims had not been completely suppressed yet, but their threat to the system had been blunted. The Manchus had resigned themselves to the necessity of accommodating the Western demands.

The emergence of new political leadership was another important reason which gave impetus to the desire for reform. The death of the Xianfeng Emperor in 1861 resulted in a palace coup led Prince Gong and Empress Dowager Cixi who wanted to undermine the influence of the two regents appointed to assist the young Tongzhi Emperor. Prince Gong and Cixi would play dominant roles in Chinese state affairs from then on as a result of the successful coup. Of the two, Prince Kung was the more progressive/pragmatic as he would try to build a policy of peace with the treaty powers and one of the main figures behind the policy of reform. Cixi was virulently anti-foreign but had to accommodate Prince Gong as he was an influential political figure in the Manchu court. She would however become the most formidable obstacle in the way of reform as her political influence increased. Prince Gong was made regent, grand councilor and head of the newly formed Zongli Yamen. Prince Gong would be assisted by a new generation of leaders. (see below)

Favorable external circumstances came in the form of the Western powers' acknowledgment of the need to cooperate with each other in trying to preserve the unity and integrity of China and to assist China to increase her strengths. The reform movement would thus receive support from the West and was in their interests to sustain the Manchu for the continuation of their treaty rights which were dependent on the continuation of the dynasty.

[edit] Aims of the Self-Strengthening Movement/Tung Chih Restoration

The term Self-Strengthening, also known as Ziqiang, is used on purpose as it is a traditional Chinese term used to refer to what a dynasty in decline needed to do in order to recover. This recovery of the dynasty was termed as 'restoration'. It must be noted that the SSM was not synonymous with the Tonghzi Restoration (TR). This was because the former lasted from around 1860 to 1894 but the latter lasted only from 1860 to 1874, when the emperor Tongzhi passed away. This term was applied to the period in the traditional dynastic cycle when the decline was temporarily stopped and its decay was replaced by renewal of strength.

The aim of the SSM was to save the Qing Dynasty from being destroyed by internal rebellions and foreign aggression by rejuvenating the dynasty, by rehabilitating the devastated economy and by adopting appropriate strategies which would result in a strengthened China.

It should not be assumed that the Chinese reformers in the 1860s were trailblazers eager to turn the system upside down with their changes. Their way of thinking was still strongly influenced by conservatism and thus the solutions they came up with would be conservative (thus the term, restorative) and not innovative in nature.

Unlike their successors of a generation later, they were still confident of the basic soundness of Chinese state and society based on Confucianism. It was impossible for them to see that these values and traditions were not adequate in dealing with 19th century problems. They believed that the disorder and problems the dynasty was facing was because China had deviated from basic Confucian principles. Hence, the solution was to reassert Confucian principles and restore ancient institutions. Whatever reforms would be sanctioned with the Confucianist doctrine of change within tradition.

Western practices and learning should be adopted to better defend China against the West. The motivating force was 'to learn the superior techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians'. Chinese (Confucian) learning and principles should remain the basis of Chinese society while Western practices should be adopted for practical uses. Chinese society would be strengthened through a restoration of Confucianism and not through the introduction of new values and institutions.

Since Confucian theory was to remain as the basis of Chinese society, the reform movement did not aim for large scale revamping of the social, economic and political structure of China. It had only limited aims in limited areas - diplomatic, economic, military and educational. The SSM/CTR was thus, a restorative movement aimed at the preservation of the status quo.

The Tung Chih Restoration formed part of the entire self-strengthening period. The Tung Chih Restoration technically ended in 1874 with the death of Tung Chih, but the self-strengthening movement continued.

[edit] Leaders and Phases

The effort to graft Western technology onto Chinese institutions became known as the Self-Strengthening Movement. Political leadership was provided by figures like Prince Gong, Wenxiang, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang.

