Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Articles for deletion This article was nominated for deletion on November 1, 2005. The result of the discussion was keep.

— JIP | Talk 20:27, 6 November 2005 (UTC)


--- Please add comments at the end, or at the end of the relevant section, and sign them with 4 '~' in a row. Thanks. ---

Man to all conspiracy nuts, just answer me: Why the fuck ths US needed a enourmous catastrophe like that? Just for a Cause to go to WAR and mobilize the masses? If i knew that japan will attack, and has mobilised its whole fleet, i can be prepared and still have a reasonable cause to go to war...

This article contains no discussion about why only obsolete old ships were in port at the time of the attack, while the valuable new aircraft carriers happened to be at sea. It's not good enough to say that they were only thought of as being useful for reconnaisance. The aircraft on them were fitted with guns and bombs - wheras reconnaisance aircraft would mainly need to fly economically. Does anyone know why the aircraft carriers were not in port on 7-Dec-41, please? --New Thought 16:29, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

"One rationale here, of many, relates to the on-going effort to bolster the B-17 fleet in the Philippines as a strategic force against Japan. See in Layton's text an insert of a chart showing the RoA (i.e., radius of action) of the B-17 C&Ds (as well as the B-24 C&Ds and the very "short-legged" B-18A). The carriers were used to place aircraft at Wake and Midway, those to act of air cover as the B-17s were being ferried during their hops to the Philippines. Of course, that is just one rendition of the story ... there are many others. -jamaksin"

I believe I can answer. Hopefully this site will help http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/ "An intersting site with much good material.

(However, a real bastion of objectivity for many, and not so for many others. -jamaksin")

Pure dumb luck. Fears of Japanese attacks on Midway & Wake →reinforcement transported by CV→no CVs in harbor. And Sara was under refit, ditto. This isn't in dispute. (I haven't seen the "escort B-17s" argument before, but I haven't read Layton, either...) Trekphiler 10:59, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

And you wonder why your comments were removed by the mods?(SS)

205.188.116.73 (AKA Jamaskin) please don't vandalize ("viz., Using exact references to make needed corrections to obvious errors of omission and bias - jamaksin") the page anymore and keep your comments here. Also please show me a copy of pg 111 from the NA. The doc that starts out "Station H November, 1941. Naval Movement reports...

If you can post any errors here, I would be happy to read them. (SS)

"Two specific citations - both within the public domain were provided in full - to this query and were posted as such. Along with those was a note regarding call sign HA N 8, also of 28 Nov. As these citations and note have been removed, I cannot help you. -jamaksin"

Put them here because my copy states: 28 Nov (Call) HA N 8 (Identification) (Blank) (Indicator) Code movement (Position) (Blank) (Time) 0810 (Sheet) 94069 I posted a copy here As you can see there are no handwritten comments on the original document in the code movement for call sign RU SI 8. Nor is there any comments written under HA N 8.


(SS)

Contents

[edit] Breaks

I added a bit on "such breaks as existed". Holmes & Blair (& I think Kahn) mention them; evidently, they were only into the additive table. This would be important in the ultimate reading of JN-25B, but I'm not qualified to say (tho the article should!) how the additive table breaks assisted. Trekphiler 11:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Germans

What is the fascination with the Germans? Kuhn was a poseur & Popov was a double; Prange deals with them in exhaustive detail, & dismisses them as significant. Trekphiler 11:19, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Sabotage

I deleted & rewrote this:

"In addition, Short had sent coded messages to Washington that, when decoded, said he was making preparations for a possible attack. With Washington thinking Short was understanding the situation there was no need to risk breaking security by being more blunt in the warnings. However, Short had changed his code words without informing Washington; or, as it now known, General Short did in fact notify Washington what his specific alert was, as is on the record with the signature of General Gerow and others, and they did not disabuse that with any specific changes to Short's Alert Level. Therefore, his messages that indicated he was preparing for a possible attack were meant to say he was preparing to guard against only sabotage which Washington accepted without any change."

