Peremptory challenge
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Peremptory challenge usually refers to a right in jury selection for the defense and prosecution to reject a certain number of potential jurors who appear to have an unfavorable bias without having to give any reason. Other potential jurors may be challenged for cause, i.e. by giving a reason why they might be unable to reach a fair verdict.
The idea behind peremptory challenges is that the as both parties have contributed in the configuration of the jury, they will find its verdict more acceptable.
The use of peremptory challenges is controversial as it has been used to undermine the balanced representation on a jury which would occur using random selection. Despite this, it still remains in use in several jurisdictions and in some cases leads to extensive and expensive jury research, aimed at producing a favorable jury.
Most jurisdictions do not use the Voir dire system to the controversial extent that it is used in the United States which enables counsels to examine potential jurors. Therefore, peremptory challenges are largely based on hunches of how a juror may vote. These hunches are usually due to the stereotypes given to people of different occupations, socio-economic backgrounds, and ethnicity. This use of stereotyping in the configuration of a jury could result in some groups being challenged more than others, going against the principle that a jury is a uniform sample of the community.
Contents |
[edit] Australia
All Australian states allow for peremptory challenges in jury selection; however, the number of challenges granted to the counsels in each state are not all the same.
see,Jury Trials in Australia for details
[edit] England
Peremptory challenges were first used in England not many years after the Magna Carta of 1215 was signed allowing jury trials. When the concept was first introduced into the jury system, the maximum number of peremptory challenges allowed was thirty-five. As time went on, this number reduced, and by the year 1509 the maximum number of peremptory challenges was twenty. By 1977, the amount of peremptory challenges granted to each side was reduced from seven to three. The right of peremptory challenge was abolished altogether by The Criminal Justice Act 1988,[1] which saw it as an erosion of the principle of random selection, and felt that its removal would “increase the fairness of the jury system”.
[edit] New Zealand
Each party is entitled to six peremptory challenges in New Zealand, and where there are two or more accused the prosecution is provided with a maximum of twelve.
[edit] Northern Ireland
Unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, peremptory challenge is still used in Northern Ireland. The Juries (Northern Ireland) Order 1996[2] entitles each party to a maximum of six peremptory challenges in civil cases. In criminal cases, each defendant is entitled to a maximum of twelve peremptory challenges; however, the prosecution is only allowed to challenge for cause.
[edit] Other
Another form of the peremptory challenge (or peremptory disqualification), available in some jurisdictions, is the right to remove a judge assigned to hear the case without showing that the judge is actually biased or had a conflict of interest. While actual determination of a judge's bias is not required to employ the peremptory challenge, the moving party must still allege bias under oath. In jurisdictions that have this form of peremptory challenge, it generally may only be used once per party per case. (see, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §170.6)
[edit] United States of America
All jurisdictions in the United States have some form of peremptory challenges. In the United States, the use of peremptory challenges by criminal prosecutors to remove persons from a cognizable group (i.e., of one race, ethnicity, or gender) based on that group characteristic has been ruled to be unconstitutional in Batson v. Kentucky, . "Batson challenge" is a term now used to refer to the act of arguing for the invalidity of a trial on the basis that peremptory challenges during jury selection resulted in the exclusion of a cognizable group.
Batson's authority has also recently been reinforced in a pair of 2005 decisions, Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005) and Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2005).