Prince Gong was the leader of the progressive/pragmatic faction in court. He was instrumental in the change of China's attitude towards the treaty system from one of non-adherence to compliance. Supported by Wenxiang in the Manchu court who shared the prince's belief that China needed to pursue peace with the foreigners so as to gain a reprieve to strengthen itself. Both advocated a long-range plan for self-strengthening, the first step of which must be the manufacturing of equipment which had given the Europeans the vital advantage over the Chinese.

Zeng, Li and Zuo played important roles in modernization efforts undertaken as part of the movement. Their interest in Western technology had been inspired by their successes in using western arms and munitions during their suppression of the various domestic rebellions. For these men, self-strengthening went beyond merely adopting Western technology, it should involve changes to the existing system of education and civil service recruitment.

People like Prince Kung, Zeng, Li and Zuo constitutes the minority. The majority of the ruling elite preferred to subscribe to this view - to strengthen China against the West, China had to learn from the West techniques of manufacturing ships and guns and the scientific knowledge behind it. This was all China had to learn from the West. This could be achieved by establishing shipyards and arsenals, and by hiring foreign advisers to train Chinese artisans to manufacture such wares in China. It was believed that since the intelligence and wisdom of the Chinese are superior to those of barbarians, China would thus first learn from foreigners, then equal them, and finally surpass them.

[edit] First Phase (1861-1872)

The movement can be divided into three phases. The first lasted from 1861 to 1872, emphasized the adoption of Western firearms, machines, scientific knowledge and training of technical and diplomatic personnel through the establishment of a diplomatic office and a college.

[edit] Tsungli Yamen/Modernization of diplomatic affairs

Established in 1861 to handle diplomatic representation with the west. Given impetus by figures like Prince Kung who believed that maintaining peace with the westerners was the only way the Chinese could hope to recover its strength. In line with the shift in policy towards diplomatic relations from one of non-cooperation to that of cooperation.

Established in spite of opposition from the conservatives who continued to view Sino-Western relations in the context of tribute system and regard foreign affairs as beneath their dignity.

It is important to note the underlying motivations of the Chinese in this case. The Chinese had not become converts to the concept of diplomatic equality overnight. To them, the Tsungli Yamen was an expedient solution to the problem of western demands. The concept of 'Chi-mi'/loose rein policy (traditionally used to refer to the usage of appeasement to deal with and eventually overcome stronger barbarians) is used to justify its establishment. Prince Kung believed that the West did not covet Chinese territory and people, but trade. Thus it was possible to appease them with commercial privileges and to control them through material inducements. He hoped that this policy would result in a period of peace which would allow China to strengthen itself with Western military aid.

The Tsungli Yamen thus represented a move which China was compelled to make as a result of war. Her world view of herself as the Middle Kingdom did not change: the demands made after both Anglo Chinese wars did not change her position of universal supremacy. Her continued reluctance to establish representation abroad reflected this attitude. Her attempts to refuse the foreigners rights to audience with the Emperor also reflected it.

Other signs that China was still refusing to face the reality of her situation are evident in the limited powers and influence of the Tsungli Yamen. This "Office for General Management" was not actually a new ministry but only a subordinate of the Ground Council that took the place of a foreign office. Decisions on foreign policy still came from the emperor (or the Empress Dowager who wielded the authority of the throne), and the Yamen was in charge of foreign relations only at Peking. (In the coastal provinces, two commissioners for foreign affairs, the governor-generals at Nanking and Tianjing) reported directly to the emperor). It was also made clear that the Tsungli Yamen was only to be a temporary institution, to be maintained until he current foreign and domestic crises had passed.

In spite of these limitations, the Tsungli Yamen was still China's first major institutional innovation in response to the Western impact and demonstrated China's new policy of treaty observance. Its close association with the Grand Council did give it a strategic position to realize its policies and programmes.

[edit] Adoption of International Law

The decision to adopt the policy of treaty observance was accompanied by efforts to be familiar with principles of international law essential to the conduct of foreign relations.

Ignorance of international law on such issues as tariff autonomy, extraterritoriality and most favoured nation treatment had led the Chinese to concede these rights to the foreigners easily. They did not realize that these were the real issues which threatened Chinese sovereignty.

