Planned invasion of Australia during World War II

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In February 1942, Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had planned the Attack on Pearl Harbor as part of the Japanese strategic planning for the Pacific (1905-1940), proposed an immediate invasion of Australia. This proposal was, however, eventually rejected by the Japanese high command.

Contents

[edit] Diversionary operations and naval interests

Admiral Yamamoto's plan appeared to be a diversionary invasion plan rather than a plan to occupy Australia. He wanted to draw large American forces away from launching attacks on the Japanese island chain far to the north of Australia. Sato was at first part of the planning for some of the invasion proposals that Admiral Yamamoto had suggested but were never approved. Later he developed a new version of the proposal, which he proposed to Japanese High Command.

Different strategic purposes were envisaged for the operation by different people. The proposed operation could be one great diversionary action, replacing the alternative operation of occupying New Caledonia, New Hebrides, West Samoa and the nearby islands, or it could be a suitable operation for making a formal occupation of Australian territory, to bring it under Japanese dependency inside the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere alliance, following the thoughts of Nobuhiro Sato, another Navy theorist.

There was interest in such an operation amongst the Japanese Navy Staff, for possible control of the strategic area, natural and economic resources, taking direct political and military control as in Taiwan or the South Pacific Mandate. An important first step was "Operation Mo", a plan to invade Port Moresby and possibly use it as a springboard in further attacks on Australian territory.

Another alleged proposer and supporter of Yamamoto's Plan of Australian Invasion was Captain (later Admiral) Sadatoshi Tomioka, chief of the plans division in the First Section (Operations) of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, under the lead of Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome. Admiral Osami Nagano, the Chief of the Navy General Staff, was also in favour of the Australian invasion plan.

It was Tomioka who was primarily responsible for the suggestion of Australia as Japan's next major objective. Australia, he argued, could eventually become the "springboard" for a future counter-offensive against Japan. To prevent this it would either have to be brought under Japanese control or if this were not possible at least cut off from the United States. This plan was rejected by Army High Command, allegedly because they did not possess the minimal quantities of forces needed for such an operation, estimated at ten divisions by their strategy experts. Another plan proposed by the Navy around the same time was the Invasion of Ceylon (possibly linked with the Army plan of Indian Invasion); this plan was also rejected by Army Staff. Within the Navy there existed the so-called "Australia-first" school of thought, which defended the importance of such an objective to the Navy and Empire commands as part of political and strategical planning in southern areas; between other supporters and knowers of these naval school of thought stayed the Commander Chuichi Nagumo amongst officers Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya.

General Tomoyuki Yamashita agreed with Yamamoto's Invasion Plan and even volunteered to lead the invasion. However, the plan was opposed by Tojo, as he believed that there were no contingency plans considered.[citation needed]

The Army proper, using its occupation forces in New Guinea (called the "Nineteenth Army"), formed a study unit (the North Australian Region Group inside of "Gohoku Region") to analyze the tactical and strategical issues of an Australian invasion using local knowledge. One of the heads of this group was Takeshi Mori. The same unit also confirmed reports of the strength of Australian forces at the time: 350,000 men (10 divisions), 500 aircraft, reinforced by one to two U. S. Army divisions then arriving, plus New Zealand units.

Faced then with the Army's rejection of an all-out invasion of Australia, the Naval General Staff, was forced back on a less ambitious plan. It involved the isolation of Australia and stoppage of her flow of war material. This was to be done by the gradual extension of Japanese control over the Pacific islands of New Guinea, the Solomons, New Caledonia and Fiji.

[edit] Strategic and tactical lines of Australian invasion

Kenosuke Sato, a Navy theorist, proposed that a large Japanese invasion force of troop transports and warships head south from Japan to make a beach landing halfway between Townsville, Queensland and Brisbane, while other forces landed in Darwin and the northwest area of Western Australia.

Yamamoto petitioned the Japanese General Staff to land two or four Japanese Army divisions on the northern coastline of Australia, which was very poorly defended. They were to follow the north-south railway line to Adelaide, thus dividing Australia into two fronts. When Adelaide had been taken by this first unit, a second force would land on the southeast coast of Australia and drive northwards to Sydney and southwards to Melbourne.[citation needed]

Sato has stated that the Japanese had realized that it would have been too difficult to move a large force south from Darwin and had then decided to attack the Queensland coast midway between Townsville and Brisbane. He indicated that communications were good and the population was sparse in that area.

The city of Brisbane was reportedly the first objective. The Japanese believed that Brisbane could be taken quite quickly with a minimum of cost and resistance.[citation needed]

Sydney was the next objective and was to be attacked by land and amphibious forces. They then planned to move on to Melbourne, but by this time, they anticipated that Australia would have surrendered. Mr. Sato claimed that morale in Australia was low at that time, and that Australian complaints about Britain deserting Australia was evidence of this fact.[citation needed]

[edit] Appointment of Japanese Administrator

Kenosuke Sato was to be appointed civil administrator of the occupied Australian territories after a successful Japanese invasion in 1942.[citation needed] He worked on preparing the political and administrative details with Admiral Kanyei Chuyo, Chief of 8° Unit "Yashika" of the Japanese Navy Intelligence Services, and the Tokyo Bureau (Australian Section) of the Navy intelligence unit.

He indicated that Australians would not have been treated very harshly if they had surrendered. He seemed to know a great many leading Australians and he indicated that he was quite certain a good number of Australians would have agreed to co-operate with the Japanese.[citation needed]

[edit] Australian fears of a Japanese invasion since the 1920s

1942 propoganda poster referring to the threat of Japanese invasion. This poster was criticised for being alarmist when it was released and was banned by the Queensland government.[1]
1942 propoganda poster referring to the threat of Japanese invasion. This poster was criticised for being alarmist when it was released and was banned by the Queensland government.[1]

From the late 1920s, officials in Canberra began to consolidate their perceptions of fear of a Japanese attack.

