Sea Tigers

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LTTE Sea Tiger head, Colonel Soosai on a Sea Tiger vessel off Mullaitivu
LTTE Sea Tiger head, Colonel Soosai on a Sea Tiger vessel off Mullaitivu

Sea Tigers is the naval part of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, founded in 1984[citation needed]. The Sea Tigers have a number of small, but very effective vessels[citation needed]. During its existence it has gained a reputation as a very capable adversary for the Sri Lankan Navy[citation needed]. The Sea Tigers are led by Col. Soosai, with their main base at Mullaitivu, on the north-eastern coast of Sri Lanka[citation needed]. Over the years the Sea Tigers have sunk more than 30 Sri Lankan naval vessels, these being fast patrol boats and catamarans and freighters[citation needed].

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[edit] Sea Tigers background

As the Tamil insurgency gained weight the LTTE required much of its supplies to be smuggled by sea. It was soon realised that a naval component was needed to complement the land-based guerrilla forces. The leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, having grown up in the coastal village of Valvettithurai, with its rich smuggling traditions, instinctively understood the tactical necessity of a naval force[citation needed].

The Sea Tigers were officially founded in 1984. In the first years its primary task was smuggling personnel and equipment between the LTTE's bases in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, in particular Jaffna. As the Sea Tiger cadres gained experience it took on offensive operations against the Sri Lankan Navy[citation needed].

Sea Tiger attack vessel by sunken Sri Lankan freighter
Sea Tiger attack vessel by sunken Sri Lankan freighter

[edit] Operational capacities

[edit] Boats

Light fibreglass boats are used for offense. These boats can be up to 15 meter, usually equipped with four 250 Hp outboard engines and a mixture of weaponry; light and heavy machine guns, 20-23 mm guns and grenade launchers. The Sea Tiger attack vessels are only on the sea during operations and training; when idle they are loaded on large trailers and hidden in the dense jungle southwest of Mullaitivu or even transported to the west coast if needed[citation needed].

[edit] Ships

The Sea Tigers also man a number of larger merchant vessels (sailing under various flags) used for smuggling equipment from neighbouring countries. As there are no large ports under LTTE control the supplies are loaded on smaller vessels that can land directly on the beaches[citation needed].

[edit] Frogmen

Frogmen are also serving with the Sea Tigers and have been used in sinking at least one freighter at the Sri Lankan Navy base at Kankesanturai - KKS, at the northern point of the Jaffna peninsula[citation needed].

On 17 June 2006 on the coast near Colombo in Sri Lanka two or three (news accounts vary) frogmen belonging to the Sea Tigers branch of the Tamil Tigers were captured by Sri Lanka's army. News images seem to show that those frogmen were using rebreathers, probably a type with one oxygen cylinder across the belly. On capture, two of them tried to commit suicide using cyanide.

[edit] Personnel

The total personnel strength is between 2,000 - 3,000 women and men. Women operate the boats on an equal footing as their male compatriots. However the number of personnel may vary depending on operational needs. Local fishermen and farmers in the region act as "sleeping" cadres, and may be reactivated if the Norwegian-mediated ceasefire agreement between the parties is abandoned. Local arms caches are hidden in the jungle close to villages[citation needed].

[edit] Major Sea Tiger operations

During several of the LTTE offensive campaigns the Sea Tigers have landed troops to outflank Sri Lankan Army units; the latest was when the LTTE attacked the Karuna faction in the east in 2004. The most significant use of combined operations was at the battle for Elephant Pass in the Spring of 2000, when some 1,500 LTTE cadres were landed behind enemy lines. Previously the largest such operation was the capture of Mullaitivu in 1996, the SLA losing over a thousand soldiers with all their equipment[citation needed].

Sea Tigers fast patrol boats and smaller suicide boats have engaged and sunk around 30 SLN fast patrol boats. They have also attacked the main SLN naval base at Trincomalee and sunk one of two SLN catamarans used for troop transports, a significant loss for the SLN[citation needed].