The Chinese familiarized themselves with the principles of international law through the help of foreigners like W A P Martin who translated a text of international law in 1864.

With this new knowledge in combination with other measures of diplomatic modernization, China managed to maintain peaceful relations with the foreign powers throughout the 1860s, this provided her with a suitable environment with which to pursue domestic reforms.

[edit] The Tung Wen-Kuan (1862)/Educational Modernization

Intended as a school for the teaching of both Western and Chinese languages. Created in response to the Tianjing Treaty clauses which specified the English and French texts as the sole authentic versions of the treaties. China therefore needed to train interpreters so that she need not rely on foreign interpreters.

Missionaries played important roles in these schools (the original Tung Wen Kuan in Peking was followed by similar ones in Shanghai, Canton and Foochow), prominent figures here included WAP Martin who later became president of the college, who added in a variety of subjects including mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and international law.

Prince Kung also a strong advocate. He was the one who obtained court's permission to open school, later succeeded in transforming the school into full-fledged college in 1867 despite strong opposition from court officials that the Chinese had no need for barbarians as teachers. The first director of the College was Xu Jiyu, an admirer of the West. Signified a breakthrough in the institutional environment since the Tung Wen Kuan marked the beginning of Western education in China.

The college was not very popular as not many families sent their sons there. There was the problem of incentive for students, since the Ching civil service and examination system remained unchanged. Students at the Shanghai and Canton Tung Wen Kuan were even found to be practicing the eight legged essay in preparation for the regular provincial examinations even though they had entered the schools and were paid stipends to learn English and mathematics.

The obstacles posed by conservative opposition remained. Obstructed whatever reforms which did not conform to their conservative principles. A reform involved the sending of small groups of students abroad to study at Western schools (1872). Whatever potential this reform had in promoting the transmission of western ideas to China was stifled when the programme was abruptly stopped in 1881 when it was realized that the students had westernized too radically.

Any radical proposals which required changes to be made to the traditional examination system were turned down. Proposals for the establishment of a new category in the examination system for candidates specializing in technology and for the graduates of Tung Wen Kuan to be given extraordinary recommendation were turned down in the face of strong opposition from the conservative faction in court.

[edit] The Superintendents of Trade

Two superintendents of trade were appointed to handle foreign trade matters at the newly opened treaty ports. They were based at Tianjing and Shanghai (Commissioner of trade for the southern and northern ports respectively).

The ostensible reasons for the establishment of these two ports was to deal with the new demands of the new treaty ports. The underlying reasons for their establishment was more complicated as these superintendents were supposed to direct business away from Peking and hence to forestall as much of diplomatic transactions at the capital as possible. The authority of the commissioners also came to include the overseeing of all new undertakings involving the utilization of Western knowledge and personnel, they were the coordinators of most self-strengthening programmes.

Li Hong Zhang was the Tianjing Superintendent from 1870 and was so successful in taking over the functions of the Tsungli Yamen that communication between the imperial court and the foreign diplomats at Peking were kept under the auspices of self-strengthening (see relevant sections)

[edit] The Maritime Customs Service (1861)

A British national, Horatio Nelson Lay, was appointed as the Inspector general of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service set up in April 1861. This evolved from the Inspectorate of Customs which had been created in 1854 as a response to the threat of Taiping attacks on Shanghai and designed to collect tariffs equitably and generate new revenues for the Manchu court from the import dues on foreign goods. Lay's main duty was to exercise surveillance over all aspects of maritime revenue and to supervise the Chinese inspector superintendents who collected revenue at the various treaty ports. This move might seem revolutionary but in reality, it merely institutionalized (formalized) a system which had been in existence since 1854.

Lay was replaced by Robert Hart in 1863 after he was found to be unsuited to the job. It was Hart who succeeded in establishing an international customs service for China. Hart and his assistants were nominally subordinate of the Chinese government superintendents of customs at each port but in reality, Hart had full control over the entire foreign staff.

