Quantal response equilibria

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Quantal response equilibria (QRE) are a game-theoretical formulation. First introduced by Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey in two papers (Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games and Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games), it provides an alternative to Nash equilibria. QREs do not require perfect rationality—instead, players are assumed to make normally distributed errors in their predicted payoff for any mixed equilibria. As the variance on these errors approaches zero, QRE predicts a unique equilibrium that is a Nash equilibrium.

[edit] References

• McKelvey, Richard and Palfrey, Thomas (1998) Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games Games and Economic Behavior
• McKelvey, Richard and Palfrey, Thomas (1998) Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games Experimental Economics

view	Topics in game theory
Definitions	Normal form game · Extensive form game · Cooperative game · Information set · Preference
Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium · Subgame perfection · Bayes-Nash · Trembling hand · Proper equilibrium · Epsilon-equilibrium · Correlated equilibrium · Sequential equilibrium · Quasi-perfect equilibrium · ESS · Risk dominance
Strategies	Dominant strategies · Mixed strategy · Tit for tat · Grim trigger
Classes of games	Symmetric game · Perfect information · Dynamic game · Repeated game · Signaling game · Cheap talk · Zero-sum game · Mechanism design · Stochastic game
Games	Prisoner's dilemma · Coordination game · Chicken · Battle of the sexes · Stag hunt · Matching pennies · Ultimatum game · Minority game · Rock, Paper, Scissors · Pirate game · Dictator game · Public goods game · Nash bargaining game
Theorems	Minimax theorem · Purification theorems · Folk theorem · Revelation principle · Arrow's Theorem
Related topics	Mathematics · Economics · Behavioral economics · Evolutionary game theory · Population genetics · Behavioral ecology · Adaptive dynamics · List of game theorists