As it is, it isn't clear, & his alert level wasn't the issue. Moreover, his instructions were to expect sabotage, not air attack. Trekphiler 11:42, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Sorry about the delay in reply. I've only just noticed this comment. I think the point here is that had Washington understood Short's changes in the meaning of his report ("I have instituted alert level 3"), there might have been more understanding in DC that Short wasn't preparing for an actual attack, but was thinking sabotage. In short, part of the problem is that what Short was reporting wasn't what DC thought he was doing. And some of htat was due to the redefinition of the meaning of alert level designations. And that was due to Short's innitiative in changing them. ww 16:09, 11 August 2006 (UTC)
Sorry about the delay in reply. (I've just come back to this page...). I wasn't aware Short had changed his codewords or alert ratings, so maybe I sounded stupid; as rewritten since I posted, it's clearer & more accurate. I did intend to make the point DC didn't correct him; now I see why not. Nevertheless, I can't help think any error falls on DC as the senior command; if they didn't know, they should have. Trekphiler 10:22, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Windy

Evidence of a "winds execute" is so flimsy, & the "winds" issue adds so little, IMHO it should be deleted. Trekphiler 12:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Technical Assistance

I deleted this:

"Page 81, left-column has the text " ... Nevertheless some wireless communication had to take place, for it would be folly to expect the voyage for this armada of ships to co-ordinate without it. Short wave signals from Japan could be picked up by the larger ships but not the small craft - more especially the low-lying submarines - this was impossible, because of their aerials and the curvature of the earth. To solve this problem Nagumo's radio technicians had to resort to a subterfuge. High frequency (short wave) signals, picked up by one of the carriers, were re-transmitted simultaneously on a low frequency [sic longwave]. These short range signals the smaller ships could intercept, and the hoax worked almost perfectly because none of the US monitoring stations was looking for a Japanese signal in the low frequency band. However, ..." [Release of the classified CV AKAGI source materials would be very helpful here.]"

This is as mistaken as the belief of Lurline's radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. Under radio silence, navies resort to older techniques, developed & used for decades before radio, blinker light & morse; when these are inappropriate, flag & semaphore, in use for over 200yr, are available. Trekphiler 12:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII

[edit] Quote from the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate article

James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII (Summit, 1991) which posits that while the Americans couldn't read the Japanese naval code (JN-25), the British could, and Churchill deliberately withheld warning because the UK needed US help. Sir Nave was an Australian cryptographer whose diaries were used in writing this book; he later distanced himself from its content. A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time. The information shown in the Appendix is of interest to note, especially a true copy of SRN-116741.

[edit] Requests

I think we should provide references substanciating the above mentioned claims :

  • If the sentence : he later distanced himself from its content (diff) is true, we should know when this distanciation was made, and in which publication this distanciation was made if it was ever made.
  • If the sentence : A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time (diff) is true, we should know who, (when, in which publication) made the check.--Teofilo talk 14:09, 3 January 2006 (UTC)

Explain your edits better here jamaskin. I believe some of your information would improve this artcile, however its filled with wild speculation, jargon errors, non encyclopedic edits, and info. some that already has been addressed. Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV_tutorial#Accusations

I also agree that some clean up is needed within this article.

[edit] " All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures for their situations."

What about the B 17s being caught on the ground un-camouflaged on Clark Field, well after Pearl Harbor? What about the dive bomber pilots in the Philippines without their airplanes? What about canceling the plan to stock food and other supplies on the Bataan Peninsula?

The ticky-tacky response is that Phillipines wasn't Federalized until after MacArthur made most of his monumental misjudgements and too late to repair them before the Japanese arrived on a roll. More substantially, MacArthur was at least thinking, though deranged thinking, about a land invasion by the Japanese, and making preparations, though wrongfooted ones. Pearl Harbor didn't even take that much precaustion against an attack -- no torpedo nets, minimal long distance partolling by the B-17 and PBYs they actually had, thought that wasn't enough to manage an all directions, continuous surveillance, actually ready anti-aircraft guns (ammunition was in locked sotage when the attack began!!), failure to get the radar stations in actual operation as opposed to training mode (where they had long been) or to get the early warning center at Pearl (where Lt Tyler was) actually operational, etc, etc
As for the mismanagement in Phil of those planes, leading to their total loss, it clearly wasn't due to any plot from Washington to deprive MacArthur of information. Those planes were hit about 9 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. There was pleanty of warning time to do something more effective than burn on the runway.
Guam, Wake, the Canal, etc all took seriously the late Nov warnings and would not have cuaght so flatfooted as was Pearl. Smashed to be sure, but at least they were awake enough to notice the attack before the planes came around the mountains on their attack runs. There was more disdain for what they'd been warned about in Pearl (on all sides) than would have been acceptable to me had I been Marshall or Knox or Roosevelt. ww 00:54, 23 March 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Split

Article seems to get a bit long, should i split it out? --Striver 18:41, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