The MCS ensured to Peking a growing, reliable and constant source of new revenue to the Chinese government. Increased from 8.5 million taels in 1865 to 14.5 million taels in 1885. Customs revenue paid of the 1860 indemnities. It also furnished part or all of the revenues of such new undertakings as the Peking Tung Wen Kuan, the Kiangnan and Tientsin Arsenals, the Foochow Navy Yard, the educational mission to the United States. The MCS also played an important role in checking smuggling. It also charted the Chinese coast, installed lighthouses, beacons and other modern aids to navigation. The MCS thus set the best example of joint Sino-Western administration in the handling of China's problems of foreign contact and modernization.

Hart had tried to do more than ensuring that the MCS provided a smooth flow of revenue for the Manchu court. He had tried to initiate some efforts which would contribute towards Self-Strengthening. he tried to persuade the Manchu government of the need to establish a modern mint, he also advocated a national post office, he even tried to help China organize a modern naval fleet. However, he was unable to win acceptance for any of his ideas. Clearly, the Manchu court was not willing to allow foreigners to play an active role in the SSM.

[edit] Military Modernization: Arsenals, Shipyards and Modern Armies

The most important emphasis of the Self-Strengthening Movement was placed on the development of military industries. (The building of ship building dockyards to strengthen Chinese navy and of military arsenals).

Spearheaded by regional leaders like Zeng Guo Fan who established the Shanghai arsenal, Li Hung Zhang who built the Nanking and Tientsin Arsenal, Zuo Zong Tang who constructed the Foochow Dockyard. LI and Zeng collaborated to construct the Kiangnan Arsenal. Schools for the study of mechanical skills and navigation under the direction of foreign advisers were established at these arsenals and dockyards. These powerful regional strongmen were able to carry out their operations rather independently of the central government. Thus, there were little coordination between the provinces and the government.

These military industries were mostly sponsored by the government. As such, they suffered from the usual bureaucratic inefficiency and nepotism. Also heavily reliant on foreign expertise and materials, not even aware when the foreigners employed were not trained for the tasks. Military modernization was also hampered by the lack of material and human resources.

Li Hong Zhang had wanted the Kiangnan Arsenal to produce breech loading rifles of the Remington type. Production only started in 1871 and produced only 4,200 rifles by 1873 and the products were not only more costly than, but also far inferior to the imported Remingtons. Shipbuilding efforts were also disappointing, the programme consumed half of the arsenal's annual income but the ships built were at least twice as costly as comparable vessels available for purchase in Britain. The lack of material resources proved to be a formidable problem with the escalating personnel costs. The unavoidable growth in the size of foreign staff had made increased costs inevitable. However, many of the Chinese administrative personnel were sinecure holders who got on the payroll through influence. Laxity in procurement practices also accounted for escalating costs. Many opportunities for corruption existed in construction contracts and in the distribution of workers' wages.

Another area of reform targeted the modernization of military organization and structure. The most necessary reform was to cut down the Green Standard forces to a fraction of their swollen numbers and modernize the remainder. This was done in two provinces under the influence of Li Hong Zhang, but failed to spread.

[edit] Second Phase (1872-1885)

By the second period, Li Hong Zhang had became the most important leader of the reform movement. He played a pivotal role in starting and supporting many of the initiatives during this period. Over 90 per cent of the modernization projects were launched under his aegis.

During this phase, commerce, industry and agriculture received increasing attention. At the heart of these efforts to learn economics from the West lay the burning desire to make China a rich and strong country. Attention was also given to the creation of wealth in this second period of the self-strengthening movement. The idea of creating wealth in order to strengthen the country is something new to the Chinese who had always been uncomfortable with activities which create wealth from anything other than land. The development of profit oriented industries such as shipping, railways, mining and telegraph was, as such, rather new ventures for the Chinese government.

The Chinese government sanctioned what was known as "government-supervised merchant undertakings" - profit-oriented enterprises operated by merchants but controlled and directed by government officials. Capital for these enterprises came from private sources but the government managed them and also provided subsidy in some cases.

