Rumsfeld Doctrine
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The Rumsfeld Doctrine (named after its originator Donald Rumsfeld) is primarily concerned with the transformation of the United States Military. It would be considered Rumsfeld's own take on RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). It seeks to increase force readiness and decrease the amount of supply required to maintain forces, by reducing the number in a theater. This is done mainly by using LAVs (Light Armoured Vehicles) to scout for enemies who are then destroyed via airstrikes. The basic tenets of this military strategy are:
- High technology combat systems
- Reliance on air forces
- Small, nimble ground forces
Afghanistan and the Iraq wars are considered the two closest implementations of this doctrine.
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[edit] Iraq War Controversy
The Pentagon has in the post-Vietnam period favored using overwhelming force (the opposite of limited engagement), the Powell Doctrine, with well defined objectives and exit strategies. This has often come at odds with Rumsfeld’s administration. With the apparent success of the Rumsfeld doctrine in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld pushed for the extension of the doctrine in Iraq.
Rumsfeld wanted only 60,000 troops in the Iraq invasion. The Pentagon (General Franks) wanted 400,000. 140,000 went into Iraq. At issue was not the number of troops needed to topple the regime, but the number needed to maintain the peace afterwards. In the days before the invasion the Pentagon had declared that the invasion would last mere weeks, not months. However, the Pentagon maintained that “boots” were necessary to maintain the peace.
[edit] Supporting Opinion
Supporters argue that there is no way to prove that results would have been different if more troops were sent. Thus there is no way to actually prove that the doctrine was a huge and tragic mistake. They argue that the war was much more successful than the first Gulf War. They also argue a cost benefit analysis. A million troops (more than twice the number actually requested by the military) could have been sent to Iraq, but would have been extremely costly and would not justify any supposed extra benefit, such as being able to withdraw much sooner, saving lives and maintaining US military credibility. US support in Iraq was to be for the long haul. Therefore, no exit strategy is necessary, any statements about a campaign lasting "weeks, not months" to the contrary. Any public disclosure of such a strategy could potentially be harmful in emboldening insurgency more than it is emboldened under the current approach.
Four years into the Iraq war there had been over 3,000 US military deaths and many more civilian deaths. The Korean and Vietnam conflicts each had well over 50,000 US military deaths along with more civilian deaths. The Korean War lasted around three years. The Vietnam war lasted around fifteen years. Thus the number of US military deaths per year in Iraq is lower than in the Korea or Vietnam conflicts, which were fought with different military and medical technology, against different enemies and in different theaters. By this measure, the Vietnam conflict was considerably more successful than the Korean conflict.
The issue is complicated by other policies such as debaathification, put in place by the same administration that produced the Rumsfeld doctrine. This is perhaps the biggest difference between the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, other than Iraq's oil wealth, its large (if not well-trained) standing army, its ethnic and religious diversity, its geopolitical position, its history and the secular nature of the ousted regime. In Afghanistan the US utilized the existing war lords as opposed to disbanding the official army and giving sectarian militias free reign.
[edit] Opposition Opinion
Opponents argue that the doctrine entails a heavy reliance on airstrikes to replace a lack of ground forces. Beginning with Saddam Hussein, there were at least 50 airstrikes aimed at decapitating the Iraqi leadership. Not a single one was successful. However, there was extensive collateral damage to civilians. [1]
Opponents also claim that without ground troops to secure the border, top Ba'athist regime members fled the country with vast Iraqi funds and foreign insurgents moved into the country. There were not enough troops to defend the Iraqi border from foreign-backed insurgents. This was not as much of a problem in Afghanistan because Soviet hostilities had long ended and Afghanistan benefits from geological border protections.
They also claim that without sufficient troops the country could not be pacified. Without sufficient troops to guard the Iraqi military infrastructure large amounts of munitions were looted. This has led to the current problem of insurgents and their improvised explosive devices (IED)s. Notably, Thomas L. Friedman of the New York Times has referred to the Rumsfeld Doctrine as one of 'just enough troops to lose.'