SLN troop transport catamaran, sister ship of the one sunk by Sea Tigers, a significant loss for the SLN
SLN troop transport catamaran, sister ship of the one sunk by Sea Tigers, a significant loss for the SLN

On May 11 2006, the Sea Tigers attacked and sank one Sri Lankan naval vessel while seriously damaging another. The attack is ruled as a grave violation of the CFA by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In response, LTTE threatened the truce monitors not to be aboard naval vessels [1]. 18 sailors perished on the Sri Lankan patrol-boat, and an unknown number of Sea Tiger cadres also died in the attack [2].

On October 20 2006, the Sri Lankan Navy reported that it had sunk two Sea Tigers boats, and damaged several others in a major skirmish which reportedly left twenty rebels dead.[1]

[edit] Analysts' views of Sea Tigers

Jane's International Defence Review, in a report on Sri Lanka, published a few years ago, pointed out that the Sea Tigers "have taken on the Sri Lankan navy with unprecedented success." A recent publication of the Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies reckons that they have destroyed 30 to 50 per cent of Sri Lanka's navy coastal craft[citation needed].

The fact that the Sea Tigers do not rely on communications with their command on shore during ongoing operations is one factor in their success. The Sri Lankan Navy on the other hand is required to act in accordance with commanders onshore. Sea Tiger intelligence has also played a key role in their operations, allowing for detailed and bold operations to be carried out in almost silent mode (highest EMCON)[citation needed].

The basis of Sea Tiger offensive operations can be described as "hit and run"; avoiding any attempt of sea control, but keeping the SLN on their toes with their extensive sea denial tactics in the northern waters of Sri Lanka. Some analysts say the Sea Tigers have adopted the military theory of 'Versatile Maritime Force'. Sea Tiger operations could also be seen as a clear example of asymmetric warfare[citation needed].

LTTE Sea Tigers boat with a female crew.
LTTE Sea Tigers boat with a female crew.

[edit] Strategic implications of Sea Tigers

Currently the LTTE controls the northern part of Sri Lanka, except the Jaffna peninsula; the Sri Lankan forces there are mainly supplied through naval convoys from Trincomalee in the east. The Sea Tigers bases are well located for attacks on these shipments, and forces the SLN to keep a significant force of fast attack patrol-boats on alert. Sea Tigers have also captured and seized the cargo of at least two Sri Lankan freighters. Due to the fact that the SLA/SLN received satellite images in the middle of the 90s, the operations concept has changed. To avoid the SL airforce, the ST are rarely static. Furthermore has the war with GoSL made the tactical concept even more hidden than in the early days. On sea this implicates small fishing boats rigged with angled claymore mines with padal triggers optimized for damaging SLN FPB's off the water when inspecting/hailing the fishing vessel[citation needed].

The troop transport vessel "MV Pearl Cruise II" about to dock in Kankesanturai - KKS, at the Jaffna peninsula. The vessel carries up to 700 soldiers and sails regularly between KKS and the main SLN base in Trincomalee. The MV Pearl Cruise II was at the center of a sea battle between the SLN and the Sea Tigers in May 2006
The troop transport vessel "MV Pearl Cruise II" about to dock in Kankesanturai - KKS, at the Jaffna peninsula. The vessel carries up to 700 soldiers and sails regularly between KKS and the main SLN base in Trincomalee. The MV Pearl Cruise II was at the center of a sea battle between the SLN and the Sea Tigers in May 2006

[citation needed]

In many ways the ST has adapted and overcome a larger and more modern Navy, due to their tactics based on SLN operations cycles and reaction time. The "fog of war" seems hardly as dense as for the navy during actions[citation needed].

India regards the Sea Tigers as a destabilising force in South Asian waters.

[edit] Human Rights Abuses

The sea tigers have been widely accused of human rights abuses by many groups including Human rights watch, Amnesty International and the Sri Lankan Government[citation needed]. Their most recent allegation was that the sea tigers attacked a civillian cruise ship named 'Green Ocean' carrying 300 civillians from Trincomalee to Jaffna on the 9th of November 2006 [3].

[edit] External links

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