Examples of such government supervised merchant undertakings include the China Merchant's Steam Navigation Company, Kaiping Coal Mines, the Shanghai Cotton Mill and the Imperial Telegraph Administration.

However, being government supervised, these enterprises could not escape from the ugly sides of government administration. They suffered from the evils of nepotism, corruption and lack of initiative. Managers also found ways to siphoning away profits to avoid the payment of official levies and exactions. And they monopolized business in their respective areas and discouraged private competition, thus impeding economic development. Despite its economic inefficiencies, the merchant-bureaucrat combination remained the principal device for initiating industrial enterprises.

[edit] Third Phase (1885-1895)

By this period, the enthusiasm for reform had slowed down to a crawl. The conservative faction at court had managed to overwhelm Prince Kung and his supporters.

While the emphasis on military industries continued, the idea of enriching the country through light industry gained the favour of the court, thus industries like textiles and cotton-weaving developed rapidly.

New types of enterprises sprouted in this period: joint government and merchant enterprises, even incipient "private enterprises". These would compete against the government supervised merchant undertakings. These failed to take off due to traditional official discrimination against private merchants. All the initial encouragement seemed to mark a change in the attitude of the government towards private enterprises. However, the government was only interested in getting capital from private enterprises, they were not ready to let them take an active role in economic development yet. Thus control of such enterprises remained firmly in government's hands.

Examples of such enterprises included Kweichow Ironworks established in 1891 and the Hupeh Textile Company established in 1894. Like all other newly-sprouted enterprises of its kind, they were very weak and represented only a small fraction of the total industrial effort an investment.

[edit] Overview and Assessment of China's attempts to strengthen its economy

Although the unequal treaties did impede China's ability to strengthen its economy with the tariff restrictions, China could still have succeeded in overcoming this handicap by modernizing its economy through the vigorous pursuit of industrialization.

Efforts at industrialization succeeded only in areas where there was effective leadership. People like Li Hong Zhang, Zeng Guo Fan and Zuo Zong Tang provided this. And China's total investment in state-patronized industries was by no means inconsiderable and the scope of developments undertaken was very wide. If the enterprises had been as successful as their founders had hoped and if private enterprise had been allowed to develop, China might have laid the foundations for self-reliant industrialization. However, all kinds of obstacles like the conservatism of and opposition from the majority of the official class stood in the way.

Conservative attitudes regarding the creation of wealth and the position of merchants made the industrialization effort even more difficult than it already was. The new mindset required for modern industrialization was simply not present. The traditional emphasis on agriculture was retained. Private enterprises were not allowed to develop as most industrialization efforts remained in government hands. There was no willingness to accept long-term risks. There was also a stubborn refusal to accept foreign capital and investments. The refusal to allow foreigners to open factories in areas outside the treaty ports impeded the effective transmission of modern technology and practices to the Chinese. Most fundamentally, the officials were not concerned with the promotion of commercially viable development.

Reforms to its antiquated revenue collection and distribution system were also very necessary. Peking's fiscal system was still based on the age old system of tax farming - provincial officials were expected to make certain tax quotas available to Peking while maintaining themselves and local administration on the remainder. Thus, the mobilization and use of fiscal resources was beyond the control of the central government and left by default to provincial officials.

[edit] Court Politics during the era of Self-Strengthening Movement

Two levels of tensions characterized Court politics during the period of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The first was the struggle for influence between the conservative and progressive/pragmatic factions in court. The other were the tensions between traditional central power and new regional interests. These tensions determined the character and ultimately the successes and failures of the movement.