It'd be better to trim it it if it's too long. I don't see a logical split. -Will Beback 21:50, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
Please read Wikipedia:How to break up a page--Striver 22:57, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
I see now that you put a split marker above the bilbiography. I still believe that this article has too much casual writing, is too-weaselly, and would benefit by shortening.
For example:
  • Another point brought up in the debate is the fact that neither Admiral Kimmel or General Short ever faced court martial. It is suggested that in order to do so the military would have had to release information they did not want to see the light of day.
Who brings up this point? Who suggests?
  • However this is much more likely (or perhaps not) to be part of the radio deception program to mislead enemy intelligence into believing that the units and commands of the Kido Butai were continuing to exercise off Kyushu and the Western Inland Sea.
How do we know what is more likely (or not)?
-Will Beback 23:18, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

The first example is about verifiablity, and it can be fixed. The second example is pov and need to be qualified in order to be npov, "x states that y is probable" instead of "y is probable". I have not read the entire artilce, im a new-bee in this topic and dont know more than i have listened on some interviews. However, i like the topic. In any case, does that mean that we should not break that part out? --Striver 23:22, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Splitting out the bibliography would mean removing the sources, and I don't see how that would help. -Will Beback 23:33, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
ok. --Striver 23:40, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Why is there no mention of this documented note ?

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Warning of an Attack on Pearl Harbor, 27 January 1941

[Telegram: Paraphrase]

TOKYO, January 27, 1941-6 p.m. [Received January 27-6: 38 a.m.]

125. A member of the Embassy was told by my ------- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

GREW


Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 617-618

The note was mentioned in the discussion of intelligence about the attack at Attack on Pearl Harbor. It is not now thought, nor was it then, to have been 'real'. And in fact, given the timing, it was almost certainly not as Yamamoto had only just begun to consider it. No planning, even preliminary, was underway at the time, if memory serves. If it reflected a real proposal, it was not the one which actually resulted in 7.12.41. This was one of several reports which suggested such a thing. None came with sufficient evidence that they compelled belief. ww 21:33, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Proposal to split out bibliography?

This article was split from attack on Pearl Harbor sometime ago, and has rather grown since then. The bibliography has also grown, though it remains unsatisfactory as of now. Splitting it out would force a reader interested in the subject to chase down three articles, before even getting to any of the original sources. I don't think we've so much of a problem with the article as it stands that it makes much sense to force the reader to those lengths, despite a longish article. It will make no difference to WP hardware/software, and will not unduly increase load time over even a slow Net connection (this article is essentially all text). I see no reason to bother, and a couple not to.

It would be a little neater though, evening off article lengths a little. ww 05:23, 2 July 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Intresting article

Here is a intresting article on US Gov using Problem-reaction-solution: [1]. --Striver 20:27, 7 August 2006 (UTC)


[edit] article is getting well out of hand

I've been a contributor to both this and the main Attack article for some years now. So this observation comes from a longish perspective.

This article is now so sloppy that it is an Wikimbarrassment. Editors have been adding snippets of entirely opaque evidence to paragraphs which attempt to summarize current understanding of <whatever>. This is simply bad writing, aside from content problems. And there is much similar stuff.

WP articles are not places to list raw evidence for or against. To the extent WP is a place for raw evidence at all, it is the Talk pages which are. WP articles should summarize the state of knowledge about this or that topic, NPOVishly. In this case, that knowledge includes the facts that there are many arguments in favor of (one or another sort of conspiracy), that essentially all are controversial, that most are supported by some (also controversial) evidence, and all by much (also controversial) speculation. That's fair enough to note in a well-written and well-organized way in a WP article, but embedding the reader in a tarball of entirely opaque references to evidentiary bits (which are not themselves presented) is not. And, the bibliography is contaminated by allegations of bias and incompetence, again without much in the way of evidence.

In short, this article is likely inevitably to be the resultant of pushing and pulling of dispute about events and intents, and so somewhat clangerous, but it has now reached a stage of dissolution and failure to meet WP standards that is rapidly approaching (if not already passed) so low a quality as to suggest its deletion.