They suspected that the Japanese migrants in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia were part of a government-organised Japanese expansionist program. The Australian Navy was monitoring the activities of the Japanese in New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies and Thursday Island intensively.[citation needed] Similary Australian officials suspected that Japanese and Chinese fishing boats operating illegally in waters north of Australia had some connection with Japanese espionage. Australian Naval Intelligence collected detailed reports of Japanese poaching in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Ninigo Group, Solomon Islands, and so on.[citation needed]

The Commander of the Royal Australian Navy predicted that, in the event of war, the Japanese armed forces would land somewhere on Cape York Peninsula.[citation needed] A Naval expert pointed out the significance of the Japanese South Pacific Mandate as advanced bases and emphasised the vulnerability of Rabaul, by comparing distances:

In comparison, the significance of the Japanese South Pacific Mandate, which could be used by the Japanese as an intermediate base to the Australian Mandated Islands is not generally realised. The distance from Truk in the Caroline Islands to Rabaul is only a matter of 800 miles.

During the late years of the 1930s Australians became even more fearful of invasion. The Prime Minister's Department studied the Japanese southward advancement policy and monitored the entry of agents from Japanese companies in New Guinea.[citation needed] In particular they were concerned when the giant Zaibatsu Nippon Mining Co. sent a geologist to investigate the Copper ore deposit in Nakanai district on the north-west coast of New Britain in 1937 and when the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha (South Seas Company) sent four Japanese experts to research the Goldfields at Wau in 1939.

Additionally the prominent Japanese merchant Y.Nishimura, who died during questioning at the police department in Rabaul, was accused of espionage. Another Japanese merchant was also interrogated and deported while some documents were seized. This prompted rumours about a large Japanese spy net operating in the area.

The Nanyo Boeki Kaisha sent trade envoys to Samarai and Port Moresby in 1939, and presented Japanese films about industry and tourist attractions. The Pacific Island Monthly reported that "In spite of wars and the echoes of wars and the manifest distrust of all British communities in the Central and South Pacific, the Japanese with their program of commercial penetration, part of own campaign to secure domination of the Pacific."[citation needed]

In June 1937, the Australian Navy patrol boat "Larrakia", illegally seized and took possession of the Japanese fishing vessel "New Guinea Maru", in the Arafura Sea, and imprisoned the captain and crew. The Japanese appealed to the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory which ordered the Australian Government to pay compensation.[citation needed]

Another incident occurred when the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha purchased the steamer "Papua Chief", which was wrecked and lying on a reef near Port Moresby, and sent a Japanese crew to salvage it. The entry of the crew to Port Moresby was granted in July 1941 but the Australian Department of Defence strongly objected, insisting that: "The view of the Department of Defence is that it is undesirable to have the Japanese at Port Moresby, particularly having regard to the movement of troops and other defence measures now taking place." However the Department of Foreign Affairs permitted the Japanese crew to stay in Port Moresby for a limited time.[citation needed]

[edit] Opposition to Invasion

Ultimately, Tojo opposed the plan and recommended that Emperor Hirohito reject it. In particular, Tojo was more interested in using forces in others operations in Mainland Asia such as "Operation Otsu" or "KANTOKUEN" Plan, the Japanese invasion of the Soviet Far East and Siberia, against Russians; "Szechwan Invasion", the planned destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek government, with the defeat of the Chinese Army in Sichuan allowing a definitive occupation of China; or "Plan 21", the Japanese invasion of British India along with Indian nationalist forces under the command of Subash Chandra Bose.

Tojo was concerned that the Japanese transport and merchant fleets were extended to their limits and the Americans could readily divert their B-17 Flying Fortress bombers to Sydney to destroy the invading forces. In the last interview he gave before his execution on 23 December 1948 Tojo insisted that Japan had no plans for the physical invasion of Australia or New Zealand. In a statement he said in reply to a specific question regarding any contemplated invasion of New Zealand and Australia:

We never had enough troops to do so. We had already far over-stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion - no, at no time.[1]

This "Australia first" Navy plan was rejected by the Army even more quickly than Kuroshima's proposed Invasion of Ceylon. Ten combat divisions was the minimum required for the Australian operation and the Army High Command emphatically declared that it could not spare them. The truth was that the Japanese Army generals were not interested in any of these plans. They knew that Germany was planning a major offensive in the Caucasus and they were confident of a Wehrmacht victory there. When this had been achieved, they wanted to be ready to stab their ancient enemy Russia in the back.[citation needed] For this reason they were holding large forces in reserve which could be hurled across the Soviet Union's Siberian border. In any event it was abundantly clear that the Army did not want to commit substantial forces to the southeast area and would have no part of an attempt to invade Australia.[citation needed]

Hirohito decided to delay the invasion plan until Japanese forces had taken Burma and joined forces with the Indian Nationalists forces. The fate of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway ensured the ambitious Japanese Navy Invasion Plan for Australia was finally abandoned.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Typed copies of this statement were submitted to Japanese Prime Minister Tojo and his defending solicitor, an American, Mr George Blewett, and approved by them both. (Footnote 9) Gill, G Hermon [1957]. "Chapter 17 - Prelude to Victory", Official Histories – Second World War; Volume I – Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942 (1st edition, 1957) (pdf), online, Australian War Memorial, p. 643. Retrieved on 2006-11-06. 
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