The conservative faction was led by Empress Dowager Cixi who became the most powerful political figure in the Manchu court after she succeeded in controlling the young emperor Tong Chih and in making Guang Xu, her nephew, emperor in 1875. Cixi was adept at manipulating court politics and rivalry to her advantage. She had to accept the reforms of Prince Kung and his supporters initially because of Prince Kung's role in helping her seize power and because of her relative inexperience in political affairs. However, as her own political acumen developed over the years, her support of either faction would depend on the political circumstances. Increasingly, she began to undermine the influence of Prince Kung's faction by supporting conservatives' (Prince Chun, Wo Jen, Li Hung Tsao, Chou Tsu Pei) opposition and criticism of reforms. Prince Kung was also temporarily removed from his office several times to undercut his influence. Wen Hsiang's death in 1876 further weakened the position of Prince Kung. Cixi's final success was evident from her removal of Prince Kung from power in 1884.

Cixi was also acutely aware of the tensions that had arisen as a result of the growing influence of regional Chinese leaders (from 1861-1890, almost half of the governor generals were Chinese who had risen through military command). Regionalism became even stronger as modernization projects were spearheaded by these regional officials. Modernization projects like arsenals and industries increased the influence of regional officials like Li, Zeng and Zuo. Manchu rule was thus dependent on the loyalty of regional officials. Cixi thus had to cooperate with these regional leaders initially but her strong influence over these regional leaders continued to determine the success or failure of modernization efforts.

The Manchu court was fortunate in that regional leaders like Li remained loyal to the center in spite of their influence. Li Hong Zhang provide the best example of the delicate balance between regional power and dynastic loyalty. He was governor-general of Chili and commissioner for the northern ports, he controlled the Anhwei Army which was supplied by arsenals which he had established at Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai and had provincial revenues at his disposal. However, he remained loyal to the throne and to Cixi. The regional leaders were also increasingly restricted by the opposition from the conservative faction in court as the faction got more influential. In time, even Li Hong Zhang had to resort to allying with Prince Chun in order to win the favour of Cixi.

[edit] Overall Assessment

The success of the movement must be measured against the main aim of movement: which was preserving and revitalizing the dynasty. The Self-Strengthening Movement was successful in suppressing rebellions and in saving the dynasty from immediate collapse, extending its life span by another 50 years. The movement can be regarded as a success in this sense.

Beyond the political sphere, the innovations made in the name of self-strengthening would produce far reaching results. The new knowledge and attitudes introduced during this period would lead inevitably to a departure from traditional statecraft. It would also lay the roots for China's reach for wealth and strength as it marked the beginning of industrialization in China. The areas with the arsenals, dockyards, schools, factories and modern enterprises eventually developed into the richest cities in China.

However, these new knowledge and attitudes had to contend with ideas and institutions which had endured for thousands of years. The stability of Chinese society which had helped preserve the imperial system had also led to stagnation, now it would be a handicap paralyzing the reform movement. Traditions were simply too deeply entrenched.

Although the Self-Strengthening Movement was successful in preventing the collapse of the dynasty, it did not do enough to check its decline. The solutions proffered by the men behind the Self-Strengthening Movement were simply inadequate in addressing the old as well as the new problems and challenges confronting China since its first painful clashes with the West in 1842. The persistence of these old problems as well as the challenges posed by the new problems also shed light on the reasons for the failure of the movement.

The great socio-economic problems caused by population pressures continued to be serious. Although millions of lives had been lost in Taiping rebellion and helped to reduce the population pressure in some areas, the problem became more serious with time. The conservative socio-economic policies of the restoration did not result in China harnessing the energies of industrialization to propel the economy. Nor did it result in the alleviation of the peasantry's problems of poverty and social inequity through the redistribution of land. In short, it contributed very little towards relieving the problems of widespread poverty and social tension. Many measures benefited the gentry rather than the peasants. This was expected as the reforms were initiated by the gentry. The social and economic gap thus widened. Peasant discontent did not erupt into widespread rebellion during this period because the local armies developed during the Taiping rebellion were very effective in suppressing whatever riots there were and because government troops now had the edge of modern weapons.