Comments from other editors, please? ww 16:01, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

>> I agree this article is an embarassment. I was going to attempt to clean it up some but I think there is no way to do that without junking half of it and starting over. The Attack on Pearl Harbor United States preparedness section covers most of the relevant material and is better written, sourced, and wikified. The only value I see in this link is a separate discussion of the various inquiries that followed the attacks, and possibly a discussion of the conspiracy theories that have been written. For the latter, the model might be a similar article on Kennedy assassination theories? I think the article can be saved though...a discussion of the conspiracy theories are worthwhile if only because so much has been written on them to date, much like the Kennedy assassination. ppfleiger 19:13, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Please don't delete this article. Otherwise all the conspiracy stuff would end up in the main Pearl Harbor article. -Will Beback 20:50, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
I came to thsi article today knowing nothing about it (except perhaps watching one TV documentary). Although it is a bit disorganised and in need of tidying up, I found it informative.Billlion 14:20, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Its got some good stuff. However one person "jamaskin" is putting in unsupporting, wild and incorrect information. If anyone has questions as to why I remove his materical let me know. I'd be glad to discuss.

It's got some excellent stuff. I've been reading in this area for 25yrs, & I learned things. Trekphiler 10:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Talking head

Just some assorted comments. I added this:

"(This was in part due to fears of compromise as a result of poor security, after decrypts were found in a wastebasket.[citation needed])

I've seen it in a couple of places, but I can't cite a source offhand. Can somebody? I also added this:

"In Short's defense, it should be noted he had training responsibilites to meet, and the best patrol aircraft, B-17s and B-24s, were in demand in the Philippines and Britain, both of which had higher priority."

and this:

"(The third, Saratoga, was in routine refit in Puget Sound.)"

Also, re. Lyttelton's comment, except for his remark, "Japan was provoked into attacking", he has the situation exactly right. Take a look at what FDR was doing in the Atlantic. There was plenty of casus belli to go around for Germany or Congress to declare war; neither was willing. Trekphiler 10:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

The assorted attacks on US vessels were on the high seas, and IIRC, not a result of a deliberate policy to start a war. FDR did take numerious actions which were decidely not even handed (Lend-Lease, the takeover of convoy escorting in the Western half of the N Atlantic, etc). US personnel were killed an ssin[ps sunk by the Germans and FDR refrained from asking for a declaration. I think the causus belli were not from the British, the other nation active inthe N Atlantic, but from the Germans. And that FDR didn;t go to war over such incidents speaks to a reluctance to do so, not a devious plat to find a way to do so. ww 22:05, 13 February 2007 (UTC)
I have to disagree. "[T]akeover of convoy escorting in the Western half of the N Atlantic" is most certainly not an act of a neutral. Neither is the order to report U-boats to RN escorts. An order to shoot U-boats on sight is definitely not. (That alone was casus belli, had Hitler chosen.) As for German actions, shooting 1 USN DD (Reuben James?) & sinking another (Greer?) (I always get them switcthed...), is casus belli, had Congress chosen. I suspect FDR didn't ask for a declaration because there wasn't enough public (or political) outcry over Reuben James & Greer (which makes nonsense of the oft-repeated fiction of Lusitania, no?), or maybe he was hoping Hitler'd do it for him. Either way, keeping Japan peaceful was crucial, which is why the orders to all Pacific commands were full of "let Japan make the first overt act" instructions (which the conspiracy loons take as evidence of conspiracy, rather than an effort to avoid war...). Trekphiler 08:18, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
To clarify, I believe it was, if not a concerted plan, certainly a concerted effort by FDR to give Britain maximum aid, & to fulfill his promise come into the war; my guess is, FDR understood that would be the best thing he could do, per WW1. In the event, he was proven right; Hitler (& McCollum) saw that, too. Too bad the conspiracy nuts can't see it. Trekphiler 05:52, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

Some more stuff. I deleted "Corregidor" because I'm unclear it was on Corregidor at the time in question, & it'd been in Cavite for years before that. If somebody's sure of the location at that date, put it back. I rewrote

"If she had been directed to investigate the source of the planes"

to

"If she had been correctly directed to the source of the planes,

The Kido Butai had been picked up by DF; Holmes notes, due to an inability to distiguish reciprocal bearings, common to DF at the time, Halsey was sent the wrong way. Trekphiler 05:52, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

After your comment here, I'm not sure we disagree at all. Very confusing. As for Cavite / Corregidor, Station CAST started out at the Navy Yard and was moved to Corregidor during the retreat. It stayed there until evacuated by submarine after pushing the equipment they couldn't take with them into the bay. It's a famous account. CAST personell ended up in Australia as part of the Combined Bureau under MacArthur. It was they who got the soggy sheets found in the buried trunk at Sio New Guinea. Major break into Japanese army crypto systems. Hilarious description of that as well, with sheets hanging from stings all over the Bureau offices as they tried to dry them out. ww 21:08, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

s

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org../../../p/e/a/Talk%7EPearl_Harbor_advance-knowledge_debate_732d.html"