Political problems like inefficiency and corruption continued. The central government continued to be dominated by factions who were more interested in preserving their vested interests. Official ranks and titles continued to be sold widely, by the end of the 1800s, more than a third of degree holders qualified only by purchase. The problems of corruption and the lack of effective personnel hampered the effective implementation of reforms in many cases. The specially created new agencies were more flexible and efficient than old style governmental offices but still not free from the habits and customs of the Ching bureaucracy as a whole. In time, self-strengthening became less a rally cry for genuine efforts at innovation than a shibboleth that served to justify expenditures and vest bureaucratic interests.

Another age-old problem which also became even more serious was the problem of regionalism. The post-Taiping rebellion government never regained centralized control over the provinces. Governors who had risen to power by the organization of regional armies had acquired considerable amount of autonomous political, military and financial power. The centralized power structure was never restored. The modernization efforts thus suffered from a lack of coordination as the brunt of modernization efforts was borne by provincial authorities without central direction.

The most important obstacle in the way of true reform remained the dominance of the conservative mentality which was one which only accepted the imitation of Western technology and resisted the making of more fundamental changes necessary for true progress to take place. The belief was that since European power appeared to depend on technology, the adoption of this technology would be enough to save China. Furthermore, improvements in technology could not be attained at the expense of Confucian culture and principles of good government. Other opposition raised by the conservatives included arguments that the shortcomings far outweighed its merits, that China could not successfully learn from the barbarians because what China got from the West was outdated and obsolete.

This conservative mentality was one held by the majority of court officials and supported by the powerful Empress Dowager Cixi. Whatever successes the progressive/pragmatic faction led by Prince Kung had in carrying out reforms came about because of Prince Kung's influence. The conservative officials attacked the reformers at all levels. The power struggle between the progressive/pragmatic and conservative factions in court meant that reforms could only be passed when the progressive/pragmatic faction succeeded in overriding the opposition from the conservative faction. Reforms passed under such circumstances were, more often than not, limited in nature and scope. In other cases when more far reaching reforms were proposed, opposition from the conservative faction would succeed in overturning the proposals.

The conservative mentality combined potently with vested interests to create great institutional and psychological inertia. The officials had vested interests in the status quo (the present political structure) and did not want the reforms to threaten them. Thus, the reforms and modernization efforts would either be poorly conceived or poorly executed because of these vested interests.

The majority of the population also possessed this conservative mentality. The reform leaders were simply not supported by enough human resources; they could start off the reforms with material resources and the help of selected Western personnel but the continuation and further development of the reforms would depend on the availability of suitable human personnel. Popular support of the reforms was lacking. The majority of Chinese remained skeptical and suspicious of Western technology, education and modern industries. This led to reliance on foreign advice which was not reliable all of the time.

The lack of suitable human resources was compounded by the problem of insufficient capital. China was a poor country with a limited supply of capital, especially given the indemnities she had to pay the Western powers after the Anglo-Chinese wars. There was a shortage of bureaucratic as well as private capital which restricted the initiation and growth of industries and enterprises. The fact that the same entrepreneurs financed all the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mills and the Imperial Telegraph Administration indicates how limited available funds were. Moreover, the lack of a modern sense of business acumen prevented profits from being reinvested, instead profits were all distributed to shareholders as dividends and businesses were not allowed to incur long term debts with the government.

The above reasons account for the limited success and inherent weaknesses of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The movement had not resulted in a strengthened China, capable of tackling the Western challenges independently (the main aim of the movement in the first place). This failure was exposed in the French War of 1884-1885, when China, after twenty years of modernization, was unable to defend its tributary state of Annam. The failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement to reform China adequately was confirmed beyond doubt by the defeat in the Japanese war ten years later. The inability to modernize itself adequately when it had the opportunity to would have serious repercussions which imperial China would never recover from. The period of the Self-Strengthening Movement was also a time when the forces of imperialism grew in strength. This was the time in which the established imperialist powers like Britain, France and Russia would extend their influence over more areas in Asia. New powers, Germany and most notably Japan, which had emerged from a period of domestic modernization a very much stronger nation, would join these imperialist powers. China had lost the golden opportunity to modernize itself, it now had to face the forces of imperialism again, not much stronger than it was in 1842.

[edit] See also

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